城市商业银行有效市场退出机制的探索

在市场竞争日趋激烈的金融环境下,建立城市商业银行有效市场退出机制,不仅可以减轻国家财政负担,还可以促进城市商业银行形成有效激励约束机制,实现健康有序地发展.本文通过回顾中国金融机构退出现状以及城市商业银行的发展状况,分析了中国城市商业银行退出机制存在的问题,从建立显性存款保险制度和完善金融机构市场退出法律体系两个角度,对中国城市商业银行构建有效市场退出机制提出政策建议.     

稳定与效率:中国金融业市场退出研究

我国金融业机构的扩张和市场退出都是在特定的历史和制度条件下形成和演化的,截止目前我国依然没有建立起完善的市场退出机制.处理好金融稳定、金融效率与社会净福利的关系是我国金融市场退出机制建设必须面对的问题.加快我国金融业市场退出机制的改革是提高金融效率和实现金融业稳定发展的需要.     

我国商业银行市场退出法律制度的缺陷及完善对策

有商业银行的市场进入,就必然有商业银行的市场退出,这是市场经济的客观规律。市场经济发达国家多已形成有效的市场退出机制。我国目前尚未形成一套系统的、操作性强的商业银行市场退出法律制度,无法对一些问题严重、濒临破产倒闭的商业银行实施有效的市场退出。文章着重分析我国商业银行市场退出法律制度存在的问题,并结合已有市场退出的实践,提出完善该法律制度的若干建议。     

我国存款保险制度的道德风险分析和防范

存款保险制度于2015年5月1日起正式施行.建立存款保险制度,有利于保护存款人的利益,促进金融安全网的建立,提高我国银行业的竞争力水平,完善破产金融机构市场退出机制,促进银行业的健康发展.但是,与其相随的道德问题不容忽视.本文首先介绍存款保险制度道德风险的表现与形式,其次探析道德风险的原因.最后,提出适合我国国情的道德风险防范措施.     

关于国家信用担保制度退出我国存款保险领域的若干探讨

虽然国家信用担保制度为存款保险制度取代是市场经济的必然要求,但是,由于我国居民的风险意识淡薄以及市场环境和银行自身条件不成熟的限制,目前并不是推出存款保险制度的最佳时机。在全面推出存款保险制度之前,需要一个较长的准备过渡过程,提出可以将国家信用担保制度退出或存款保险制度的建立过程分成3个阶段,即造势和准备阶段、过渡阶段和国家信用担保制度全面退出阶段,每个阶段有其必须解决的关键问题。     

问题银行市场退出机制研究

随着中国利率市场化进程的加快和我国商业银行改革的深入,银行的企业性质越来越突出,在经济趋向市场化的情况下,问题银行对我国的金融稳定,进而对经济稳定构成了一定威胁。建立有效的问题银行市场退出机制,化解庞大的银行不良资产风险已经迫在眉睫。构建问题银行市场退出机制意义重大,本文通过分析我国问题银行退出机制目前存在的问题,在此基础上提出了完善问题银行退出机制的建议。     

商业银行的市场退出与存款保险制度

商业银行的市场退出与存款保险制度刘希伟我国金融体制改革的一个重要方面就是要建立现代化的商业银行体制，把银行推向市场经济的大潮中，让其自由竞争，以实现资本的最优配置。而市场经济是风险经济，不可能没有被淘汰的东西，优胜劣汰是市场经济的一般规律，商业银行的...     

对建立银行存款保险制度的分析研究

金融中介机构在现代市场经济中起着至关重要的作用,但是伴随着中国银行业市场化步伐的加快,金融领域的平静日益被打破,“优胜劣汰”的改革会使一些金融机构退出金融市场。为了保护这一退出过程中的存款者利益,构建良好的改革氛围,迫切要求我国尽快建立起存款保险制度。本文主要分析建立存款保险制度的时机选择,并结合我国实际情况,提出中国建立存款保险制度的构想。     

从商业银行实务角度分析Shibor与利率市场化改革

本文通过回顾利率市场化改革进程以及Shibor利率运行情况分析,探讨了进一步推进利率市场化改革的措施,并对商业银行在利率市场化的市场竞争如何应对提出建议。本文提出我国应该建立Shibor为核心的利率体系;加快建立存款保险制度,完善金融市场退出机制;商业银行应该加强利率精细化管理和金融创新。     

中美商业银行存款的机制、行为和监管的比较分析

随着中国社会主义市场经济的不断完善,同时为了保证中国金融业的健康发展和国际惯例接轨的需要,中国必须积极构建商业银行的存款风险防范机制.本文从银行的存款业务切入,分析了中国商业银行存款产品和商业银行存款经营行为,并与美国商业银行存款作比较分析,提出建立适应社会主义市场经济的存款账户管理办法、提高中国商业银行的存款创新能力和积极构建存款风险监管的相关建议.     

存款人的市场约束对银行成本效率的影响

本文基于我国2008—2015年65家商业银行的面板数据,从银行效率的独特视角对银行存款人市场约束的有效性进行经验研究.研究结果表明﹕ 存款价格约束和个人定期存款数量约束能够促进银行成本效率的提高;公司存款没有发挥有效的市场约束效应;未保险存款对银行效率有一定影响,但没有发挥正向积极约束效应;隐性存款保险制度不利于存款人市场约束效应的发挥;信息披露有助于存款人市场约束作用的发挥;银行成本效率存在显著的规模经济效应.     

从日本的"支付"解禁看存款保险制度的实施条件

日本实施存款限额保护措施所遇到的困难以至最终延期表明,存款保险制度是在一国金融体系整体状况良好的情况下,发挥约束银行经营行为和淘汰劣质银行作用的一种制度。只有在金融监管有效运行的情况下,存款保险制度才能切实发挥其功能。而且,它要求市场信息的高度透明和国民高水平的伦理素质。结合金融领域的实际情况,我国建立存款保险制度的时机尚未成熟。     

An empirical note on the impact of federal deposit insurance on bank failures in the U.S.

This study empirically examines the impact of federal deposit insurance coverage on the failure rate of commercial banks in the U.S. over the 1963–91 period. The analysis allows for the potential bank failure rate impact of the growth rate of real GDP, the real prime lending rate, the real cost of funds, and the commercial bank tangible capital-to-asset ratio, while measuring federal deposit insurance coverage as the percentage of deposits at federally insured banks that was covered by federal deposit insurance. The instrumental variables' estimates indicate that the greater the extent of federal deposit insurance coverage, the higher the bank failure rate.     

基于Merton模型的存款保险定价研究

存款保险制度的核心是存款保险费率的厘定。本文以Merton存款保险定价的看跌期权模型为基础,引入监管宽容和未保险存款的利率两个参数,给出了商业银行存款保险定价公式。选择不同的银行对其保险费率进行估算,所得的保险费率之间有一定的差距,表明不同银行的存款保险费率是不同的,中国不适合单一费率,而适合风险费率。本文对我国正在酝酿出台的存款保险制度具有一定的指导意义。     

MARKET VALUE ACCOUNTING AND THE BANK BALANCE SHEET

Market value accounting for depository institutions is frequently suggested as a means of limiting losses to the deposit insurance funds. But opponents argue that market value accounting is too costly to be worth the effort. This article examines each balance sheet category to determine the feasibility of marking bank portfolios to market. One can assume that almost two-thirds of the asset side and over half of the liability side already are at market. In addition, securities and loans to less-developed countries are traded in secondary markets. Thus, the major cost of market value accounting would be computing current values of commercial loans through discounted cash flow analysis. But efforts now are under way in the private sector to develop less costly ways to determine market values. If market value accounting is adopted, then it will likely have its greatest effect on institutions with large holdings of loans to less-developed countries.     

Deposit insurance and moral hazard problem: the case of Turkish banking system

We investigate the effect of full deposit insurance introduced in 1994 on the financial performance of Turkish commercial banks. We construct a model, under reasonable assumptions, with deposit insurance where banks undertake excessive risk –?moral hazard risk. Empirical investigation using experimental design approach supports our moral hazard hypothesis. Our findings indicate that banks subject to the moral hazard behaviour show significant increases in foreign exchange position risk and deterioration in capital adequacy relative to their benchmark after introduction of full deposit insurance system. We relate this excessive risk-taking to the moral hazard behaviour by commercial banks. The research results indicate that complete deposit insurance system distorts the incentive structure of commercial banks and thus, prevents proper functioning of market discipline mechanism and leads to the taking excessive risk-taking.     

商业银行流动性过剩成因考察

商业银行流动性过剩问题引起了社会广泛关注和许多研究.本文另辟蹊径,从商业银行成本收益角度出发,通过对银行体系在中央银行超额存款准备金和银行间市场人民币交易成交的情况进行考察,得出当前我国商业银行仍旧面临着流动性过剩问题.商业银行流动性过剩是2004年以后才在我国经济领域中明显展露出来的.文章系统考察了影响商业银行流动性过剩的因素,认为主要是三个方面的因素对商业银行流动性过剩产生作用:分业经营体制下存差规模快速扩大;国际收支"双顺差"持续出现;货币流通速度加快.     

COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE EXPANSION OF THE MARKET

The developing country debt crisis brought attention to the type of lending behavior that predominated while the commercial bank market developed. This article presents the major characterizations of bank behavior, particularly regarding predictions that can be tested empirically. Critically comparing existing empirical studies with these predictions shows that the magnitude of default risk and deposit insurance were incorporated into the lending behavior. However, these alone do not explain the evolution of the market. One can understand this evolution in terms of information imperfections in the market, but this evaluation contradicts a major role for agency problems in the banking firm.     

对中国存款保险基金规模的初步测算

目标比率是衡量存款保险基金规模的一个重要参数。确定合理的目标比率是建立存款保险制度不容回避的问题,它的设定涉及存款保险制度的诸多因素,具有一定的复杂性。文章根据经验算法,对中国存款保险基金的目标比率进行了初步测算。测算结果表明,我国的存款保险基金的目标比率为1.12%左右,在赋予存款保险机构适当融资渠道的条件下,该目标水平基本上能保证赔付要求。根据该目标比率测算的保险费率水平,亦能为我国商业银行所承受。     

THE DEFECTIVE DESIGN OF FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE

Deposit insurance funds, especially the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, are currently in visible trouble. Two central defects of the existing deposit insurance system are identified: (1) mispricing of the insurance premiums and (2) incentives for both the industry and the insurance agencies to postpone recognizing and realizing losses.
Insurance premiums are mispriced because they are assessed at the same rate for all institutions, which creates a bias for banks to take greater risks. Practical difficulties of setting an appropriate risk-based premium for each bank are real but not necessarily insurmountable. In particular, the sale by the bank of unsecured and uninsured debt could provide a market measure of default risk, under a given failure rule.
The choice of a failure rule is also a critical matter. Current failure rules are poorly defined and permit insolvent institutions to continue in operation. Specifying a market value test of insolvency in the statutes would be helpful, but it would have to be supported by market-value accounting requirements and stronger pressures on banking authorities not to defer action.