Optimal tax base with administrative fixed costs

This note characterizes the optimal base for commodity taxation in the presence of administrative fixed costs varying across goods. For low tax rates, the optimal base only comprises commodities whose discouragement index is greater than the ratio of their administrative costs to the tax they yield. An illustration with UK data shows that a category of goods should be taxed only if the revenue generated on this category is at least ten times greater than its administrative fixed cost. The cost imputable to the category of goods taxed at the standard rate would be at most 6 percent of total VAT revenue. The administration cost associated with categories of goods currently tax-free could justify exemption.     

Ad Valorem Taxation on Intermediate Goods in Oligopoly

Thepaper compares the efficiency of value added taxation (VAT),in which intermediate goods are not taxed, with that of cascadetaxation, in which they are, when levied on imperfectly-competitivevertically-related industries. One type of commodity taxationis not always superior to the other in terms of welfare. Indeed,when intermediate-goods have close substitutes, VAT is the optimalcommodity tax system. But when input substitutability is weakor absent and input producers have market power, they shouldbe taxed. In fact, in the absence of lump sum taxes and withno input substitutability, it is optimal to tax, not to subsidize,the most monopolistic industry. True cascading, in which bothupstream and downstream industries are taxed, is thus betterthan VAT when, besides no input substitutability and both intermediateand final good producers with market power, the needed revenuerequirement is not small. We therefore submit a rationale forthe coexistence of VAT and cascade taxation.     

Cross-border shopping and the Atkinson–Stiglitz theorem

We introduce cross-border shopping and indirect tax competition into a model of optimal taxation. The Atkinson–Stiglitz result that indirect taxation cannot improve the efficiency of information-constrained tax-transfer policies, and that indirect taxes should not be differentiated across goods, is shown to hold in this case even if countries are asymmetric. However, if the tax system must contain indirect taxation, differentiated indirect tax rates arise in the equilibrium and restricting differentiated indirect taxation can be welfare-increasing.     

Optimal policies for sin goods and health care: Tax or subsidy?

In this paper, we examine the optimal policies for sin goods and health care in a two-period economy. Individuals are myopic in the sense that they undervalue the utilities of future consumption and health quality. When investing in health care in the second period, individuals who have previously made myopic decisions may persist in their shortsighted consumption plans (persistent error) or recognize their mistakes (dual self). We show that, for persistent-error myopes, the first-best policy mix requires a subsidy on savings and a tax on sin goods. The health care should be taxed (subsidized) if the degree of myopia concerning future consumption is larger (smaller) than that concerning health quality. For dual-self myopes, the optimal policy for sin goods can be either a tax or a subsidy, depending on the relative degrees of myopia and the property of the health quality function.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Optimal factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy

A two-sector trade model with specific factors and perfect international capital mobility is used to analyze the optimal mix of factor and commodity taxation in a small open economy that faces domestic or international constraints on its tax instruments. In the unconstrained benchmark case, the small country will tax specific factors and domestic consumption but chooses zero tax rates for a selective production tax (i.e., an origin-based commodity tax) and a source-based tax on capital income. When commodity taxation must follow a combination of origin and destination principles, then this mixed commodity tax rate will be positive and its production effects are partly compensated in the optimum by a capital subsidy. These international restrictions interact with domestic constraints when rents accruing to fixed factors cannot be taxed by a separate instrument, and a positive tax rate on capital serves as an indirect way of rent taxation.     

An Efficiency Analysis of Consumption and Production Taxation with an Application to Value-Added Taxation

The usual arguments pro destination-based, consumption-oriented or pro origin-based, production-oriented VAT are found wanting. They largely ignore tax effects on locational choices of firms. This paper provides a comparison of consumption and production taxation within a model of firm and household mobility. It is shown that the case for consumption taxation becomes stronger when profit taxes are not available. The consumption tax is the more targeted instrument when households are to be induced to locate efficiently. It is argued that, with border controls lacking, the alternative option should be seen more in a wage tax and less in a production tax.     

Reforming the Direct–Indirect Tax Mix

This paper provides a new framework for evaluating the welfare effects of commodity tax reforms. It is shown that tax reforms are welfare improving if and only if they satisfy the following intuitive property: on average, consumer prices fall for commodities with high marginal excess burdens. The rule is then applied to analyze a shift from differentiated commodity taxation to direct flat-rate taxation of labour income. The welfare impact of such reforms can be decomposed into two effects: (i) the increase in welfare associated with substitution among taxed commodities, and (ii) the loss in welfare associated with substitution between commodities and leisure. On balance, a shift towards direct taxation is desirable when inter-commodity substitution effects are large relative to commodity–leisure substitution effects. The analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently conflicting results of the tax reform and optimal taxation literatures.     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital

This paper is concerned with the structure and time-consistency of optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital. In a dynamic context, optimal taxation means distributing tax distortions over time in a welfare-maximizing way. For a barter economy, our main finding is that with debt commitments of sufficiently rich maturity structure, an optimal policy, if one exists, is time-consistent. In a monetary economy, the idea of optimal taxation must be broadened to include an ‘inflation tax’, and we find that time-consistency does not carry over. An optimal ‘inflation tax’ requires commitment by ‘rules’ in a sense that has no counterpart in the dynamic theory of ordinary excise taxes. The reason time-consistency fails in a monetary economy is that nominal assets should, from a welfare-maximizing point of view, always be taxed away via an immediate inflation in a kind of ‘capital levy’. This emerges as a new possibility when money is introduced into an economy without capital.     

Three challenges for public finance

Conclusions There is one common thread that runs through all three of these challenges. It is a plea to look beyond the standard model of taxation in which it is assumed that the taxed goods directly enter into individuals' utility functions or firms' production functions. At a very basic level this assumption is incorrect because what is taxed is what the taxpayer reports or the tax agency observes, not what the taxpayer consumes or the firm uses and produces. Thus we must analyze tax systems in which the compliance and enforcement elements are explicit.This focus is especially important for international taxation issues because of the difficulty of taxing nonresidents' income and the foreign-source income of domestic residents. It is inevitable that tax systems are designed with these practical difficulties in mind, and, in order to participate fully in the policy debates, economists ought to think carefully about these issues.The distinction may also hold the key to making sense of the empirical evidence about the impact of the U. S. tax changes of the 1980s. There are many avenues of response to tax rate changes other than changing one's consumption bundle or input mix; we need to think hard about whether these responses preclude or merely accompany the real responses that are of ultimate interest.If public finance is to decline in the 1990s, it will not be because of a lack of intellectually exciting challenges that confront us. There are many such challenges, and I am confident that they will attract the attention of both newly minted and well circulated economists.     

The optimal rate of inflation revisited

Inflation viewed as a tax on cash balances is investigated using the optimal commodity tax framework. The optimal inflation rate is shown to depend on the effect of changes in the rate of inflation on quantity demanded of ‘costly-to-produce’ goods. Even when other goods are taxed, it is not always optimal to have a positive tax on money, as Phelps and others have claimed. A zero tax or even a rate of deflation greater than the pre-tax rate of interest may be optimal.     

Optimal taxation with home production

Optimal taxes for Europe and the U.S. are derived in a realistically calibrated model in which agents buy consumption goods and services and use home capital and labor to produce household services. The optimal tax rate on services is substantially lower than the tax rate on goods. Specifically, the planner cannot tax home production directly and instead lowers the tax rate on market services to increase the relative price of home production. The optimal tax rate on the return to home capital is strictly positive and the welfare gains from switching to optimal taxes are large.     

应税消费品的界定、识别与调整——基于法律、技术与政治互动的税收逻辑

当前,我国消费税制改革与立法一体化工作的关键问题在于应税消费品的法治选择,该过程表现为立法框定、技术识别与政治调整的互动逻辑。在立法层面,针对现有应税消费品概念的语义抽象性,有必要在分析选择课税理论、梳理历史变迁的基础上,完成应税消费品概念的法律化和内涵化;在技术层面,基于典型税案中所暴露出的问题,应从形式和实质维度强化法律规则与技术标准的衔接;在政治层面,应从税制改革与税收法定的协调性、功能明晰与税目重构的关联性、选择课税与政治决策的程序化方面着力。     

Optimal tax-timing and asset allocation when tax rebates on capital losses are limited

This article studies the portfolio problem with realization-based capital gain taxation when limited amounts of losses qualify for tax rebate payments, as is the case under current US tax law. When the tax rate applicable to realized losses exceeds that on realized capital gains, it can be optimal to realize capital gains immediately and pay capital gain taxes to regain the option to use potential future losses against a higher tax rate. This incentive adds an entirely new and as yet unstudied dimension to the portfolio problem. It causes risk averse investors to hold more equity and attain higher welfare levels than is the case when trading under a tax system that seeks to collect the same amount of taxes, but does not allow for tax rebate payments. This is because the benefit to these investors from having their losses subsidized is greater than the suffering from having profits taxed at a higher rate.     

关于数据的可税性研究

数据在经济活动中的地位越来越重要,能否对数据征税(即数据的可税性)的问题也开始逐步显现。本文从经济、法律、征管三个层面分析了可税性的标准以及数据的可税性。尽管数据满足可税性条件并且实际上已经开始征税,但我国数据产业的征税范围仍然偏窄,相关税收收入在规模、比重以及增速方面还有很大的提升空间。要在数字经济时代成为新的重要税源,数据课税还需要解决在理论、制度和管理方面存在的一些问题。     

Indirect tax reform and the role of exemptions

This paper examines the question of whether indirect tax rates should be uniform, using four different modelling strategies. First, marginal tax reform is examined. This is concerned with the optimal direction of small changes in effective indirect tax rates and requires considerably less information than the calculation of optimal rates. Second, the welfare effects of a partial shift from the current indirect tax system in Australia towards a goods and services tax (GST) are considered, with particular emphasis on differences between household types and the role of exemptions. Third, in view of the stress on a distributional role for exemptions of certain goods from a GST, the potential limits to such redistribution are considered. The fourth approach examines the extent of horizontal inequity and reranking that can arise when there are non‐uniform tax rates. These inequities arise essentially because of preference heterogeneity.     

个人所得税改革对居民消费的效应评价与完善路径

当前我国居民消费不足的最主要原因在于居民收入水平不高、国民收入分配失衡,所以2018年个人所得税改革的重点是提高费用扣除标准、调整税率结构,降低纳税人负担,增加纳税人可支配收入,提高居民消费水平。要进一步促进居民消费,个人所得税有必要继续减税,同时进一步调节收入分配差距,使收入分配更加公平。具体对策包括:将专项附加扣除中的子女教育支出范围扩大为子女养育支出,增加家庭合并征税模式,费用扣除标准指数化动态调整,进一步优化税率结构,建立负所得税制度。     

Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?

The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good that is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax country and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given, and an asymmetry is introduced through different preferences for public goods. Two tax coordination measures are discussed—a minimum tax rate and a coordinated increase in the costs of cross-border shopping. It is shown that tax coordination generally benefits the high-tax country while the low-tax country will gain only if the intensity of tax competition is high in the initial equilibrium or if governments are pricesensitive toward the effective marginal costs of public good supply.     

Pawns and queens revisited: public provision of private goods when individuals make mistakes

This paper analyses the optimal tax policy and public provision of private goods when the government is paternalistic and has a redistributive objective. When individuals only differ with respect to their income-earning abilities, the publicly-provided goods should be overprovided, relative to the decentralised optimum, if society’s marginal valuation of them exceeds the individual valuation and if these goods are complements to labour supply. However, when the individuals also differ in terms of their valuation of the publicly-provided good, this simple conclusion does not hold. Optimal marginal income tax rates are shown to differ from the standard rules if publicly-provided goods and labour supply are related.