Making room to manoeuvre: How firms increase their influence with others in business networks

Earlier research has highlighted the dynamic nature of influencing in business networks, and shown that firms may vary considerably in their influence, defined as their potential to achieve changes in the activities, resources, or goals of other firms in the business network. There is, however, limited understanding of the specific means of influencing which may allow firms, over time, to increase their influence with other firms in the same network. Drawing on a longitudinal case study, we describe how a firm, through influencing others by the dynamic enactment of network management activities, gradually increased its influence with other firms in the business network. Based on our observations, we offer a processual model for influencing in business networks that links specific network management activities to conditions under which they are used.     

Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences

Institutional investors report that they prefer to invest in firms with greater board independence despite the fact that researchers have been unable to demonstrate a link between board independence and firm performance. We investigate whether differences among institutional investors affect these preferences. We find that trading strategies have some effect but that mutual funds—facing the strongest institutional pressures—have significantly stronger preferences for firms with greater board independence than do other types of institutional investors. This suggests that institutional investor preferences for independent boards are at least partially driven by institutional pressures rather than anticipated reductions in agency costs. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Firm-specific time preferences and postmerger firm performance

This study investigates the role of firm-level discount factors in evaluating the impact of mergers on market outcomes. Discount factors reflect time preferences for future cash flows and are used to determine the present value of investment projects such as mergers. Firm-specific discount factors imply that firms may attach different present values to mergers. We elicit firm-specific time preferences and identify firms’ discount factors using firm-specific production data while building on the existence of learning-by-doing in the semiconductor industry. Our estimation results show that firm-specific discount factors explain firms’ production decisions. We also find that firms’ discount factors and merger acquisition strategies explain heterogeneous merger outcomes. Our results show that acquiring firms characterized by low discount factors (impatient firms) are highly efficient and merge with highly efficient and innovative firms. Impatient acquirers achieve relatively higher efficiency gains in the short run than patient acquirers and adopt acquisition strategies that put more weight on achieving instant efficiency gains. In contrast, patient acquirers are least efficient and merge with firms that are larger than themselves. Patient acquirers place more value on achieving efficiency gains in the more distant future.     

Disconnect in trade show staffing: A comparison of exhibitor emphasis and attendee preferences

This research explores how and whether staffing at trade shows by exhibitors is consistent with attendee preferences for staffing in this channel. Using secondary data from 9215 attendees and 885 exhibitors, we observe that relative to attendee preferences, exhibitors significantly understaff with technical personnel, while overstaffing with executive/upper management and sales/marketing personnel. Additional comparisons between attendees who are decision-makers vs. influencers in the purchase process, between attendees from different kinds of firms (B2B vs. B2C, large vs. small firms) and between attendees to trade shows that differ in geographic scope suggest that substantial inconsistencies persist between preferences of attendees and staffing by exhibitors.     

Ain't it “suite”? Bundling in the PC office software market

Research Summary: We examine the importance of office suites for the evolution of the personal computer (PC) office software market in the 1990s. An estimated discrete‐choice model reveals a positive correlation of consumer values for spreadsheets and wordprocessors, a bonus value for suites, and advantages for Microsoft products. We employ the estimates to simulate various hypothetical market structures to evaluate the profitability, welfare, and competitive effects of suites under alternative correlation assumptions. We find that firms benefit greatly from bundling components (i.e., a spreadsheet and a word processor) when the correlation of consumer preferences over the components in the bundle is positive. Our work adds another aspect to the recent work in the strategy literature that examines benefits from bundling when there are complementary relationships across the products in the bundle. Managerial Summary: Our research helps managers understand the conditions under which product bundling is likely to be most profitable. We show that one key to enhanced profitability is the correlation in consumer preferences over the individual products. We consider the performance implications of bundling under a variety of alternative market structures and competitive environments. Our analysis reveals that firms benefit greatly from bundling when the correlation of consumer valuations over the products is positive. Consumers benefit as well. Hence, bundling is a win‐win for firms and their customers. Since profits increase by more than consumer surplus, bundling leads to increased value capture by the firms. Consequently, it may be profitable for firms to invest in actively increasing the correlation in consumer preferences over products in the bundle.     

PAYING FOR LOYALTY: PRODUCT BUNDLING IN OLIGOPOLY*

In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied brands continue to set independently. We show that a pair of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of other firms and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling arrangements, there are no beneficiaries and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub‐optimal brand mix.     

Locational Determinants of Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in China

This study examines 2,933 cases of Japanese investment in 27 provinces and regions in China to identify the role that policy determinants had in influencing the sub-national location decision of Japanese firms in China. The empirical results show that the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Opening Coastal Cities (OCCs) were a successful policy instrument initially, as SEZs and OCCs had a strong influence on Japanese foreign investment during the early years of China's liberalized foreign investment environment. Since the mid-1990s SEZs and OCCs have attracted proportionally less foreign investment as competition from other special investment zones has intensified in China. From these observations, we discuss the periodic influence of SEZs and OCCs and introduce and review the influence of newly emerging investment zones. We also draw inferences to the location choice literature in terms of understanding the variable influence of policy factors and traditional locational indicators as driven by temporal changes in investor motivations and preferences in a country.     

Brand-specific tastes for quality

This paper develops a model of nonlinear pricing with competition. The novel element is that each consumer's willingness to pay for quality is private information and is allowed to differ across brands. The consumer's preferences are represented by a multidimensional type containing the marginal value of quality for different products. Buyers with high willingness to pay for quality also display strong preferences for particular brands, and require higher discounts in order to switch away from their favorite product. Therefore, competition is fiercer for buyers with lower tastes for quality, and hence more elastic demands. This is in sharp contrast to earlier models in which competition is fiercer for higher-taste, more valuable buyers. In equilibrium, firms either compete intensively for the entire market (providing strictly positive rents to all consumers) or shut down the least profitable segment of the market. Quality levels are distorted downwards for all buyers, except for those with the highest type. The number of competing firms and the degree of correlation across brand preferences enhance the efficiency of the allocation.     

Dysfunctional learning in decision processes: the case of employee reciprocity

While traditional economic models characterize individuals as boundlessly self‐interested, decades of empirical findings suggest that individuals' self‐interest motives are constrained by concurrent preferences for fairness. Individuals act on these preferences by behaving reciprocally: rewarding others perceived as behaving fairly and punishing others perceived as behaving unfairly. Successful firms must learn to navigate environments characterized by the reciprocity of their transaction partners. This paper investigates firms' judgments about employee reciprocity and posits a dysfunctional learning process whereby firms that overestimate employee reciprocity learn to correct their beliefs through feedback, while those that underestimate employee reciprocity do not. The result, demonstrated through computer simulation, is a systematic bias toward an overemphasis on employee self‐interest, and a resulting inefficiency in wage choices that hurts firm profitability. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing with customer recognition

This article studies the dynamic effects of behaviour-based price discrimination and customer recognition in a duopolistic market where the distribution of consumers' preferences is discrete. Consumers are myopic and firms are forward looking. In the static and first-period equilibrium firms choose prices with mixed strategies. When price discrimination is allowed, forward-looking firms have an incentive to avoid customer recognition, thus the probability that both will have positive first-period sales decreases as they become more patient. Furthermore, an asymmetric equilibrium sometimes exists, yielding a 100–0 division of the first-period sales. As a whole, price discrimination is bad for profits but good for consumer surplus and welfare.     

Explaining Patterns of Profit-Sharing Activity

This paper compares the characteristics of firms that adopt deferred profit-sharing plans with those that adopt pension plans. Tax reports from a sample of 6, 000 firms in various industries are incorporated into logistic regression equations that predict whether these firms will have pension or deferred profit-sharing plans. The evidence suggests that custom in the labor market may play the greatest role in influencing the choice between the two plans.     

Resident Bid Preference,Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico

In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes.     

MARKET SEGMENTATION WITH NONLINEAR PRICING*

We study the benefits and drawbacks of allowing firms to offer different price‐quality menus to captive consumers and to consumers more exposed to competition (market segmentation). We show that the effect of market segmentation depends on the relationship between the range of consumer preferences found in captive and competitive markets. When the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘wide,’ segmentation is quality and (aggregate) welfare reducing, while the opposite holds when the range of consumer preferences in captive markets is ‘narrow.’ Segmentation always harms captive consumers, while it always benefits consumers located in competitive markets.     

Complementary assets as pipes and prisms: Innovation incentives and trajectory choices

The issue of the failure of incumbent firms in the face of radical technical change has been a central question in the technology strategy domain for some time. We add to prior contributions by highlighting the role a firm's existing set of complementary assets have in influencing its investment in alternative technological trajectories. We develop an analytical model that considers firm heterogeneity with respect to both technological trajectories and complementary assets. Complementary assets play a dual role in incumbents' investment behavior toward radical technological change: they are not only resources (pipes) that can buffer firms from technology change, but also prisms through which firms view those changes, influencing both the magnitude of resources that should be invested and the trajectory to which these resources should be directed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Cultural distance,investment flow,and control in cross‐border cooperation

Previous research analyzing the impact of cultural distance on joint venture negotiations has often confounded firm and environment effects. To decouple these effects, the cross‐border cooperation preferences of small and medium‐sized Korean firms were studied, considering simultaneously firms involved in inward and outward investment ventures. While cultural distance showed no significant relationship with the degree of control sought over the cooperative ventures, cultural distance was significantly related with a preference for ventures in domestic or foreign markets. The impact of cultural distance was found to be greater in inward investment than in outward investment. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Technological innovation of firms in China: Past, present, and future

What do we know about technological innovation of firms in China? What are the directions for future research on this topic? This paper summarizes and discusses some of the newest literature on technological innovation of firms in China in the following three ways: (1) the influence of firms?? external factors, (2) the influence of firms?? internal factors, and (3) interfirm cooperation factors. Based on the analysis of these articles, we propose a framework which highlights these influencing factors, decision-making and implementation of technological innovation and innovation performance, in the context of China??s emerging economy. This framework sheds lights on future innovation research.     

Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions

Collusion in auctions can take different forms, such as refraining from bidding. Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted in Kentucky from 2005-2007. We determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and potential bidders for each paving project. We analyze firms’ bid participation decisions, including variables affecting costs as well as competitive and strategic effects. In many geographic markets where firms face only a few identifiable rivals, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid.     

纵向一体化的选择及其影响因素——基于能源行业的实证分析

文章研究中国能源行业的纵向一体化状况,以能源企业的纵向并购为例运用Logit模型分析了能源企业选择纵向一体化方式时考虑的因素。研究结果表明,策略效应和交易成本对能源企业采用纵向一体化的意愿影响较大,生产成本和不确定性的影响较小。     

Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.