The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy

When it comes to philanthropy, executives increasingly see themselves as caught between critics demanding ever higher levels of "corporate social responsibility" and investors applying pressure to maximize short-term profits. In response, many companies have sought to make their giving more strategic, but what passes for strategic philanthropy is almost never truly strategic, and often isn't particularly effective as philanthropy. Increasingly, philanthropy is used as a form of public relations or advertising, promoting a company's image through high-profile sponsorships. But there is a more truly strategic way to think about philanthropy. Corporations can use their charitable efforts to improve their competitive context--the quality of the business environment in the locations where they operate. Using philanthropy to enhance competitive context aligns social and economic goals and improves a company's long-term business prospects. Addressing context enables a company to not only give money but also leverage its capabilities and relationships in support of charitable causes. The produces social benefits far exceeding those provided by individual donors, foundations, or even governments. Taking this new direction requires fundamental changes in the way companies approach their contribution programs. For example, philanthropic investments can improve education and local quality of life in ways that will benefit the company. Such investments can also improve the company's competitiveness by contributing to expanding the local market and helping to reduce corruption in the local business environment. Adopting a context-focused approach goes against the grain of current philanthropic practice, and it requires a far more disciplined approach than is prevalent today. But it can make a company's philanthropic activities far more effective.     

Growing talent as if your business depended on it

Traditionally, corporate boards have left leadership planning and development very much up to their CEOs and human resources departments-primarily because they don't perceive that a lack of leadership development in their companies poses the same kind of threat that accounting blunders or missed earnings do. That's a shortsighted view, the authors argue. Companies whose boards and senior executives fail to prioritize succession planning and leadership development end up experiencing a steady attrition in talent and becoming extremely vulnerable when they have to cope with inevitable upheavals- integrating an acquired company with a different operating style and culture, for instance, or reexamining basic operating assumptions when a competitor with a leaner cost structure emerges. Firms that haven't focused on their systems for building their bench strength will probably make wrong decisions in these situations. In this article, the authors explain what makes a successful leadership development program, based on their research over the past few years with companies in a range of industries. They describe how several forward-thinking companies (Tyson Foods, Starbucks, and Mellon Financial, in particular) are implementing smart, integrated, talent development initiatives. A leadership development program should not comprise stand-alone, ad hoc activities coordinated by the human resources department, the authors say. A company's leadership development processes should align with strategic priorities. From the board of directors on down, senior executives should be deeply involved in finding and growing talent, and line managers should be evaluated and promoted expressly for their contributions to the organization-wide effort. HR should be allowed to create development tools and facilitate their use, but the business units should take responsibility for development activities, and the board should ultimately oversee the whole system.     

Selling the brand inside

When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.     

M&A needn't be a loser's game

Three out of four acquisitions fail; they destroy wealth for the buyer's shareholders, who end up worse off than they would have been had the deal not been done. But it doesn't have to be that way, argue the authors. In evaluating acquisitions, companies must look beyond the lure of profits the income statement promises and examine the balance sheet, where the company keeps track of capital. It's ignoring the balance sheet that causes so many acquisitions to destroy shareholders' wealth. Unfortunately, most executives focus only on sales and profits going up, never realizing that they've put in motion a plan to destroy their company's true profitability--its return on invested capital. M&A, like other aspects of running a company, works best when seen as a way to create shareholder value through customers. Some deals are sought to help create better value propositions for the business or to better execute current strategies--or to block competitors from doing these things. But most deals are about customers and should start with an analysis of customer profitability. Some customers are deliciously profitable; others are dismal money losers. The better an acquirer understands the profitability of its own customers, the better positioned it will be to perform such analyses on other companies. In this article, the authors show that customer profitability varies far more dramatically than most managers suspect. They also describe how to measure the profitability of customers. By understanding the economics of customer profitability, companies can avoid making deals that hurt their shareholders, they can identify surprising deals that do create wealth, and they can salvage deals that would otherwise be losers.     

Strategy as ecology

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.     

Building deals on bedrock

The headlines are filled with the sorry tales of companies like Vivendi and AOL Time Warner that tried to use mergers and acquisitions to grow big fast or transform fundamentally weak business models. But, drawing on extensive data and experience, the authors conclude that major deals make sense in only two circumstances: when they reinforce a company's existing basis of competition or when they help a company make the shift, as the industry's competitive base changes. In most stable industries, the authors contend, only one basis--superior cost position, brand power, consumer loyalty, real-asset advantage, or government protection--leads to industry leadership, and companies should do only those deals that bolster a strategy to capitalize on that competitive base. That's what Kellogg did when it acquired Keebler. Rather than bow to price pressures from lesser players, Kellogg sought to strengthen its existing basis of competition--its brand--through Keebler's innovative distribution system. A company coping with a changing industry should embark on a series of acquisitions (most likely coupled with divestitures) aimed at moving the firm to the new competitive basis. That's what Comcast did when changes in government regulations fundamentally altered the broadcast industry. In such cases, speed is essential, the investments required are huge, and half-measures can be worse than nothing at all. Still, the research shows, successful acquirers are not those that try to swallow a single, large, supposedly transformative deal but those that go to the M&A table often and take small bites. Deals can fuel growth--as long as they're anchored in the fundamental way money is made in your industry. Fail to understand that and no amount of integration planning will keep you and your shareholders from bearing the high cost of your mistakes.     

The ambidextrous organization

Corporate executives must constantly look backward, attending to the products and processes of the past, while also gazing forward, preparing for the innovations that will define the future. This mental balancing act is one of the toughest of all managerial challenges--it requires executives to explore new opportunities even as they work diligently to exploit existing capabilities--and it's no surprise that few companies do it well. But as every businessperson knows, there are companies that do. What's their secret? These organizations separate their new, exploratory units from their traditional, exploitative ones, allowing them to have different processes, structures, and cultures; at the same time, they maintain tight links across units at the senior executive level. Such "ambidextrous organizations," as the authors call them, allow executives to pioneer radical or disruptive innovations while also pursuing incremental gains. Of utmost importance to the ambidextrous organization are ambidextrous managers--executives who have the ability to understand and be sensitive to the needs of very different kinds of businesses. They possess the attributes of rigorous cost cutters and free-thinking entrepreneurs while also maintaining the objectivity required to make difficult trade-offs. Almost every company needs to renew itself through the creation of breakthrough products and processes, but it shouldn't do so at the expense of its traditional business. Building an ambidextrous organization is by no means easy, but the structure itself, combining organizational separation with senior team integration, is not difficult to understand. Given the executive will to make it happen, any company can become ambidextrous.     

What is a global manager?

Riven by ideology, religion, and mistrust, the world seems more fragmented than at any time since, arguably, World War II. But however deep the political divisions, business operations continue to span the globe, and executives still have to figure out how to run them efficiently and well. In "What Is a Global Manager?" (first published in September-October 1992), business professors Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal lay out a model for a management structure that balances the local, regional, and global demands placed on companies operating across the world's many borders. In the volatile world of transnational corporations, there is no such thing as a "universal" global manager, the authors say. Rather, there are three groups of specialists: business managers, country managers, and functional managers. And there are the top executives at corporate headquarters who manage the complex interactions between the three--and can identify and develop the talented executives a successful transnational requires. This kind of organizational structure characterizes a transnational rather than an old-line multinational, international, or global company. Transnationals integrate assets, resources, and diverse people in operating units around the world. Through a flexible management process, in which business, country, and functional managers form a triad of different perspectives that balance one another, transnational companies can build three strategic capabilities: global-scale efficiency and competitiveness; national-level responsiveness and flexibility; and cross-market capacity to leverage learning on a worldwide basis. Through a close look at the successful careers of Leif Johansson of Electrolux, Howard Gottlieb of NEC, and Wahib Zaki of Procter & Gamble, the authors illustrate the skills that each managerial specialist requires.     

基于新闻文本共现性的银企关系分析——以房地产上市公司为例

本文首次提出基于新闻文本共现性衡量银企关系强度的指标。相比多数传统方法,该指标能够更为全面地反映银行和企业间的业务和非业务联系,并在数据可获得性上也具备优势。据此,本文对2009年至2014年间我国238家房地产上市公司与19家主要内资银行之间的银企关系强度进行了定量度量,并利用该指标对银企关系影响企业信贷融资能力的规律进行了实证分析。结果显示,良好的银企关系确实能显著提高企业的信贷可得性,但整体上对企业信贷融资成本的影响有限。同时,上述影响规律存在显著的企业间差异,对于规模小或盈利能力弱的企业,银企关系尤其能够帮助其提高信贷可得性或降低信贷融资成本。     

The myth of secure computing

Few senior executives pay a whole lot of attention to computer security. They either hand off responsibility to their technical people or bring in consultants. But given the stakes involved, an arm's-length approach is extremely unwise. According to industry estimates, security breaches affect 90% of all businesses every year and cost some $17 billion. Fortunately, the authors say, senior executives don't need to learn about the more arcane aspects of their company's IT systems in order to take a hands-on approach. Instead, they should focus on the familiar task of managing risk. Their role should be to assess the business value of their information assets, determine the likelihood that those assets will be compromised, and then tailor a set of risk abatement processes to their company's particular vulnerabilities. This approach, which views computer security as an operational rather than a technical challenge, is akin to a classic quality assurance program in that it attempts to avoid problems rather than fix them and involves all employees, not just IT staffers. The goal is not to make computer systems completely secure--that's impossible--but to reduce the business risk to an acceptable level. This article looks at the types of threats a company is apt to face. It also examines the processes a general manager should spearhead to lessen the likelihood of a successful attack. The authors recommend eight processes in all, ranging from deciding how much protection each digital asset deserves to insisting on secure software to rehearsing a response to a security breach. The important thing to realize, they emphasize, is that decisions about digital security are not much different from other cost-benefit decisions. The tools general managers bring to bear on other areas of the business are good models for what they need to do in this technical space.     

Avoiding integrity land mines

How does a large multinational keep thousands of employees, operating in hundreds of countries, honest in a high-pressure business environment? As the chief legal officer at General Electric for nearly 20 years, Ben Heineman was part of the senior management group that sought to do just that--to make sure its executives and employees are moved to do the right thing as strongly as they are motivated to make their numbers. Heineman describes a set of systems that combine the communication of clear expectations with oversight, deterrence, and incentives. Nowhere are the expectations higher--and the sanctions more powerful--than for top executives. Heineman recounts example after example of senior leaders terminated for ethical lapses even when the business consequences of doing so were painful--and even when they had no direct knowledge of the violations occurring on their watch. To make expectations clear throughout the company, GE has systematically sought to set uniform standards that stay well ahead of current legal developments and stakeholders' changing attitudes about corporate accountability. Responsibility for implementing those standards, which are embedded in GE's operating practices, rests with the business leaders in the field. Oversight is both methodical and multifaceted. A host of auditing and assessment systems enables GE to compare the performance of its various business units against one another and against industry benchmarks. Perhaps the most powerful is the company's ombudsman system, which doesn't just allow but requires employees to lodge concerns. Failures to report into the system or up the line, or retaliation in any form, are firing offenses. The current intense focus on board-level governance has missed the point, Heineman argues. It is time to shift the debate from board oversight of the CEO to how top company leaders can most effectively infuse integrity at all levels of the corporation.     

Capitalizing on capabilities

By making the most of organizational capabilities--employees' collective skills and fields of expertise--you can dramatically improve your company's market value. Although there is no magic list of proficiencies that every organization needs in order to succeed, the authors identify 11 intangible assets that well-managed companies tend to have: talent, speed, shared mind-set and coherent brand identity, accountability, collaboration, learning, leadership, customer connectivity, strategic unity, innovation, and efficiency. Such companies typically excel in only three of these capabilities while maintaining industry parity in the other areas. Organizations that fall below the norm in any of the 11 are likely candidates for dysfunction and competitive disadvantage. So you can determine how your company fares in these categories (or others, if the generic list doesn't suit your needs), the authors explain how to conduct a "capabilities audit," describing in particular the experiences and findings of two companies that recently performed such audits. In addition to highlighting which intangible assets are most important given the organization's history and strategy, this exercise will gauge how well your company delivers on its capabilities and will guide you in developing an action plan for improvement. A capabilities audit can work for an entire organization, a business unit, or a region--indeed, for any part of a company that has a strategy to generate financial or customer-related results. It enables executives to assess overall company strengths and weaknesses, senior leaders to define strategy, midlevel managers to execute strategy, and frontline leaders to achieve tactical results. In short, it helps turn intangible assets into concrete strengths.     

Why business models matter

"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.     

8 ways to build collaborative teams

Executing complex initiatives like acquisitions or an IT overhaul requires a breadth of knowledge that can be provided only by teams that are large, diverse, virtual, and composed of highly educated specialists. The irony is, those same characteristics have an alarming tendency to decrease collaboration on a team. What's a company to do? Gratton, a London Business School professor, and Erickson, president of the Concours Institute, studied 55 large teams and identified those with strong collaboration despite their complexity. Examining the team dynamics and environment at firms ranging from Royal Bank of Scotland to Nokia to Marriott, the authors isolated eight success factors: (1) "Signature" relationship practices that build bonds among the staff, in memorable ways that are particularly suited to a company's business. (2) Role models of collaboration among executives, which help cooperation trickle down to the staff. (3) The establishment of a "gift culture," in which managers support employees by mentoring them daily, instead of a transactional "tit-for-tat culture", (4) Training in relationship skills, such as communication and conflict resolution. (5) A sense of community, which corporate HR can foster by sponsoring group activities. (6) Ambidextrous leadership, or leaders who are both task-oriented and relationship-oriented. (7) Good use of heritage relationships, by populating teams with members who know and trust one another. (8) Role clarity and task ambiguity, achieved by defining individual roles sharply but giving teams latitude on approach. As teams have grown from a standard of 20 members to comprise 100 or more, team practices that once worked well no longer apply. The new complexity of teams requires companies to increase their capacity for collaboration, by making long-term investments that build relationships and trust, and smart near-term decisions about how teams are formed and run.     

Stop making plans; start making decisions

Many executives have grown skeptical of strategic planning. Is it any wonder? Despite all the time and energy that go into it, strategic planning most often acts as a barrier to good decision making and does little to influence strategy. Strategic planning fails because of two factors: It typically occurs annually, and it focuses on individual business units. As such, the process is completely at odds with the way executives actually make important strategy decisions, which are neither constrained by the calendar nor defined by unit boundaries. Thus, according to a survey of 156 large companies, senior executives often make strategic decisions outside the planning process, in an ad hoc fashion and without rigorous analysis or productive debate. But companies can fix the process if they attack its root problems. A few forward-looking firms have thrown out their calendar-driven, business-unit-focused planning procedures and replaced them with continuous, issues-focused decision making. In doing so, they rely on several basic principles: They separate, but integrate, decision making and plan making. They focus on a few key themes. And they structure strategy reviews to produce real decisions. When companies change the timing and focus of strategic planning, they also change the nature of senior management's discussions about strategy--from "review and approve" to "debate and decide," in which top executives actively think through every major decision and its implications for the company's performance and value. The authors have found that these companies make more than twice as many important strategic decisions per year as companies that follow the traditional planning model.     

Strategic sourcing: from periphery to the core

As globalization changes the basis of competition, sourcing is moving from the periphery of corporate functions to the core. Always important in terms of costs, sourcing is becoming a strategic opportunity. But few companies are ready for this shift. Outsourcing has grown so sophisticated that even critical functions like engineering, R&D, manufacturing, and marketing can-and often should-be moved outside. And that, in turn, is changing the way companies think about their organizations, their value chains, and their competitive positions. Already, a handful of vanguard companies are transforming what used to be purely internal corporate functions into entirely new industries. Companies like UPS, Solectron, and Hewitt have created new business models by concentrating scale and skill within a single function. As these and other function-based companies grow, so does the potential value of outsourcing to all companies. Migrating from a vertically integrated company to a specialized provider of a single function is not a winning strategy for everyone. But all companies need to rigorously reassess each of their functions as possible outsourcing candidates. Presented in this article is a simple three-step process to identify which functions your company needs to own and protect, which can be best performed by what kinds of partners, and which could be turned into new business opportunities. The result of such an analysis will be a comprehensive capabilities-sourcing strategy. As a detailed examination of 7-Eleven's experience shows, the success of the strategy often hinges on the creativity with which partnerships are organized and managed. But only by first taking a broad, strategic view of capabilities sourcing can your company gain the greatest benefit from all of its sourcing choices.     

Making the deal real: how GE Capital integrates acquisitions

Most companies view acquisitions and mergers as onetime events managed with heroic effort--anxiety-producing experiences that often result in lost jobs, restructured responsibilities, derailed careers, and diminished power. Little wonder, then, that most managers think about how to get them over with--not how to do them better. But even as the number of mergers and acquisitions rises in the United States, studies show the performance of the resulting companies falls below industry averages more often than not. To improve these statistics, executives need to view acquisition integration as a manageable process, not a unique event. One company that has done exactly that is GE Capital Services, which has assimilated more than 100 acquisitions in the past five years alone and, in the process, has developed a formal model for melding new acquisitions into the corporate fold. Drawing on their experiences working with the company to develop the model, consultants Ron Ashkenas and Suzanne Francis, together with GE Capital's Lawrence DeMonaco, offer four lessons from the company's successful run. First, begin the integration process before the deal is signed. Second, dedicate a full-time individual to managing the integration process. Third, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later. And fourth, integrate not only the business operations but also the corporate cultures. These guidelines won't erase all of the discomfort that accompanies many mergers, but they can make the process more transparent and predictable for those involved.     

Fast, global, and entrepreneurial: supply chain management, Hong Kong style. An interview with Victor Fung. Interview by Joan Magretta

Li & Fung, Hong Kong's largest export trading company, has been an innovator in supply chain management--a topic of increasing importance to many senior executives. In this interview, chairman Victor Fung explains both the philosophy behind supply chain management and the specific practices that Li & Fung has developed to reduce costs and lead times, allowing its customers to buy "closer to the market." Li & Fung has been a pioneer in "dispersed manufacturing." It performs the higher-value-added tasks such as design and quality control in Hong Kong, and outsources the lower-value-added tasks to the best possible locations around the world. The result is something new: a truly global product. To produce a garment, for example, the company might purchase yarn from Korea that will be woven and dyed in Taiwan, then shipped to Thailand for final assembly, where it will be matched with zippers from a Japanese company. For every order, the goal is to customize the value chain to meet the customer's specific needs. To be run effectively, Victor Fung maintains, trading companies have to be small and entrepreneurial. He describes the organizational approaches that keep the company that way despite its growing size and geographic scope: its organization around small, customer-focused units; its incentives and compensation structure; and its use of venture capital as a vehicle for business development. As Asia's economic crisis continues, chairman Fung sees a new model of companies emerging--companies that are, like Li & Fung, narrowly focused and professionally managed.     

Predictable surprises: the disasters you should have seen coming

Think hard about the problems in your organization or about potential upheavals in the markets in which you operate. Could some of those problems--ones no one is attending to--turn into disasters? If you're like most executives, you'll sheepishly answer yes. As Harvard Business School professors Michael Watkins and Max Bazerman illustrate in this timely article, most of the "unexpected" events that buffet companies should have been anticipated--they're "predictable surprises." Such disasters take many forms, from financial scandals to disruptions in operations, from organizational upheavals to product failures. Some result in short-term losses or distractions, while others cause damage that takes years to repair. Some are truly catastrophic--the events of September 11, 2001, are a tragic example of a predictable surprise. The bad news is that all companies, including your own, are vulnerable to predictable surprises. The good news is that recent research helps explain why that's so and what companies can do to minimize their risk. The authors contend that organizations' inability to prepare for predictable surprises can be traced to three sets of vulnerabilities: psychological, organizational, and political. To address these vulnerabilities, the authors recommend the RPM approach. More than just the usual environmental scanning and contingency planning, RPM requires a chain of actions--recognizing, prioritizing, and mobilizing--that companies must meticulously adhere to. Failure to apply any one of these steps, the authors say, can leave an organization vulnerable. Given the extraordinarily high stakes involved, it should be every business leader's core responsibility to apply the RPM approach, the authors conclude.     

Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the Earnings Game

CEOs and CFOs put themselves in a bind by providing earnings guidance and then making decisions designed to meet Wall Street's expectations for quarterly earnings. When earnings appear to be coming in short of projections, top managers often react by suggesting or demanding that middle and lower level managers redo their forecasts, plans, and budgets. In some cases, top executives simply acquiesce to increasingly unrealistic analyst forecasts and adopt them as the basis for setting organizational goals and developing internal budgets. But in cases where external expectations are impossible to meet, either approach sets up the firm and its managers for failure.
Using the experiences of several companies, the authors illustrate the dangers of conforming to market pressures for unrealistic growth targets. They argue that an overvalued stock, by encouraging overpriced acquisitions and other risky, value-destroying bets, can be as damaging to the long-run health of a company as an undervalued stock.
Putting an end to the "earnings game" requires that CEOs reclaim the initiative by avoiding earnings guidance and managing expectations in such a way that their stocks trade reasonably close to their intrinsic value. In place of earnings forecasts, management should provide information about the company's strategic goals and main value drivers. They should also talk about the risks associated with the strategies, and management's plans to deal with them.