Analyst Earnings Forecast Revisions and the Pricing of Accruals

We investigate the relation between two market anomalies to provide insights into analysts role as information intermediaries. Prior research finds that accruals and analyst earnings forecast revisions predict future returns. We find that the accrual and forecast revision strategies generate hedge returns of 15.5% and 5.5% when implemented independently. Strikingly, a combined strategy that uses forecast revisions to refine the accrual strategy generates a hedge return of 28.5%. Firms with consistent accrual and forecast revision signals have less persistent accruals and earnings. We also find that accruals can be used to refine the forecast revision strategy—high accruals are associated with overoptimism in analyst forecasts. Our findings indicate that although forecast revisions reflect information about accrual and earnings persistence beyond that reflected in the level of current year accruals, investors do not fully incorporate this information into their valuation assessments.     

Does Meeting Earnings Expectations Matter? Evidence from Analyst Forecast Revisions and Share Prices

This paper investigates whether the market rewards firms meeting current period earnings expectations, and whether any such reward reflects the implications of meeting expectations in the current period for future earnings or reflects a distinct market premium. We document that abnormal annual returns are significantly greater for firms meeting expectations, controlling for the information in the current year's earnings. We then test whether firms meeting expectations experience higher returns simply because their expected future earnings are also higher. We find firms meeting expectations have significantly higher earnings forecasts and realized earnings than firms that do not. We find that controlling for these higher future earnings, firms meeting expectations in one or two years do not receive a greater valuation than their fundamentals would suggest. We find, however, that the market assigns a higher value to firms that meet expectations consistently, controlling for an estimate of the firm's fundamental value.     

The Dynamics of Earnings Forecast Management

This paper examines whether firms manage analyst forecasts andthe associated value consequences. We find that earnings forecaststend to grow pessimistic over the forecast horizon and theseforecast changes and their timing are key determinants of whetherfirms generate positive earnings surprises: Late forecasts thatraise (lower) the consensus sharply reduce (raise) the probabilityof positive surprises. This findng is the opposite of that predictedif consensus revisions reflected new information arrival. Investorsseem to be "misled": downward consensus revisions lead to largeabnormal returns following the earnings announcement. Paradoxically,downward forecast management reduces post-announcement shareprice, as the impact of reduced forecasts dominates the gainfrom generating positive surprises.     

Relationship Between Analyst Forecast Properties and Equity Bid‐Ask Spreads and Depths Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

Abstract:   We study the relationships between three variables which proxy for the ex‐ante level of information asymmetry – forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, and the level of analyst coverage, and equity bid‐ask spread and depth changes around quarterly earnings releases. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that earnings releases increase the level of information asymmetry and lower the level of liquidity in the security market. Using both an OLS regression framework and a simultaneous equations model, we examine whether equity bid‐ask spreads increase and depths decrease as the level of information asymmetry increases. Our results indicate that spreads are higher (relative to a non‐event period) around earnings announcements when information asymmetry is more pronounced; however, depths are lower only on the day following the announcement when there is greater information asymmetry. Relative spreads have a significant positive relation with both forecast dispersion and revision volatility and a significant negative relation with analyst coverage. Relative depths have a significant negative relation with forecast dispersion and a significant positive relation with analyst coverage. Our findings indicate that the equity specialist adjusts both spreads and depths when confronting informed traders around earnings releases and that these adjustments are more pronounced when the level of information asymmetry is greater.     

中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究

随着业绩预告制度的实施和演进,我国资本市场上逐步出现了越来越多的上市公司自愿业绩预告,这对于缓解管理层与投资者、机构投资者与中小投资者之间的信息不对称具有重要意义。那么,是什么因素激励上市公司管理层自愿披露业绩预告?通过借鉴西方的自愿信息披露理论,并结合我国转轨经济的制度背景,本文提出了我国上市公司自愿业绩预告的三类动机:资本市场交易、管理层股票收益和管理层能力信号传递,并以2001-2008年我国上市公司业绩预告数据为研究样本对此进行了检验。研究结果显示,融资需求高、管理者利益协同程度高、会计业绩好的上市公司更有动机自愿披露业绩预告,并且国有相对于非国有上市公司自愿披露动机更弱。     

On the Structure of Analyst Research Portfolios and Forecast Accuracy

This study provides insights into the forces and constraints that shape analyst research coverage along country and sector dimensions and the impact of the structure of an analyst's portfolio on forecast accuracy. We find that analyst specialization by country and sector is sensitive to the extent to which firms  within  a country or sector and firms  across  country-sectors are exposed to common economic forces, the potential for revenue generation, and broker culture. Our tests indicate that existing research on the relation between analyst portfolio structure and forecast accuracy may suffer from an endogeneity bias. We use our analysis of analyst specialization to develop controls for this bias. Once we employ these controls, we find that country diversification is associated with superior forecast accuracy. However, the relation between sector diversification and forecast accuracy is context-specific. Specifically, sector diversification enhances forecast accuracy in an international context, while it detracts from forecast accuracy in a domestic U.S. context.     

Evidence that Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership Accelerate the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper presents evidence that prices of firms followed by sell-side analysts and favored by institutional investors incorporate future earnings earlier than prices of other firms. We conduct two sets of empirical tests: the first examines coefficients from regressions of returns on lead, contemporaneous, and lag earnings changes; the second compares the timing of monthly abnormal returns from earnings-based zero-investment portfolios. In both sets of tests, the results for analysts and institutions are incremental to each other. In addition, neither the analyst price lead nor the institutional price lead is due to price leads increasing with firm size.     

Effects of Preannouncements on Analyst and Stock Price Reactions to Earnings News

This study examines the effects of earnings preannouncements on financial analyst and stock price reactions to earnings news. Prior experimental research documents that when the signs of a preannouncement surprise and subsequent earnings announcement surprise are consistent (i.e., both either positive or negative), analysts make larger magnitude revisions to their future period earnings forecasts in response to the total earnings news conveyed in the preannouncement and earnings announcement than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. This study extends this research by examining a sample of actual preannouncements from 1993–1997 to determine whether the effects documented in laboratory settings manifest at the aggregate market level in stock prices and consensus analyst forecast revisions. Results indicate that after controlling for the sign of earnings news, sign of earnings, and sign of the earnings announcement surprise, stock prices and analyst forecast revisions respond more strongly when a preannouncement and subsequent earnings announcement elicit the same surprise signs than when the surprise signs are inconsistent. Further analysis indicates that the consistency of the signs of a preannouncement surprise and earnings announcement surprise is not associated with future earnings, suggesting that the magnified reaction of investors and analysts to consistent surprise signs is not a rational reaction to associations observed in market settings.     

Analyst Forecasting Ability and the Stock Price Reaction to Forecast Revisions

We empirically identifysuperior analysts using their past forecasting track record fora specific firm's earnings and demonstrate that subsequent forecastannouncements by these superior analysts have a greater impacton security prices than do the forecasts of other analysts. Wefind that, in our sample, the price effects of this firm-specificforecasting ability do not spill over to other firms followedby the same analyst. We also demonstrate that an analyst's forecastingability with respect to the earnings of a certain firm is relativelymore important in the period immediately preceding an earningsannouncement by that firm.     

The Relationship Between Unsystematic Security Returns and Earnings Forecast Errors*

This paper extends the Australian evidence on the information content of earnings announcements by considering both the sign and magnitude of unexpected earnings for a sample of 120 firms in the period 1964–1972, and a further 117 firms for 1972–1980. Results at both the portfolio level and the individual security level are highly significant and are consistent with those documented in both the United States and New Zealand.     

Investor Reaction to Celebrity Analysts: The Case of Earnings Forecast Revisions

We examine the effects of analysts' celebrity on investor reaction to earnings forecast revisions. We measure celebrity as the quantity of media coverage analysts receive in sources included in the Dow Jones Interactive database, and find that media coverage is positively related to investor reaction to forecast revisions. The effect of celebrity on the reaction to forecast revisions remains significant after controlling for forecast performance variables examined in prior studies (ex post forecast accuracy, ex ante accuracy, award status, and other variables shown to be related to forecast accuracy). While these results are consistent with the familiarity of the analyst's name affecting the market reaction, we cannot rule out that our measure of celebrity is correlated with error in the performance measures we examine and/or correlated with other unexamined dimensions of forecast performance. A content analysis of a random subsample of the media coverage of our sample analysts suggests that our findings likely are not due to the increased availability of forecast revisions. Finally, an investigation of the excess returns around the quarterly earnings announcement date suggests that market participants react too strongly to forecast revisions issued by analysts with high levels of media coverage. Taken together, these findings suggest that an analyst's level of media coverage can affect the initial market reaction to his forecast revisions.     

Investor and Analyst Reactions to Earnings Announcements of Related Firms: An Empirical Analysis

In this article I examine the response of investors and analysts of nonannouncing firms to the earnings report of the first announcers in the industry. The error in the earnings forecast of the first announcer is found to be informative about the errors in the contemporaneous earnings forecasts of subsequent announcers in the industry. However, investors and analysts do not appear to fully incorporate the information from the first announcers' news in their revised earnings expectations for subsequent announcers. This apparent underreaction to the first announcers' news leads to predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers in the days following the first announcement. Results of this study can be seen as further evidence of investor and analyst underreaction to publicly available information.     

Investor and (Value Line) Analyst Underreaction to Information about Future Earnings: The Corrective Role of Non-Earnings-Surprise Information

Prior research suggests that financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts' earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts' forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts' earnings forecast revisions.     

Empirical Investigation of the Ability of Sensitivity of Stock Prices to Earnings News in Predicting Earnings Management and Management Forecast Errors

This paper presents an evidence that a firm’s Sensitivity of Stock Price to Earnings News (SSPEN), as measured by surplus stock demand over its supply, affects on incentives to manage earnings and, in turn, Management Forecast Errors (MFE). In particular, we find a tendency for firms rated a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income-decreasing Earnings Management (EM), indicating that they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives to create accounting reserves especially in the form of earnings baths than other firms. In contrast, firms rated a Buy (Sell) are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than management forecasts. The result of empirical evidence from Iranian firms in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) showing the existence of a meaningful relationship between SSPEN and EM. Generally, SSPEN can be used to predict EM and Forecast Errors (FEs).     

The Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on Analyst Forecast Properties: The Impact of Firm Size and Growth Opportunities

Abstract:  We provide evidence that the effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the Act) of 1995 on analyst forecast properties is conditional on firm size and growth opportunities. We show that analyst coverage, frequency of forecast revisions, forecast errors and dispersion after the Act decreased for large firms and for firms with low growth opportunities but increased for small firms and for firms with high growth opportunities. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Act results in additional high quality disclosures in large firms, which face higher litigation risk and tighter scrutiny from investors but not in smaller firms. Our findings of increases in analyst coverage and revision but deterioration in accuracy and precision of analyst forecasts for firms with high growth opportunities after the Act suggest that in spite of increased corporate disclosures, the information environment for analysts deteriorated in those firms.     

承销商分析师与非承销商分析师利益冲突比较研究

基于证券分析师首次发表的关于2006~2008年A股市场IPO股票的研究报告数据,运用非参数检验与多元回归分析方法,对我国证券分析师利益冲突行为进行实证分析。研究结果表明,承销商分析师与非承销商分析师均存在乐观倾向,而且承销商分析师的投资评级更为乐观;市场对于承销商分析师与非承销商分析师关注股票的反应并无显著差异,表明我国证券市场投资者并没有认识到分析师的利益冲突行为。     

A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Analysts' Forecast Bias, Analyst Following, and Institutional Ownership

In this paper we use a simultaneous equations model to examine the relationship between analysts' forecasts, analyst following, and institutions' investment decisions. Estimates of our three equation model using US data indicate that higher institutional demand leads to greater optimism among analysts and lower analyst following. At the same time, institutional demand increases with increasing optimism in analysts' forecasts but decreases with analyst following. We also investigate firm characteristics as determinants of analysts' and institutions' decisions. Empirical estimates of the effects of these characteristics indicate that agency‐driven behavioral considerations are significant.     

The Two Faces of Analyst Coverage

We find that positive excess (strong) analyst coverage is associated with overvaluation and low future returns. This finding is consistent with the view that excessive analyst coverage, driven by investment banking incentives and analyst self-interests, raises investor optimism causing share prices to trade above fundamental value. However, weak analyst coverage causes stocks to trade below fundamental values. This finding indicates that investors tend to believe that these firms are more likely to be plagued by information asymmetries and agency problems. The results remain robust after controlling for the possible endogenous nature of analyst coverage and analysts' self-selection bias.     

The Impact of SFAS No. 14 Segment Information on Price Variability and Earnings Forecast Accuracy

This study provides empirical evidence on the economic effects of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 14 segment disclosures. Required disclosures under this standard subsume those of the Securities and Exchange Commission' (SEC) 1970 line-of-business disclosure rule both in terms of the variables to be disclosed and the degree of decomposition of the consolidated information. Consequently, this study hypothesizes that stock price variability will be greater at the time of, and security analysts' earnings forecasts more accurate following, release of these disclosures. The results of the empirical analysis support these hypotheses. They indicate that SFAS No. 14 segment disclosures convey incremental information over previously reported SEC line-of-business information that is relevant to stockholders and to security analysts.     

The Effect of Earnings Forecasts on Earnings Management

We develop a theory of the association between earnings management and voluntary management forecasts in an agency setting. Earnings management is modeled as a "window dressing" action that can increase the firm's reported accounting earnings but has no impact on the firm's real cash flows. Earnings forecasts are modeled as the manager's communication of the firm's future cash flows. We show that it is easier to prevent the manager from managing earnings if he is asked to forecast earnings. We also show that earnings management is more likely to follow high earnings forecasts than low earnings forecasts. Finally, our analysis shows that shareholders may not find it optimal to prohibit earnings management. Earlier results rationalize earnings management by violating some assumption underlying the Revelation Principle. By contrast, in our model the principal can make full commitments and communication is unrestricted. Nonetheless, earnings management can be beneficial as it reduces the cost of eliciting truthful forecasts.