REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

异质机构持股、政府补贴与企业技术创新

机构投资者与政府补贴等优惠政策作为企业经营的重要资本来源和制度保障，势必对企业技术创新产生重要影响。以我国沪深两市战略性新兴上市企业2010-2015年面板数据为研究样本，对异质机构持股、政府补贴与企业技术创新的关系进行实证分析。结果发现：机构持股对企业技术创新没有显著影响，政府补贴可以促进机构持股对企业技术创新尤其是实质性技术创新产生显著正向影响；基金持股对企业技术创新存在显著负向影响，券商持股与QFII持股对企业技术创新分别存在不显著和显著正向影响；政府补贴能够降低基金持股对企业技术创新的负向影响，有效促进基金持股对企业技术创新的正向影响，并通过调节作用促进券商持股和QFII持股对企业技术创新产生更加显著的正向效应；政府补贴对基金持股与企业非实质性技术创新关系的正向调节作用更加显著，对券商持股和QFII持股与企业实质性技术创新关系的正向调节作用更加显著。     

股权结构对买卖价差的影响研究

本文从市场微观结构层面研究了买卖价差和股权结构之间的关系,引入股权激励和B、H股因素,选取2006年至2010年上证180指数成分股作为研究标的。研究表明,公司内部人和机构投资者持股增加了买卖价差,并且机构投资者的影响更大,股权转让会导致买卖价差上升。股权激励在长期中能够降低买卖价差,但是在牛市行情中作用不明显。发行B、H股产生的市场分割和信息非对称会提高A股的买卖价差。     

MONEY HOLDINGS,INFLATION, AND WELFARE IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET*

This article examines an environment where money is essential and agents exchange in perfectly competitive, Walrasian markets. Agents consume and produce a homogeneous good, but hold money to purchase consumption in the event of a relatively low productivity shock. A Walrasian market delivers a nondegenerate distribution of money holdings across agents and avoids some of the computational difficulties associated with the market assumption of bilateral bargaining common to search‐theoretic environments. The model is calibrated to long‐run U.S. velocity, and the welfare costs of inflation are assessed for variable buyer–seller ratios and persistent states of buying and selling.     

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS,GOVERNANCE, AND CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

This article aims at identifying the determinants of government expenditures of developing countries by placing emphasis on the political institutions and governance variables, which have not been addressed so much in the previous literature. Using a panel data analysis for 97 developing countries from the period 1984 to 2004, this study finds evidence that controlling for economic, social, and demographical factors, political institutional and governance variables significantly influence the consumption expenditure in developing countries. Political institutional variables such as the type of political ruling and political power in the parliament positively influence consumption expenditure; on the contrary, governance variables such as corruption influence negatively. Furthermore, we find that autocratic governments with military ruling are not particularly accommodative toward consumption expenditures as the public spending significantly shrinks under military dictatorship compared with other forms of governance. In order to check consistency of our findings, we ran alternative specifications as well as conducted extreme bound tests. Our results largely survived these tests showing robustness of our findings. (JEL E01, E02, E61, E62, H2, H4, H5, H6, O11, O5)     

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS,CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN

Since the beginning of the 2000s, institutional investors in Japan have become active in strengthening corporate governance, with the aim of achieving long‐term corporate value. The present paper examines the relationship between institutional investors and corporate governance, and also the relationship between institutional investors' shareholdings and firm performance. The results suggest that corporate governance has been enhanced by institutional investors. However, it is found that there is not a statistically significant difference between institutional investors' shareholdings and firm performance.     

政府控制、制度环境与上市公司财务重述行为

在我国转轨经济背景下,政府干预对企业行为具有重要影响。本文以财务重述为研究对象,实证检验了不同层级的政府干预和地区制度环境与上市公司财务重述行为之间的关系。研究发现,与非政府控制的公司相比,政府控制的公司尤其是地方政府控制的公司发生财务重述的概率更高,而公司所处地区制度环境的改善能够显著降低上市公司发生财务重述的概率。具体来说,公司所处地区的市场化进程越快、政府干预越少、法治水平越高,上市公司发生财务重述的可能性越低。本文为理解转型经济中政府在公司信息披露行为中的作用提供了实证支持,拓展了财务重述影响因素的研究,同时提供了改善公司财务报告质量的有效路径。     

Privatizations around the world: economic or political determinants?

The article examines economic, political, and institutional determinants of privatization using a panel of 50 countries over the period of 1988–2006. Our sample includes developed, developing, and transition economies. Privatization activity is measured by the number of privatization deals as well as the revenue raised and analyzed using the negative binomial regression and Tobit regression respectively. Although more privatization activity is usually taking place in countries displaying satisfactory economic performance in some respect, the role of economic factors turns out to be limited. The results identify a number of political and institutional determinants but some effects are specific to a particular type of economy. For example, in developing countries, right‐wing governments are associated with privatizations while new, not necessarily right‐wing governments, are behind privatization in Eastern Europe. The role of financial development is also varied, with sound financial institutions related to successful privatization in developed and developing countries but not in transition economies.     

CULTURE AND GROWTH: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Using Hofstede's cultural data set, this paper examines the impact of cultural characteristics on a nation's economic performance. Using a two‐step estimation procedure, we first estimate a panel growth regression and obtain estimates of each nation's fixed effects, which reflect idiosyncratic differences in growth performance. In the second step, we regress the fixed effects on invariant cultural and institutional variables. Our estimation results suggest that individuality and tolerance for uncertainty are the most important cultural factors in explaining nation‐specific growth performance. Furthermore, our findings suggest that political and property rights play a major role in determining idiosyncratic growth.     

Is globalization detrimental to financial development? Further evidence from a very large emerging economy with significant orientation towards policies

This study attempts to explore the relationship between globalization and financial development by endogenizing economic growth, population density, inflation and institutional quality for India during the period from 1971–2013. Using the more conclusivecombined cointegration method, the study provides evidence of cointegration among these variables. The long-run and short-run estimates from the ARDL model and causality tests, respectively, suggest that globalization in its all forms (political, social and economic) and its overall measure as well as inflation are detrimental to financial development, while economic growth and population density both promote financial development. Furthermore, the results also point out that institutional quality is not conducive to financial development in India, and there exists a feedback effect between financial development and inflation. Moreover, financial development is influenced by economic growth, institutional quality and population density.     

所有制、制度环境与公司治理效率

资本所有制作为资本所有权的制度安排是企业有效治理的前提条件。企业治理制度的形成具有路径依赖的特性 ,是与各个国家和企业所处的环境因素分不开的。在既定的经济技术和制度环境下 ,只要企业所有权安排得当 ,任何与其经济技术和制度环境相适应的资本所有制形式都是可以有效的。衡量治理效率的标准是治理成本的最小化或治理主体收益的最大化。为了提高治理效率 ,我国应根据不同企业的情况适时进行治理制度的改革和创新 ,并努力创造适于企业生存的制度环境。     

Do corporate governance mechanisms affect cash dividends? An empirical investigation of UK firms

The study examines whether corporate governance mechanisms and the compliance with good governance practice are related to cash dividends. In particular, the study assesses the effect of institutional ownership and board structure on the decision to pay cash dividends. A study on UK firms is interesting because firms are expected to voluntarily structure governance mechanisms based on their own needs. We find that institutional owners positively affect cash dividend payments, suggesting that UK institutions are effective in forcing firms to disgorge cash. There is limited evidence that independent directors affect the cash dividends. The results also show that firm specifics affect the cash dividends, namely, business risk, firm size, and leverage ratio. The results are consistent across several robustness checks.     

财富、权利与声望:民营企业家行动的制度分析与实证研究

本文从制度理论视角分析了民营企业家的政治身份与慈善行为及其背后的逻辑。企业家政治身份有助于企业获得制度层面的合法性以及资源。行业、地区制度环境差异显著影响企业家政治身份;企业规模作为一种经济权利,企业慈善作为一种声望资本,都有助于企业家获取政治身份。企业家的慈善行为可以被视为由经济动机驱动的去获取规范合法性以赢得利益相关者认可和良好声誉的战略性行动。民营企业家制度行动促使财富、权利和声望产生互动,这些行动已经超越了仅仅是获取合法性的象征性行动,而是能带来有效资源的实质性行动。     

制度环境、所有权性质与负债的治理效应

已有证据发现制度环境对企业债务融资具有重要的影响,但就制度环境对不同所有制之间负债治理效应差异的影响尚不明了。本文以我国上市公司2003—2007年的数据为样本,初步检验了国有上市公司和民营上市公司在负债治理效应方面是否存在显著差异以及制度环境对两者关系的影响。结果发现,整体上国有上市公司在负债治理效应上显著弱于民营上市公司,但是随着政府干预的减少、市场化进程的加快和法制水平的提高,国有上市公司相比民营上市公司在负债治理效应方面的差异将会逐渐缩小。这一研究成果不仅丰富了国内外学者对负债治理效应的相关经验研究,而且有助于我们更加深入地理解导致负债治理效应差异的制度根源。     

Federalism as a Public Good

This paper suggests that stabilizing federalism is like solving a public good provision problem. It reviews results in the public good provision literature that are relevant for federalism, and discusses the implications of these results for the institutional design of federalism. JEL classification: H110, H770, P160     

The Machine-Building Industry in Communist China

This article identifies the connections between original institutional economics and communitarian philosophy. For instance, both share the common emphasis on the cultural conditioning of human agency. Moreover, they present a common orientation to the human motives that surpass purely traditional economic considerations. We exemplify these correspondences with the similar explanations of the institutionalist Anne Mayhew and the communitarian political philosopher Michael Sandel to American farmer protests during the Gilded Age and Progressive Era. We conclude by suggesting a possible common research agenda for institutionalists and communitarians regarding the moral limits of markets and civic consequences of economic arrangements.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

POLITICAL ASYMMETRY AND COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFFS IN A CUSTOMS UNION

This paper examines the effect of political and economic asymmetries in the formation of common external tariffs (CETs) in a customs union (CU). We do so by introducing possible cross‐border lobbying and by endogenizing tariff formation in a political economic model for the determination of CETs. The latter allows us to consider asymmetries among the member nations in their susceptibilities to lobbying. We also consider asymmetries in the influence of the member nations in CU‐wide decision‐making. A central finding of this paper is that, in the absence of economic asymmetry, the CET rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in country influences if the two countries are equally susceptible to lobbying. If influences are the same, the CET also rises monotonically with the degree of asymmetry in susceptibilities. These results hold irrespective of whether the lobby groups in the two member countries cooperate or work non‐cooperatively.     

制度差异、“一带一路”倡议与中国大型对外投资——基于投资边际、模式与成败的三重视角

本文基于2005—2016年中国609个企业2 440个大型对外投资微观样本，全面考察正式与非正式制度差异对企业投资边际、模式与成败的影响。研究发现：正式制度差异对投资规模化的影响不大，但显著影响投资多元化。企业为了避免正式制度差异带来的管理风险，倾向于选择全资股权结构，但企业选择绿地投资还是跨国并购并不受到正式制度差异的影响。相比之下，非正式制度差异的影响更为广泛。无论是正式制度差异还是非正式制度差异，均会显著增加企业投资的失败概率。进一步研究发现，“一带一路”倡议主要对正式制度差异存在优化互补效应。研究结论表明，夯实“一带一路”倡议，尤其大力发展与沿线国家的文化深度交流，有助于企业更快、更好地走出去。     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN AND THE UK: CODES,THEORY AND PRACTICE

We reflect on the evolution of corporate governance and the role of institutional investors in enhancing governance in Japan and the UK. Japan places emphasis on stakeholder capitalism, whereas the UK places emphasis on shareholder capitalism. Nonetheless, in both countries, institutional investors have exerted significant influence on the evolution of corporate governance. Institutional investors in the UK have more power over company management than their Japanese counterparts, although it is alleged that these powers are not exercised to their best potential in either country.