Auditor Reputation,Auditor Independence,and the Stock‐Market Impact of Andersen's Indictment on Its Client Firms*

In this paper, we study a broad sample of Arthur Andersen clients and investigate whether the decline in Andersen's reputation, due to its criminal indictment on March 14, 2002, adversely affected the stock market's perception of its audit quality. Because these reputa‐tional concerns are more of an issue if an auditor's independence is impaired, we investigate the relationship between the abnormal market returns for Andersen clients around the time of the indictment announcement and several fee‐based measures of auditor independence. Our results suggest that when news about Andersen's indictment was released, the market reacted negatively to Andersen clients. More importantly, we find that the indictment period abnormal return is significantly more negative when the market perceived the auditor's independence to be threatened. We also examine the abnormal returns when firms announced the dismissal of Andersen as an auditor. Consistent with the audit quality explanation, we document that when firms quickly dismissed Andersen, the announcement returns are significantly higher when firms switched to a Big 4 auditor than when they either switched to non‐Big 4 auditors or did not announce the identity of the replacement auditor. Our empirical results support the notion that auditor reputation and independence have a material impact on perceived audit quality and the credibility of audited financial statements, and that the market prices this.     

Market Structure and Audit Fees: A Local Analysis*

This study conducts a local analysis of the relation between market structure and audit fees. The research question of interest to us is how audit fees are determined by each practicing local office, after taking into account the auditor's own position in a local market and the influence exerted by his or her clients. Appealing to the economic theories of monopoly and monopsony power, we hypothesize a positive audit fee‐concentration relation, and a negative audit fee‐client influence relation. Results indicate that auditor market concentration is positively associated with the non‐Big 6 audit fees but is unrelated to the Big 6 audit fees. Evidence is mixed concerning the client influence hypothesis. When this construct is proxied by the number of rival auditors operating within a geographic area centered on the municipality, the prediction of negative audit fee‐client influence relation is strongly supported for both groups of auditors. Results are much weaker using measures developed based on the relative importance of a municipal client to its auditor's audit portfolio. The issues addressed in this study are important at a time when the Canadian municipal sector is undergoing major changes because of municipal amalgamation, altering the underlying market structure for audit services and the bargaining position of a municipality vis‐Ã‐vis its auditor. More broadly speaking, our analysis implies that when assessing an auditor's report for signs of client pressure, the professional oversight bodies and regulatory authorities need to consider the relative, rather than the absolute, bargaining position of the client in question.     

Independence in Appearance and in Fact: An Experimental Investigation*

In this study, we use experimental markets to assess the effect of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) new independence rule on investors' perceptions of independence, investors' payoff distributions, and market prices. The new rule requires client firms to disclose in their annual proxy statements the amount of nonaudit fees paid to their auditors. The new disclosure is intended to inform investors of auditors' incentives to compromise their independence. Our experimental design is a 2 3 between‐subjects design, where we control the presence (unbiased reports) or absence of auditor independence in fact (biased reports). While independence in fact was not immediately observable to investors, we controlled for independence in appearance by varying the public disclosure of the extent of nonaudit services provided by the auditor to the client. In one market setting, investors were not given any information about whether the auditor provided such nonaudit services; in a second setting, investors were explicitly informed that the auditor did not provide any non‐audit services; and in a third setting, investors were told that the auditor provided nonaudit services that could be perceived to have an adverse effect on independence in fact. We found that disclosures of nonaudit services reduced the accuracy of investors' beliefs of auditors' independence in fact when independence in appearance was inconsistent with independence in fact. This then caused prices of assets to deviate more from their economic predictions (lower market efficiency) in the inconsistent settings relative to the no‐disclosure and consistent settings. Thus, disclosures of fees for nonaudit services could reduce the efficiency of capital markets if such disclosures result in investors forming inaccurate beliefs of auditor independence in fact ‐ that is, auditors appear independent but they are not independent in fact, or vice versa. The latter is the maintained position of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), which argued against the new rule. Further research is needed to assess the degree of correspondence between independence in fact and independence in appearance.     

Two Models of the Auditor - Client Interaction: Tests with United Kingdom Data*

Abstract. Accounting research contains two distinct approaches to the interaction between accounting management and the independent auditor. Game theory suggests that the auditor's testing strategy will affect the manager's reporting strategy and that the two strategies form an equilibrium. The game-theoretic approach views the auditor as active, in that the auditor acknowledges the effect that his or her testing strategy has on the manager's reporting. In contrast, in the decision-theoretic approach, the auditor tests reports, but ignores the effect that such testing might have on the manager's reporting behavior. Essentially, the decision-theoretic approach views the auditor as passive, taking the reporting strategy as given when designing tests. We use United Kingdom data to estimate both models and test their validity using nested hypothesis tests. Our results demonstrate that the active, game-theoretic model better describes the auditor-manager interaction. This is the first empirical validation of the game-theoretic model using archival accounting data.     

Who Cares about Auditor Reputation?*

I provide evidence on the demand for auditor reputation by examining the defections of Arthur Andersen LLP's clients following the accounting scandals and criminal conviction marring the auditor's reputation in 2002. About 95 percent of clients in my sample did not switch auditors until after Andersen was indicted for criminal misconduct regarding its failed audit of Enron Corp. I test whether the timing of client defections and the choice of a new auditor are consistent with managers' incentives to mitigate potentially costly information and agency problems. I find that clients defected sooner, mostly to another Big 5 auditor, if they were more visible in the capital markets; such clients attracted more analysts and press coverage, had larger institutional ownership and share turnover, and raised more cash in recent security issues. However, my proxies for agency conflicts — managerial ownership and financial leverage — are not associated with the timing of defections or the choice of new auditor. Overall, my study suggests that firms more visible in the capital markets tend to be more concerned about engaging highly reputable auditors, consistent with such firms trying to build and preserve their own reputations for credible financial reporting.     

Do Investors Care about the Auditor's Economic Dependence on the Client?*

In this study, we investigate whether investor perceptions of the financial reporting credibility of Big 5 audits are related to the auditor's economic dependence on the client as measured by nonaudit as well as total (audit and nonaudit) fees paid to the incumbent auditor. We use the client‐specific ex ante cost of equity capital as a proxy for investor perceptions of financial reporting credibility and examine auditor fees both as a proportion of the revenues of the audit firm and as a proportion of the revenues of the audit firm's practice office through which the audit was conducted. Our findings suggest that both nonaudit and total fees are perceived negatively by investors' that is, the higher the fees paid to the auditor, the greater the implied threat to auditor independence, and the lower the financial reporting credibility of a Big 5 audit. Furthermore, our findings appear to be largely unrelated to corporate governance: investors do not perceive the auditor as compensating for weak governance. Separately, recent anecdotal evidence suggests that declining revenues from nonaudit services' as a result of recent regulatory restrictions” are being offset by substantial increases in audit fees. Other things being equal, rising audit fees imply higher profit margins for audit services, indicating that the audit function may no longer be a loss leader. Thus, to the extent that investors perceive total fees negatively, recent regulatory initiatives to limit nonaudit fees may not have adequately addressed the perceived, if not the actual, threat to auditor independence posed by fees.     

Legal Damages and Auditor Efforts*

Abstract. Conventional wisdom holds that an auditor's optimal response to an increase in legal exposure is to double his efforts in finding errors in his client's financial reports. This paper's main result is that in a market setting where clients shop for opinions and auditors must compete for clients, the conventional wisdom may fail. Increased damages: affect all auditors reducing the competition among auditors for clients. Thus, an auditor can reduce his legal exposure by reporting more conservatively, instead of working harder. The main result is mitigated if client firms also face legal damages and if clients themselves are more conservative in preparing their unaudited financial statements. If it is more likely that a client claiming “good news” is truly good, the auditor has an incentive to work harder to confirm this good report and satisfy his client. This incentive to work harder to please his client may prevent the auditor from retreating into conservatism when damages are increased. Finally, if the auditors' report space were continuous, as with a continuum of client types, the main result would be reversed: additional damages would (weakly) increase the auditor's efforts. With a continuum of possible reports, the competition is not eliminated as damages increase; only the range of reports that the auditors offer is reduced. Because the competition cannot be eliminated and the incumbent cannot resort to conservatism to reduce his legal exposure, the auditor works hard. Résumé. Par tradition, la sagesse veut que la réaction la plus appropriée d'un vérificateur à une augmentation des risques juridiques soit un redoublement d'efforts pour déceler les erreurs dans les rapports financiers de ses clients. L'auteur en arrive pourtant à la principale conclusion que, dans le contexte d'un marché où les clients font du «magasinage» d'opinion et où les vérificateurs doivent se disputer les clients, la sagesse nous amène à faire fausse route. L'augmentation des dommages touche tous les vérificateurs et atténue la rivalité qui les oppose dans la recherche de clients. Ainsi, un vérificateur peut diminuer le risque juridique auquel il est exposé en usant d'une plus grande prudence dans ses rapports plutôt qu'en travaillant avec plus d'acharnement. L'auteur est cependant moins catégorique à ce sujet lorsque l'entreprise cliente fait aussi l'objet de poursuites en dommages et qu'elle est donc plus prudente dans la préparation de ses états financiers non vérifiés. Il est davantage probable que les nouvelles positives qu'une telle entreprise publie le soient véritablement, de sorte que le vérificateur est, lui, davantage enclin à déployer les efforts nécessaires pour confirmer ces nouvelles positives et satisfaire son client. Cette incitation à travailler avec plus d'énergie pour satisfaire le client peut faire en sorte que le vérificateur ne se replie pas derrière la prudence lorsque les dommages augmentent. Enfin, s'il existe un large éventail de rapports de vérification, comme dans le cas d'une multiplicité de types d'entreprises, la conclusion principale se trouve inversée; l'augmentation des montants de dommages entraîne une (faible) hausse de l'intensité du travail du vérificateur. Dans le cas d'un large éventail de rapports possibles, la concurrence ne s'atténue pas avec l'augmentation des montants de dommages; seul l'éventail des rapports qu'offrent les vérificateurs est réduit. Étant donné que la concurrence ne peut être éliminée, et que le vérificateur attitré ne peut recourir à la prudence pour réduire le risque juridique auquel il est exposé, il redouble d'effort.     

Managing Perceptions of Technical Competence: How Well Do Auditors Know How Others View Them?*

We investigate factors that influence an auditor's accuracy in knowing how subordinates, peers, and superiors view his or her own technical competence (metaperception). Extant literature on reputation management in auditing contexts depicts preparers of audit workpapers as strategic agents (subordinates) who stylize workpapers and engage in behaviors that enhance their reputations with reviewers (superiors). These superiors, in turn, are represented as strategically engaging in coping behaviors in response to such stylization attempts. One of the necessary conditions for auditors to enhance their reputations on a sustainable basis is accurate metaperception. We report the results of an experiment that investigates determinants of auditors' metaperception accuracy. Our participants comprise teams of audit partners, managers, and seniors who work together in the field. Each auditor performs two tasks of varying complexity and then predicts whether other team members can accurately perform the task and how other team members assess his or her performance on the tasks. Results show that accuracy in knowing what others think of one's technical proficiency (metaperception) is generally high, particularly when the predictor auditors are partners and managers; however, metaperception accuracy is asymmetric and varies depending on the predictor auditor, the target auditor being predicted, and task complexity. Implications are discussed.     

The Influence of Nonaudit Service Revenues and Client Pressure on External Auditors' Decisions to Rely on Internal Audit*

This paper investigates how external auditor provision of significant nonaudit services and client pressure to use the work of internal audit influence external auditors' use of internal auditors' work. More specifically, we study how external audit evidence gathering choices are influenced by nonaudit fees and client pressure. Our research is motivated by an observation that the magnitude of nonaudit services provided to audit clients introduces the risk that client management may leverage its position with the external auditor and potentially affect the audit process. We address this issue by extending prior research and focusing on the importance of various explanatory variables, including nonaudit service revenues, client pressure, internal audit quality, and coordination, to the external auditor's decision to rely on the work of internal audit. We use data primarily obtained through surveys completed by internal and external auditors. The survey responses represent 74 separate audit engagements. Our findings reveal that when significant nonaudit services are not provided to a client, internal audit quality and the level of internal‐external auditor coordination positively affect auditors' internal audit reliance decisions. However, when the auditor provides significant nonaudit services to the client, internal audit quality and the extent of internal ‐ external auditor coordination do not significantly affect auditors' reliance decisions. Furthermore, when significant nonaudit services are provided, client pressure significantly increases the extent of internal audit reliance. Thus, external auditors appear to be more affected by client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality and coordination when making internal audit reliance decisions at clients for whom significant nonaudit services are also provided.     

The Impact of R&D Intensity on Demand for Specialist Auditor Services*

The audit fee research literature argues that auditors' costs of developing brand name reputations, including top‐tier designation and recognition for industry specialization, are compensated through audit fee premiums. Audited firms reduce agency costs by engaging high‐quality auditors who monitor the levels and reporting of discretionary expenditures and accruals. In this study we examine whether specialist auditor choice is associated with a particular discretionary expenditure ‐ research and development (R&D). For a large sample of U.S. companies from a range of industries, we find strong evidence that R&D intensity is positively associated with firms' choices of auditors who specialize in auditing R&D contracts. Additionally, we find that R&D intensive firms tend to appoint top‐tier auditors. We use simultaneous equations to control for interrelationships between dependent variables in addition to single‐equation ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression models. Our results are particularly strong in tests using samples of small firms whose auditor choice is not constrained by the need to appoint a top‐tier auditor to ensure the auditor's financial independence from the client.     

When Are Audit Firms Sued for Financial Reporting Failures and What Are the Lawsuit Outcomes?

We examine how often audit firms are sued in a large sample of accounting lawsuits that allege financial reporting failures. We find an insignificant relation between the likelihood of auditor litigation and restatements, but the likelihood of auditor litigation is strongly related to the types of alleged accounting deficiencies. We also find that the auditor's type influences the probability of the auditor being sued and the size of the payouts from auditor and nonauditor defendants. In particular, the Big N firms are approximately 7 percent less likely than non–Big N firms to be named as co-defendants, and the auditor's contribution to the plaintiff's payout is significantly larger when a Big N firm is sued. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors are rarely blamed when there are allegations of financial reporting failures, but the types of accounting deficiencies and the auditor's type significantly influence the probability of the audit firm being sued and the outcomes of the lawsuits.     

Imperfect information,insurance, and auditors' legal liability*

Abstract. This paper analyzes the incentive effects of alternative legal systems on the auditor's decision making process. The first system, termed strict liability, holds the auditor liable whenever there is a loss, and the second system, termed negligence, holds the auditor liable for losses arising from the auditor's deviation from a prescribed due care standard. The auditor is assumed to have ex ante limited knowledge of the financial state of the client and the standard setting process. He revises his beliefs on the client's financial state based on a costless signal that may be interpreted as an internal audit report. The analysis shows that signal “quality” and auditor's perception of the client's financial state jointly determine the level of liability required to induce the auditor to adopt a socially optimal due care level. As in Simon's (1982) Model, negligence with supplementary insurance is preferred to strict liability. Further, negligence is shown to operate with less information than strict liability, in contrast to models such as Green (1978) and Shavell (1978). Résumé. Cet article analyse les effets incitatifs de systèmes juridiques alternatifs sur le processus décisionnel du vérificateur. Le premier système, dit de responsabilité stricte, considère le vérificateur responsable à chaque fois qu'il y a une perte, et le deuxième système, dit de négligence, considère le vérificateur responsable des pertes résultant de sa déviance d'une norme prescrite. Le vérificateur est supposé posséder ex ante une connaissance limitée de la situation financière du client ainsi que du processus de normalisation. Il révise ses opinions portant sur la situation financière du client à la lumière d'un signal sans frais qui peut être assimilé à un rapport de vérification interne. L'analyse montre qu'un signal «qualité» ainsi que la perception du vérificateur quant à la situation financière du client déterminent conjointement le niveau de responsabilité requis pour inciter le vérificateur à retenir un niveau de soin raisonnable socialement optimal. De même que le modèle de Simon (1982), le système de négligence avec assurances additionnelles est préféré à la responsabilité stricte. De plus, il est montré que le système de négligence fonctionne avec moins d'information que le système de responsabilité stricte, par opposition à d'autres modèles tels Green (1978) et Shavell (1978).     

Independence Threats,Litigation Risk,and the Auditor's Decision Process*

This study examines the effect of independence threats and litigation risk on auditors' evaluation of information and subsequent reporting choices. Using a Web‐based experiment, I tracked auditors' information gathering and evaluation leading to a going‐concern reporting decision. Specifically, 48 audit managers assessed client survival likelihood, gathered additional information, and suggested audit report choices. I found that auditors facing high independence threats (fear of losing the client) evaluated information as more indicative of a surviving client and were more likely to suggest an unmodified audit report, consistent with client preferences. In contrast, auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated information as more indicative of a failing client and were more likely to suggest a modified audit report. In addition, the association between risk and report choice was fully mediated by final information evaluation. This suggests that it is unlikely that different reporting choices resulted from a conscious choice bias, but rather that motivated reasoning during evidence evaluation plays a key role in the effect of risk in auditor decision making.     

Auditor Liability and Business Investment*

We model a firm's investment decision, an auditor's effort‐rendering behavior, audit fees, and prices of the firms under two auditor liability rules: strict liability and negligence liability. We show that an auditor's effort level is socially optimal under strict liability, while it is not generally so under negligence liability. Furthermore, both the firm owner's expected benefit and the audit fee are higher under strict liability than under negligence liability. We define the legal error under negligence liability as the difference between the assessed audit effort (that is, the estimate of audit effort made by the court) and the actual audit effort and prove that the greater the variance of the legal error, the more incentive an auditor has to exert effort under negligence liability compared with strict liability. Finally, the number of investments being undertaken could be higher under strict liability because more firm owners are willing to hire auditors to go public.     

Evidence of Industry Scale Effects on Audit Hours,Billing Rates,and Pricing

Using a proprietary data set consisting of all private firm audit engagements in 2000 from one Big 4 firm in Belgium, we investigate (i) whether audit office industry scale is associated with a reduction of total, partner, and staff audit hours and thus with efficiency gains triggered by organizational learning from servicing more clients in an industry and (ii) whether the extent of efficiency pass‐on from the auditor to its clients depends on the audit firm's market power. We find that auditor office industry scale is associated with efficiency gains and a reduction of the variable costs (i.e., fewer total audit hours, partner hours, and staff hours), ceteris paribus. Our results also suggest that, on average, realized efficiencies are entirely passed on, as evidenced by a nonsignificant effect of auditor industry scale on the auditor's billing rate. Furthermore, we find that the extent of the efficiency pass‐on decreases with the market power of the audit firm in the industry market segment as we document a higher billing rate for auditors with high market power (versus low market power). In addition, we find that the lower audit hours associated with auditor industry scale do not compromise audit quality.     

Outsourcing and Audit Risk for Internal Audit Services*

Some companies now outsource their internal audit function to public accountants. Internal auditors and accounting firms disagree about the merits of outsourcing. Each type of auditor claims to provide more cost‐effective services and appears to claim superior expertise. This paper uses agency theory to examine outsourcing and reconciles the outsourcing debate without resorting to differential auditor expertise. Under the assumptions that public accountants' “deep pockets” provide incentives to outsource and their higher opportunity cost provides a disincentive, we characterize the optimal employment contract with each auditor. We find that public accountants provide higher levels of testing, but possibly for a higher expected fee. This result supports both the internal auditor's claim as the lower cost provider, and the public accountant's claim of higher quality. We also find that incentives to outsource generally increase in various measures of risk, including the risk that a control weakness exists and the size of the loss that can result from an undetected control weakness.     

Auditor Face‐Work at the Annual General Meeting

This paper examines how auditors prepare for the annual general meeting (AGM) and how they report their work to the shareholders there. Prior literature has suggested—but not explicitly studied—that the endpoint of an audit is a state of comfort between the auditor and the management and audit committee members, but also is potentially fragile. The fragility can arise from a failure to relay trust to the investor community, which may initiate or increase doubts about the financial report and/or the auditor's independence. We build the case that an AGM is an event to study how the endpoint of an audit engagement is both a state of collective comfort and a fragile state. The analysis is based on ten interviews and three workshops with auditors as well as observations at 67 AGMs. To analyze the field material, the paper draws on Goffman's idea of face‐work, which requires backstage preparations, notably with management, and a front stage performance as an independent auditor to relay trust to the shareholders. The paper details how auditors at the AGM perform as independent verifiers of the management's financial report. Although we recorded that auditors were typically successful in preventing the backstage activities from becoming visible to the shareholders, we found incidents that challenged both the auditors' and the managements' face. In analyzing these incidents, we found that auditors reinforced their image as independent to regain both their own face and the management's face. The management did not take a similar collective responsibility for the auditor's face, which implies that auditors were asymmetrically committed to the management. As a take‐away, the paper discusses how governance mechanisms backstage are linked and can surface front stage at the AGM.     

The Provision of Nonaudit Services by Accounting Firms to their Audit Clients*

Abstract. There has been a strong growth in accounting firms' provisions of nonaudit services to their audit clients. To date, however, there have been few studies into the determinants of this joint provision of audit and nonaudit services. One reason for the paucity of research is the lack of publicly available data with which to empirically examine relationships and test theories. However, recent legislation in the United Kingdom requires publication of nonaudit fees paid to a company's auditor, and this disclosure provides the data with which to investigate the joint provision of consultancy and audit services. A model is developed that seeks to explain a company's decision to hire nonaudit services from the auditor. The model argues that companies that face potentially high agency costs purchase relatively smaller amounts of nonaudit services from their auditor. High agency-cost companies require independent audits in order to reassure investors and creditors; the provision of joint services, which increases the economic bonding of the auditor to the client, may jeopardize independence or the appearance of independence. The model is tested using data observations from 500 companies, and the results indicate that companies that have higher agency-cost proxies are associated with smaller purchases of nonaudit services from their auditors.     

Do Client Bankruptcies Preceded by Clean Audit Opinions Damage Auditor Reputation?*

There is a maintained assumption within the accounting literature that client bankruptcies preceded by clean audit opinions (Type II going concern opinion (GCO) errors) damage an auditor's reputation. Consistent with this view, the PCAOB proposes that stakeholders may use Type II GCO errors as indicators of low audit quality. This study examines audit committee and investor responses to Type II GCO errors. I find no evidence that audit offices with Type II GCOs are more likely to be dismissed, have lower subsequent audit fees, or have a lower likelihood of being selected for new audit engagements. These findings are consistent with audit committees not using Type II GCO errors as indicators of low auditor quality. Using event study analysis, I find evidence of modest incremental negative investor responses for clients of audit offices with Type II GCO errors. However, these negative investor responses are found only during the financial crisis period of 2008–2010 and are observed only within windows of 30 days or less. Given this limited evidence that stakeholders do respond to Type II GCO errors, I examine whether stakeholders should respond to Type II GCO errors. I find that audit office Type II GCO errors are positively associated with subsequent restatements, an established measure of low audit quality. Taking the results as a whole, I do not find that audit offices incur substantial reputational costs for Type II GCO errors. However, the negative investor response and the positive association with restatements provide some evidence that Type II GCO errors may serve as indicators of low audit quality.     

An Examination of Factors Affecting Audit Practice Development*

In this study, we examine the possibility that audit managers' judgments may be affected by practice development objectives. Given the competitive nature of public accounting, the extent to which auditors are inclined to be aggressive in the domain of practice development may be a function of their superiors' preferences. This study builds on the exploratory work of Hooks, Cheramy, and Sinich 1994 and Asare, Hackenbrack, and Knechel 1994 by examining the delicate balance that exists between a public accounting firm's need to “grow its business” and its need to maintain its objectivity and professionalism. An experiment is conducted to determine whether the auditor's willingness to tender a bid on an engagement is affected by (1) the nature of the auditor-auditee relationship (i.e., do existing clients receive the same treatment as potential clients?), or (2) the audit partner's aggressiveness with respect to practice development, which also includes elements of ethics and competence. Seventy-four audit managers from two Big-Six firms participated in the study. The results indicate that the type of client (current or potential) and the type of partner (more or less aggressive with respect to practice development) significantly affected the auditors' judgments. Specifically, subjects in the “current client” condition, as well as those who are accountable to a more aggressive partner, are more likely to recommend bidding for the client. The experimental results of this study are based on a case where the client was proposing a relatively aggressive position with respect to accounting for research and development (R&D) costs. Our findings also suggest that the judgements related to bidding on the client are not independent of the auditor's willingness to accept the client's accounting treatment. These results also provide further evidence that the influence of accountability is important in the professional audit environment.