WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS

This paper examines the behaviours of a profit‐maximizing firm and a labour‐managed profit‐per‐worker‐maximizing firm in a two‐stage quantity‐setting model with a wage‐rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the profit‐maximizing firm is the leader and the labour‐managed firm is the follower.     

Nonlinearity and asymmetry in the exchange rate pass‐through: What role for nominal price stickiness?

This paper examines the importance of nominal rigidity for nonlinearity and asymmetry of exchange rate pass‐through. For this purpose, we rely on company‐level data of French importing firms. We find that the well established fact that “prices rise faster than they fall,” which is characterized by the convex import price reaction function, lies primarily with the presence of nominal rigidity. Once price stickiness is controlled for, there is empirical evidence that the import price reaction function is rather concave if the linearity assumption can be rejected, indicating that firms aim primarily to protect their market share.     

对几种典型企业组织的规模差异评析

基于从本质到现象的分析路线,我们可以更清楚地认识企业规模：社会合理规模与企业的有效性相对应,取决于企业的组织成本和协调收益;而企业的现实规模则与特定个体的效率相对应,效率不仅取决于协调收益也与转移收益有关。一般地,企业的决策权为不同人所掌握,就会产生不同的收益转移效应,从而产生了多姿多彩的企业形态：（1）不同社会文化伦理中的收益转移效应差异会影响企业规模。一般地,社会信任度越高,企业规模就越合理;而信任度不高的那些社会中,企业规模往往走向两个极端。（2）不同的分配制度中的收益转移效应差异也会影响企业规模。利润分享制企业的剩余索取权往往为所有员工所分享,从而其规模往往小于泰勒制企业。（3）在工人自治型企业中,由于工人主导了剩余索取权的分配,从而使得企业的规模相对较小。（4）中央计划体制下国有企业是极端化的经理管理型企业,经理们所追求的社会收益与企业规模联系在一起,因而这类企业的规模较大。     

Innovation and evolution as a dynamic game with rational behaviour

In the recent literature about the explanation of the behaviour of innovating firms there coexist two basically different approaches. To so calledneoclassical approach assumes maximising behaviour relating to an exogenously given innovation technology and theevolutionary approach postulates time constant routine decisions. Both explanations are supported by well known arguments. Nevertheless they seem to be completely separated in the literature. The evolutionary approach even defines itself by the separation of the neo-classical approach. In this paper the two methods or philosophies are linked in a simple duopolistic model. It will be shown, that the strategic maximising behaviour of innovating firms leads in a dynamic model to routine decisions as equilibrium strategies.     

Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets

Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. Moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount.     

Differentiated interchange fees

Payment networks typically differentiate interchange fees across different merchant sectors. This paper shows that it is generally efficient for a regulator to leave the decision on the structure of interchange fees to payment networks.     

Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry

This article proposes a theoretical framework for studying the invention of new products when demand is uncertain. In this framework, under general conditions, the threat of ex post entry by a competitor can deter invention ex ante. Asymmetric market power in the ex post market exacerbates the problem. The implications of these general results are examined in a series of examples that represent important markets in the computer industry. The first is a model that shows how an operating system monopolist, by its mere presence, can deter the invention of complements, to its own detriment as well as that of society. The implications of policies such as patent protection, price regulation, and mandatory divestiture are considered. Three additional examples consider the ability of a monopolist in one market to commit to bundling an unrelated product, a pair of horizontally differentiated firms that can add a new feature to their products, and a platform leader that can be challenged in its base market by the supplier of a complementary product.     

广义的利润目标的可能性——基于个体偏好融合的动态演化分析

利润最大化的理论困惑与现实困境使广义的利润目标成为可能,其实现必须拓展主流范式中自涉与稳定的偏好假定并进行偏好的融合,从而融合后的个体偏好是自涉偏好与他涉偏好的统一;是情景依存的,内生于社会制度之中;是异质的;是演化的。基于偏好融合的动态演化分析表明：广义的利润目标是企业生产经营过程中的内生变量,内生于企业的生命周期之中。这对金融危机背景下企业和谐发展的探讨具有较强的学术意义与实践参考价值。     

Profiting in the info-coms industry in the age of broadband: Lessons and new considerations

Who profits in the info-coms industry in the broadband age, and how? This paper looks at this question by considering broadband as quite a broad phenomenon, including both the most important focus in the current evolution of the Internet, high speed access, and the new services created. We focus on two key stylized facts: SF1: “R&D and patent licensing are increasingly high in this industry, but the initiators of innovations have greatly changed over time”, and SF2: “Small, facilities-less companies contributed to the development of the Internet industry, but have generally performed badly as the industry has matured and broadband use has become widespread”. The paper uses the approach developed by Teece (1986) which analyses strategies of integration, collaboration, licensing and public policy in the presence of technological innovation. These organizational strategies, in practice, are not all profitable and, as Teece correctly stressed as a general principle, their success appears to depend to a great extent on whether they are initiated by innovators or imitators, and how they are articulated within a) regimes of appropriability, b) dominant design issues, and c) complementary assets access. The paper analyses the robustness of Teece (1986), which over the last twenty years has greatly influenced research in economic organization and business strategy on the issue of profiting from innovation, in its ability to provide a framework appropriate to the changes that have occurred in the broadband industry. The paper draws some lessons, and provides some new considerations related to the robustness of Teece's framework. The framework appears robust on SF1: innovators globally have won, though some of them (the best innovators) were acquired by imitators. On SF2, again the innovators have won, but the only success strategy (vertical integration) was only attainable for the largest ISPs/IAPs. We conclude, therefore, that there are many lessons that can be drawn from Teece's framework, though further work should be done on two essential topics: deeper analysis of the sources of technology provision, and investigation of the role of firm heterogeneity.     

THE EFFICIENCY OF THE STATE‐OWNED FIRM AND SOCIAL WELFARE: A NOTE

We consider a mixed market where a state‐owned firm competes with private firms. If the number of firms is exogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm might improve social welfare. This situation occurs when the state‐owned firm is inefficient and private firms are efficient. However, if the number of firms is endogenous, then a deterioration of the efficiency of the state‐owned firm must reduce social welfare.     

The Labor-Managed Firm: Permanent or Start-Up Subsidies?

We explore a new argument that seeks to explain the near absence of the labor-managed firm or cooperative, despite a range of inefficiencies attributed to the present-day capitalist firm. We derive the crucial condition for the emergence of labor-managed firms and show that it is unduly restrictive from an efficiency point of view. The policy implication is that public intervention to promote labor-managed firms should primarily be in the form of start-up subsidies rather than in providing permanent tax subsidies.     

A direct test of direct democracy: New England town meetings

Representative democracies govern most locales in the US, making it difficult to compare performance relative to direct democracy. New England states, however, provide an opportunity to test both direct and representative democracy at the local level. This article uses revealed preference axioms to compare spending patterns in New England towns and cities against median voter hypothesis benchmarks. Contrary to previous evidence, we find no differences between direct and representative democracy. The results suggest that horizontal competition arising from local fragmentation minimize differences between direct and representative local government, providing support for wider applicability of median voter-based empirical models of local government behaviour in the US.