Firm‐specific knowledge resources and competitive advantage: the roles of economic‐ and relationship‐based employee governance mechanisms

The resource‐based view of the firm emphasizes the role of firm‐specific resources, especially firm‐specific knowledge resources, in helping a firm to achieve sustainable competitive advantage. However, the deployment of firm‐specific knowledge often requires key employees to make specialized human capital investments that are not easily redeployable to other settings. Thus, in the absence of effective safeguards and trust building devices, employees with foresight may be reluctant to make such specialized investments. This study explores both economic‐ and relationship‐based governance mechanisms that might mitigate this underinvestment problem. Effective use of these governance mechanisms enables a firm to obtain greater performance from its efforts to deploy firm‐specific knowledge resources. Empirical results further support these key arguments. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why firms make unilateral investments specific to other firms: the case of OEM suppliers

This study examines why and under what conditions firms will make unilateral relationship‐specific investments to their transaction partners. We propose that firms are more likely to make such investments when the investment yields positive economic spillover values for other transactions with the same exchange partners as well as for third‐party transactions. We also model two types of positive inter‐project spillover effects that a transaction may generate: knowledge spillovers and reputation spillovers. We find empirical support for our developed theory in the context of Taiwanese suppliers of original equipment manufacturers. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of uncertainty and asset co‐specialization on governance in biotechnology alliances

We explore transaction cost economics (TCE) and real option (RO) rationales for alliance governance and find the predictive power of each depends upon the type of uncertainty confronted. Our review of alliance activity from 1995 through 2000 for 642 alliances confirms that governance is influenced directly by partner, task, and technological uncertainty and by interactions among asset co‐specialization, partner uncertainty, and task uncertainty. Consistent with TCE, co‐specialized assets increased the likelihood of hierarchical governance. Partner and task uncertainty increased this effect. Consistent with RO, we find technological uncertainty decreased the likelihood of hierarchical governance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Capture,governance, and resilience: strategy implications from the history of Rome

Organizational resilience is a subject of great interest to management and strategy scholars. Drawing on over 1,000 years of historical data on the Republic of Rome, and focusing primarily on the period of its establishment (509 BC–338 BC), we identify two generic strategies, capture and governance, that together are essential for organizational resilience. Capture strategy relates to market expansions, while governance strategy refers to the capacity of an organization to assimilate, retain, defend, and increase its dominance within annexed markets. The history of Rome also reveals four supporting tactics—saving power, maintaining a stronghold base, isolating and weakening adversaries, and creating forward outposts—that shore up and reinforce the capture and governance strategies, to create a more enduring and resilient enterprise. Interestingly, a system‐wide view of the strategy‐tactic framework also offers insights on resilience through smallness, thus illustrating its conceptual utility to organizations of all sizes including small enterprises. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition in Research and Development: A Theory for Contradictory Predictions

This paper develops reasons for the many seemingly contradictory findings in the literature about competition and research and development (R&D) investment. The theory of R&D competition implies that increases in competitive pressure may increase R&D investment, decrease it, increase it initially but decrease it over greater levels of competitive pressure (an inverted-U relation), decrease it initially but increase it over greater levels (a U relation), or have no effect at all.      

National corporate governance institutions and post‐acquisition target reorganization

We examine the characteristics of national systems of corporate governance to theorize about the nature of the shareholders' and employees' interests when it comes to reorganization, under the assumption that the firm is coalitional in nature. We argue that corporate governance institutions prevalent in both the host and the target country of the merging firms enable or constrain the ability of the acquirer to reorganize the target. Using a cross‐national dataset of corporate acquisitions and post‐acquisition reorganization, we found support for our predictions that stronger legal protection of shareholder rights in the acquirer country compared to the target country increases the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and leverage the target's resources, while the protection of employee rights in the target country restricts the acquirer's ability to restructure the target's assets and redeploy resources to and from the target. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing a model of reasoned risk‐taking: governance,the experience of principals and agents,and global strategy in high‐technology IPO firms

Research on the governance of risky ventures, like the initial public offerings (IPOs) of high‐technology firms, has focused primarily on the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance. While such an emphasis is clearly important, it does little to shed light on potential relationships between governance and the strategies pursued by risky firms, nor does it take into account the complementary role of key stakeholders in affecting those strategies. To partially remedy this deficit we integrate agency and behavioral perspectives to develop a theory of ‘reasoned risk‐taking,’ whereby the nature of risks undertaken is a consequence of the interaction of governance mechanisms and stakeholder characteristics. We demonstrate our theory by predicting when corporate governance should be associated with strategic risk‐seeking beyond a firm's technical core—as seen in the degree to which it has expanded internationally. Surprisingly, even though venture capitalists (VC) are risk specialists, we find that technology‐based IPO firms are less likely (i.e., a negative relationship) to have extensive global sales when they are backed by a VC. In support of our reasoned risk‐taking theoretical framework, we find that VCs are indeed risk‐seeking when VC backing is complemented by the international experience of their board appointees, top management team (TMT) members, or both. IPO firms with significant insider ownership are similarly global risk‐seekers, and those effects are strongest with an internationally seasoned board and TMT at the helm. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate governance and IPO underpricing in a cross‐national sample: A multilevel knowledge‐based view

Prior studies of IPO underpricing, mostly using agency theory and single‐country samples, have generally fallen short. In this study, we employ the knowledge‐based view (KBV) to explore underpricing across 17 countries. We find that agency indicators are insignificant predictors, board of director knowledge limits underpricing, and external knowledge both substitutes for and complements internal board knowledge. This third finding suggests that future KBV studies should consider how internal and external knowledge states interact with each other. Our study offers new insights into the antecedents of underpricing and extends our understanding of comparative governance and the KBV of the firm. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is performance driven by industry‐ or firm‐specific factors? A reply to McNamara,Aime, and Vaaler

We revisit the questions of identification of outlying firms within industries and their impact on the relative importance of firm‐ and industry‐specific factors for firm performance. In response to McNamara, Aime and Valler (2005), we argue that the key results in Hawawini, Subramnian and Verdin (2003) are insensitive to the varying methods used to identify firm outliers. Further, we argue that conducting tests on industry outliers are inconsistent to what is indicated by theory and past empirical results on the relative importance of firm and industry effects to firm performance. Firm effects may matter most for outperforming and underpeforming firms, while industry effects may be at least as important to firms ‘stuck in the middle’. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Customer‐specific synergies and market convergence

We use an analytical model to study the effects of customer‐specific synergies, i.e., synergies that arise when firms sell multiple products to the same customers. At the firm level, we show that the profitability of a customer‐specific synergy depends upon cross‐market correlation of customer preferences, differs when the synergy is cost‐based versus differentiation‐based, and can even be negative when the synergy is kept proprietary to a single firm. We also show that returns to imitating such a synergy may decline as it strengthens. At the industry level, we find that exploiting customer‐specific synergies causes endogenous market convergence at a point that depends upon whether the synergy is cost‐based or differentiation‐based and whether it is imitated. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty

Research summary: We examine the interplay of behavioral and environmental uncertainty in shaping the effectiveness of two key governance mechanisms used by strategic alliances: contractual and trust‐based governance. We develop and test hypotheses, using a meta‐analytic dataset encompassing over 15,000 strategic alliances across 82 independent samples. We find that contractual governance works best under low to moderate levels of behavioral uncertainty and moderate to high levels of environmental uncertainty, while it is detrimental to alliance performance when both types of uncertainty are low or high. Trust‐based governance is most effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty and low levels of environmental uncertainty. It suffers a large loss of usefulness at high behavioral uncertainty as environmental uncertainty increases. Managerial summary: Strategic alliances allow firms to gain greater efficiency and create value. Yet, many such alliances fail because they are not able to deal with the twin challenges posed by behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Findings from our meta‐analysis imply that under conditions of high behavioral uncertainty and low‐to‐moderate levels of environmental uncertainty, the use of trust‐based governance alongside contractual governance might enhance the latter's effectiveness. The combined effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance under high levels of both behavioral and environmental uncertainty is not obvious. When both behavioral and environmental uncertainty are high, contractual governance hurts alliance performance while trust‐based governance does not function at its best either. Under these conditions, it might be better for firms to turn to hierarchy or vertical integration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate governance antecedents to shareholder activism: A zero‐inflated process

Research summary: Shareholder activism has become more widespread, yet the role of corporate governance as antecedent to shareholder activism remains equivocal. We propose a new conceptual model that characterizes the stochastic of observable shareholder activism as a compound product of two latent components representing (1) shareholder activists' propensity to target a company and (2) executives' propensity to settle activists' demands privately. Our model explicitly decouples corporate governance expectations for the two latent components embedded in activism process, and thus allows us to relax assumptions of homogenous shareholder interests and constrained managerial discretion where corporate managers are expected to negotiate privately and settle only value‐creating activist demands. Bayesian analysis of zero‐inflated Poisson regression reveals that corporate governance relationships with activism vary across shareholder demands and private settlements. Managerial summary: Increasing shareholder activism has generated debates as to whether activism promotes managerial accountability and responsibility or instead encourages managerial short‐termism. Our research model allows for heterogeneous interests among a company's shareholders. We theorize and empirically investigate a broader role of corporate governance: governance mechanisms need to ensure that executives are not (1) ignoring activists' value‐increasing demands or (2) accommodating activists' value‐decreasing demands in a private, opaque manner that disenfranchises other shareholders. Our results indicate that corporate governance implications differ for visible shareholder demands in contrast with private activism. A plausible application of our model is that it provides estimates of the probability of the numbers of shareholder demands to be received by a firm and the probability of privately settling a demand. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Governance mode vs. governance fit: Performance implications of make‐or‐ally choices for product innovation in the worldwide aircraft industry, 1942–2000

We examine the impact of governance mode and governance fit on performance in make‐or‐ally decisions. We argue that while horizontal collaboration and autonomous governance have direct and countervailing performance implications, the alignment of make‐or‐ally choices with the focal firm's resource endowment and the activity's resource requirements leads to better performance. Data on the aircraft industry show that relative to aircraft developed autonomously, collaborative aircraft exhibit greater sales but require longer time‐to‐market. However, governance fit increases unit sales and reduces time‐to‐market. We contribute to the alliance and economic organization literatures. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific human capital,organizational incentives,and agency costs: Evidence from retail banking

This paper explores conflicting implications of firm‐specific human capital (FSHC) for firm performance. Existing theory predicts a productivity effect that can be enhanced with strong incentives. We propose an offsetting agency effect: FSHC may facilitate more‐sophisticated ‘gaming’ of incentives, to the detriment of firm performance. Using a unique dataset from a multiunit retail bank, we document both effects and estimate their net impact. Managers with superior FSHC are more productive in selling loans but are also more likely to manipulate loan terms to increase incentive payouts. We find that resulting profits are two percentage points lower for high‐FSHC managers. Finally, profit losses increase more rapidly for high‐FSHC managers, indicating adverse learning. Our results suggest that FSHC can create agency costs that outweigh its productive benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm‐specific knowledge assets and employment arrangements: Evidence from CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal

Research summary : We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long‐term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm‐specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms. Managerial summary : A firm's knowledge structure, that is, the extent to which its knowledge assets are firm‐specific versus general, has implications for both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal. In particular, we find that a firm with a high level of firm‐specific knowledge has the incentive to retain its CEO through the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation. Such a firm is also likely to provide job security for its CEO, leading to a lower likelihood of CEO dismissal. These arguments, however, are less likely to hold in diversified corporations as CEOs in such corporations are more removed from the deployment of knowledge assets. A key managerial implication is that CEO compensation and job security design should be made according to the nature of firm knowledge assets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.     

Demand‐side strategy,relational advantage,and partner‐driven corporate scope: The case for client‐led diversification

Research Summary: We advance research on corporate diversification by joining insights from the demand‐side and relational views in strategy to offer a novel theory of client‐led diversification. We propose that client‐led diversification results from a combination of the customer‐driven opportunities emphasized in the demand‐side view and the creation of added value through relational assets that is a central tenet of the relational view. Furthermore, we hypothesize that suppliers’ client‐specific knowledge, clients’ relational commitment to suppliers, and growth opportunities in clients’ markets (relative to the suppliers’ own markets) will magnify the client‐led diversification effect. We test our hypotheses using a longitudinal dataset on patent law firms and their diversification into new domains of patent prosecution work for their corporate clients. Managerial Summary: Explanations of why firms diversify into new lines of business have largely concerned the redeployment of underutilized resources, with little regard to opportunities or influences stemming from firms’ existing customers. In our article, we show how the changing scope of business needs from a knowledge‐based supplier firm's set of existing clients is a central driver of supplier‐firm diversification, and this is especially the case when the level of relational assets shared between a supplier and its clients is higher. In a competitive landscape where suppliers compete intensively for the business of clients, our results show how managers can increase the likelihood of capturing additional business from its existing exchange relationships rather than bearing the risks of seeking new exchange relationships.