A bargaining perspective on resource advantage

Whereas prices serve to allocate many resources in market economies, there remain vast reservoirs of unpriced resources to be managed. Business management and strategy concerns the creation, evaluation, manipulation, administration, and deployment of unpriced specialized scarce resource combinations. This paper applies the formalism of cooperative game theory to these concerns. In cooperative game theory, rents appear as the negotiated payments for the services of scarce valuable resources. The division of surplus is determined by the relative values created by different use combinations of resources. Within this framework, the strategy problem is clearly seen as one of discovering or estimating the value of various resource combinations. New wealth can be created by trade in resources as long as there are hitherto unexamined combinations. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation in relation to worker compensation across countries: The configurational impact of country‐level institutions

Executive compensation and its relation to that of rank and file employees are vital areas of strategy research. This study contributes to our understanding of cross‐national differences in executive compensation by exploring how key formal and informal country‐level institutions of social power structures combine to shape CEO and worker compensation across countries as well as the resulting pay dispersion. Analyzing data spanning 54 countries using the configurational approach fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), the study also explores the causal asymmetry underlying compensation outcomes by investigating institutional configurations linked to high CEO compensation, high worker pay, and high pay dispersion and those configurations linked to the absence of these outcomes. The article concludes by discussing the study's implications for theory and research on executive compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Revisiting the gender gap in CEO compensation: Replication and extension of Hill,Upadhyay, and Beekun's (2015) work on CEO gender pay gap

Research Summary: The increasing number of women chief executives motivates considerable interest in examining possible gender differences in CEO compensation. Recently, Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun reported that female CEOs receive greater compensation than male CEOs, which runs counter to common wisdom that the gender pay gap in the labor market favors men over women. With the goal of contributing to cumulative knowledge development in this area, we seek to reexamine Hill et al.'s finding about gender differences in CEO compensation by extending the analyses further in time, using a larger sample of firms and more rigorous empirical analyses. Our findings, which are robust to different statistical procedures and econometric specifications, do not reveal reliable evidence for differences in compensation paid to male and female CEOs. Managerial Summary : For years, a lively debate has centered on the issue of gender pay gap. The ubiquity of the pay gap between men and women has recently been questioned by Hill et al. who identify the chief executive officer (CEO) role as a workplace position where women receive greater compensation than men. Our investigation examines whether women CEOs are indeed compensated substantively more than male CEOs. We seek to replicate earlier work by Hill and colleagues, using an expanded dataset over a longer period of time and with more rigorous analytical tools. We do not find reliable evidence for a difference in compensation paid to male and female CEOs, suggesting that claims about gender gap in CEO compensation favoring women over men may be premature.     

Higher Highs and Lower Lows: The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in CEO Dismissal

Research summary: Investing a firm's resources in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives remains a contentious issue. While research suggests firm financial performance is the primary driver of CEO dismissal, we propose that CSR will provide important additional context when interpreting a firm's financial performance. Consistent with this prediction, our results suggest that past CSR decisions amplify the negative relationship between financial performance and CEO dismissal. Specifically, we find that greater prior investments in CSR appear to expose CEOs of firms with poor financial performance to a greater risk of dismissal. In contrast, greater past investments in CSR appear to help shield CEOs of firms with good financial performance from dismissal. These findings provide novel insight into how CEOs' career outcomes may be affected by earlier CSR decisions. Managerial summary: In this study, we examined a potential personal consequence for CEOs related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We explored the role prior investments in CSR play when a board evaluates the firm's financial performance and considers whether or not to fire the CEO. Our results suggest that while financial performance sets the overall tone of a CEO's evaluation, CSR amplifies that baseline evaluation. Specifically, our results suggest that greater past investments in CSR appear to (a) greatly increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is poor, and (b) somewhat reduce the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is good. Thus, striving to deliver profits in a socially responsible manner may have both positive and negative personal consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of reference point in CEO restricted stock and its impact on R&D intensity in high‐technology firms

Prior work based on agency theory and behavioral agency model has focused on how absolute pay values affect firm outcomes. Departing from this traditional approach, we draw from behavioral decision theory to explain how relative pay levels influence firm risk taking. We investigate how CEO restricted stock value relative to reference point influences R&D intensity in high‐technology firms. We propose that negative deviation increases are related to R&D increases and positive deviation increases lead to R&D decreases, while negative deviation has greater effect than positive deviation. We establish theoretical boundary conditions by considering CEO duality and board vigilance as moderators. Drawing from agency theory, we predict the main effects will be enhanced under duality and weakened under high board vigilance. Our hypotheses are largely supported. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A demand‐based perspective on sustainable competitive advantage

We develop an approach to analyzing the sustainability of competitive advantage that emphasizes demand‐side factors. We extend the added‐value approach to business strategy by introducing an explicit treatment of how firms create value for consumers. This allows us to characterize how consumer heterogeneity and marginal utility from performance improvements on the demand side interact with resource heterogeneity and improving technologies on the supply side. Using this approach, we address a variety of questions including whether technology substitutions will be permanent or transitory; the sequence in which new technologies attack different market segments; how rents from different types of resources change over time; whether decreasing marginal utility and imitation give rise to similar rent profiles; the extent of synergies within a firm's resource portfolio; the emergence of new generic strategies; and the conditions that support strategic diversity in a market. Our focus on consumer utility and value creation complements the traditional focus in the strategy literature on competition and value capture. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early‐stage CEO evaluation

This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early‐stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance consequences of new CEO ‘Outsiderness’: Moderating effects of pre‐ and post‐succession contexts

This study seeks to reconcile inconsistent findings on the performance consequences of new CEO origin. Drawing on five decades of empirical research on CEO succession outcomes, I develop a more refined theoretical conceptualization and a finer‐grained measurement of the underlying construct of the insider vs. outsider CEO, and build and test a more comprehensive and nuanced framework of the succession context. A longitudinal investigation of the U.S. airline and chemical industries (1972–2002) indicates that new CEO ‘Outsiderness’, conceptualized as a continuum raging from new CEOs who have a greater combination of firm and industry tenure to those who have no experience in the firm and the industry, has no main effect on post‐succession firm performance. However, significant moderating effects are found when environmental munificence, pre‐succession firm performance, and concomitant strategic and senior executive team changes are considered. Together, these findings highlight the need to consider both pre‐ and post‐succession contextual factors for evaluating the performance effects of new CEO outsiderness. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Marketing resources and performance of exhibitor firms in trade shows: A contingent resource perspective

In spite of the fundamental nature of trade shows as venues for working on webs of vertical and horizontal relationships, the extant trade show literature neglected relationship and network context factors. Specifically, previous studies attributed superior trade show performance to internal resource conditions and hence failed to address the moderating influence of important contexts such as relationship assets and knowledge assets. This study adopts the contingent resource perspective and extends the literature by proposing that the main effect of trade show resources on trade show performance is contingent upon the firm's internal knowledge assets and its external relationship assets. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the contingency models. One major managerial implication for exhibitor managers is the need to adjust allocation of its trade show marketing resources according to market-based assets it possesses.     

The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based view

This paper elucidates the underlying economics of the resource-based view of competitive advantage and integrates existing perspectives into a parsimonious model of resources and firm performance. The essence of this model is that four conditions underlie sustained competitive advantage, all of which must be met. These include superior resources (heterogeneity within an industry), ex post limits to competition, imperfect resource mobility, and ex ante limits to competition. In the concluding section, applications of the model for both single business strategy and corporate strategy are discussed.     

The role of social proximity in professional CEO appointments: Evidence from caste/religion‐based hiring of CEOs in India

Research Summary: The role of homophily in CEO appointments at the largest corporations is an important subject in corporate governance. This subject is particularly important in a country like India where a multitude of religions, castes, and communities form its social fabric. We test for the role of homophily in professional CEO appointments in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. Using a unique dataset, assembled by detailed identification of castes/religions from family names and counterfactuals obtained through the Coarsened Exact Matching technique, we find that caste/religion plays a crucial role in CEO selection as a source of information (positive discrimination). The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences (negative discrimination). Managerial Summary: We test for the role of homophily in the appointments of CEOs in India by empirically examining the preference for same caste/religion CEOs by the largest firms. We find that caste/religion plays an important role in CEO selection, i.e., as a form of information or “positive discrimination.” The evidence is not consistent with its use to pursue taste‐based preferences or “negative discrimination.”     

Bank performance and executive compensation: a managerial discretion perspective

This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do‐no‐harm versus do‐good social responsibility: Attributional thinking and the liability of foreignness

Research summary: The efforts of multinational corporations to be socially responsible do not always engender positive evaluations from overseas stakeholders. Drawing on attribution theory, we argue that two heuristics guide stakeholders in evaluating firms' social performance: foreignness and the valence of firms' social responsibility. We provide evidence from a field study of secondary stakeholders and an experimental study involving 129 non‐governmental organizations. Consistent with attribution theory, the liability of foreignness is minimized when firms engage in “do‐good” social responsibility (focused on proactive engagement creating positive externalities) but is substantial when firms engage in “do‐no‐harm” social responsibility (focused on attenuating negative externalities). In online supporting information, Appendix S1, we demonstrate that these evaluations have consequences for whether stakeholders subsequently cooperate, or sow conflict, with firms. Managerial summary: There is no guarantee that efforts to be socially responsible will improve multinational corporations' relations with overseas stakeholders, such as customers, governments, and activists. In a field study and an experiment, we unpack when foreign firms suffer from harsh stakeholder evaluations. Foreign firms especially suffer from harsh evaluations when they conduct “do‐no‐harm” CSR rather than “do‐good” CSR. Stakeholders attribute the motive for foreign firms' do‐no‐harm CSR to managerial interests and shareholder pressures, perceiving a wedge between managers and owners (who may be unmotivated to reduce the negative impacts of their business activities) and local stakeholders (who bear the social costs). A practical implication is that foreign firms gain more from highlighting do‐good rather than do‐(no)‐harm CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A bargaining perspective on strategic outsourcing and supply competition

This article considers the outsourcing choice of a downstream firm with its own upstream production resources or assets. The novelty of the approach is to consider the outsourced function as involving resources consistent with the resource‐based view of the firm. From a bargaining perspective, we characterize a downstream firm's decision whether to outsource to an independent or to an established upstream firm. In so doing, the downstream firm faces a trade‐off between lower input costs afforded by independent competition, and higher resource value associated with those who can consolidate upstream capabilities. We show that this trade‐off is resolved in favor of outsourcing to an established firm. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective

In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddedness—as reflected in the number of outside directorships—plays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions. Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.