Inflation, Deflation and Normal Price Adjustment

This paper thinks that the price of a commodity depends on both the value of the commodity and that of the currency. The change in either value will cause the change of the price of the commodity. Only the price rising caused by the decreasing of the currency value can be called inflation, and the price rising led by the increasing of the value of the merchandise can not be called inflation. Therefore, it is not proper, as defined by the modem economics, to think that any price increasing should be in general called inflation.     

Price and nominal wage Phillips curves and the dynamics of distribution in Japan†

This study estimates two types of Phillips curves – the price Phillips curve and nominal wage Phillips curve – for the Japanese economy and analyses the institutional structure of the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution in each period from 1977 to 2007. The estimated results allow us to make the following three findings. First, the Japanese economy was a profit-led regime and a counter-cyclical wage share regime. The combination of regimes can make the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution unstable. Second, the dynamics of price and nominal wage do not reflect each other in Japan by labour–management cooperation. Finally, after 1997, the distributive regime in Japan switched from a counter-cyclical wage share to a pro-cyclical wage share regime because Japanese firms quickened their speeds of employment adjustment. As a result, the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution were stabilised.     

Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis

We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on the emergence of price leadership in a price-setting duopoly with capacity constraints. Independent of the level of size asymmetry, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our timing game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. Experimental data show that price leadership by the large firm is frequent, but simultaneous moves are also often observed. Profit outcomes in the previous period affect the subjects’ decisions to announce or wait in a way that hampers convergence to the equilibrium. Furthermore, while both small and large firms display a strong tendency to wait to announce their price when firm size asymmetry is low, they often set prices early when size asymmetry is high. Prices are higher when price setting is sequential rather than simultaneous and when firm size asymmetry is high. Hence, price leadership by either type of firm has an anti-competitive effect that is more pronounced when the size difference between firms is large.     

Are Oil Price News Headlines Statistically and Economically Significant for Investors?

While much has been written about the effects of oil price on stock returns, surprisingly nothing is known about the effect of oil price news on stock returns. This article is a response to this research gap. For a large number of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange, the authors find that while oil price news does predict market returns it only predicts returns of some sectors and not all. They find that sorting stocks based on oil price news generates a significant return differential in the cross-section, which holds consistently across a range of models allowing for the well-known risk factors. Their findings suggest that information contained in oil price news affects stock returns.     

Strategic Consumption Complementarities: Can Price Flexibility Eliminate Inefficiencies and Instability?

Generally, two facts occur with strategic complementarities and fixed prices: (i) the equilibria are multiple and (ii) if the complementarities are strong, the law of demand is violated and the equilibrium is unstable. In this paper, we analyse the effect of price flexibility on these features as well as on market welfare properties. Assuming an exchange economy with H agents consuming two goods with one strategic complement, we show that flexibility of prices may remove both the multiplicity of the equilibria and the instability of behavior when the externalities are strong. Moreover, we find conditions to correct instability when it is caused by perverse wealth effects. When preferences are quasilinear and identical, if the externality is beneficial, any equilibrium is Pareto optimal despite the externality. But if the externality is detrimental, corrections are required.     

Is inequality harmful for innovation and growth? Price versus market size effects

We introduce non-homothetic preferences into an R&D based growth model to study how demand forces shape the impact of inequality on innovation and growth. Inequality affects the incentive to innovate via a price effect and a market size effect. When innovators have a large productivity advantage over traditional producers a higher extent of inequality tends to increase innovators’ prices and mark-ups. When this productivity gap is small, however, a redistribution from the rich to the poor increases market sizes and speeds up growth.     

A GWR-Based Study on Spatial Pattern and Structural Determinants of Shanghai＇ s Housing Price

利用上海市外环以内2010年12月1014个小区的平均房价数据,通过构建地理加权回归模型,并与基于全局最小二乘法（OLS）进行比较,揭示上海小区房价的空间分异和不同影响因子的影响。研究发现,每增加或减少一个单位各影响因子对房价的影响大小依次为：建成时间,到CBD距离,绿化率,到公园距离,距地铁站距离,距超市距离和距学校距离。同时,地理加权回归分解成局部参数估计优于OLS提供的全局参数估计,它可以深刻的揭示出房价和空间影响因子之间复杂的关系,而且可视化的工具可以用地图的形式更详细的呈现出城市房价的整体景观,这些都是传统OLS无法比拟的。     

Comment on Price Regulation of Railway

Basing on the economic analysis of railway＇s natural monopoly, we begin from the foreign models to analyze the experiences of America and England. We give some advice on price regulation of China railway industry from fixing price method, supervised objects, patterns and institution.     

Fewer Fish for Higher Profits? Price Response and Economic Incentives in Global Tuna Fisheries Management

This paper evaluates industry-wide economic incentives arising from changes in product prices in an industry exploiting a common renewable resource (tropical tunas) that is regulated via output limits. Changes in prices alter economic incentives by affecting revenues, profits, conservation, and nonmarket public benefits. Economic incentives in industries exploiting common resources have been examined from multiple angles. However, industry level variation in market prices arising from changes in public regulation has not been explored. We analyse the impact on economic incentives due to changes in output limits and market prices through estimation of ex-vessel price and scale flexibilities for imported skipjack and yellowfin in Thailand’s cannery market. The unitary scale flexibility, estimated from the General Synthetic Inverse Demand Systems, indicates no loss in revenue and even potential profit increases resulting from lower harvest levels that could arise from lower catch limits. However, for a revenue neutral or positive outcome to be achieved, the three inter-governmental tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, which manage the majority of the yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, would have to coordinate multilaterally to set the catch limits for both species.     

Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly

This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the price competition can become the unique equilibrium market structure. Furthermore, we show that there exists an area of the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects such that the situation wherein the public firm chooses its price contract whereas the private firm chooses its quantity contract can become the unique equilibrium structure.     

Who Pays a Price on Carbon?

We use the 2003 Consumer Expenditure Survey and emissions estimates from an input-output model based on the 1997 US economy to estimate the incidence of a price on carbon induced by a cap-and-trade program or carbon tax in the context of the US. We present results on how much different income deciles pay for a carbon tax as well as which industries see the largest increase in costs due to a carbon tax. We illustrate the main determinant of the regressivity: consumption patterns for energy-intensive goods. Furthermore, on a per-capita basis a carbon price is much more regressive than calculations at the household level. We discuss policy options to offset the adverse distributional effects of a carbon emissions policy.     

Accounting for the "Subnational Penn Effect"—A General Theory of Regional and National Price Levels

As an extension of the neoclassical urban systems theory (Henderson, 1974), we develop a general theory of regional (inter-city) price dispersion which also explains the “subnational Penn effect,” i.e., cross-city correlations among population size, prices, real income and human capital stock. The model is also a theory of international price dispersion that is observationally equivalent to and more appealing than the Balassa-Samuelson theory, implying that the (international) Penn effect may simply be an aggregate result of the “subnational Penn effect.” Furthermore, it shows that, contrary to the popular view, economic integration can increase as well as decrease spatial price variation.     

When and Where Are Informed Traders? What Is Their Relationship with Analysts in the Price Discovery Process?

The authors' aim was to analyze the influence of analysts' recommendations on the activity of informed and uninformed traders and whether such influence produces changes in the price discovery process. The analysis was carried out in the Spanish market, considered to be an ideal market given its characteristics. The authors' results indicate that although investors as a whole react to new information from analysts and their activity increases, this reaction is not independent of the type of stock. Informed traders do not increase their activity with small stocks to the same extent as uninformed investors do. Furthermore, the influence of these movements on price discovery is not significant. The results suggest that the interpretation role of analysts is more important for less accessible firms in terms of assessing their growth opportunities. This role may enhance the herding behavior of uninformed agents trading in those small titles for which they would otherwise need to invest extra time and extra money for taking profitable decisions.     

Politics of Intra-firm Trade: Corporate Price Planning and the Double Role of the Arm’s Length Principle

Intra-firm trade is an emerging issue. One of its key elements is the international shifting of profits, for example, through transfer pricing that big enterprises use to cross-subsidise their subsidiaries, often to avoid taxes. Accounting rules conceal much of the information about transfer pricing, reproducing secrecy and facilitating the use of administered prices. Given the prevalence of administered price setting, a significant amount of international trade cannot be meaningfully analysed as market transactions. This provokes questions about the validity of market assumptions in research on trade in particular and global capitalism more generally. Our specific contribution focuses on the role of the arm’s length principle and the significance of cross-subsidisation and other forms of corporate planning in intra-firm trade. Under certain conditions, price planning by private corporations should be analysed as political rule within the economic sphere. Since the politics of the world economy is not merely related to governmental intervention, corporations should also be theorised as potentially political entities. Crossing the disciplinary boundaries between political economy and normative political theory, we suggest that the politicisation of intra-firm trade opens possibilities for creating more effective responses to price administration and for creating more democratic ways of governing the global economy.     

What If There Are No Conventional Price Mechanisms?

Inspired by Frederic (“Fred”) S. Lee’s theoretical contribution to institutional-heterodox economics, I make the case that the neoclassical price mechanism is not only flawed, but also irrelevant for the study of actual coordination mechanisms, hence the price mechanism — as a theory as well as a way of thinking — should be discarded. While this position was addressed by early institutionalists, starting with Thorstein Veblen, later institutionalists have not completely rejected the price mechanism. The sympathy for the price mechanism has prevented institutionalists (and other heterodox economists) from fully developing an alternative theoretical framework concerning how actual economic activities are organized. I, therefore, provide an institutionalist-heterodox framework of the provisioning process focusing on business enterprise activities. This framework shows how institutional economics becomes more refined and useful when it is married to other traditions in heterodox economics, in particular, Marxian, social, and post-Keynesian economics. Such an integrative approach is what Fred Lee showed through his work toward producing a better theory and policy for the underlying population.     

Should Commodity Exporters Peg to the Export Price?

To account for the specific situation of commodity exporters, pegging to export prices (PEP) has been proposed elsewhere as an alternative to other conventional monetary regimes such as an exchange rate peg or inflation targeting. PEP is supposed to deliver automatic accommodation to terms‐of‐trade shocks, while retaining the credibility gain from a nominal anchor. This paper analyzes the PEP proposal in a dynamic general‐equilibrium model and compares it with a standard Taylor rule, consumer price index (CPI)‐level targeting and a nominal exchange rate peg. Judged by the degree of output stabilization, PEP performs very similar to CPI targeting for export demand as well as domestic demand shocks and underperforms in the case of shocks to the export price. The results suggest that PEP is not superior to conventional CPI targeting from a macroeconomic stabilization perspective.     

Price convergence in the EMU? Evidence from micro data

The establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) was widely expected to cause price convergence among member states. In an investigation of this claim, the present study avoids problems of comparability and representativeness by using an extremely detailed and comprehensive scanner database on washing machine prices and sales volumes for 17 European countries. A hedonic regression yields country-specific time series for quality-adjusted price differentials. Statistically and economically significant deviations from the Law of One Price emerge. Log t tests firmly reject price convergence among EMU countries. Small convergence clusters can be identified but they are unrelated to EMU membership.     

Price,private demand and optimal provision of public R&D investment: An application to Italian agriculture, 1960–1995

The current paper presents a model in which public R&D stock is included as a quasi-fixed input in a variable cost function. Its price affects the long run desired level, while its shadow price indicates whether under (over) investment occurs in the short run. Two alternative R&D prices and, thus, two different long-run desired levels, are defined. One concerns the private (farmer) perspective, in which farmers express demand under the assumption of costless R&D. The other considers the societal point of view, in which the objective is the optimal public R&D supply conditioned on its cost. Application of the above model to the Italian agricultural context (1960–1995) suggests a significant difference between these private and social desired R&D levels. The latter are, on average, closer to the observed values, though over-investment has emerged since the mid-eighties.