Operationalizing and testing Galbraith's center of gravity theory

This paper develops and tests an expanded model of relatedness and firm performance, based on Galbraith's (1983) center of gravity concept. Traditional empirical approaches to relatedness have focused primarily on product similarities. This research operationalizes and tests a managerial dimension of relatedness, based on a firm's historical center of gravity, which assumes that businesses in the same vertical stage of the value chain are more similar to manage than those in different stages. Empirical results support Galbraith's hypothesis that this managerial dimension of relatedness may be more important than constrained product relatedness in achieving high performance. This finding suggests that diversified firms should operate in lines of business that are managerially similar in order to minimize complexity and apply core skills appropriately. Interestingly, while managerial relatedness was positively associated with firm performance in two out of three samples, constrained product relatedness was negatively associated with performance in two of the three samples. Taken together, these results suggest that optimal relatedness profiles may be industry specific, and that corporate relatedness may be more important in managing diversity than product relatedness. Future research should seek a better understanding of the specific dimensions which underlie both product and managerial relatedness.     

Size and relatedness of units sold: An agency theory and resource-based perspective

This study tests the effects of ownership concentration, outside director equity holdings, and corporate strategy on, and the Performance implications of, the size and relatedness of units sold by parent firms. The study is based on a model that integrates agency and resource-based theories, and a sample of sell-offs by 112 Fortune 500 firms. Ownership concentration is found to be associated positively with the sale of unrelated and small units. This relationship is strengthened when outside director equity is high. In addition, the effects of corporate strategy types on the characteristics of units sold depend on ownership concentration and outside director equity. Finally, post'sell-off performance of the parent firm is associated negatively with the relatedness of the unit sold. These results suggest that the type of unit sold depends on the type of economic benefit sought by the parent firm.     

董事会资本、高管薪酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据

董事会资本、高管激励契约与研发投入之间的关系一直是国内外学者研究的热点和焦点问题。论文基于资源依赖理论和委托代理理论的双重视角,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用两阶段最小二乘法,考察了董事会资本对研发投入的影响,以及高管薪酬激励对二者关系的调节作用。实证研究结果显示：（1）董事会资本宽度对企业的研发投入具有显著的正向影响;（2）董事会资本深度对企业的R&D投入具有显著的正向影响;（3）进一步分析发现,高管薪酬激励对董事会资本和研发投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用。