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1.
中国铁路运输供需缺口及相关产业组织政策分析   总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4  
铁路运输的供需受经济发展水平、工业化进程、人均收入等诸多因素的影响。中国目前受各种因素影响,铁路运输供需缺口较大。根据实证分析测算,中国目前铁路货运供需缺口率为35.74%,客运供需缺口率为43.09%。导致铁路运输供需缺口长期存在的原因主要是铁路运输企业目标错位,定价机制失效,投资机制扭曲,行业进入壁垒较高等。从根本上解决铁路运输供需缺口问题需要大力推进制度建设和体制改革,包括实施“网运分离”,理顺价格机制;实行激励性规制,消除行政垄断;完善投资体制,促进行业内与行业间的有效竞争等。  相似文献   

2.
李晓菲 《商用汽车新闻》2014,(22):F0001-F0001
在近两年的公路客车市场,“公铁竞争”是提及率颇高的一个词儿,然而,公铁竞争究竟残酷到了怎样的地步?或许从当前客车市场的变化中可窥其一二。高铁时代的到来,使得铁路、公路、航空三分天下的客运结构出现变动,对于道路客运而言,高铁的强势来袭大大压缩了公路客运的生存空间,客运结构的调整带来了用车需求的变化。  相似文献   

3.
本文采用协整技术研究中国煤炭需求的长期均衡关系,估计出中国煤炭需求的长期收入弹性、价格弹性、结构弹性以及运输成本弹性;预测未来长期煤炭需求并分析其对环境、煤炭供给和煤炭价格的影响;模拟解释变量不同增长率下煤炭需求的演变并给出政策选择。中国高速经济增长是煤炭需求增长的主要原因。GDP是引导煤炭需求的原因,但煤炭需求不是引导GDP增长的原因,这也说明了将GDP作为解释变量的合理性。变量模拟得出的政策选择是工业结构的调整,即便是微调,也会对煤炭需求有很大的抑制作用;煤炭出厂价格的变动对煤炭需求变动的影响不太大,但煤炭需求对运输成本相当敏感.因而煤炭的最终价格对煤炭需求影响很大。  相似文献   

4.
在大多数情况下 ,产品定价时需求价格弹性的计算多使用点弹性公式 ,这在营销学中是有缺陷的。本文对其进行了分析 ,并提出应使用弧弹性公式指导产品定价  相似文献   

5.
《中国汽摩配》2006,(10):60-61
各省、自治区、直辖市及计划单列市、副省级省会城市发展改革委、物价局: 为适应政府价格主管部门制定客运出租汽车运营价格的需要,提高政府定价的科学性和合理性,根据《政府制定价格成本监审办法》(国家发展改革委42号令)的规定,我们起草了《客运出租汽车运营定价成本监审办法(试行)》(征求意见稿)。  相似文献   

6.
这个夏天,在气温居高不下的同时,北京各大客运站也进入了热热闹闹的暑运期。相对于铁路客运的火爆异常,公路客运也不逊色。车站门口熙熙攘攘,车站内人满为患。在今年暑运中,公路客运的客流量情况如何?近期的客车起火等事故是否会导致公路客运有所降温呢?近日,《商用汽车新闻》记者采访了北京祥龙阿尔萨客运有限公司,并走访了六里桥长途客运站。  相似文献   

7.
纵向一体化网络的接入定价研究   总被引:11,自引:0,他引:11  
中国铁路、煤气、自来水、邮政等绝大多数网络型产业的结构改革将选择纵向一体化与自由接入作为突破口,研究纵向一体化网络的接入定价理论和政策已成为中国网络型产业规制政策研究的一个重要问题。本文首先依据资源最优配置、次优配置、生产效率等原则,研究了不同的接入定价理论,详细探讨了不同的接入定价方法,最后进一步分析了纵向一体化网络在不同政策目标下的接入定价政策选择。  相似文献   

8.
7月1日零时起,全国铁路再次调整列车运行图,这是今年铁路第二次对此做出调整。本报随即对石太、合武公路客运线路进行了调查,结果不出所料,这两条线路的客流量进一步缩减,原因就是动车组抢客。无论是客运企业还是客车企业,都清楚地认识到:在中国已经进入高速铁路时代的大背景  相似文献   

9.
电信业定价的经济模型分析   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
近年来人们关于电信的评论,使用最多的词语之一是“垄断”。处于垄断行业一定是垄断定价吗?本文首先分析了竞争市场和垄断市场的产品定价模型,认为它们均不适合电信业定价;通过平均成本曲线的引入,本文建立了电信业的定价模型,提出四种定价模式,即按成本高位定价、按成本低位定价、垄断定价、直觉定价;最后在中国资费现状的分析基础上,认为我国电信业属于典型的直觉定价。  相似文献   

10.
公铁竞争再度加剧。铁路屡次提速,加上铁路客运专线建设如火如荼,公路客运再次面临挑战。为了了解目前公路客运的生存现状,10月28日,《商用汽车新闻》记者走访了北京部分客运站。  相似文献   

11.
Behaviour-based price discrimination (BBPD) is typically analysed in a framework characterised by perfectly inelastic demand. This paper provides a first assessment of the role of demand elasticity on the profit, consumer and welfare effects of BBPD. We show that the demand expansion effect, that is obviously overlooked by the standard framework with unit demand, plays a relevant role. In comparison to uniform pricing, we show that firms are worse off under BBPD, however, as demand elasticity increases the negative impact of BBPD on profits gets smaller. Despite a possible slight increase in the average prices charged over the two periods in comparison to uniform pricing, we show that BBPD boosts consumer surplus and that this benefit is independent of elasticity. In contrast to the welfare results derived under the unit demand assumption, where BBPD is always bad for welfare, the paper shows that BBPD can be welfare enhancing if demand elasticity is sufficiently high.  相似文献   

12.
This paper explores possible determinants that may affect an airline’s decision to charge passengers different roundtrip fares depending on trip origin, a case of directional price discrimination. Such fare differences cannot be the result of differences in cost, as the cost of flying a roundtrip passenger does not significantly differ depending on direction. It is argued that directional fare differences result from airlines recognizing that passenger price elasticities differ between route endpoints. A price discriminating airline will then charge a higher roundtrip fare at the endpoint where the passenger price elasticity of demand is comparatively lower. Evidence is found suggesting that airlines do use differences in income to price discriminate when setting roundtrip fares. Fares are found to be $0.18-$0.43 higher on average for each $1000 difference in average per capita income between origin and destination metro areas. This finding is sensible assuming that higher incomes reduce the price elasticity of demand for air travel, with richer passengers being less sensitive to the cost of travel.  相似文献   

13.
This paper describes a structural model of markup pricing under joint production with quasi-fixed inputs of capital, labor, and inventories. The price–cost markups are functions of the inverse price elasticity of demand, an industry average conjectural variation elasticity, and the inventory to sales ratio. Our empirical findings suggest significant markups over marginal cost that differ considerably by product. This study also estimates the elasticities of markups with respect to supply and demand shocks.  相似文献   

14.
Heavily skewed pricing in two-sided markets   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
A common feature in two-sided markets is the prevalence of heavily skewed pricing strategies in which price markups are much higher on one side of the market than the other. We show that maximal skewed pricing is profit maximizing under constant elasticity of demand. The most elastic side of the market is used to generate maximum demand by providing it with platform services at the lowest possible price. Full participation of the high-elasticity, low-price side of the market attracts the other side. As this side is less price elastic, the platform is able to extract high prices.  相似文献   

15.
A note on the excess entry theorem in spatial models with elastic demand   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper revisits the excess entry theorem in spatial models according to Vickrey [Vickrey, W.S., 1964. Microstatics. Harcourt, Brace and World, New York] and Salop [Salop, S., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141–156] while relaxing the assumption of inelastic demand. Using a demand function with a constant demand elasticity, we show that the number of firms that enter a market decreases with the degree of demand elasticity. We find that the excess entry theorem does only hold when the demand elasticity is sufficiently small. Otherwise, there is insufficient entry. In the limiting case of unit elastic demand, the market is monopolized. We broaden our results with a more general transportation cost function.  相似文献   

16.
Multiproduct Price Regulation Under Asymmetric Information   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
We discuss the regulation of a multiproduct monopolist when the firm has private information about cost or demand conditions. The regulator offers the firm a set of prices from which to choose. When there is private information only about costs, the firm should always have a degree of discretion over its pricing policy. When uncertainty concerns demand, whether discretion is desirable depends on how demand elasticities vary with the scale of demands. If a positive demand shock is associated with a reduction in the market elasticity, discretion is good for overall welfare; otherwise it is not.  相似文献   

17.
The economic experts in the Microsoft case debated whether Microsoft's pricing of Windows was consistent with Microsoft having a monopoly over personal computer (PC) operating systems. In this debate, PCs were treated as a single homogeneous commodity. This paper demonstrates that PC heterogeneity is likely to reduce substantially the monopoly price of Windows. The reason is that low-end PCs, which surely have the more elastic demand, are of disproportionate importance in determining the elasticity of derived demand for Windows.  相似文献   

18.
一般来说,个体最优和整体最优是不一致的,二者之间存在着偏差,这一偏差就是分散优化带来的效率损失。库存与运输联合优化(ITIO)将物流系统中的库存控制和运输管理融合到一个大问题中,去寻求这一联合问题而非单个问题的最优解决方案,可以最优化整个配送系统的运营成本。本文在考虑营销成本条件下,建立ITIO三阶段决策模型,并求解分析模型性质。研究表明:ITIO零售价和营销成本与需求的营销成本弹性、零售商订购成本、供应商生产启动成本、供应商生产成本、运输固定成本和运输可变成本正相关;与需求函数的价格弹性和订货批量负相关;当订购数量相同时,零售商单独优化的营销成本大于ITIO联合优化的营销成本。  相似文献   

19.
为了更准确地掌握轨道交通客流在线网中的时空分布,更高效地匹配客流需求与运输能力,实现提高轨道交通运输效率、改善运营服务质量的目的,提出了一种基于长短期记忆网络的短期OD(交通起止点)客流量预测方法。以历史客流数据为基础,定性分析车站间OD客流量的时空相关性,利用回归分析法定量分析客流影响因素,筛选出运营时刻、运营日特征、最低气温3个时间特征。为提高预测精度,以长短期记忆网络为基础,结合时间特征,为每对起讫点单独构建预测模型,形成了基于长短期记忆网络的轨道交通短期OD客流量预测模型。以苏州市为例进行验证,结果表明,加入了时间特征的短期OD客流量预测模型较移动平均模型、仅利用历史客流数据训练的基于LSTM网络的短期OD客流量预测模型,预测结果与真实值之间的误差降低了6.27%~8.58%,所提出的方法和模型可为轨道交通运营部门制定列车运行计划、组织客运工作提供更准确的数据资料。  相似文献   

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