透明度变化对股票市场投资者委托单提交行为和交易成本影响研究

基于2003年12月8日沪深交易所交易前市场透明度改革背景,本文利用一家营业部的投资者报价和交易数据,研究同一个机构投资者和散户投资者在透明度改革前后委托单提交激进程度的变化,以及这种变化对其完成交易的成本的影响。我们发现,透明度改革前后,机构投资者的委托单提交激进程度都显著大于散户投资者的委托单提交激进程度。透明度增加以后,机构投资者的委托单激进程度显著减少,而散户投资者的委托单提交激进程度增加。同时发现,透明度增加以后,机构投资者通过分拆委托单,增加交易次数,导致完成交易的时间增加,但价格影响力基本没有变化,散户投资者的成交时间和价格影响力有显著改善。     

Optimal Refunding Strategies, Transaction Costs, and the Market Value of Corporate Debt

The primary purpose of this paper is to consider both qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of refunding transaction costs and interest rate uncertainty on optimal refunding strategies and the market value of corporate debt. A dynamic model of corporate bond refunding with transaction costs is developed that simultaneously solves for the optimal refunding strategy, the value of the refunding call option, the value of the bond liability to the firm, and the market (investor) value of the fixed-rate contract. We provide examples in which the price of the callable bond does exceed the call price, and we examine whether or not typical levels of refunding costs are sufficient to explain the magnitude and duration of frequently observed premiums on callable corporate bonds.     

Corporate Fraud and Corporate Bond Costs: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between corporate fraud and four typical components of costs associated with corporate bonds. Based on data from a booming corporate bond market in China, we confirm that fraudulent issuers have higher corporate bond costs. Specifically, they are more likely to push upward price revisions, pay higher issue fees and coupon spreads, and encounter larger underpricing after issuance. Moreover, we demonstrate that severe corporate fraud is also significantly related to the costs of corporate bonds. Furthermore, we find that investors pay more attention to fraud in accounting information and disclosure. These results remain robust to a strand of endogeneity and through the robustness tests. In additional research, we find that bonds issued by fraudulent firms tend to receive lower ratings and show inferior performance after issuance. We also demonstrate that the effects of corporate fraud on bond costs erode as time passes, although the mitigation speed is slow. Finally, we find that hiring reputable financial intermediaries can partially mitigate the negative effects of corporate fraud.     

Underpricing in the Corporate Bond Market

This article examines underpricing of initial public offerings(IPOs) and seasoned offerings in the corporate bond market.We investigate whether underpricing represents a solution toan information problem or a liquidity problem. We find thatunderpricing occurs with both IPOs and seasoned offerings andis highest among riskier, unknown firms. Our evidence suggeststhat information problems drive underpricing, with support forboth the bookbuilding view of underpricing and the asymmetricinformation theory. We do not find evidence in favor of theRock model of underpricing or any evidence that illiquiditycauses underpricing.     

基于行为金融的银行间债券交易行为研究

本章主要从数量的角度分析了银行间债券市场的主体交易行为。由于传统金融市场理论与银行间市场的实际情况存在不符的情况,作者试图用行为经济学理论来解释银行间市场的主体交易行为。由于数据方面的原因,本实证分析仅局限于银行间现券交易。实证结果显示,银行间市场不同主体之间的行为存在显著的差异性。最后,论文引入行为因子,对传统债券定价模型进行修正。     

中国企业债券市场发展的实证分析

相对于国债、金融债，股票市场和企业信贷融资，企业债券市场是我国证券市场乃至金融市场的“跛腿”和“短板”。……     

Secondary Trading Costs in the Municipal Bond Market

Using new econometric methods, we separately estimate average transaction costs for over 167,000 bonds from a 1‐year sample of all U.S. municipal bond trades. Municipal bond transaction costs decrease with trade size and do not depend significantly on trade frequency. Also, municipal bond trades are substantially more expensive than similar‐sized equity trades. We attribute these results to the lack of bond market price transparency. Additional cross‐sectional analyses show that bond trading costs increase with credit risk, instrument complexity, time to maturity, and time since issuance. Investors, and perhaps ultimately issuers, might benefit if issuers issued simpler bonds.     

Corporate Bond Trading Costs: A Peek Behind the Curtain

In this paper, I use institutional corporate bond trade data to estimate transactions costs in the over-the-counter bond market. I find average round-trip trading costs to be about $0.27 per $100 of par value. Trading costs are lower for larger trades. Small institutions pay more to trade than large institutions, all else being equal. Small bond dealers charge more than large ones. I find no evidence that trading costs more for lower-rated bonds.     

我国企业债券市场的若干问题

在我国,企业债券是指具有法人资格的企业为筹集生产与建设资金,依照法定程序发行,约定在一定期限内还本付息的债务凭证.与之相对的是公司债券,其指股份公司为筹措长期资金而向一般大众举借款项而发行的债券.实际上,公司债和企业债只是名称上的区分,并无本质差别.一直以来,国家发改委等部门沿用企业债的名称,主要因为大部分发债主体尚不是公司制企业.     

发展我国企业债券市场的政策建议

企业债券市场作为证券市场的重要组成部分,它的发展状况对建立统一、高效的资本市场有着不可忽视的作用,而我国由于制度安排性原因,使企业债券市场的发展遇到了诸如发行、交易等多方面的问题,因此,要想证券市场和谐、健康、持续发展,必须通过制度的重新安排及法律、法规的建设完善予以解决。     

企业债券市场：寻求新的突破

80年代末，我国企业债券市场开始起步，并在1991、1992年曾出现一轮发债高潮，但从总体上看，发展速度明显慢于股票市场，在市场规模、品种多样化等方面，与国内股票和国际债券市场相比都存在着较大的差距，形成了我国证券市场畸形发展的差距，形成了我国证券市场畸形发展的局面。统计资料显示，1999年，美国公司债券发行额突破2500亿美元，为同期股票发行量的5．8倍；而我国，虽然99年企业债券发行规模 首次突破420亿元，但与同期企业通过股票市场的939亿元的资金量相比，规模上有明显差距，基本上处于“萌芽状态”。因此，本着重分析我国企业债券市场几年来发展中存在的问题，探讨解决问题的对策，以推动国内企业债券市场的健康发展。     

透明度对银行间债券市场流动性变化趋势的影响

为检验透明度制度变化对我国银行间债券市场流动性变化趋势是否有影响,本文将突变理论引入债券市场研究,并对我国银行间债券市场的综合流动性、国债流动性、政策性金融债券和短期融资券流动性进行突变检验。结果表明,我国银行间债券市场流动性数据的生成过程没有出现结构突变,整体上观察,我国银行间债券市场流动性呈平稳上升趋势。我们又使用非参数检验方法检验了透明度变化对流动性的影响,结果表明,透明度对流动性的影响因债券而各异,对整个银行间债券市场的流动性也因各种债券受到透明度的影响强度不同而不同。     

台湾地区私募公司债市场的发展与启示

本文对台湾私募债券市场的发展状况进行了研究,分析了台湾地区私募公司债市场发展缓慢的原因.研究结果表明:尽管台湾地区仿效美国建立了较为完备的私募制度,但台湾地区私募公司债市场发展缓慢,其主要原因在于台湾私募公司债发行制度并没有明显的简化便利优势,市场流动性受到较多限制,而且市场透明度也相对较低.台湾地区私募公司债的发展为大陆私募债券市场的制度设计提供了启示,即私募公司债的发行主体要更加多元化、转让制度要更加灵活、参与者要更加丰富、监管制度要更加完备.     

我国公司债券市场发展模式探讨

本文选择美国债券市场作为我国债券市场的参照,通过对美国债券市场以及国内其他类型债券市场的相关制度和规定的总结、思考,认为我国公司债券市场应该由证监会统一监管,采取核准制发行并逐步向注册制发行过渡,在面向机构投资者的银行间场外交易市场交易;应该充分发挥自律组织对监管的补充作用,鼓励私募发行以发挥其对公开发行的补充作用,完善做市商制度以引导其对场外交易市场的积极作用.     

公司债券市场信息不对称和政府作用

分析公司债券市场信息不对称的后果和处理方式的特点,以及政府在减少公司债券市场信息不对称方面应该发挥的作用.指出我国政府对公司债券的利率管制和强制担保要求等不当干预加重了公司债券市场的信息不对称,阻碍了市场的健康发展.建议取消政府在公司债券市场上的不当干预、将公司债券的主要投资者定位于机构投资者、完善金融市场基础设施建设.     

Liquidity Premia and Transaction Costs

Standard literature concludes that transaction costs only have a second‐order effect on liquidity premia. We show that this conclusion depends crucially on the assumption of a constant investment opportunity set. In a regime‐switching model in which the investment opportunity set varies over time, we explicitly characterize the optimal consumption and investment strategy. In contrast to the standard literature, we find that transaction costs can have a first‐order effect on liquidity premia. However, with reasonably calibrated parameters, the presence of transaction costs still cannot fully explain the equity premium puzzle.     

企业债券市场的发展与评级机构的监管

和发达国家不同的是,对于评级机构,我国面临的不仅仅是监管与规范的问题,还有一个发展的问题。在监管中使用评级结果必须是在确保评级质量的前提下由点到面逐步推开。首先,明确评级机构获得监管当局认可的条件。其次,建立对评级机构资格评估以及动态监管的正式程序。最后,完善退出机制。     

发展我国企业债券市场的路径选择

我国企业债券市场的发展主要受到政府干预过多、发债主体单一、市场流动性不足、企业积极性不高、信用评级体系不完善等方面的制约。我们应从正确评估我国的企业债券市场、大力发展信用评级机构、提高债券流动性、实现企业债券利率的市场化、改进和完善企业债券监管制度、积极引导国有企业利用债券融资、不断改善我国企业债券市场的发展环境等方面促进我国企业债券市场的发展。     

公司债市场信用违约风险的传染效应与控制机理

本文基于2014年1月-2020年9月公司债市场信用违约与一级市场信用利差省级月度面板数据,运用固定效应与中介效应模型,分析公司债违约风险传染效应.发现:(1)公司债违约风险在公司债市场内部传染并产生结构化定价效应,区域商业银行投债机制、政府兜底机制是重要的风险中介传导机制;(2)不同类型、信用等级、区域的公司债发行价...     

What Determines Corporate Transparency?

We investigate corporate transparency, defined as the availability of firm‐specific information to those outside publicly traded firms. We conceptualize corporate transparency within a country as output from a multifaceted system whose components collectively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information. We factor analyze a range of measures capturing countries' firm‐specific information environments, isolating two distinct factors. The first factor, interpreted as financial transparency, captures the intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures, and their interpretation and dissemination by analysts and the media. The second factor, interpreted as governance transparency, captures the intensity of governance disclosures used by outside investors to hold officers and directors accountable. We investigate whether these factors vary with countries' legal/judicial regimes and political economies. Our main multivariate result is that the governance transparency factor is primarily related to a country's legal/judicial regime, whereas the financial transparency factor is primarily related to political economy.