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In this paper stock returns are modeled as a function of payment delays. Three hypotheses are tested: (1) that buyers compensate sellers for a six-business-day payment delay; (2) that the rate of compensation is the riskless rate; and (3) that this delay is solely responsible for day-of-the-week effects. Results support the first and second hypotheses, but not the third. The coefficient on the variable that controls for payment delays is correctly signed and statistically significant. It is the correct size in all periods but one. However, the estimated rate of compensation probably differs across days of the week. Finally, controlling for a six-business-day payment delay fails to eliminate the weekly pricing pattern.  相似文献   

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A stock's relative price ratio, defined as the ratio of the current price to the average of the highest and lowest prices over some holding period, is shown to be a better predictor of future stock returns than firm size. The price ratio has an even stronger January seasonality than does firm size. After controlling for price ratio variations, firm size has no significant relationship to return. The abnormal returns for the price ratio effect are consistent with those predicted by optimal tax selling considerations.  相似文献   

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This study is an investigation of estimates of expected stock returns implicit in option data. The Lee-Rao-Auchmuty option valuation model provides a unique opportunity to examine whether return measurements derived by nonlinear estimation techniques show any correlation with future stock returns. During the short period covered in this study, the Lee-Rao-Auchmuty estimates give preliminary indications that they are better predictors of actual stock returns than are estimates obtained from historical data.  相似文献   

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Despite the explosion in the corporate use of stock options, the incentives created by stock options are not well understood by either the boards who grant them or the executives who are meant to be motivated by them. A major source of confusion stems from the corporate practice of using multi-year stock option plans. Such multi-year grants create subtle, potentially important links between current performance and future grants that can significantly dilute incentives for better performance.
For example, so-called fixed value plans provide very weak, even perverse, incentives ex ante since the value of future option grants is completely insulated from current performance. Under such plans, an executive's reward for superior performance is to receive fewer options, and to receive more options for substandard performance. In contrast, the fixed number plan creates an intrinsic link between changes in this year's stock price and changes in the value of future option grants.
The author also reports the findings of new empirical research that shows that stock option plans, taken as a whole, have a pay-to-performance correlation that is eight times stronger than that of salary and bonus. But, consistent with the analysis above, fixed value option plans have pay-to-performance that is only six times that of salary and bonus, as compared to ten times for fixed number plans.  相似文献   

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We develop a set of hypotheses to explain cross-sectional differences in variance changes associated with option listing. Transactions variance is decomposed into three components: the bid-ask spread, return autocorrelations, and intrinsic variance. Each is investigated separately. We find support for hypotheses that link: (1) changes in dealer transactions costs to changes in the bid-ask spread following option listing; (2) changes in the quantity and quality of information and the value of new information to movements of the return autocorrelation structure toward zero; and (3) changes in trading volume and the clientele that trades the underlying security to changes in intrinsic variance following option listing.  相似文献   

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