Distortionary Taxation, Debt, and the Price Level

This paper compares the determinacy of equilibria under exogenous interest rates in an economy with a cash constraint, in which taxation is lump-sum or distortionary. Under passive fiscal policies lump-sum taxes generate nominal indeterminacy, while with distortionary taxes indeterminacy can be real, but not purely nominal. In general, under distortionary taxation uniqueness of the equilibrium allocation depends on monetary and fiscal policy interactions through taxes, debt, and interest rates. To illustrate this principle, we consider balanced-budget policies under distortionary income taxation and show that a unique equilibrium allocation prevails if interest rates are set consistent with long-run deflation. A separate section extends the analysis to endogenous interest rates.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Financing Public Goods with Income Taxation: Provision Rules vs. Provision Level

Due to the use of distortionary taxation, many believe that real-world economies should attain a lower level of public expenditures than in a situation where lump-sum taxes are available. The present paper examines this hypothesis by means of the two-type self-selection model of income taxation. Based on the findings of Boadway and Keen (1993), I provide sufficient conditions for both a lower and a higher level of public expenditures in second best than in first best. In particular, it is shown that the separability assumption of Christiansen (1981) leads to under-provision of the public good in the income tax optimum.     

Taxes and stabilization in contemporary macroeconomic models

The role of proportional and procyclic labor income taxes for automatic stabilization with stochastic productivity is analyzed in a contemporary macroeconomic model based on imperfect competition. The importance of short-run nominal wage rigidity for the effectiveness of progressive taxes on labor income for stabilizing output and raising household welfare is examined in a model that yields complete analytical solutions with stochastic output shocks. Increasing the procyclicity of labor income tax rates raises welfare with and without rigid nominal wages in the model economy. With fully flexible prices and wages, a positive covariance between the distortionary tax rate and productivity reduces the volatility of production and employment. This effect disappears under nominal wage rigidity, although progressive taxation can still raise welfare by reducing the distortion caused by a proportional labor tax. With rigid nominal wages and flexible consumer goods prices, payroll taxes levied at rates that rise with output can serve as automatic stabilizers. JEL Code E62 · H20     

Rent taxation and its intertemporal welfare effects in a small open economy

Previous literature concludes that replacing wage taxation by taxes on a fixed factor or its rents benefits future generations. However, the effects of such steady-state gains on the transition generations have been left open. In this paper, we show that taxation of rents may also increase utility of the current generation provided tax revenues are earmarked to reduce wage taxes. In particular, a shift in the tax mix may yield an intergenerational Pareto-improvement when the initially prevailing tax mix is sufficiently skewed toward wage taxation.     

National income taxation and the geographic distribution of population

We study how different national taxation schemes interact with geographic variation in productivity and consumption amenities in determining regional populations. A neoclassical migration equilibrium model is used to analyze the current nominal income tax system in Norway. The analysis is based on estimated regional income differences accounting for both observable and unobservable individual characteristics and the value of experience. Given regional differences in incomes and housing prices, quality of life and productivity are calibrated to model equilibrium. Compared to an undistorted equilibrium with lump-sum taxation, nominal income taxation creates a disincentive to locate in productive high-income regions. The deadweight loss due to locational inefficiencies is 0.18% of gross domestic product (GDP). We study real income taxation and equal real taxes as alternative tax systems. Both alternatives generate a geographic distribution of the population closer to the undistorted equilibrium, and hence with lower deadweight loss. In an extension of the analysis, we take into account payroll taxes. The existing regionally differentiated payroll taxes to the disadvantage of cities generate a deadweight loss of 0.22% of GDP in an economy with lump-sum income taxation. The two distortionary taxes interact and strengthen each other and the combined distortionary effect of income and payroll taxation in the Norwegian system is 0.46% of GDP.     

Taxation and skills investment in frictional labor markets

This paper examines the effects of wage taxation and corporate income taxation on training investment in frictional labor markets. Because of labor market frictions, the wage structure is compressed and workers do not capture the entire return from their skills. As a result, both firms and workers have incentives to support part of the costs of training investments. The analysis shows that when decisions to invest in training are made by firms and workers acting cooperatively, a wage tax increases the level of investment in skills whereas a corporate income tax decreases it. In this case, the introduction of a small wage tax unambiguously increases efficiency. The effects of both types of taxes on training are reversed when investment decisions are taken by firms alone. In any case, a corporate income tax is not neutral with respect to decisions to invest in skills even if the full cost of investment is deducted from taxable income in the period when it is incurred and the tax system provides full loss offset.     

Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide

There has been considerable debate as to whether the revenue-neutral substitution of environmental taxes for ordinary income taxes might offer a double dividend: not only (1) improve the environment but also (2) reduce certain costs of the tax system. This paper articulates different notions of double dividend and examines the theoretical and empirical evidence for each. It also connects the double-dividend issue with principles of optimal environmental taxation in a second-best setting.A weak double-dividend claim-that returning tax revenues through cuts in distortionary taxes leads to cost savings relative to the case where revenues are returned lump sum-is easily defended on theoretical grounds and (thankfully) receives wide support from numerical simulations. The stronger versions contend that revenueneutral swaps of environmental taxes for ordinary distortionary taxes involve zero or negative gross costs. Theoretical analyses and numerical results tend to cast doubt on the strong double-dividend claim, although the theoretical case is not air-tight and the numerical evidence is mixed.     

On the International Dimension of Fiscal Policy

This paper analyzes the international dimension of fiscal policy in a small open economy framework. We consider the case in which the government finances its spending by levying distortionary taxes and issuing state‐contingent debt. While in a closed economy taxes are essentially invariant, in an open economy taxes can be as volatile as output. This is because the presence of a terms of trade externality introduces efficient fluctuations in the consumption–leisure wedge driven by movements in the real exchange rate. As a result, the optimal fiscal rule suggests that taxes should be varied to replicate these fluctuations.     

A Second-Best Analysis of Environmental Subsidies

This paper examines the complications posed by pre-existing tax distortions in the economy, for the evaluation of a variety of subsidy policies that affect the environment. These complications include not only the efficiency cost of financing the subsidy by distortionary taxation, but also the interaction effects between the subsidized market and markets with pre-existing taxes. Studies that ignore both of these effects, or only incorporate the first type of effect, can be highly misleading.     

Political Sustainability and the Design of Environmental Taxes

This paper studies the issue of political support for environmental taxes. The environmental tax is determined by majority voting, given a refund rule that specifies the allocation of tax proceeds. The refund rule is chosen by a welfare-maximizing constitutional planner. We show that: (i) The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the proportion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. (ii) If labor and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion, to keep the government's budget balanced, majority voting yields a rate of environmental taxation that is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. (iii) To mitigate this negative bias, the government reduces wage taxes by a higher proportion than capital income taxes. (iv) The final outcome will either be the Pigouvian tax or else all reductions will be given in wage taxes. This depends on individuals' preferences for the polluting good as well as wage and capital income distributions.     

An Efficiency Analysis of Consumption and Production Taxation with an Application to Value-Added Taxation

The usual arguments pro destination-based, consumption-oriented or pro origin-based, production-oriented VAT are found wanting. They largely ignore tax effects on locational choices of firms. This paper provides a comparison of consumption and production taxation within a model of firm and household mobility. It is shown that the case for consumption taxation becomes stronger when profit taxes are not available. The consumption tax is the more targeted instrument when households are to be induced to locate efficiently. It is argued that, with border controls lacking, the alternative option should be seen more in a wage tax and less in a production tax.     

Shadow-Pricing Interpretation of the Pigovian Rule for the Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Note

The Pigovian rule for the optimal public goods provision with distortionary taxation is given a new interpretation. It relates the Pigovian rule to project evaluation rules in terms of shadow prices. Our formula for the Pigovian rule is compared with that given by existing literature for cases in which commodity taxes are set optimally to articulate the implications of their results. This approach also renders a clear insight on the nature of resource allocation and income redistribution effect involved in the public goods provision in a heterogeneous-consumers economy.     

Unequal wages for equal utilities

When educational policy is supplemented by a redistributive income tax, and when individuals differ in their ability to benefit from education, the optimal policy is typically rather regressive. Resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a “cake” as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxation. In this paper, we put forward another reason to push for regressive education. It is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability but to the property that welfare may be a convex function of an individual’s wage. For simplicity, we assume a linear education technology and a given education budget. To give the equal wage outcome the best chance to emerge, we also assume that individuals have identical learning abilities. Nevertheless, it turns out that in the first-best wage inequality is always preferable to wage equality. Even more surprisingly, this conclusion remains valid in the second-best when the feasible degree of wage differentiation is sufficiently large. This is in spite of the fact that wage equalization would eliminate any need for distortionary income taxation.     

When are origin and destination regimes equivalent?

A series of equivalence results are established which show that a switch from a destination regime of commodity taxation to an origin regime has no real effects. These significantly generalize those in the existing literature. Assuming uniformity of taxes within each country, equivalence applies (1) in a general competitive economy with an arbitrary (finite) number of goods and factors of production, arbitrary factor taxes, and arbitrary transport costs; (2) in an imperfectly competitive economy with any form of imperfect competition and with transport costs; and (3) in monetary economies where there is some price rigidity (such as nominal wage rigidity) as long as the exchange rate is flexible. Conditions under which nonequivalence applies are also identified and discussed.     

Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in nonoptimal unbounded infinite horizon economies

In applied work in macroeconomics and finance, nonoptimal infinite horizon economies are often studied in which the state-space is unbounded. Important examples of such economies are single-sector growth models with production externalities, valued fiat money, monopolistic competition, and/or distortionary government taxation. Although sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Markovian equilibrium are well known for the compact state space case, no similar sufficient conditions exist for unbounded growth. This paper provides such a set of sufficient conditions, and presents a computational algorithm that will prove asymptotically consistent when computing Markovian equilibrium.     

Real Effects of Money Growth and Optimal Rate of Inflation in a Cash‐in‐Advance Economy with Labor‐Market Frictions

This paper studies the consequences of labor‐market frictions for the real effects of steady inflation when cash is required for households' consumption purchases and firms' wage payments. Money growth may generate a positive real effect by encouraging vacancy creation and raising job matches. This may result in a positive optimal rate of inflation, particularly in an economy with moderate money injections to firms and with nonnegligible labor‐market frictions in which wage bargains are not efficient. This main finding holds for a wide range of money injection schemes, with alternative cash constraints, and in a second‐best world with preexisting distortionary taxes.     

Pareto-improving bequest taxation

Altruistic parents may transfer resources to their offspring by providing education, and by leaving bequests. We show that in the presence of wage taxation, a small bequest tax may improve efficiency in an overlapping-generations framework with only intended bequests, by enhancing incentives of parents to invest in their children’s education. We also calculate an optimal mix of wage and bequest taxes with alternative parameter combinations. In all cases, the optimal wage tax rate is clearly higher than the optimal bequest tax rate, but the latter is generally positive when the required government revenue in the economy is sufficiently high. If educational investment is partly unobservable for the government, these results qualitatively hold also when allowing for education subsidies.     

Tax-tariff reform with costs of tax administration

As is broadly recognised, the straightforward application of the Diamond–Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem implies that when lump-sum taxation is not available, then it is optimal for the government in a small open economy to rely on taxes on the net demand of households rather than on border taxes to finance its resource requirements. However, the theorem does not hold when taxation is associated with administrative costs. The present paper explores the implications for optimal taxation and for desirable directions of tax-tariff reform of taking into account the costs of tax administration in countries at different levels of economic development. The paper clarifies the reasons for, and lends support to, the criticism by Stiglitz (Presentation to Congress of International Institute of Public Finance, Prague, 2003) of the IMF and the World Bank’s recommendation to developing countries to adopt VAT to replace border taxes.