The Effect of Earnings–Announcement Timing on Earnings Management

This paper examines whether firms which delay earnings announcements engage in earnings management. The cross–sectional version of the modified Jones 1995 model is used to estimate 'normal' accruals. Prior research has documented that, on average, delayed earnings announcements are associated with negative earnings surprises. Our evidence suggests that the market anticipates unfavorable earnings news when it observes reporting delays. As a consequence, late reporters appear to make the most of a bad situation by employing income–decreasing accruals in big–bath–type earnings management and in contractual renegotiations. We find that the magnitude of income–reducing abnormal accruals is related to the reporting lag.     

The impact on stock prices of deferral and elimination of internal control audit requirement for small firms

This paper examines the cumulative market reaction to the events related to deferral of internal control audit requirement under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and its elimination under the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 for nonaccelerated filers (small firms). We document that small firms experienced negative cumulative abnormal returns around these events; and the differences between the cumulative abnormal returns for small firms and the two control groups (accelerated and large accelerated filers) were negative and significant at the 1% level. These results support the notion that market participants value the reliability of financial information irrespective of the firm size. Within the small firms, we find no firm characteristic significantly explains the market reaction to the events considered. That is, all small firms lost market value in reaction to the events that delayed and eliminated their internal control audit requirement.     

The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs,Earnings Quality,and Stock Prices

This paper exploits a natural quasi‐experiment to isolate the effects that were uniquely due to the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX): U.S. firms with a public float under $75 million could delay Section 404 compliance, and foreign firms under $700 million could delay the auditor's attestation requirement. As designed, Section 404 led to conservative reported earnings, but also imposed real costs. On net, SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms.     

Firm Characteristics and Stock Price

This study examines the stock price reaction to the internal control reporting required under Section 404 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 for three distinct groups of firms. After controlling for general stock price movements, we find that stock returns are most negative for firms that delay filing of their internal control reports, continue to be negative for firms with ineffective internal controls, and are positive for firms with effective internal controls. The decrease in stock prices of the first two groups is more pronounced for those with a lower return on assets, higher growth rate in sales, and no prior disclosure of their internal controls weaknesses. Our results indicate that market participants value the reliability of financial information ensuing from Section 404 compliance, irrespective of firm size and debt proportion. Thus, regulators and policymakers worldwide should consider mandating comparable SOX 404 compliance for all publicly held companies to improve the accuracy and reliability of financial reports.     

A NOTE ON FIRM SIZE, INFORMATION AVAILABILITY AND MARKET REACTIONS TO US STOCK OWNERSHIP REPORTING ANNOUNCEMENTS

This note examines cross-sectional differences in market reaction to five percent stock ownership reporting announcements. The results presented here document an inverse relationship between firm size and market reaction. Specifically, the announcement day market reaction is 310 percent larger for a portfolio of small firms compared to a portfolio of large firms.     

Share price performance following actual share repurchases

Using unique actual daily share repurchase data from Hong Kong, this paper investigates share price performance surrounding and following actual share repurchases. It is found that repurchasing firms buy back shares following price drops, suggesting that they behave opportunistically when implementing actual share repurchases. On average, the initial 3-day market response to actual repurchases is about 0.43%. Repurchasing firms do not seem to exhibit superior abnormal performance over long horizons when they make actual share repurchases. However, the price performance of repurchasing firms varies across firm size and market–book value ratios, and shows a clear and consistent pattern. The market responds the most favorably to repurchases that are made by small and value (high book-to-market value) firms. Over a long horizon, there is some evidence that repurchases made by value firms show superior performance. The three-year buy-and-hold abnormal return, which is measured against a portfolio of control firms that are matched by size and book-to-market value ratios, is over 20%. At least, repurchases made by high book-to-market value firms, for which undervaluation is more likely to occur, can benefit long-term shareholders.     

Stock price informativeness,cross-listings,and investment decisions

We show that a cross-listing enables firms to obtain, from the stock market, more precise information about the value of their growth opportunities. Thus, cross-listed firms make better investment decisions and trade at a premium. This theory of cross-listings implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices is larger for cross-listed firms. Moreover, the cross-listing premium is positively related to the size of growth opportunities and negatively related to the quality of managerial information. The sensitivity of the premium to the size of growth opportunities increases with factors that strengthen the impact of the cross-listing on price informativeness.     

Bond Market Access,Credit Quality,and Capital Structure: Canadian Evidence

We examine the impact of bond market access (measured by having a credit rating) on leverage for Canadian high credit quality (HQ) and low credit quality (LQ) firms, and find that the leverage impact is more pronounced for LQ firms. The results are similar for U.S. firms. Our results are confirmed when we control for the firm's credit quality, examine the change in leverage around rating initiation, and account for the issue size effect. A similar leverage impact for Canadian and U.S. LQ firms suggests that the Canada‐U.S. bond market integration has mitigated the financial constraints for Canadian LQ firms.     

Big is brilliant: Understanding the Chinese size effect through profitability shocks

Taking a dynamic view, this paper assesses the extent to which profitability shocks affect the size premium in the Chinese market. In the short run, there is a significant U-shaped relationship between size and profitability shocks; i.e., both small and large firms experience large and (in most cases) positive profitability shocks, while firms with medium market capitalizations display small profitability shocks. In the long run, profitability shocks in large firms remain large and stable, while profitability shocks in small firms decrease sharply. Adjusting for profitability shocks increases the returns of small firms but decreases the returns of large firms, indicating that large and positive profitability shocks in small firms cannot bring investors sizable returns even though the correlation between profitability shocks and returns is positive. Mismatches between profitability shocks and the per-unit return impact of such shocks (e.g., when firms experience positive shocks but the market reacts to these shocks irrationally) can help explain this phenomenon. Our work reveals that in terms of fundamentals, large firms are very worthy of investment owing to their superb fundamental performance, i.e., large and persistent profitability shocks.     

Are firms from developed markets more international than firms from emerging markets?

Regionalist supporters’ claim that most of the world's largest firms are regional rather than global and that managers should be encouraged to ‘think regional, act local and forget global’ (Rugman and Moore, 2004, p. 67). We apply the matrix of multinationality proposed by Aggarwal et al. (2011) to a sample of the world's 500 largest corporations, the Fortune Global 500. We show that these firms range from purely domestic to regional, trans-regional and entirely global with most lying in the trans-regional and global categories. Our results imply that global strategies are essential to international trade and management in today's business environment. We compare multinationality results by market type (developed versus emerging market), industry, size and age. We find that firms from more advanced economies tend to be older, larger and more multinational than firms from emerging markets. We find no relationship between multinationality and age or multinationality and size, and conclude that developed market firms are not more multinational as a result of size, age or industrial structure.     

Is There a Size Effect in the Pricing of Stocks in the Chinese Stock Markets?: The Case of Bull Versus Bear Markets

Size effect studies generally suggest that a return premium exists for small firms. While the size effect has mostly disappeared in recent years in mature markets (e.g., US and UK), it remains mostly strong in developing markets. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between firm size and excess stock returns in the Chinese stock markets, and to examine this effect in both a bull and bear market. No studies have previously examined these relationships in the Chinese markets. The results of the study indicate that a size effect exists in the Chinese stock markets over the 6-year period from 1998 to 2003. We find small firms have significantly greater excess returns than large firms. Moreover, small firms are found to have a stronger reaction to the direction of the market than large firms. Small firms have significantly greater positive excess returns than large firms during the bull market. However, small firms have significantly greater negative returns (using total market value), or no significant difference in returns (using float market value) during the bear market period.     

Monetary policy and stock returns: Financing constraints and asymmetries in bull and bear markets

We examine asymmetries in the impact of monetary policy surprises on stock returns between bull and bear markets in the period 1994 to 2005. We ask how these impacts respond to the relative ability of firms to obtain external finance. We find that the impact of a surprise monetary policy in a bear market is large, negative, and statistically significant, and this holds across size decile portfolios. The impact of a surprise policy action in a bear market for most industries is significantly greater than the impact of surprise monetary policy in a bull market. Controlling for the capacity for external finance, stock returns of firms in bear states respond more than firms in bull states. Capacity for external finance is more important in a bear market, as it partially mitigates the larger impact of monetary policy in a bear market.     

Preemption,leverage, and financing constraints

This paper investigates the interactions between preemptive competition and leverage in a duopoly market. We investigate both a case in which the firms have optimal financial structures, and a case in which financing constraints require firms to finance their investments by debt. Our findings are that the second mover always leaves the duopoly market before the leader, although the leader may exit before the follower's entry. The leverage effects of debt financing can increase the value of a firm and accelerate investment, even in the presence of preemptive competition. Notably, financing constraints can delay preemptive investment and improve firm values in preemptive equilibrium. Indeed, the leader's high leverage due to financing constraints can lower the first-mover advantage and weaken preemptive competition. Especially with strong first-mover advantage, the financing constraint effects can dominate the leverage effects. These findings are almost consistent with the empirical evidence, which shows that high leverage leads to competitive disadvantage and mitigates product market competition.     

Share Repurchases, the Clustering Problem, and the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis

We examine the market reaction to announcements of actual share repurchases, events that cluster both within and across firms. Using a multivariate regression model, we find that the market reacts positively to the events, indicating that these announcements provide additional information to that contained in the initial repurchase intention announcements. Further, the market response is especially favorable for firms with overinvestment problems as measured by Tobin's q , and is not related to signaling costs as measured by the size of the repurchase. Our findings generally support the hypothesis that share repurchases reduce the agency costs of excessive free cash flow .     

Audit firm, corporate governance, and audit quality: Evidence from Bahrain

The aim of this research is to document the perceptions of credit and financial analysts with regard to the relationship between the effectiveness of audit committee, size of the auditing firm and audit quality in the context of Bahrain, which is characterized by a developed financial sector, low-liquidity stock market, low turnover in board of directors of listed firms, an inactive merger and acquisitions market and almost non-extent litigation. A survey of 300 credit and financial analysts shows that analysts considered auditors' opinion useful. Both credit and financial analysts see the credibility of financial statements to be a function of the size of the auditing firm. Both groups assume that the characteristics of Big-Four firms allow them to produce better-quality reports than non-Big firms. Non-audit services were found to affect auditor's independence and hence impair audit quality. Both the groups of analysts believe that effective audit committee enhances the quality of audit reports. Financial analysts perceive financial statements to be more credible than do credit analysts.     

Managerial compensation: Luck,skill or labor markets?

Luck, skill and labor markets all have empirical support as determinants of managerial compensation. We examine the relative importance of pay for luck, managerial skill and labor market opportunities in determining compensation. We measure luck as the predictable component of firm performance, measure skill using managerial fixed effects and measure labor market opportunities as the compensation of executives at matched firms. Our results imply that managerial skill is the most important determinant of managers' compensation, followed by firm size and labor market opportunities, and that luck is not an important determinant of managerial compensation.     

Do less regulated markets attract lower quality firms? Evidence from the London AIM market

The paper examines whether the moderately regulated London AIM market is at a disadvantage in attracting high quality firms. The results show that firms listed on AIM are of the same quality level as firms listed in the US and in Continental Europe, albeit smaller in size. Furthermore, the delisting and valuation pattern is the same across markets, whereas AIM listed firms raise relatively more capital. Thus, rather than catering to low quality firms seeking to conceal their type, the AIM market attracts small firms that – due to size – face disproportional regulatory costs, but are otherwise equivalent to firms listing in more regulated markets.     

CEO EXTRAVERSION AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF FIRM DYNAMICS,PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION,AND FINANCIAL CRISIS

Using panel data of U.S. firms, we focus on an important yet understudied facet of the chief executive officer's (CEO) personality—extraversion—and how it affects corporate capital structure decisions. We examine how this relation is moderated by financing (tax) benefits, financial crisis, firm size, growth opportunities, and collateralization. The results show that firms managed by extraverted CEOs use greater financial leverage, adjusting toward target leverage levels at a faster speed, with about half-life within a year for book and market leverage. In addition, the positive extraversion–leverage relation is enhanced for firms that are large, have greater collateralizable assets, and are more vulnerable to external shocks (financial crisis). Last, although the positive extraversion–leverage relation holds particularly when product market competition is high, the effect is attenuated for high-growth opportunity firms.     

Capital expenditures,financial constraints,and the use of options

This paper analyzes why gold mining firms use options instead of linear strategies to hedge their gold price risk. Consistent with financial constraints based theories, the largest and least financially constrained firms are the most likely to hedge with insurance strategies (put options), while more constrained firms finance the purchase of puts by selling calls (collars). The most financially constrained firms use strategies that involve selling calls. Firms with large investment programs are also more likely to use insurance rather than linear strategies. Firms’ hedging instrument choices are also correlated with current market conditions, suggesting that managers’ market views partially drive hedging instrument choices.     

On the relation between the market-to-book ratio, growth opportunity, and leverage ratio

The negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is one of the most widely documented empirical regularities in the capital structure literature. Most related studies take this negative relation as given and debate about its economic interpretation. We show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios face lower debt financing costs and borrow more. The relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is not monotonic and is positive for most firms (more than 88% of COMPUSTAT firms and more than 95% of total market capitalization). The previously documented negative relation is driven by a subset of firms with high market-to-book ratios.