Power Structure – Ownership,Integration, and Competition in the U.S. Electric Utility Industry. John E. Kwoka,Jr.

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Deregulation,governance structures,and efficiency: the U.S. electric utility sector

The business strategy literature offers apparently opposite views of the ability of vertical integration to cope with the uncertainty related to changing regulatory environments. In this paper, we analyze how the process of retail deregulation affects the comparative efficiency of governance structures, which range on a continuum from fully vertically integrated structures to market transactions. Based on the analysis of 177 U.S. electric utilities from 1998 to 2001, our results show that the process of retail deregulation has a negative impact on firms' productive efficiency, as measured using Data Envelopment Analysis. Furthermore, firms that are vertically integrated into electricity generation, or that rely on the market for the supply of their electricity, are more efficient than firms that adopt hybrid structures combining vertical integration and contracting. This research has important implications because it shows the coexistence of different types of governance structures that cope efficiently with regulatory uncertainty through different mechanisms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Economics, Competition, and Costs in the Resructuring of U.S. Electricity Markets

Many of the problems facing U.S. electricity markets stem from blatant disregard for the advice and warnings of economists who specialize in these markets. The short list of disregarded economic advice includes existing market power of some generators; transmission discrimination, lack of efficient pricing of transmission congestion; inefficient retail prices; anemic incentives to minimize costs; and lack of consumer choice and experience, occasionally coupled with high switching costs. As uncomfortable as the current state of electric power restructuring may be, going back to full regulation likely would be worse. There is reason to hope that less direct paths to increased competition will resolve some of the worst policy patches and half-reforms. These less direct paths to increased competition include expansion of the size of geographic markets, geographic expansion of transmission unbundling, reductions in obstacles to long-term supply contracting, growth of demand response programs, improvements in generator efficiency and availability, and expansion of real-time pricing and customized energy services for commercial and industrial customers. In aggregate, these constitute a promising “quiet phase” of electric power reform.     

Networks,Infrastructure and the New Task for Regulation. Werner Sichel and Donald L. Alexander,editors.

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Industry Structure,Strategy, and Public Policy. F. M. Scherer.

Review of Industrial Organization -     

Entry timing,exploration, and firm survival in the early U.S. bicycle industry

We explore the relationship between a firm's entry timing and its probability of surviving the early, uncertain period of its industry, and consider the trade‐off between entering early and potentially establishing a strong position in the industry vs. waiting until technological uncertainty is reduced. We hypothesize that, owing to inertial forces, firms that enter the industry at the earliest point in its history are least likely to make the conversion to the product generation that becomes the dominant design in the industry. Exploration through the introduction of new products appears to reflect a local search process and retards the transition to the dominant design. We also hypothesize that, though firms entering early may exhibit longer life spans, their advantages are limited to the period before the emergence of the dominant design. We test our hypotheses in the early U.S. bicycle industry, and find evidence consistent with the idea that inertia limits firms' abilities to make the transition between generations of product configurations. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Industry Structure,Segmentation, and Quality Competition in the U.S. Hotel Industry*

We examine how quality competition affects the relationship between market size and industry structure at the product level using evidence from the U.S. hotel industry. Starting in the early 1980s, quality competition for business travelers became more based on variable and less on fixed costs, and became less scale intensive. Since then, market size increases have been met by more, but smaller, hotels in business travel destinations but continued to be met by larger hotels in personal travel destinations. Our results illustrate how the way consumers benefit from increases in market size depends on how firms compete.