信息不对称与政府规制经济

在经济生活领域,信息不对称是普遍存在的现象。信息不对称对市场运行效率有着深刻的影响,会降低市场运行的效率。因此,应弥补信息不对称缺陷,加强政府的经济规制。     

信息不对称下的几个经济学实验

实验方法受到经济学界的重视,不对称信息条件下的实验方法研究具有重要现实意义。笔者探讨了若干在不对称信息条件下的经济学实验,包括名誉的作用、信号传递等重要实验,认为不对称信息下的实验的方法及其研究思路值得我国经济学者借鉴和深入研究。     

Information Disclosure as Environmental Regulation: A Theoretical Analysis

Governments around the world are beginning to embrace a new form of environmental regulation – mandatory disclosure of information. While information disclosure programs appear to have an impact on subsequent firm behavior – often resulting in lower levels of pollution – little is known about the costs and benefits of these programs and whether or not they enhance social welfare. This paper presents a simple bargaining model where mandatory information disclosure is used to overcome a lack of information on the part of the public. We characterize the conditions under which information disclosure will lead to a reduction in emissions, and ultimately, the conditions under which it will enhance social welfare. Several extensions of the model are briefly explored, including the effect of two sources of pollution – only one of which is subject to information disclosure. This paper was prepared while V. Santhakumar was a Visiting Scholar at the Vanderbilt Center for Environmental Management Studies, Vanderbilt University.     

风险投资退出交易中非对称信息度量研究——基于证据理论

采用改进的证据理论方法对风险投资退出交易中的非对称信息进行度量,以期帮助风险投资家设计占优的交易机制与交易规则,最大化风险投资家的生产者剩余。算例表明,改进的证据理论方法合理可靠,且具有可操作性。     

以信息非对称理论分析电子商务诚信建设

我国电子商务飞速发展,但由于信息的非对称,使得电子商务诚信行为缺乏必要的制度约束,造成了电子商务交易中诚信关系的严重扭曲和道德风险行为,暴露出来的诚信问题越来越引起社会的深切关注.基于信息非对称理论对电子商务的诚信建设问题进行了探讨.     

非对称信息下政府对企业节能减排激励机制研究

综合考虑经济增长与节能减排的双重任务,将消费者购买行为、节能减排努力准入标准、政府监督信号考虑在内,构建了政府与企业之间的多任务委托‐代理模型。分别探讨了对称信息和非对称信息下政府如何设计有效的激励机制,鼓励和引导企业积极进行节能减排。结果表明:节能减排努力市场准入标准越高,政府应给与企业越多的固定补贴;政府应根据观测到的企业不同节能减排努力水平设计激励机制;政府监督对促进企业节能减排具有重要作用。     

Information sharing about a demand shock

This paper examines two questions in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with a demand shock. Under which conditions is information sharing a subgame-perfect equilibrium? What is the welfare effect when firms are better off? Given these questions, the normal assumptions in the earlier literature can be relaxed in three ways: demand functions can be asymmetric; a demand shock can affect firms differently; distributions of the demand shock and information signals can be arbitrary. Under these general assumptions, the answer to the first question is: every firm's response to the demand shock is stronger when all firms have perfect information than when one firm does so alone; the answer to the second question is: social welfare increases in Cournot competition, and consumer surplus decreases in Bertrand competition.     

Optimal Control of Upstream Pollution under Asymmetric Information

This paper derives optimal bribes to reduce upstream transfrontieremissions in the presence of asymmetric information on the polluter'sconcern for the environment. In a model in which the starting point forthe negotiations on emission reduction is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, itis shown that transfers from the victim induce the polluting country toexaggerate its concern for the environment. As a consequence, in thesecond best solution, abatement of all but the least caring type isdistorted downward and optimal bribes may be such that more caring typesturn them down. These results are in sharp contrast to earlier policyproposals derived for a non-equilibrium starting point. They indicatethat under asymmetric information the binding incentive problem is toprevent the polluting country from claiming not to care about theenvironment and that optimal bribes from the victim should be restrictedto sufficiently environmentally concerned polluters.     

Self-Reporting and Ex Post Asymmetric Information

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions are reduced for self-reporting individuals. Violators get private signals about their individual probabilities of apprehension after they committed a crime. Since violators will self-report if and only if the signal is above a specific threshold, the possibility of self-reporting has an option value that leads to a higher crime rate if the authority's effort remains unchanged. We demonstrate that self-reporting nevertheless increases social welfare even under the restriction that the crime rate must not be higher than without self-reporting. Received June 15, 2001; revised version received December 19, 2001     

信息不对称条件下我国商业银行信贷资产安全分析

本文从信息经济学和行为金融学的特殊视角探讨了信息不对称条件下我国商业银行信贷资产不安全的形成机理,并创造性地对银行信贷资产安全内涵进行了界定,总结和提出了信贷交易中存在的5种主要信息不对称形式,特别是创新地提出了商业银行与商业银行之间、与信用中介评级机构之间存在的信息不对称问题,对于当前形势下加强和防范信贷经营中的超额授信、过度授信、关联企业等风险具有较强的实践意义.     

网购市场鱼龙混杂现象的经济学解释：基于二维不对称信息的视角

网络购物市场存在商品鱼龙混杂的典型现象：高价格的商品不一定高质量,低价格的商品也不一定低质量,表现出明显的信息不对称特征。文章基于网络购物市场所存在的两个维度不对称信息的特征事实,即厂商在产品质量与产品生产成本两个方面拥有私有信息,通过构建二维不对称信息的分析框架,从市场均衡的视角首次解释了上述现象的经济机理。分析表明,由于二维不对称信息的存在,消费者和厂商决策的互动过程使得市场上产品价格与质量不再具有单调递增关系,从而网络购物市场可能出现鱼龙混杂的市场均衡,文章证明了这一均衡在合理的条件下是存在的。文章通过比较静态分析考察了市场环境的变化如何影响商品质量的价格信号显示效率以及消费者购买行为,并考察了网络购物行业商家披露信息、消费者对于商家的反馈评分机制和保证退货等手段对于消除商品鱼龙混杂现象的有效性,为进一步规范发展我国网络购物行业提供了参考。     

食品安全规制:研究缘起、效率及展望

食品安全是一个与人类生存密切相关的问题.食品供给者缺乏社会责任心和长远的眼光,唯利是图,会减少他人和社会的福利;信息不对称是产生市场失灵的主要原因.食品安全的负外部性的存在导致食品安全规制的产生与发展.食品安全规制政策的选择是消费者、农户、食品制造商、食品零售商、政府、纳税人等利益集团博弈的结果,不同利益集团对食品安全规制的诉求不同;主体间利益关系的博弈可能会导致食品安全规制部门不断改进规制方法,但也可能会导致其被食品生产企业所“俘虏”;各种规制方法的不同成本和效率成为改进实施方法最直接的动因.全球食品安全问题不容乐观,构建和完善食品安全规制的体系和体制亟待进行.总的来看,食品安全规制的研究正日益注重博弈论和数理经济学的相关方法的应用,注重相关策略和标准的成本一效率分析,向客观理性的深‘层次研究迈进;国内有关食品安全规制的研究滞后于欧美等发达国家的研究,亟需结合实践,开展理论创新.     

Asymmetric Regulation of Identical Polluters in Oligopoly Models

Studies of optimal second-best environmental regulation of identical polluting agents have invariably ignored potentially welfare-improving asymmetric regulation by imposing equal regulatory treatment of identical firms at the outset. Yet, cost asymmetry between oligopoly firms may well give rise to private as well as social gains. A trade-off is demonstrated for the regulator, between private costs savings and additional social costs when asymmetric treatment is allowed. Asymmetry is indeed optimal for a range of plausible parameter values. Further, it is demonstrated that for a broad class of abatement cost functions, there is scope for increasing welfare while keeping both total output and total emission constant. Some motivating policy issues are discussed in light of the results, including international harmonization and global carbon dioxide reduction.     

不对称管制的弱化对市场结构的影响分析

通过模型对长期存在于我国一些行业的不对称管制现象进行理论分析。模型将不对称管制的弱化看作一个冲击,分析了这个冲击的边际变动对市场结构的影响。结论是放松不对称管制有利于打破市场分割,增加竞争因素,提高企业效率,提高社会福利。     

Entitling the Pollutee: Liability versus Standard under Private Information

This paper considers and compares two different legal means -- full liability and standard – to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs. The familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage. Since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage. Nevertheless, voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist (e.g., for Coasean reasons). However, such out-of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs. Given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law, we propose a modification of standards: the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied, yet can trade this right for financial compensations. Contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing (the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends) and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and (often) better than the polluter pays principle. This relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty (here liability dominates the standard).JEL classification: D62, D82     

A Guide to Extracting Information from Environmental Pressure Groups

This paper examines the relationship between environmental pressure groupsand environmental policy makers. Environmental pressure groups are assumedto possess valuable private information on environmental issues.Environmental pressure groups are also assumed to pursue their ownpreferences, which are only partially correlated with policy makers'preferences. A new aspect is that binding contracts with side payments arenot allowed, which accurately describes the interaction betweenenvironmental pressure groups and governments. It is shown that by choosingprobabilities of acting on environmental pressure groups' signals, adecision maker can force environmental pressure groups to reveal superiorinformation even in the absence of binding contracts.     

Information and housing search: theory and evidence from China market

Asymmetric market information plays a role in households’ housing choice. To study this role, we theoretically and empirically examine the varied behaviours between better-informed and less-informed households in a housing market. The housing search model theoretically predicts that better-informed households are more likely to secure a better deal. With the data from Tianjin in China, hedonic models are calibrated to quantify the impacts of asymmetric information on housing search outcomes. The results show that the less-informed homebuyers need to pay around 1~2.3% more than those better-informed homebuyers after controlling the heterogeneity of housing units, which are consistent with the theoretical predictions. It suggests that policies and institutions to alleviate asymmetric information in housing market could improve the welfare of households.     

中国公众投资者信息需求之探索性研究

公众投资者在获取上市公司信息方面通常处于弱势地位。本文旨在通过问卷调查 ,研究中国公众投资者信息需求的特点 ,对目前信息供给状况的态度 ,以及他们与国外公众投资者在信息需求和决策变量选择上是否存在差异等。研究发现 ,信息的真实性、及时性和充分披露是我国公众投资者认为最重要的质量特征。为此 ,建议通过采取完善与信息披露相关的法律法规、加强监管、严厉处罚等手段 ,促进上市公司及会计师事务所等中介机构披露真实、及时的信息 ;鼓励上市公司更多地作出诸如公司未来收益潜力预测等前瞻性信息的自愿披露。     

Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs

An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation.