The new road to the top

By comparing the top executives of 1980's Fortune 100 companies with the top brass of firms in the 2001 list, the authors have quantified a transformation that until now has been largely anecdotal. A dramatic shift in executive careers, and in executives themselves, has occurred over the past two decades. Today's Fortune 100 executives are younger, more of them are female, and fewer were educated at elite institutions. They're also making their way to the top more quickly. They're taking fewer jobs along the way, and they increasingly move from one company to the next as their careers unfold. In their wide-ranging analysis,the authors offer a number of insights. For one thing, it has become clear that there are huge advantages to working in a growing firm. For another, the firms that have been big for a long time still provide the most extensive training and development. They also offer relatively long promotion ladders--hence the common wisdom that these "academy companies" are great to have been from. While women were disproportionately scarce among the most senior ranks of executives in 2001, those who arrived got there faster and at a younger age than their male colleagues. Perhaps the career hurdles that women face had blocked all but the most highly qualified female managers, who then proceeded to rise quickly. In the future, a record of good P&L performance may become even more critical to getting hired and advancing in the largest companies. As a result, we may see a reversal of the usual flow of talent, which has been from the academy companies to smaller firms. It may be increasingly common for executives to develop records of performance in small companies, or even as entrepreneurs, and then seek positions in large corporations.     

The secularization of science and a new deal for science policy

The secularization of science, by analogy with the separation of Church and state, would divest all science funding from the state, except where it bears directly on matters of public policy. I argue for an intensification of this tendency, which is already occurring across the Euro-American world. I then explore the policy implications in some detail, including historical precedents in New Deal attitudes toward the role of science in public policy. I begin by reviewing the secularization of Christendom, which turns out to be intimately tied with the social ascendency of the natural sciences. I then explore more recent conditions that contribute to the secularization of science itself, during which I claim that the Cold War's scaling up of state support for scientific research should be regarded as a historical aberration that we are currently getting over. However, I still reserve a very strong role for the state in the public distribution of already existing knowledge, the primary vehicle for which will remain the university.     

Holes at the top. Why CEO firings backfire

When a company does well, its CEO is showered with money and adulation. When it does poorly, the CEO gets the blame--and the boot. For better or worse, investors now view chief executives as the primary determinant of corporate performance. But the reality is that most companies perform no better after they dismiss their CEOs than they did in the years leading up to the dismissals. Worse, the organizational disruption created by a rushed firing can leave a company with deep and lasting scars. Far from being a silver bullet, the replacement of a CEO often amounts to little more than a self-inflicted wound. The blame for such poor results, the author argues, lies squarely with boards of directors. Boards often lack the strategic understanding of the business necessary to give due diligence to choosing a replacement CEO. Concern over restoring investor confidence quickly--rather than doing what's right for the company--drives the selection process. And all too often, companies continue to be dogged by the same old problems after the new CEOs come on board. But a good board can make a CEO replacement pay off if its members first develop a better understanding of the business context, worry less about pleasing the investment community and more about a replacement's strategic fit, and take an active role in overseeing the new CEO and the performance and direction of the company. In the long run, such approaches are likely to foster stability at the helm--making it less likely a company will have to fire its CEO in the first place.     

外运长航：瞄准世界五百强

中国对外贸易运输（集团）总公司（简称中国外运）是国务院国资委在央企中建立规范董事会的试点企业之一,也是第一家外部董事任董事长的试点企业。试点从理论上讲允许失败,但在中国,试点则意味着上级的重视、重托,只能成功不能失败。试点的结果能否真正实现决策权与执行权的有效分离？能否让这家不够大的企业做大做强？这对中国外运来说,是机遇,更是挑战。经过近五年的努力,他们成功了,     

应对危机：中国信保推出两款创新产品

为促进银行扩大对企业的出口贸易融资业务,支持中小出口企业做大做强,中国出口信用保险公司（以下简称“中国信保”）于今年7月正式推出银行保单、中小企业综合保险保单两个新产品     

Negotiating the spirit of the deal

Most experienced negotiators are comfortable working out the terms of an economic contract--they bargain for the best price, haggle over equity splits, and finesse detailed exit clauses. Yet these same seasoned professionals spend so much time ironing out the letter of the deal that they often pay little attention to the spirit of the deal--the social contract. And that can lead to major problems, say the authors, because even though the parties agree to the same terms on paper, they may have very different expectations about how to meet them. Those on one side, for instance, might think they're entering into a long-term partnership, while those on the other believe they're simply making a series of discrete transactions. Because the parties have failed to have a true meeting of the minds, they sign a deal that is likely to fall apart. To avoid such a disastrous outcome, negotiators should explicitly discuss the details of their social contract before inking the deal. They should talk about the underlying social contract, which answers the question, What? For instance, what is the real nature, extent, and duration of the agreement? And they should discuss the ongoing social contract, which answers the question, How? For instance, in practice, how will we make decisions, handle unforeseen events, communicate with one another, and resolve disputes? Drawing on real-life examples, the authors explore the problems that arise when the letter and spirit of the deal are at odds and suggest ways to dovetail them so they are both independently strong and mutually reinforcing. They also highlight risk factors that can lead to misunderstandings and expose common misperceptions about the social contract.     

国能生物：全球生物质发电的领航者

＂十大绿色创新企业＂的评选活动在《国际融资》杂志评选项目工作组及55位评委、5位独立评审顾问和联合国工业发展组织国际环境资源监督管理机构的共同努力下,历时半年时间,终于揭晓。     

一家具有百年历史的英国中型事务所的与时俱进

Michelle Perry与Saffery Champness事务所的负责人Rob Elliott进行了一次会谈,讨论该事务所的发展以及该所是如何利用其他中型     

The effects of tone at the top and coordination with external auditors on internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments

Prior research suggests that internal auditors’ judgements are subject to management influence resulting in compromised risk assessments. This study investigates the effects of the tone at the top and coordination with external auditors on internal auditors’ fraud risk assessments. Results of an experiment involving 64 internal auditors indicate that when the tone at the top is poor, rather than favouring management, internal auditors report a higher risk of intentional misstatements and that coordination with external auditors can further reduce expectations of the incidence of intentional misstatements.     

国投：集结一流

2008年“两会”期间,《国际融资》记者在全国政协委员下榻的京丰宾馆采访了国家开发投资公司总裁王会生,两个小时的采访结束后,记者对国家开发投资公司（以下简称“国投”）、对国投当家人的由衷感慨,可以浓缩为两个沉甸甸的字：“不易”!因为,在国家划转的计划经济时代形成的一大堆资产中创造一流业绩,难!但他们摸石头过河,创造了奇迹。在没有产业优势的背景下拿到一流项目,难!但他们以超常的拼搏,占领了市场。在令人眼红的金融市场中发现机遇不难,抓住机遇实属不易,但他们却赢得了机遇之神的青睐。“二次创业”5年来,国投总资产由2002年的755亿元增长到2007年的1460亿元,增长99％,实现利润从8．6亿元增长到50亿元,增加了480％。国投成功的秘诀在哪儿？实现一流的密钥又是什么？下一个5年,国投的投资目标将对准哪里？且看     

2010中国十大并购事件

全国工商联并购公会、全球并购研究中心、中国并购交易网共同主办的2010年“中国十大并购”评选活动揭晓。十大具有标志性意义的事件获选“2010中国十大并购事件”。     

From new deal institutions to capital markets: Commercial consumer risk scores and the making of subprime mortgage finance

The investment fueled US mortgage market has traditionally been sustained by New Deal institutions called government sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Known as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the GSEs once dominated mortgage backed securities underwriting. The recent subprime mortgage crisis has drawn attention to the fact that during the real estate boom, these agencies were temporarily overtaken by risk tolerant channels of lending, securitization, and investment, driven by investment banks and private capital players. This research traces the movement of a specific brand of commercial consumer credit analytics into mortgage underwriting. It demonstrates that what might look like the spontaneous rise (and fall) of a ‘free’ market divested of direct government intervention has been thoroughly embedded in the concerted movement of calculative risk management technologies. The transformations began with a sequence of GSE decisions taken in the mid-1990’s to implement a consumer risk score called a FICO^® into automated underwriting systems. Having been endorsed by the GSEs, this scoring tool was gradually hardwired throughout the industry to become a distributed and collective ‘market device’. As the paper will show, once modified by specific GSE interpretations the calculative properties generated by these credit bureau scores reconfigured mortgage finance into two parts: the conventional, risk-adverse, GSE conforming ‘prime’ and an infrastructurally distinct, risk-avaricious, investment grade ‘subprime’.     

The value relevance of top executive departures: Evidence from the Netherlands

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock price effects due to the simultaneous occurrence of the positive real effect of monitoring and the opposing information effect. (ii) The combination of board monitoring and monitoring by other parties prevents assessing the value relevance of board monitoring in isolation. (iii) The confounding effect of a simultaneous successor appointment typically generates an upward biased estimate. Based on an analysis of price effects and trading volumes at announcement, we conclude that monitoring by the supervisory board is valued by investors: Forced departures of executive directors, also without a successor appointment, are value relevant in the Netherlands where external control mechanisms and shareholder control were virtually absent in the period studied (1991–2000).     

大中华区IPO公司排行榜

The top 10 companies in raising capital by IPO从2001年到2003年,IPO 募集资金排名前10位的公司占当年所有IPO募集资金总数的百分比分别是47%、62%和60%。2002年和2003年IPO募集资金排名前为10位的公司募集的资金总数比2001年的前10位公司分别增加了67%。除2002年,其他两年I     

克服经济失衡引起的宏观波动

如何透过这些纷繁复杂的现象理解中国经济当前的问题,尤其是宏观经济问题?刚刚公布的7月份物价指数引发了新一轮关于中国宏观经济的讨论。在一系列令人眼花缭乱的数据和名词中,我们可以看到中国的宏观经济出现了许多似乎是"问题"的现象:比如投资增长速度仍然比消费增长速度快;CPI达到了5.6%这样的高水平;房价和股价不断上涨;贸易顺     

应对拖欠余款的方案与启示

中国国内A公司向买方出运五票摩托车散件,买方承兑后仅支付第一笔货款,余款拖欠。A公司随后向中国信保通报可损,同时委托中国信保进行海外追讨,这场拖欠风波源于环保标准.     

盘点2012中国十大特别人特别事

2012年对于中国来说,绝对不是平凡的一年,伦敦奥运会大发光彩、“神舟九号”飞船发射升空、中国首艘航母正式服役……除此外,这一年还有哪些特别人特别事呢？     

Making the deal real: how GE Capital integrates acquisitions

Most companies view acquisitions and mergers as onetime events managed with heroic effort--anxiety-producing experiences that often result in lost jobs, restructured responsibilities, derailed careers, and diminished power. Little wonder, then, that most managers think about how to get them over with--not how to do them better. But even as the number of mergers and acquisitions rises in the United States, studies show the performance of the resulting companies falls below industry averages more often than not. To improve these statistics, executives need to view acquisition integration as a manageable process, not a unique event. One company that has done exactly that is GE Capital Services, which has assimilated more than 100 acquisitions in the past five years alone and, in the process, has developed a formal model for melding new acquisitions into the corporate fold. Drawing on their experiences working with the company to develop the model, consultants Ron Ashkenas and Suzanne Francis, together with GE Capital's Lawrence DeMonaco, offer four lessons from the company's successful run. First, begin the integration process before the deal is signed. Second, dedicate a full-time individual to managing the integration process. Third, implement any necessary restructuring sooner rather than later. And fourth, integrate not only the business operations but also the corporate cultures. These guidelines won't erase all of the discomfort that accompanies many mergers, but they can make the process more transparent and predictable for those involved.