‘Keep out’ signs: the role of deterrence in the competition for resources

To explain resource heterogeneity, past research focuses on how rivals' resources are hidden from firms and firms accordingly have difficulties accessing them. We argue that resource heterogeneity may also arise when firms are deterred from a technological space upon being shown what resources rivals already possess within that space. To illustrate this deterrence effect, we use patent reexamination certificates, which indicate strategic stakes within a technological space without materially disclosing additional details of the underlying technologies and hence avoid the confounding effect of attracting competition through disclosure. We demonstrate how rivals' reexamination certificates within a technological space induce a firm to subsequently allocate less inventive effort in that space, based on two mechanisms—indications of rivals' developmental speed and exclusionary ability. We further develop these two mechanisms by arguing that the deterrence effect is stronger when rivals' speed is enhanced by their downstream capabilities, or when rivals' exclusion is enhanced by their litigation experiences. Findings suggest that a firm's path of resource accumulation evolves through avoidance of rivals' paths, and deterrence may constitute a viable alternative theory of resource heterogeneity. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pawn to Save a Chariot,or Drawbridge Into the Fort? Firms' Disclosure During Standard Setting and Complementary Technologies Within Ecosystems

Research summary: W ithin an ecosystem, standard setting coordinates development of complementary technologies across firms. But each firm can itself own multiple of these complementary technologies. We study how a firm's own complementary technologies influence its disclosure inclination during standard setting. We identify a tradeoff: disclosure increases value‐creation of the firm's non‐disclosed complementary technologies, but also heightens expropriation risk. Using data on the U.S. communications equipment industry 1991–2008, we show that the firm's complementary technologies increase its disclosure inclination when its technological areas are less crowded, but decrease such inclination when there are SSO members with strong expropriation abilities. Findings stress that disclosure involves but a piece of the firm's portfolio; a systemic perspective of the entire portfolio provides a more comprehensive picture of value‐creation during standard setting . Managerial summary: W hy should a firm disclose its key technology to participate in standard setting within an ecosystem? We urge managers to think beyond “disclosing to ensure compatibility with other firms' complementary technologies within the ecosystem” as a motivation, to also consider how disclosure affects the firm's own complementary technologies within its portfolio. Disclosure in one technological area makes the firm's nondisclosed complementary technologies in other areas more valuable to itself, especially with fewer rivals competing in these other areas. But disclosure also renders the firm susceptible to losing these complementary technologies to rivals, especially when rivals have strong expropriation abilities. Analyzing disclosure decisions by communication equipment firms, we show that this tradeoff is indeed a relevant consideration in managers' strategic calculations when participating in standard setting . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Understanding the impact of symbolic and substantive environmental actions on organizational reputation

Research in corporate environmental practices has shown that stakeholders impose coercive and normative forces that drive firms to perform environmental protection actions. However, limited attention has been placed on how different constituents of stakeholders value the firm's environmental actions. By focusing on industry peers as a constituent of stakeholders, we examine how the firm's environmental actions impact its reputation. Based on institutional theory and signaling theory we propose that symbolic environmental actions negatively affect reputation, whereas substantive actions improve firm's reputation among its peers. Building on the notion of signaling process, the authors also observe that a firm's reporting practices moderate positively the negative effect of symbolic actions. Data from a sample of 213 publicly traded firms operating in polluting industries from 2006 to 2013 support these results. The findings emphasize the danger of using symbolic actions to signal environmental commitment in a context of high-involvement information search and opportunistic behaviors.     

Playing dirty or building capability? Corruption and HR training as competitive actions to threats from informal and foreign firm rivals

Research summary : We examine why a firm takes specific competitive action in nonmarket and resource‐market spaces, particularly when it perceives threats from informal and foreign competitor groups, respectively. We address this question by combining insights from competitive rivalry, strategic groups, and nonmarket strategy literatures in an emerging economy context. Specifically, we theorize how threats from informal and foreign rival firms in an emerging market influence a firm's engagement in corruption activities and its investments in HR training, respectively. We also argue that the likelihoods of such focal firm actions against competitor group threats differ, contingent on the focal firm's market and resource profiles. Results from the empirical analyses, with survey data from the Indian IT industry, provide broad support to our hypotheses. Managerial summary : Based on a World Bank dataset on the Indian IT industry, this study finds that corruption and HR training are pursued by firms in emerging economies as mindful strategies against specific types of rivals—informal and foreign firm rivals, respectively, and are not pursued simply as culturally‐based practices. Multinational companies may need to understand that domestic firms in emerging countries will engage in corruption strategically to reduce their costs and time to market of their products/services. Therefore, multinational firms may need to devise suitable strategies other than corruption to reduce their costs and time to market if they wish to compete with firms in emerging economies for customers who don't care about ethical issues and will buy a cheaper product/service that is delivered quickly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

COMPATIBILITY INCENTIVES OF A LARGE NETWORK FACING MULTIPLE RIVALS*

Under network effects, we analyze when a firm with the largest market share of installed‐base customers prefers incompatibility with smaller rivals that are themselves compatible. With incompatibility, consumers realize that intra‐network competition makes the rivals' network more aggressive than a single‐firm network in adding customers. Consequently, under incompatibility the unique equilibrium can entail tipping away from the largest firm whatever its market share. The largest firm is more likely to prefer incompatibility as its share rises (above fifty per cent is necessary) or the potential to add consumers falls; the number of rivals and strength of network effects have ambiguous implications.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

Is doing more doing better? The relationship between responsible supply chain management and corporate reputation

Responsible supply chain management (RSCM) can help protect a firm's corporate reputation by shielding it from negative media attention and consumer boycotts. RSCM can also enhance a firm's corporate reputation, which allows firms to secure business contracts and penetrate new market segments successfully. This study empirically examines: (i) the extent to which responsible supply chain management practices is driven by a desire to protect corporate reputation; and (ii) whether responsible supply chain management can enhance corporate reputation and thereby generate competitive advantage to the firm. We draw on primary and secondary datasets across seven firms, spanning the publishing, technology, beverage, tobacco, finance and home improvement sectors. We find compelling evidence to suggest that firms often engage in RSCM due to a desire to protect corporate reputation. Similarly, we find empirical evidence to suggest that responsible supply chain practices can enhance reputation and thereby create competitive benefits, although this link is not as profound as the relationship between RSCM and reputation protection and there are significant variations across industries. These findings have significant implications for marketing theory and, in particular, industrial marketers, who are increasingly expected to implement responsible supply chain practices.     

Unraveling the mechanisms of reputation and alliance formation: A study of venture capital syndication in China

Extant research shows that resources are significant to a firm's choice of alliance formation. We focus on an important form of intangible resource—firm reputation—and examine how it affects a firm's propensity to form alliances. We propose an inverted U‐shaped relationship between a firm's reputation and its likelihood of alliance formation, resulting from the opposing mechanisms of opportunity and need. We also examine how this relationship may vary across two contingencies: (1) foreign and domestic firms; and (2) different levels of institutional development. Empirical analyses of China's venture capital (VC) industry provide support for our hypotheses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political hazards and firms' geographic concentration

Research summary : We examine the relationship between the geographic concentration of a firm's sales and the firm's vulnerability to expropriation hazards. Although expanding outside the home location can initially increase a firm's exposure to government expropriation, we find that this effect reverses when a firm's sales outside its home location have reached a point at which it has sufficient resources to better influence government actions and to pose a credible threat to exit the market in which it is being targeted. We supplement this main result by identifying two moderating factors: the firm's level of political capital and the effectiveness of institutional constraints on government behavior. We find support for these hypotheses from survey data on privately owned enterprises in China. Managerial summary : This research advises firm managers that certain market activities might knock their firms' economic interests out of alignment with the government's political interests, and thus, influence the political hazards they face, particularly in emerging markets such as China, which has attracted strong interest of many firms with respect to entering the market. Here, all else being equal, the firms' geographic concentration exposes them to different levels of state expropriation—but not in a simple linear fashion as suggested by the conventional wisdom of local protectionism or that of the bargaining advantage generated by the threat of relocation: Those who are “stuck in the middle” ended up paying twice or even three times as much unauthorized levies as the purely local or the most expansive firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Performance implications of the buyer-supplier market orientation fit

Extant research examining the link between market orientation and performance offers few insights into how the interplay between a firm's market orientation (MO) and its key supplier's MO influences the firm's performance. Using archival and survey dyadic data from 876 firms (438 firm-supplier dyads), we explore the impact of MO fit (i.e., fit between the focal firm's MO and its supplier's MO) on the focal firm's performance (ROA). The findings indicate a direct and positive relationship between MO fit and ROA. This highlights the need for firms to focus both on their own MO and their key supplier's MO as sources of competitive advantage in today's business environment. The strength of the relationship between MO fit and ROA increases when the exchanged business volume increases between the focal firm and its supplier and when the respective relationship progresses in age. Furthermore, firms with MO fit perform best, followed by firms with higher supplier MO misfit (firm's MO is lower than its key supplier's MO), while firms with lower supplier MO misfit (firm's MO is higher than its key supplier's MO) are the laggards.     

Reputation and corporate strategy: A review of recent theory and applications

A corporate reputation is a set of attributes ascribed to a firm, inferred from the firm's past actions. While the intuition behind reputation-building is hardly new, recent research has formalized the concept. We review this research and then, using examples, illustrate some of the strategic behavioral implications of these formal models.     

Time delays,competitive interdependence,and firm performance

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge. Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multipoint contact without forbearance? How coverage synergies shape equity analysts' forecasting performance

Research Summary: Scholars regularly use multipoint contact (MPC) to explain how encountering rivals in different domains shapes performance. While most explanations rely on mutual forbearance theory, I propose that competitive deterrence does not adequately explain how MPC shapes performance in knowledge intensive work and argue instead that cross-domain synergies may play a central role. I examine how security analysts' MPC with publicly traded firms captures synergies in their coverage portfolio, which improves forecasting accuracy and information leadership. The advantages of greater MPC for a focal analyst are counterbalanced by rivals' observational learning, which reduces the focal analyst's forecasting differentiation. A natural experiment helps corroborate my argument: rival analysts' forecasting accuracy dropped for firms in which high MPC analysts perished in the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. Managerial Summary: Competition in the knowledge economy often unfolds across multiple domains including product markets, geographic locations, and customer segments. In these settings, an actor's level of multipoint contact (MPC) in a domain captures the knowledge and other synergies available to the focal actor, which can improve performance in the domain. In the equity research setting, an analyst's MPC on a focal firm captures the likelihood that the analyst also covers that firm's suppliers, customers and important competitors. Using data on analysts' forecasting performance between 2001 and 2013, I find that greater levels of MPC on a focal firm predicts greater forecasting accuracy and information leadership but also lowers forecasting differentiation by attracting rivals who observe and benefit from the focal analyst's knowledge.     

Raising Rivals' Costs Strategies via Emission Permits Markets

In the present paper we examine the effect of emissions permit price manipulation within an oligopolistic model. We examine the effect that positioning strategies in permits markets have on the degree of competition in the product market as well as on social welfare. The analysis is based on the concept of raising rivals' cost strategies. We find that competition in the product market can be lessened substantially. The welfare effect is ambiguous. If the leader expands its market share at the expense of a less efficient rival, or if it excludes a less efficient entrant, overall efficiency may increase despite the decrease in the industry's output. When efficiency decreases, or when consumers' protection is a policy priority, the initial distribution of permits can be used to control power in the permits market. Such interventions though, improve efficiency only when policy makers have substantial information on the technological structure of the industry, and thus, should be used with caution. Given the importance of information, sharing of information and coordination of actions between policy makers is very important.     

Knowledge diversity and coordination: The effect of intrafirm inventor task networks on absorption speed

Research Summary: We combine the absorptive capacity and social network theory approaches to predict how intrafirm “whole” network characteristics affect the firm's speed of absorption of external knowledge to produce inventions. We start from the widely accepted view that distant, externally‐developed knowledge is difficult to absorb into the focal firm's own knowledge production. We suggest that high levels of intrafirm inventor task network diversity and task network density are essential for a diversity of knowledge inputs and coordinated actions regarding knowledge transfer, which in turn, reduces problems related to the absorption of knowledge—especially in the case of knowledge that is distant from the focal firm. The results of an event history study of 113 pharmaceutical firms that engaged in technology in‐licensing from 1986 to 2003 provide general support for our hypotheses. Managerial Summary: Firms keen to keep up with an uncertain and ever‐changing industry environment, can benefit from the speedy introduction of inventions. We examine how firms absorb licensed‐in technologies to nurture the rapid development of own related inventions. We show that a firm's absorption speed depends on the characteristics of the internal collaboration networks among the firm's inventor employees. More specifically, technologically diverse and well‐connected inventor networks improve the firm's ability to absorb external technologies quickly. This applies especially to externally acquired technologies that are unfamiliar to the firm. Depending on the distance of the acquired technology from the focal firm combined with speed‐inducing inventor network characteristics, our estimates suggest that firms can reduce the time needed for absorption by several months.     

Mind the gap: The interplay between external and internal actions in the case of corporate social responsibility

Research summary : We explore the effect of the interplay between a firm's external and internal actions on market value in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Specifically, drawing from the neo‐institutional theory, we distinguish between external and internal CSR actions and argue that they jointly contribute to the accumulation of intangible firm resources and are therefore associated with better market value. Importantly, though, we find that, on average, firms undertake more internal than external CSR actions, and we theorize that a wider gap between external and internal actions is negatively associated with market value. We confirm our hypotheses empirically, using the market‐value equation and a sample comprising 1,492 firms in 33 countries from 2002 to 2008. Finally, we discuss implications for future research and practice. Managerial summary : Companies often accumulate intangible assets by taking internally and externally oriented CSR actions. Contrary to popular beliefs, the data show that they undertake more internal than external ones: firms do more and communicate less. How does a potential gap (i.e., a misalignment) between internal and external CSR actions affect a firm's market value? We find that although together (the sum of) internal and external actions are positively associated with market value, a wider gap has negative implications. In other words, firms do not realize the full benefits of their internal actions when such actions are not externally communicated to key stakeholders, and to the investment community in particular. This negative association with market value is particularly salient in CSR‐intensive and the natural resources and extractives industries. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

R&D AND BUYERS' WAITING OPTION*

Anticipation of technological progress may induce buyers to delay the adoption of new technologies. We analyze how buyers' waiting option may feed back into firm's timing of innovations. Buyers are shown to have inefficiently weak incentives to wait for potentially better products. This induces firms to accelerate the introduction of new products. Furthermore, buyers' inclination to adopt new technologies prematurely expands firms' scope for preemption of potential rivals. The analysis sheds light on R&D competition in durable goods markets such as the market for aircraft.     

Bundling,tying, and collusion

Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in a collusive oligopolistic market.     

Believing one's own press: the causes and consequences of CEO celebrity

This theoretical article introduces the construct of CEO celebrity in order to explain how the tendency of journalists to attribute a firm's actions and outcomes to the volition of its CEO affects such firm. In the model developed here, journalists celebrate a CEO whose firm takes strategic actions that are distinctive and consistent by attributing such actions and performance to the firm's CEO. In so doing, journalists over‐attribute a firm's actions and outcomes to the disposition of its CEO rather than to broader situational factors. A CEO who internalizes such celebrity will also tend to believe this over‐attribution and become overconfident about the efficacy of her past actions and future abilities. Hubris arises when CEO overconfidence results in problematic firm decisions, including undue persistence with actions that produce celebrity. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Emerging Market Firms' Internationalization: How Do Firms' Inward Activities Affect Their Outward Activities?

Research summary : In this study we examine how an emerging market firm's inward international activities (“inward activities”) are related to its outward international activities (“outward activities”) by focusing on the role of the firm's gain from its inward activities. On the one hand, drawing upon the organizational learning perspective, we propose that a firm's gain from inward activities may facilitate its outward activities through improving its resource fungibility. On the other hand, we draw upon the prospect theory to propose that a firm's gain from inward activities may hinder its outward activities by discouraging the firm's top managers from taking risks that are inherent in outward activities. With detailed data from a sample of manufacturing firms in China, we find empirical support for both lines of arguments . Managerial summary : Are emerging market firms with higher inward gain more likely to engage in outward internationalization activities? We argue that it depends upon how a firm uses its gain from inward activities. If the firm can improve its resource fungibility (particularly organizational resource fungibility) from its inward gain, it is more likely to engage in outward activities. If the firm cannot improve its resource fungiblity, the answer is no. Our findings suggest that for emerging market firms, internationalization is not just a path toward new markets; instead, it reflects how these firms exploit and explore what they have learned from their interactions with foreign firms at home in foreign markets. Therefore, managers must think more strategically on developing (organizational) resource fungibility from their inward activities . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.