What's all that (strategic) noise? anticipatory impression management in CEO succession

We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by simultaneously releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely when long‐term CEOs have a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well‐regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Going short‐term or long‐term? CEO stock options and temporal orientation in the presence of slack

Research summary: We draw on behavioral agency theory to explain how decision heuristics associated with CEO stock options interact with firm slack to shape the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategies (temporal orientation). Our findings suggest CEO current option wealth substitutes for the influence of slack resources in encouraging a long‐term orientation, while prospective option wealth enhances the positive effect of slack on temporal orientation. Our theory offers explanations for non‐findings in previous analysis of the relationship between CEO equity based pay and temporal orientation and provides the insights that CEO incentives created by stock options (1) enhance the effect of available slack upon temporal orientation and (2) can both incentivize and de‐incentivize destructive short‐termism, depending upon the values of current and prospective option wealth. Managerial summary: We explore how compensation design can play a role in affecting the CEO's preference for short‐ or long‐term strategic projects. When the CEOs have accumulated option wealth, they are more likely to invest in the long term. Yet when they have a large number of recently granted options with the potential to generate significant wealth in the event of successful risk taking, the CEO is more likely to prefer the short term in order to achieve personal wealth gains more quickly. The more liquid assets the firm holds, the weaker both of the aforementioned effects. An implication for boards is that they should anticipate CEO short‐termism if the CEO has been granted new options, underlining the potential negative consequences of option compensation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Heavy lies the crown? How job anxiety affects top executive decision making in gain and loss contexts

Research summary: Despite abundant anecdotal evidence that many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, the upper echelons literature has remained largely silent on the organizational implications of executive job anxiety. In this study, we theorize that job anxiety will cause executives to (1) create a social buffer against threats by surrounding themselves with supportive decision‐making teams, and (2) pursue lower‐risk firm strategies. We further argue that these effects will vary depending upon whether strategic decisions occur in gain versus loss contexts. We test our ideas using a novel multisource, multimethod approach that includes data from 84 top executives of large organizations, their decision‐making teams, their friends and families, and archival sources. Results from an analysis of 154 major strategic decisions provide general support for our theory. Managerial summary: Although many top executives experience anxiety in their jobs, some struggle more with anxiety than others. Our paper is the first to focus on how job anxiety affects executives' decisions. We analyze 154 major strategic decisions made by 84 top executives of large organizations in a range of industries, collecting data from personal interviews with executives and surveys of their decision‐making teams, spouses, and friends. We find that anxious executives take fewer strategic risks, especially when things are going well. We further argue that anxious executives focus more on “buffering” themselves from threats, and find that they surround themselves with close supporters when times are tough. Our results demonstrate a pattern through which anxiety causes top executives to focus more heavily on avoiding potential threats. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Earthquake or glacier? How CEO charisma manifests in firm strategy over time

Numerous studies have focused on CEO charisma as an antecedent to firm performance, but this literature has largely overlooked the possibility that charisma manifests in more proximal strategic initiatives that (unlike performance) are largely under the CEO's control. In this study, we integrate perspectives from the upper echelons and charismatic leadership literatures to argue that CEO charisma influences year‐over‐year strategic change, the degree to which strategies deviate from industry central tendencies, and the degree of emphasis on corporate social responsibility. We also theorize that, depending on the outcome in question, the effects of charisma can become both amplified and diminished as CEO tenure advances. Employing a novel data collection approach for a sample of 113 S&P 500 CEOs, we find broad support for our theory. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.