Capacity effects and winner fund performance: the relevance and interactions of fund size and family characteristics

This study analyzes the existence of capacity effects and performance persistence for US equity mutual funds for the period from 1992 to 2007. We focus on winner funds and distinguish between capacity effects from both size and inflows and explore their interactions with two measures of family size, i.e. family total net assets under management (family TNA) and the number of funds at the family level (family breadth). The differentiation of family size allows us to analyze competing effects at the family level such as economies of scale as well as organizational complexity costs and conflicts of interest. Our empirical results confirm diseconomies of scale at the winner fund level and indicate that only small winner funds with low inflows significantly outperform the four-factor benchmark on a net return basis. There are no universal benefits from economies of scale at the family level, but our findings suggest the existence of conflicts of interest in families offering a relatively large number of funds. Small winner funds in families offering a small number of funds significantly outperform while economies of scale only materialize among extremely small winner funds. We provide detailed robustness checks for our empirical results. Overall, simply conditioning on fund size is not sufficient for selecting future outperforming funds. The results indicate that fund investors may earn positive abnormal returns when combining information on fund size with information on fund flows or fund family affiliations in their asset allocation decisions.     

International Real Estate Mutual Fund Performance: Diversification or Costly Information?

We investigate the net effect between diversification benefit and information cost of international real estate mutual funds from three dimensions: whether investors can benefit from investing in international real estate mutual funds, whether managers of international real estate mutual funds possess superior market knowledge and timing abilities, and whether investors are motivated by returns or diversification. Our findings are threefold. First, the results show that international real estate mutual funds perform better and are less risky than domestic real estate mutual funds before Jun 2007. That is, diversification benefits outweigh the information costs, and investors therefore gain from investing in international real estate mutual funds. However, the benefit is reduced because of the economic shock of sub-prime financial crisis. Second, on average, neither international mutual fund managers nor domestic mutual fund managers possess market timing abilities. Finally, we find that fund flows are driven by investors’ return-chasing behaviors and fund size, but not by diversification purpose.     

UNDERWRITER REPUTATION AND AFTERMARKET PERFORMANCE OF CLOSED‐END FUNDS

I find a positive relation between underwriter reputation and the initial and long‐run aftermarket performance of closed‐end funds. This relation persists even after controlling for fund characteristics, types, and investment strategies. The positive relation between underwriter reputation and initial returns supports the notion that prestigious investment bankers tend to promote a price run‐up in the immediate aftermarket to enhance their reputation with the issuers and the investors. The better long‐run performance for funds underwritten by prestigious underwriters suggests that prestigious underwriters protect their reputation by underwriting only high‐quality issues that will perform well in the long run.     

Fund Manager Allocation

We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way.     

Inexperienced investors and bubbles

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers’ investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers’ actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.     

Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds

We study how incentive fees and manager’s own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund’s investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager’s own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.     

Tax Calendar Effects in the Municipal Bond Market: Tax‐Loss Selling and Cherry Picking by Investors and Market Timing by Fund Managers

Examining municipal bond returns, bond fund flows and buying activities by fund managers over the period 1990–2009, we find evidence of tax calendar‐related rational opportunistic trading patterns by fund investors and fund managers. Specifically, fund shareholders conduct tax‐loss selling in December and re‐invest in January. In April, June, and September, fund investors rationally cherry pick to sell their shares of short‐term bond funds instead of their shares of long‐term bond funds to raise cash to pay estimated taxes. Unlike fund shareholders, fund managers adopt a contrarian strategy of buying in December and selling in January.     

Is ethical money financially smart? Nonfinancial attributes and money flows of socially responsible investment funds

We study the money flows into and out of socially responsible investment (SRI) funds around the world. In their investment decisions, investors in SRI funds may be more concerned with ethical or social issues than with fund performance. Therefore, SRI money flows are less related to past fund returns. Ethical money is less sensitive to past negative returns than are conventional fund flows, especially when SRI funds primarily use negative or Sin/Ethical screens. Social attributes of SRI funds weaken the relation between money inflows and past positive returns. However, money flows into funds with environmental screens are more sensitive to past positive returns than are conventional fund flows. Stock picking based on in-house SRI research increases the money flows. These results give evidence on the role of nonfinancial attributes, which induce heterogeneity of investor clienteles within SRI funds. We find no evidence of a smart money effect, as the funds that receive more inflows neither outperform nor underperform their benchmarks or conventional funds.     

Style chasing by hedge fund investors

This paper examines whether investors chase hedge fund investment styles. We find that better-performing and more popular styles are rewarded with higher inflows in subsequent periods. This indicates that investors compare hedge fund styles in terms of recent performance and popularity, and they subsequently reallocate funds from less successful to more successful styles. Furthermore, we find evidence of competition between individual hedge funds of the same style. Funds outperforming the other funds in their styles and funds whose inflows exceed the average flows in their styles experience higher inflows in subsequent periods. One of the reasons for competition among same-style funds is investors’ search for the best managers. The high minimum investment required to invest in a hedge fund limits investors’ diversification opportunities and makes this search particularly important. Finally, we show that hedge fund investors’ implementation of style chasing in combination with intra-style fund selection represents a smart strategy.     

When should firms share credit with employees? Evidence from anonymously managed mutual funds

We study the choice between named and anonymous mutual fund managers. We argue that fund families weigh the benefits of naming managers against the cost associated with their increased future bargaining power. Named managers receive more media mentions, have greater inflows, and suffer less return diversion due to within family cross-subsidization, but departures of named managers reduce net flows. Naming managers became less common between 1993 and 2004. This was especially true in the asset classes and cities most affected by the hedge fund boom, which increased outside opportunities for, and the cost of retaining, successful named managers.     

Closing and cloning in open-end mutual funds

Using a unique dataset, we document that only those closed funds for which no new fund is subsequently launched continuously deliver positive abnormal returns. This suggests the existence of an optimal fund scale. In spite of the potential diseconomies of scale, a non-trivial proportion of closed funds have new funds cloned—the scale motive would not be a complete explanation for the closure. When managers of closed funds clone new funds, they receive greater public attention and thus can attract more fund flows and charge higher fees. Furthermore, better-performing closed fund managers attract more fund flows to their new siblings, making the closure an effective mechanism to extract economic rents. Overall, we find that closing and cloning is an attractive strategy for funds seeking to increase their management fees and funds with more managers in place. Aspects of the closed fund family also affect the launch decision of new siblings.     

Information spillovers and performance persistence for hedge funds

We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004), the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition if informed investors were to partner with non-incumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.     

THE PERFORMANCE OF BANK‐MANAGED MUTUAL FUNDS

The ability of banks to offer proprietary mutual funds has expanded over recent years, and the mutual fund industry has been a significant growth area for banks. I examine the growth and performance of bank proprietary bond mutual funds. The empirical results show no evidence that bank‐managed mutual funds underperform nonbank funds. I find some evidence that bank managers are more conservative than nonbank managers in terms of investment strategy and that banks appear more likely to target individual rather than institutional investors. Also, I find that abnormal fund performance does not appear to be a significant determinant of the net asset flows into and out of bank‐managed mutual funds. Rather, the results suggest bank investors rely mainly on past marketing information and the general reputation of the bank. JEL classification: G11, G21     

What Drives ETF Flows?

The value of exchange traded fund (ETF) assets has increased from $66 billion in 2000 to almost a trillion dollars in 2010. We use this massive expansion in ETF assets to study what drives ETF flows. Using a data set of over 500 ETFs from 2001 to 2010, we show that ETF investors chase returns in the same way as mutual fund investors. While there is an active debate about whether return chasing by mutual fund investors represents the pursuit of superior talent, the existence of return chasing in this passively managed environment should not represent a search for skilled managers. We also show that ETF flows increase following high volume, small spreads, and high price/net asset value ratios. Finally, we find little evidence of superior market timing in ETF flows. Our results suggest that return chasing in both mutual funds and ETFs is more likely the result of naïve extrapolation bias on the part of investors that has contributed to the growth of the ETF industry.     

INVESTOR REACTION TO MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM UK DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS

Existing work on the flow–performance relation in mutual funds focuses on the average U.S. investor, obscuring the contributions of different clienteles. We analyze UK data on monthly fund sales and purchases made via seven distinct distribution channels. We show that there exist marked differences in the reaction to fund performance between different types of retail and institutional investors. These differences can be understood by considering the incentives of parties involved in each channel. Our analysis indicates that the well‐documented aggregate net flow–performance convexity in mutual funds is driven by the extreme reaction of retail inflows to favorable performance, particularly from independently advised investors.     

International fund investment and local market returns

International fund investment in bonds and equities is characterized by a positive association between current net inflows and contemporaneous and past market returns: positive-feedback trading, while being possibly profitable for international fund investors, could be destabilizing for the underlying markets. Allowing for interactions between equity investment and bond investment, our panel vector autoregression shows that past equity returns contain useful information in forecasting equity and bond flows and that bond flows impact future equity returns positively.     

Bank affiliation and mutual funds’ trading strategy distinctiveness

This study investigates the effect of commercial bank affiliation on mutual fund trading strategy distinctiveness. We find that bank affiliation has a significantly positive relationship with mutual funds’ unique investment strategies, and this phenomenon exhibits better performance, supporting the benefits of bank affiliation. This association is most pronounced around macroeconomic releases, during high economic policy uncertainty periods, and among funds located within a close distance from their parent bank headquarters. Further analysis indicates that the more talented affiliated fund managers tend to pursue the distinctive strategy. Therefore, our evidence reveals that the underlying mechanisms are that affiliated funds own information advantages or hire more skilled fund managers due to the unique position of commercial banks in the economy. Finally, our results suggest that affiliated funds with a higher Strategy Distinctiveness Index attract stronger net inflows and are less exposed to risks. Our findings remain unchanged after several robustness tests.     

Investors Do Respond to Poor Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from Inflows and Outflows

We examine the relation between mutual fund performance and gross flows for a large sample of actively managed U.S. mutual funds. Unlike previous studies that have only examined periods of generally increasing net flows, our sample includes periods of both increasing and decreasing net flows. We find that outflows are related to performance, with investors withdrawing money from poor performers. We also find that outflows and inflows respond asymmetrically to performance, outflows increase more aggressively following poor performance, and inflows increase more aggressively following good performance. Additionally, we find a symmetric performance net flow relation.     

Share restrictions and asset pricing: Evidence from the hedge fund industry

This paper presents evidence on the relation between hedge fund returns and restrictions imposed by funds that limit the liquidity of fund investors. The excess returns of funds with lockup restrictions are approximately 4–7% per year higher than those of nonlockup funds. The average alpha of all funds is negative or insignificant after controlling for lockups and other share restrictions. Also, a negative relation is found between share restrictions and the liquidity of the fund's portfolio. This suggests that share restrictions allow funds to efficiently manage illiquid assets, and these benefits are captured by investors as a share illiquidity premium.     

Do Female Mutual Fund Managers Manage Differently?

We examine the performance and investment behavior of female fixed‐income mutual fund managers compared with male fixed‐income mutual fund managers. We find that male‐ and female‐managed funds do not differ significantly in terms of performance, risk, and other fund characteristics. Our results suggest that differences in investment behavior often attributed to gender may be related to investment knowledge and wealth constraints. Despite the similarities between male and female managers, we find evidence that gender influences the decision making of mutual fund investors. We find that the net asset flows into funds managed by females are lower than for males, especially for the manager's initial year managing the fund.