Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Monopoly, competition and information acquisition

An incumbent monopolist is uncertain about its linear demand, but can acquire public information at a cost. We determine how an entry threat affects the firm's information acquisition. If returns to scale are constant and the state-contingent demands become more dispersed as output increases, then entry reduces information acquisition. If, however, either the incumbent or entrant has increasing returns; or if the state-contingent demands are nonlinear or fail increasing dispersion, then entry can increase information. Finally, entry can hurt consumers. Although entry always increases output, it can decrease information. Consumers sometimes prefer a better informed monopoly to a duopoly.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry

This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.     

VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND SHARED FACILITIES IN UNREGULATED INDUSTRIES

In this paper we analyze the equilibrium market structure, following liberalization, of an industry involving an essential facility. Two alternative modes of market entry are considered, in conjunction with vertical integration, namely: (i) full entry, which means building a new and more efficient facility at a positive fixed cost; and (ii) partial entry, which means purchasing existing capacity from the incumbent, at a fixed price per unit that is freely negotiated between the incumbent and the entrant. We show that vertical integration is a dominant strategy for each firm under either entry mode, and that upstream firms choose to share the incumbent's facility when the entrant's fixed cost exceeds a positive threshold. In addition, welfare analysis shows that in many situations the market can efficiently solve the trade-off between fixed-cost savings and softened downstream competition, thus providing a rationale for the liberalization of such industries. Several competition policy implications are discussed.     

Sunk Cost and Entry

The usual mechanisms by which sunk costs are said to affect entry arethrough raising the expected average cost of an entrant, relative to that ofincumbents. I show that in standard models and in the absence of riskpremia imposed by financial markets on an entrant's cost of capital, sunkcosts may make entry unprofitable because of their effect on the post-entryunit costs of incumbents.     

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities

We analyze the potential entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” The model assumes quality-dependent marginal production costs and considers sequential quality choices by an incumbent and an entrant. Entry-quality decisions and the entry-deterrence strategies are related to the fixed cost necessary for entry and to the degree of consumers’ taste for quality. We detail the conditions under which the incumbent increases its quality level to deter entry. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well. Welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.     

Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power

An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer under the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surplus they provide to the buyer. The buyer is privately informed on her valuation for the incumbent’s service. Asymmetric information makes the incumbent favor entry as it helps screening buyers. When the entrant has some bargaining power vis-à-vis the buyer and keeps a share of the gains from entry, the incumbent instead wants to reduce entry. The compounding effect of these two forces may lead to either excessive entry or foreclosure, and possibly to a fixed rebate for exclusivity which is afforded to all buyers.     

Does the fourth entrant make any difference?: Entry and competition in the early U.S. broadband market

We study the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct in an adapted Bresnahan and Reiss (1991, 1994) framework. In our framework, entrants incur sunk costs to enter, while incumbents disregard these costs in deciding on continuation or exit. We apply this framework to study entry and competition in the local U.S. broadband markets from 1999 to 2003. Ignoring sunk costs generates unreasonable variation in firms' competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry costs are allowed. Once the market has one to three incumbent firms, the fourth entrant has little effect on competitive conduct.     

Forgoing invention to deter entry

A monopoly facing potential entry may not want to develop an efficient technology even at zero R&D costs. Such a phenomenon occurs if a new technology is distinct from the existing one so production uncertainty becomes technology-specific. Then the monopoly can reduce the entrant's post-entry profit to the point of deterrence by using the existing technology with which the entrant would enter. We show that the monopoly develops a new technology when the entrant faces a sufficiently high or low entry cost but forgoes invention when the entry cost is intermediate. These results hold both in quantity and price competition.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

When should a firm expand its business? : The signaling implications of business expansion

We examine an incumbent's trade-off between the improved efficiency that business expansion facilitates and the signaling role that business expansion plays in conveying information to potential entrants about the state of demand. We demonstrate that both separating and pooling equilibria survive the Intuitive Criterion. Essentially, in contrast to models with asymmetric information about unit cost, incumbents' benefits from investing in a signal are not necessarily monotonic in the state of demand. We investigate how the extent of informativeness of the outcome depends on the enhanced efficiency that the incumbent's expansion facilitates and the priors of the entrant.     

OPEN ARCHITECTURE AND R&D INCENTIVES

In open systems, firms give up their property rights to technologies and permit other companies to use these technologies. We ask how an incumbent's architecture choice affects social welfare by altering R&D competition among firms. More specifically, we ask whether an incumbent, by adopting an open system, can establish its socially inefficient technology as the market standard, while an entrant is developing a more efficient technology. It is shown that an incumbent has an incentive to preempt an entrant's competing technology by choosing an open system, but that the open system might result in a premature market standard.     

Profit Raising Entry

Common wisdom suggests that entry reduces profits of incumbent firms. On the contrary, we demonstrate that if the incumbents differ in marginal costs and the entrants behave like Stackelberg followers, then entry may benefit the cost efficient incumbents while hurting the cost inefficient ones. And the total outputs of all incumbents may be higher under entry.     

ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.     

Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry

This paper develops a model of pricing to deter entry by a sole supplier of a network good. We show that the installed user base of a network good can serve a preemptive function similar to that of an investment in capacity if the entrant's good is incompatible with the incumbent's good and there are network externalities in demand. Consequently, the threat of entry can lead the incumbent to set low prices. We identify some factors that should be considered in thinking about the welfare effects of entry deterrence in this and similar models.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Big splash,no waves? Cognitive mechanisms driving incumbent firms’ responses to low‐price market entry strategies

Research Summary: Low‐price market entries, aiming for rapid sales growth, tend to prompt strong competitive reactions. This research explores whether and how firms using low‐price entry strategies can mitigate retaliatory incumbent reactions. An experiment with 656 managers shows that entrants can attenuate the strength of incumbents’ responses by fostering perceptions of high aggressiveness or low commitment. Entrants may be able to accomplish this by adjusting their entry strategy to embed (subtle) cues of aggressiveness and (lack of) commitment. A replication experiment with university students reinforces our overall theoretical argument. However, the results also indicate that the interpretation of cues embedded in the entry strategy may be affected by the experience of incumbent firm managers. Overall, these results clarify the cognitive foundations of competitive responses to market entry. Managerial Summary: What drives incumbents to respond strongly to market entries, and what can the entrant, if anything, do to mitigate those responses? This research offers empirical evidence and theoretical insights for managers faced with these questions by shedding light on the thinking processes preceding competitive responses. The study shows that while managers are motivated to respond strongly to market entries that appear to be highly consequential to their business, these responses may be mitigated if the entrant manages to foster perceptions of high aggressiveness or low commitment to the market. Managers form these perceptions in part on the basis of the entrant’s behavior, creating an opportunity for entrants to adjust their entry strategies in a manner that demotivates strong competitive responses.     

Sunk Costs,Accommodation, and the Welfare Effects of Entry

Although economists usually support the unrestricted entry of firms into an industry, entry may lower social welfare if there are setup costs or if entrants have a cost disadvantage. We consider the welfare effects of entry within a standard Cournot model where some of an incumbent firm’s costs are sunk. We find that the range of parameter values over which entry can harm welfare declines monotonically in the fraction of cost that are sunk. Furthermore, the presence of even a small fraction of sunk costs often reverses an assessment that entry harms welfare.