Agency Cost of Debt and Credit Market Imperfections: A Bargaining Approach

This paper studies the effect of credit market imperfections, measured by the relative bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier. However, lower relative bargaining power of banks leads to lower lending rates and investment return distributions with lower, but less risky returns. Thus, our analysis does not support the view, presented in a large existing literature, that there would be a trade‐off between reduced credit market imperfections and higher agency costs of debt finance.     

Profit Sharing,Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment*

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options, increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options, this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections—measured by the bargaining power of trade unions—are sufficiently strong and the benefit–replacement ratio is sufficiently high. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.     

Global capital markets,housing prices,and partisan fiscal policies

In recent years, global imbalances have channeled the excess savings of surplus countries toward the real estate markets of deficit countries. By consequence, the deficit countries that attracted lots of foreign capital experienced large run‐ups in house prices, whereas most surplus countries that exported capital exhibited flat or slow house price growth. We first use new house price data and a novel instrumental variable design to show the causal relationship between housing prices and capital inflows, particularly through debt bonanzas. We then argue that international capital flows affect the fiscal policy preferences of both voters and political parties by way of their impact on housing prices. Where capital inflows are large and housing prices are rising, we expect voters to respond by demanding both lower taxes and less publicly‐provided social insurance because rising house prices allow homeowners to self‐insure against income loss. In contrast, declining house prices produce greater demands for social insurance, particularly among those most exposed to housing market risk. We present evidence from two cross‐national surveys that supports these claims, as well as a “before and after” analysis of the housing crash in Eastern Europe. We also show that the connection between house prices and social policy also manifests itself in government spending outcomes, mediated by partisan control.     

How a Bank Bailout may Increase Systemic Risk

In 2008–2009, the US government spent trillions of dollars to bailout its financial system and prevent insolvency due to a deterioration in domestic loan portfolios. The following dips in US bond prices suggest that global investors feared that the US was over-extending itself and might be unable to repay its debt with taxes rather than inflation. The paper illustrates that if uncertainty arises about a large government's ability to raise taxes to repay its debt, then a debt-financed bailout which initially restores bank health may inadvertently contribute to the financial system's ultimate demise if banks are important lenders to a foreign country that pegs its currency to the domestic money.     

Index-linked bonds from an academic,market and policy-making standpoint

The view put forward in this paper is that the index-linking of long-term public debt today represents a financial instrument thatfostersa low average rate of inflation. In particular, bonds that are fully linked to the prices of a representative basket of goods and services permit a reduction in the inflation risk premium, which weighs significantly on the nominal cost of the public debt and,ex post, gives rise to substantial real costs that distort the mechanisms of allocation and distribution and, ultimately, could lead to the debt becoming unsustainable. After re-examining the reasons for the “orthodox ” aversion to index-linking —notably on the part of the monetary authorities of the more stable countries and especially the Bundesbank —the case is put for the leading industrial countries, and notably Italy, to issue index-linked government bonds. By issuing such bonds, the Treasuries of the various countries would send a strong stabilizing signal to the markets because recourse to the inflation tax in the future would no longer be advantageous, reduce the real cost of government borrowing by eliminating the inflation risk premium that currently has to be paid on issues with fixed nominal interest rates, benefit from the positive correlation between the quality of revenue and expenditure, and obtain valuable information on forward inflation rates and the real interest rates implicit in the prices of the bonds. The long-term real interest rate offered by index-linked bonds would act as a sort of “lighthouse ” set up by the monetary authorities to illuminate the path of economic growth and enable operators and markets to co-ordinate their actions more effectively.     

Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

Prices,Productivity and Wage Bargaining in Open Economies*

According to the standard union bargaining model, unemployment benefits should have big effects on wages, but product‐market prices and productivity should play no role in the wage bargain. We formulate an alternative strategic bargaining model, where labour and product‐market conditions together determine wages. A wage equation is derived and estimated on aggregate data for four Nordic countries. Wages are found to depend not only on unemployment and the replacement ratio, but also on productivity, international prices and exchange rates. There is evidence of considerable nominal wage rigidity. Exchange rate changes have large and persistent effects on competitiveness.     

Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and Equity of European Banks: What Can we Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of Bank Soundness?

The recent consultative papers by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has raised the possibility of an explicit role for external rating agencies in the assessment of the credit risk of banks' assets, including interbank claims. Any judgement on the merits of this proposal calls for an assessment of the information contained in credit ratings and its relationship to other publicly available information on the financial health of banks and borrowers. We assess this issue via an event study of rating change announcements by leading international rating agencies, focusing on rating changes for European banks for which data on bond and equity prices are available. We find little evidence of announcement effects on bond prices, which may reflect the lack of liquidity in bond markets in Europe during much of our sample period. For equity prices, we find strong effects of ratings changes, although some of our results may suffer from contamination by contemporaneous news events. We also test for pre-announcement and post-announcement effects, but find little evidence of either. Overall, our results suggest that ratings agencies may perform a useful role in summarizing and obtaining non-public information on banks and that monitoring of banks' risk through bond holders appears to be relatively limited in Europe. The relatively weak monitoring by bondholders casts some doubt on the effectiveness of a subordinated debt requirement as a supervisory tool in the European context, at least until bond markets are more developed.
(J.E.L.: E53, G21, G33)     

Why do Banks Fail?

Banks advance loans in the absence of precise knowledge in relation to the outcome of borrowers' projects. Consequently, uncertainty in relation to loan repayment emerges. Thus, banks introduce the 'credit standard' as insurance against loans, so that should borrowers' projects fail, borrowers have an alternative means of honouring their debt obligations. It is argued in this paper that in the competitive atmosphere under which this sector operates, it is not possible to secure the entire loan portfolio by introducing the credit standard, and in recent years this difficulty has been further exacerbated by financial liberalisation, which may have caused bank failures.     

Post COVID-19 exit strategies and emerging markets economic challenges

We study emerging markets' 1980s lost growth decade, triggered by the massive reversal of the snowball effect in the US during 1974–1984, finding that higher flow costs of servicing debt overhang explain the dramatic decline in growth rates of exposed emerging markets. We also show how lowering the US cost of servicing its public debt has been associated with higher US, Japan, and Western Europe real output growth rates during the post WWII recovery decades, 1946–1956, and validate that fiscal adjustments of large countries have strong growth and volatility spillovers effects on exposed emerging markets and developing countries.     

Public debt and financial development

We examine the role of public debt in financial development. The literature has highlighted its supportive role through providing collateral and benchmark. We contrast this “safe asset” view to a “lazy banks” view: developing banking sectors that lend mainly to the public sector may develop more slowly, because it could make banks profitable but inefficient. Results from country-level and bank-level regressions are more supportive of the “lazy banks” view, but the “safe asset” view seems to play a role at moderate levels of public debt held by banks. There is also evidence of a harmful interaction between public debt and financial repression.     

Surplus liquidity,central bank losses and the use of reserve requirements in emerging markets

Since the turn of the millennium, stocks of foreign reserves held by central banks in many emerging markets and developing countries have exceeded currency in circulation. To steer money market rates, these central banks have been absorbing liquidity from, rather than providing it to, the banking sector in their regular monetary policy operations. When interest rates in countries with major reserve currencies are low, the yield on foreign reserves is low. A higher interest rate on liquidity‐absorbing operations may expose central banks to losses. Although a central bank is not a profit‐maximizing institution, central bank losses can undermine the independence of the central bank. Using data for a large panel of central banks, this paper provides some evidence that central banks tend to apply low‐remunerated reserve requirements when profitability is at stake.     

BUYERS,SELLERS, AND MIDDLEMEN: VARIATIONS ON SEARCH‐THEORETIC THEMES

We study exchange that is bilateral but indirect—it involves chains of intermediaries, or middlemen—in markets with frictions. These frictions include search and bargaining problems. We show how, and how many, intermediaries might get involved in a chain, and how bargaining with one depends on upcoming negotiations with those downstream. The roles of buyers, sellers, money, and prices are discussed, allowing us to clarify some neglected connections between different branches of search theory. Pursuing one such connection, with monetary economics, we show how bubbles can emerge in intermediation, even with fully rational agents and perfect foresight.     

Hot Money Flows,Cycles in Primary Commodity Prices,and Financial Control in Developing Countries

Because the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuses on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies on the rest of the world. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on short-term dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into Emerging Markets (EM) with convertible currencies. When each EM central bank intervenes to prevent its individual currency from appreciating, collectively they lose monetary control, inflate, and cause an upsurge in primary commodity prices internationally. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a return of the hot money to the United States (and to other industrial countries) as commercial banks stop lending to foreign exchange speculators. World prices of primary products then collapse. African countries with exchange controls and less convertible currencies are not so attractive to currency speculators. Thus, they are less vulnerable than EM to the ebb and flow of hot money. However, African countries are more vulnerable to cycles in primary commodity prices because food is a greater proportion of their consumption, and—being less industrialized—they are more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices of their commodity exports. Supply-side shocks, such as a crop failure anywhere in the world, can affect the price of an individual commodity. But joint fluctuations in the prices of all primary products—minerals, energy, cereals, and so on—reflect monetary conditions in the world economy as determined by the ebb and flow of hot money from the United States, and increasingly from other industrial countries with near-zero interest rates.     

THE GREAT RECESSION, “RAINY DAY” FUNDS,AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

We examine the fiscal policy options that were available to Latin American countries at the onset of the current global economic crisis, concluding that most of the major countries in the region possessed the fiscal space (as measured by credible fiscal sustainability and debt headroom) to run prudent countercyclical fiscal deficits. For those countries, the appropriate policy response involved a constrained fiscal expansion focused on productive public spending and financed by drawing on the “rainy day” funds—in the form of large stocks of foreign exchange reserves—that they accumulated in prior years, rather than by market borrowing. (JEL E62, E63, F34)     

Debt monetization,inflation, and the ‘neutral’ interest rate

The main purpose of this study is to explore the potential expansionary effect stemming from the monetization of debt. We develop a simple macroeconomic model with Keynesian features and four sectors: creditor and debtor households, businesses, and the public sector. We show that such expansionary effect stems mainly from the reduction in the financial cost to servicing the public debt. The efficacy of the channel that operates allegedly through the compression of the risk/term premium on securities is found to be ambiguous. Finally, we show that countries that issue their own currency can avert getting stuck in a structural ‘liquidity trap’ provided their central banks are willing to monetize the debt created by a strong enough fiscal expansion.     

National culture and (dis)trust in banks: Cross-country evidence

We examine to what extent a specific aspect of national culture—uncertainty avoidance—can explain cross-country variations in (dis)trust in banks. Relying on data from the World Values Survey, we find that trust in banks is lower in countries that score high for Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance index. Similarly, with Global Findex data, we find that financial exclusion due to a lack of trust in banks is high in high uncertainty avoidance cultures. These results highlight the need for a more culturally aware approach when designing consumer protection measures for the banking sector.     

Financial Structure and Corporate Behavior in Japan and the US: insulation versus integration with speculative pressures

This paper examines the impact of speculative financial markets on corporate behavior under the Japanese and US financial systems. While both countries experienced speculative financial booms during the 1980s, real sector corporate decision making was relatively insulated from such activity in Japan by its bifurcated capital markets: high-turnover trading of much equity coexists with another segment in which large blocks of firms equity and debt are held long term, by capital suppliers who are strategic business allies. In the American system, in contrast, fluid and impersonal stock trading leaves firms vulnerable to the impact of short term price movements. This avenue for speculative financial market pressures has militated toward reduced time horizons and financial ratio-based decision criteria in the US corporate sector. The main implication is that mechanisms must be found for insulating American corporate decision making from speculative pressures. Rather than attempting to mimic the undemocratic role played by banks and other buysiness insiders in Japan, US policy makers should achieve a similar insulating effect by vesting more power in corporate constituences other than shareholders—especially employees. An approach built around ‘democratic stakeholder governance’ is proposed.     

Pricing policies for a two-part exhaustible resource cartel: The case of OPEC

This paper examines pricing policies for OPEC under the assumption that the cartel is composed of a block of spender countries with large cash needs and a block of saver countries with little immediate need for cash and a lower rate of discount. The decision problem for the two-part cartel is embodied in a game-theoretic framework and the optimal bargaining solution is computed using results from the theory of cooperative games developed by Nash. The set of feasible bargaining points—and the corresponding Nash solution—is computed under two assumptions on the behavior of output shares: that they are subject to choice and that they are fixed at historical values. Our results suggest that for fixed output shares, there is little room for bargaining, and the price path approximates the optimal monopoly price path. If the shares are subject to control, optimal paths depend significantly on the relative bargaining power of each block.     

Corporate debt and output pricing in developing countries: Industry-level evidence from Turkey

The present study is an application of capital structure theory to developing economies where markets are commonly imperfect. The industry-level data of Turkey is used as a benchmark case to investigate the effects of corporate debt on output pricing, which in return, might have critical implications for stabilization theory. The panel estimations on the major two-digit industries reveal two basic findings. First, short-term debt leads to an increase in output prices while long-term debt has the opposite effect, and short-term but not long-term debt has a cyclical influence on prices. Second, the inflationary effect short-term debt implies a lower capital gain and induces higher prices, while the effect long-term debt implies a higher capital gain and induces lower prices. Given the predominant share of short-term debt in most developing countries, these findings suggest an explanation for inflation inertia on the side of corporate sector.