PERSISTENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL LEADERSHIP: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND INCREMENTAL INNOVATION*

In a model of competitive innovation, I derive theoretical conditions for an entrant to displace the incumbent firm by innovating in an undeveloped, substitute (emerging) technology. The main result presents conditions on profitability and innovation speed that yield a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which the entrant pursues the emerging technology, while the incumbent chooses to persist with the established technology and collect short‐run profits. Notably, this result does not require the entrant's superiority to the incumbent for innovation. Finally, when the model is calibrated to hard drive industry data, its predictions are consistent with the observed outcomes.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

Strategic financial signalling

In an entry game, the entrant and financial markets are uninformed about the incumbent's costs. The entrant wishes to enter the market if and only if the incumbent has high costs. Therefore, a low cost incumbent would like to signal its cost to the entrant to deter its entry. Simultaneously, it would like to reveal its private information to financiers to obtain actuarially fair financial prices. We suggest that financial structure may act as a common signal in financial and output markets. In equilibrium, a low cost incumbent's highly leveraged financial stucture becomes an effective entry deterrent as it reveals private information to the entrant (and financiers).     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.     

ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.     

Endogenous Average Cost Based Access Pricing

We analyze an endogenous average cost based access pricing rule, where both the regulated firm and its rivals realize the interdependence among their outputs and the regulated access price. In contrast, the existing literature on access pricing has always assumed that the access price is exogenously fixed ex-ante. We show that endogenous access pricing neutralizes the artificial cost advantage that is enjoyed by the incumbent firm. Further, endogenous access pricing results in a consumer surplus that is equal to or higher than that under exogenous access pricing. If the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, then the welfare under endogenous access pricing is higher than that under exogenous access pricing.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

Quality differentiation and firms’ choices between online and physical markets

We study firms’ choices between online and physical markets with respect to product quality and competition, and examine consequences of transparency policies on price competition and market structure. We investigate two contrasting forces. First, since consumers cannot fully inspect an online product’s quality prior to purchase, conventional wisdom and some of the literature suggest that this attracts low-quality products to the online market (a pooling effect). On the other hand, the literature on vertical product differentiation indicates that a firm with a lower-quality product may prefer to reveal its product quality in the physical market because quality differentiation helps alleviate price competition (a differentiation effect). We show that an entrant firm with product quality lower than that of the offline incumbent may choose the physical market, whereas the entrant with a quality higher than the incumbent’s may sell online. More generally the two contrasting forces can give rise to a wide range of product quality—from low-end to high-end—in both markets.     

Spawned with a silver spoon? Entrepreneurial performance and innovation in the medical device industry

Entrepreneurs in high‐technology industries often have prior experience at incumbent firms, but we know little about how knowledge obtained at the prior employer impacts entrepreneurial performance. Drawing on previous work from strategy, economics, and organizational sociology, I assess the impact of industry experience on entrepreneurial performance and innovation in medical device start‐ups. I find that spawns (ventures started by former employees of incumbent firms) perform better than other new entrants. Interestingly, my findings suggest that this superior performance is not driven by technological spillovers from parent to spawn, but rather by nontechnical knowledge related to regulatory strategy and marketing. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Growth dynamics: the bidirectional relationship between interfirm collaboration and business sales in entrant and incumbent alliances

This paper demonstrates the existence of bidirectional relationships between interfirm collaboration and business sales. Controlling for factors that influence whether firms form collaborative relationships, the analysis shows that entry and post‐entry collaboration often contribute to superior performance, which in turn attracts more partners. However, the performance influences vary across types of collaborators and collaborations, with differences among entrant and incumbent partners, between marketing and R&D partnerships, by partner size, and across time. The empirical analysis examines businesses that operated in the U.S. hospital software systems industry between 1961 and 1991. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Estimation of Search Frictions in the British Electricity Market

This paper studies consumer search and pricing behavior in the British domestic electricity market following its opening to competition in 1999. We develop a sequential search model in which an incumbent and an entrant group compete for consumers who find it costly to obtain information on prices other than from their current supplier. We use a large data set on prices and input costs to structurally estimate the model. Our estimates indicate that consumer search costs must be relatively high in order to rationalize observed pricing patterns. We confront our estimates with observed switching behavior and find they match well.     

互联网时代电商平台商业模式创新文献综述

互联网时代商业模式的创新的研究已成为近几年财务金融、市场营销、公司治理等方面热点,研究主要体现在商业模式创新的种类与对财务的绩效影响方面,这些问题的研究仍有待深入.本文认为,互联网时代商业模式的创新需要结合互联网时代的特点与商业模式的要素进行分析.电商平台在互联网时代如何防范创新的商业模式对财务绩效带来的风险,如何应对...     

Predation by noisy advertising

The paper considers a market where heterogeneous consumers are imperfectly informed about product characteristics, and an incumbent firm has developed a clientele. In this context, the paper addresses the following question: Can the incumbent advertise in such a way as to make survival by a recent entrant infeasible? The main conclusion is that such a policy, which is termed noisy advertising, can generally succeed in driving the recent entrant from the market, and is likely to prove attractive to the incumbent.     

R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry

This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.     

多种方法集成的商业模式创新研究

本文针对当前商业模式构成要素及创新需求,运用类别思维、TRIZ理论中技术成熟度预测、资源分析、进化法则及商业价值评估多种方法的集成使用,对现有商业模式发展现状、构成要素的关系、各要素所拥有资源的梳理等进行全方位分析。打破以往只关注商业模式本身的问题及发展,选取商业模式中价值主张和客户界面两个要素,结合中小学商业模式所呈现的特性,综合使用多种创新方法,用动态发展的角度把握商业模式创新,为商业模式创新提供更多更丰富的路径。     

The effect of the innovative environment on exit of entrepreneurial firms

To foster ‘creative destruction,’ entrants must survive the turbulent conditions they face in their first crucial years in the industry. We investigate how the external knowledge milieu of an entrant, conceptualized as its innovative environment, causes systematic variation in survival patterns. We test our model from 3,431 firms in 33 industries over 80 years. We depict the innovative environment along two knowledge‐related dimensions, namely technology regime and technology intensity. While the aligned state of the innovative environment, where product innovation exists in tandem with abundant innovation opportunities, promotes entrant survival, we find that this beneficial effect is more pronounced for small entrants due to a possible mitigation of scale disadvantages. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Big splash,no waves? Cognitive mechanisms driving incumbent firms’ responses to low‐price market entry strategies

Research Summary: Low‐price market entries, aiming for rapid sales growth, tend to prompt strong competitive reactions. This research explores whether and how firms using low‐price entry strategies can mitigate retaliatory incumbent reactions. An experiment with 656 managers shows that entrants can attenuate the strength of incumbents’ responses by fostering perceptions of high aggressiveness or low commitment. Entrants may be able to accomplish this by adjusting their entry strategy to embed (subtle) cues of aggressiveness and (lack of) commitment. A replication experiment with university students reinforces our overall theoretical argument. However, the results also indicate that the interpretation of cues embedded in the entry strategy may be affected by the experience of incumbent firm managers. Overall, these results clarify the cognitive foundations of competitive responses to market entry. Managerial Summary: What drives incumbents to respond strongly to market entries, and what can the entrant, if anything, do to mitigate those responses? This research offers empirical evidence and theoretical insights for managers faced with these questions by shedding light on the thinking processes preceding competitive responses. The study shows that while managers are motivated to respond strongly to market entries that appear to be highly consequential to their business, these responses may be mitigated if the entrant manages to foster perceptions of high aggressiveness or low commitment to the market. Managers form these perceptions in part on the basis of the entrant’s behavior, creating an opportunity for entrants to adjust their entry strategies in a manner that demotivates strong competitive responses.     

Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure

This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.