Aggregation,Dividend Irrelevancy,and Earnings‐Value Relations*

In this paper I show that the aggregation of operating and financial income imposes three conditions on earnings‐based value functions. These three conditions provide a shortcut way to identify dividend irrelevant value functions. For example, consider any value function V_t of book value b_t, earnings x_t, and dividends d_t. The aggregation conditions imply that V_t must be of the form V_t = (1 ? k)bt + k [f xt ? dt]. f is the permanent earnings capitalization factor and undetermined weight k may be any function of Δ_t ≡[φx_t ? d_t] ? b_t. The Ohlson 1995 model is the special case when k is constant. But generally k does not have to be constant to maintain dividend irrelevancy. Whenk varies with Δ_t, V_t is nonlinear in earnings. Hence, this result specifies how V_t may be nonlinear in earnings in settings with limited liability or production or abandonment options and still be dividend‐irrelevant. An even more remarkable feature of this result is that it holds whether accounting is clean surplus or not. One must conclude that accounting‐based valuation properly builds from accounting aggregation and Δ_t, and not from the clean surplus relation and abnormal earnings as many now believe.     

Dividend Policy at Firms Accused of Accounting Fraud

Recent studies and some policy experts have posited that dividends indicate higher‐quality earnings. In this study, we test this conjecture by comparing the dividend policies of firms accused of accounting fraud to those of firms not accused of accounting fraud. Specifically, we examine whether alleged fraud firms are as likely to be dividend payers as non‐fraud firms, and whether managers of dividend‐paying fraud firms increase dividends at the same rate as managers of non‐fraud firms. Our data reveal that dividend paying status is negatively associated with the probability of committing accounting fraud. In addition, we also find that, during the alleged fraud period, the earnings–dividends relation is weaker for the alleged fraud firms relative to firms not accused of fraud. Finally, using propensity score match tests, the data provide evidence that managers of alleged fraud firms increase dividends less often than managers of firms not accused of fraud, consistent with the alleged fraud firms not being able to match the dividend policies of firms not accused of fraud. Overall, our results suggest that dividends, especially dividend increases, are associated with higher earnings quality.     

Dividend Stickiness,Debt Covenants,and Earnings Management

Consistent with the notion that dividends are very sticky, Daniel, Denis, and Naveen ( 2008 ) report evidence that firms manage earnings upward when pre‐managed earnings are expected to fall short of dividend payments. However, we find that this evidence is not robust when controlling for firms' tendency to manage earnings upward to avoid reporting earnings declines; only firms with high leverage exhibit a statistically weak tendency to manage earnings to close deficits of pre‐managed earnings relative to dividends. We further report that the decision to cut dividends depends on whether reported earnings fall short of past dividends, but not on earnings management that eliminates a shortfall in pre‐managed earnings relative to dividend payments. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms that face dividend constraints are more likely to cut dividends than to manage earnings to avoid dividend cuts.     

The Earnings Quality Information Content of Dividend Policies and Audit Pricing

Recent studies indicate dividends are associated with higher‐quality earnings. Our study extends the literature by examining whether dividends' information is associated with auditors' assessment of their clients' earnings quality. Our results show that auditors charge lower fees to dividend‐paying clients than to nondividend‐paying clients and the average fee discount ranges from 6.0 to 10.6 percent. More importantly, we find dividends have an interactive effect with respect to earnings persistence and earnings manipulation: the negative association between audit fees and earnings persistence is more pronounced for dividend firms; and dividend payouts mitigate the positive relation between earnings manipulation risk and audit fees. Our results imply dividends reduce audit risk by enhancing clients' earnings quality information. We contribute to the literature by showing that auditors reflect the earnings quality information content of firms' dividend policies in their pricing decisions.     

On Comparing Cash Flow and Accrual Accounting Models for Use in Equity Valuation: A Response to Lundholm and O'Keefe (CAR,Summer 2001)*

A claim is commonly made that cash flow and accrual accounting methods for valuing equities must always yield equivalent valuations. A recent paper by Lundholm and O'Keefe 2001, for example, claims that, because of this equivalence, there is nothing to be learned from empirical comparison of valuation models. So they dismiss recent research that has shown that accrual accounting residual income models and earnings capitalization models perform, over a range of conditions, better than cash flow or dividend discount models. This paper demonstrates, with examples, that the claim is misguided. Practice inevitably involves forecasting over finite, truncated horizons, and the accounting specified in a model — cash versus accrual accounting in particular — is pertinent to valuation with finite‐horizon forecasting. Indeed, the issue of choosing a valuation model is an issue of specifying pro forma accounting, and so, for finite‐horizon forecasts, one cannot be indifferent to the accounting.     

Shareholder Income Taxes and the Relation between Earnings and Returns*

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether and how shareholder‐level taxes affect earnings response coefficients (ERCs). Our tests indicate that when the tax rate on dividends increases, ERCs decrease for firms with high levels of dividend yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual. For firms with high levels of share repurchase yield and whose marginal investor is likely to be an individual, an increase in dividend tax rate has no discernible effect on ERCs. These results are consistent with the notion that the tax penalty on dividends, relative to capital gains, reduces the earnings‐return relation.     

可持续增长视角下股利理论与股利政策研究

从可持续增长的模型入手,从一个全新的角度探讨了传统经典股利理论和股利政策与企业财务可持续增长的关联性,为全面、正确认识股利理论和股利政策提供了一种新的方法,为实务中决策者制定股利政策提供理论参考。     

A Comparison of Dividend,Cash Flow,and Earnings Approaches to Equity Valuation*

Standard formulas for valuing the equity of going concerns require forecasting payoffs to infinity but practical analysis requires that payoffs be forecasted over finite horizons. This truncation inevitably involves often-troublesome terminal value calculations. This paper contrasts dividend discount techniques, discounted cash flow analysis, and techniques based on accrual earnings when each is applied with finite-horizon forecasts. Valuations based on average ex post payoffs over various horizons, with and without terminal value calculations, are compared with ex ante market prices to discover the error introduced by each technique in truncating the horizon. Valuation errors are lower using accrual earnings techniques rather than cash flow and dividend discounting techniques. The accounting features that make a given technique less than ideal for finite horizon analysis are also detailed. Conditions where a given technique requires particularly long forecasting horizons are identified and the performance of the alternative techniques under those conditions is examined.     

大股东控制与盈余管理行为研究:来自配股公司的证据

在上市公司配股融资过程中,大股东具有通过盈余管理来获得配股资格和提高股票价格的强烈动机。本文以1998—2002年间456家实施配股的上市公司为样本,基于行业横截面数据和修正的Jones模型研究了配股融资过程中盈余管理的分布特征,并分析了大股东控制对盈余管理行为的影响。研究结果表明：（1）上市公司在配股前3个年度和配股当年存在显著的盈余管理机会主义行为;（2）配股公司的盈余管理程度与第一大股东持股比例具有倒u型关系：当第一大股东持股比例低于53．20％时表现出正相关关系,而当第一大股东持股比例高于53．20％时则表现出负相关关系;（3）盈余管理程度与前2—10大股东持股集中度、负债比率和资本支出水平之间具有负相关关系．而与管理层持股比例和公司规模之间具有正相关关系。大股东通过盈余管理实现了对小股东财富的掠夺效应。造成了上市公司价值、声誉和后续融资能力的下降。     

货币政策不确定性与企业现金持有——现金股利视角的新解释

研究利用中国A股上市公司样本,系统探讨了货币政策不确定性对企业现金持有策略的影响.研究发现:随着货币政策不确定性的提高,企业现金持有水平降低.深入研究发现货币政策不确定性对企业现金持有策略的影响主要通过现金股利渠道发挥作用,即在货币政策不确定性较高时期,企业持有的现金更多用于支持现金股利分配,籍此向市场传递积极信号.进一步研究排除了投资机会与代理成本等潜在干扰因素的影响,并且结合产权性质差异的分析发现货币政策不确定性对于非国有企业现金持有策略的影响更为明显.研究一方面基于不确定性视角为货币政策如何影响企业现金管理策略提出了新解释——现金股利渠道,有助于更好地理解我国上市公司的现金持有策略;另一方面也说明货币政策频繁调整所导致的货币政策不确定性很可能是加剧实体经济经营风险的宏观诱因.     

股利政策与股票的持有效用

本文以Ohlson（1995）模型为基础，通过对不同企业发展状态下的股利政策封股东财富的影响进行分析，结果表明处于快速增长期的企业不发放现金股利是利好消息，而处于衰退期的企业则发放现金股利封股东有利。     

The theory of value and earnings,and an introduction to the Ball-Brown analysis*

Abstract. The paper develops a simple and parsimonious model that relates earnings and unexpected earnings to market returns. The analysis emphasizes that any model under uncertainty must be consistent with the theory of value, earnings, and dividends under certainty (i.e., Hicksian income theory). An extension of this theory exists such that the model subsumes uncertainty. The Hicksian approach is useful because it embeds key dividend irrelevancy concepts due to Modigliani and Miller (1961), and these can be retained under uncertainty. An interesting empirical proposition can be inferred from the model: earnings, rather than the change in earnings, ought to serve as a premier exploratory variable of returns. This contention is consistent with some recent empirical findings due to Easton and Harris (1991). Résumé. L'auteur élabore un modèle simple et parcimonieux qui relie les bénéfices, et les bénéfices imprévus, aux rendements du marché. L'analyse met en relief le fait que tout modèle en situation d'incertitude doit être conforme á la théorie de la valeur, des bénéfices et des dividendes en situation de certitude (c'est-á-dire la théorie hicksienne des bénéfices). Cette théorie peut être élargie de telle sorte que le modèle tienne compte de l'incertitude. L'utilité de l'approche hicksienne tient au fait qu'elle englobe les concepts clés de non-pertinence relatifs au dividende que l'on attribue á Modigliani et Miller. et que ces concepts peuvent être appliqués en situation d'incertitude. Ce modèle permet de formuler une proposition empirique intéressante: les bénéfices, plutôt que l'évolution des bénéfices, doivent servir de première variable exploratoire des rendements. Cette affirmation est conforme aux résultats empiriques récemment obtenus pas Easton et Harris.     

Equilibrium Earnings Management,Incentive Contracts,and Accounting Standards*

In this paper, we model earnings management as a consequence of the interaction among self‐interested economic agents ‐ namely, the managers, the shareholders, and the regulators. In our model, a manager controls a stochastic production technology and makes periodic accounting reports about his or her performance; an owner chooses a compensation contract to induce desirable managerial inputs and reporting choices by the manager; and a regulatory body selects and enforces accounting standards to achieve certain social objectives. We show that various economic trade‐offs give rise to endogenous earnings management. Specifically, the owner may reduce agency costs by designing a compensation contract that tolerates some earnings management because such a contract allocates the compensation risk more efficiently. The earnings‐management activity produces accounting reports that deviate from those prescribed by accounting standards. Given such reports, the valuation of the firm may be nonlinear and s‐shaped, thereby recognizing the manager's reporting incentives. We also explore policy implications, noting that (1) the regulator may find enforcing a zero‐tolerance policy ‐ no earnings management allowed ‐ economically undesirable; and (2) when selecting the optimal accounting standard, valuation concerns may conflict with stewardship concerns. We conclude that earnings management is better understood in a strategic context that involves various economic trade‐offs.     

Corporate Investment Incentives and Accounting‐Based Debt Covenants*

This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.     

高管学术经历能提高企业分红吗？

文章选取2008-2017年沪深A股3449上市公司的23193个样本数据，实证检验了高管学术经历与企业分红水平的关系。研究发现，相比于高管无学术经历的企业，有学术经历高管企业的分红水平显著更高。高管的学术经历通过缓解融资约束，而不是缓解过度投资的路径显著提高企业分红水平。在进一步的研究中，通过引入外部治理与企业产权性质影响因素，发现外部治理较弱、非国有企业的情况下，高管的学术经历对企业分红水平的提高作用更加明显。采用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）、工具变量回归等检验结果依然稳健。研究丰富了高层梯队理论与企业分红相关性的文献，发现了中国情境下影响企业分红的新因素。     

Understanding Cross‐Country Differences in Valuation Ratios: A Variance Decomposition Approach

We use a variance decomposition approach to examine why aggregate valuation ratios differ across countries. In a cross section of 22 developed countries from 1980 to 2009, we find that 50 percent of all cross‐country differences in the aggregate price‐to‐book ratio (P/B) can be explained by cross‐country differences in expected future five‐year profitability. In the second half of our sample period, this percentage exceeds that of the first half, rising to almost 64 percent. Although international differences in accounting standards and conventions may have made earnings from different countries more difficult to compare relative to dividends, we find that it is still cross‐country differences in expected future profitability, rather than dividend growth rates, that are more closely related to international differences in valuation ratios. Even among 25 emerging markets, we find that expected future profitability at the five‐year horizon can account for 29 percent of all cross‐country P/B variations. Our results show that international investors are able to identify substantial cross‐country differences in future‐earnings prospects and incorporate them into stock market valuations.     

对目前我国上市公司股利政策的思考

股利政策作为上市公司的核心财务政策之一,由于其既关系到股东的利益和福利水平,又关系到公司未来的发展,因而一直备受利益各方充分关注。笔者结合我国上市公司股利分配政策的实践,针对其所表现出的特点,从内部根源和外部环境方面分析其问题所在及带来的危害,最后笔者提出规范我国上市公司股利分配的几点建议。     

长三角地区上市公司股利政策影响因素研究

股利政策是指上市公司税后利润向股东支付股利和企业内部留存收益之间的分配选择。对长三角地区374家上市公司2007～2009年3年的财务数据回归分析发现:当年的EPS、市价、净资产收益率、应收账款周转率、流动比率与现金股利呈正相关,上年股利支付率、资产负债率与现金股利呈负相关;市价、每股净资产与股票股利呈正相关,应收账款周转率与股票股利呈负相关。     

上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应——基于委托代理问题视角的实证研究

现金股利发放反映了债权人、股东、管理者之间的利益分配关系,现金股利的价值效应受到委托代理问题的影响。采用2008—2017年沪深A股上市公司作为研究样本,在委托代理理论的分析框架下实证检验我国上市公司发放现金股利的价值效应。研究表明,发放现金股利可能会损害债权人利益,过度债务公司发放现金股利的价值效应较小,而债务不足公司发放现金股利的价值效应较大。基于管理者代理问题视角的研究发现,现金股利可以有效发挥降低管理者代理成本的作用,当管理者代理问题严重时公司发放现金股利的价值效应更大。基于控股股东代理问题视角的实证结果表明,现金股利可以作为替代性的治理机制约束控股股东行为,当控股股东代理问题严重时现金股利具有更高的价值效应。     

Earnings Quality and the Equity Risk Premium: A Benchmark Model*

This paper solves a model that links earnings quality to the equity risk premium in an infinite‐horizon consumption capital asset pricing model (CAPM) economy. In the model, risk‐averse traders hold diversified portfolios consisting of risk‐free bonds and shares of many risky firms. When constructing their portfolios, traders rely on noisy reported earnings and dividend payments for information about the risky firms. The main new element of the model is an explicit representation of earnings quality that includes hidden accrual errors that reverse in subsequent periods. The model demonstrates that earnings quality magnifies fundamental risk. Absent fundamental risk, poor earnings quality cannot affect the equity risk premium. Moreover, only the systematic (undiversified) component of earnings‐quality risk contributes to the equity risk premium. In contrast, all components of earnings‐quality risk affect earnings capitalization factors. The model ties together consumption CAPM and accounting‐based valuation research into one price formula linking earnings quality to the equity risk premium and earnings capitalization factors.