Optimal design of pro-conservation incentives

Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for governmental and non-governmental agencies to use in addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem services. In PES schemes, payments can either be tied to indicators of actions for service provision or to indicators of the generated service itself. Performance payments are synonymous for this second group, i.e. payments are completely contingent on the procurement of an environmental good or service. Such a focus raises several practical issues during implementation. We review and translate key aspects of the economic theory of incentives into the context of performance payment schemes with special attention paid to two practical issues: risks outside the individual's control and distortion in the measurement of environmental services. Four different incentive payment approaches are presented and the effects of risk and distortion on optimal incentives are discussed. The investigation of each payment approach is accompanied by a discussion of examples from the field.     

Combining performance-based and action-based payments to provide environmental goods under uncertainty

Payments for environmental services (PES) are widely adopted to support the conservation of biodiversity and other environmental goods. Challenges that PES schemes have to tackle are (i) environmental uncertainty and (ii) information asymmetry between the provider of the service (typically a farmer) and the regulator. Environmental uncertainty calls for action-based payment schemes, because of the more favorable risk allocation if the farmer is risk-averse. Information asymmetry, on the other hand, calls for a performance-based payment, because of the more direct incentives for the farmer. Based on a principal-agent model, we study the optimal combination of both, performance-based and action-based payments under conditions of environmental uncertainty and asymmetric information. We find that for a risk-neutral regulator a combination is optimal in the majority of cases and that the welfare gain of the combined scheme over a pure action-based (performance-based) payment increases with information asymmetry (environmental uncertainty). We further show that for a regulator who is risk-averse against fluctuations in environmental goods provision the optimal performance-based payment is lower than for a risk-neutral regulator. We quantitatively illustrate our findings in a case study on the enhancement of the butterfly Scarce Large Blue (Maculinea teleius) in Landau/Germany.     

Decentralized payments for environmental services: The cases of Pimampiro and PROFAFOR in Ecuador

Few payment for environmental services (PES) schemes in developing countries operate outside of the central state's umbrella, and are at the same time old enough to allow for a meaningful evaluation. Ecuador has two such decentralised, consolidated experiences: the five-year old Pimampiro municipal watershed-protection scheme and the twelve-year old PROFAFOR carbon-sequestration programme. We describe and compare the two cases, using a common PES definition and methodology, drawing on both primary interview-based information and secondary data. We find that both schemes have been relatively effective in reaching their environmental objectives, in terms of having probably high additionality levels and low leakage effects. A strong focus on the targeted environmental service and a strong degree of conditionality seem to be two key factors explaining these achievements. Although neither scheme has targeted poverty alleviation or other side objectives, both are likely to have improved PES recipients' welfare, mostly through higher incomes. We highlight several observations with more generalised relevance and lessons for the design of PES schemes.     

Designing payments for environmental services in theory and practice: An overview of the issues

Payments for environmental services (PES) have attracted increasing interest as a mechanism to translate external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide environmental services (ES). In this introductory paper, we set the stage for the rest of this Special Issue of Ecological Economics by reviewing the main issues arising in PES design and implementation and discussing these in the light of environmental economics. We start with a discussion of PES definition and scope. We proceed to review some of the principal dimensions and design characteristics of PES programs and then analyze how PES compares to alternative policy instruments. Finally, we examine in detail two important aspects of PES programs: their effectiveness and their distributional implications.PES is not a silver bullet that can be used to address any environmental problem, but a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in which ecosystems are mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem managers. PES is based on the beneficiary-pays rather than the polluter-pays principle, and as such is attractive in settings where ES providers are poor, marginalized landholders or powerful groups of actors. An important distinction within PES is between user-financed PES in which the buyers are the users of the ES, and government-financed PES in which the buyers are others (typically the government) acting on behalf of ES users. In practice, PES programs differ in the type and scale of ES demand, the payment source, the type of activity paid for, the performance measure used, as well as the payment mode and amount. The effectiveness and efficiency of PES depends crucially on program design.     

面向交易的电子商务理论与实践的综合分析框架——电子商务三维分析模型

电子商务理论与实践的发展都亟待业界提出一个能为研究提供基础并可有效指导应用的合理而扎实的综合分析框架。本文提出的三维综合框架是基于商务链——一个由商品与市场准备、展示、沟通、谈判、签约、支付、配送、售后服务八大节点和信息流、商流、资金流、物流、信用流、人员流等组成的框架;电子商务应用模式——包括业务、经营、管理、技术、资金、信用——风险模式和B2C,B2B等电子商务商务业态概念模型组成的。其四种静态拓展模型可分别对理论研究或实践起到指导作用,而动态拓展模型则将电子商务项目策划的思路清晰化。     

推动生态补偿机制从理念到实践转化的路径探讨

现行生态补偿机制更多的是为其他目标而并非为生态补偿制定．不能形成一个有机整体来维护环境公平，促进可持续发展。本文通过分析现行生态补偿机制的局限性．揭示了实践生态补偿机制的难点和障碍，进而提出从赔偿观念、立法、补偿支付机制及地方模式探索等方面推动生态补偿机制从理念到实践的路径转化。     

科学、价值与判断在环境影响评估架构中之整合

公共政策研拟，尤其是环境影响评估，不仅牵涉技术性科学层面，同时涵盖社会性价值评估与政策性决策判断。旨在探讨如何将科学、价值与判断等因素合理融合于环境影响评估作业过程中，并据此研拟一环境影响评估架构，作为中国台湾地区环保部门开发案审核依据之参考。本文所研拟之环境影响评估架构的理论基础包括社会选择理论、社会判断理论及多属性评估方法。通过社会选择理论分析环境政策制定的机制；通过社会判断理论解释科学与价值如何整合于政策制定及其可行性中；而通过多属性评估方法建立开发案评选的集体决策技术。以山坡地开发为例说明此架构在实践中的应用。     

Reparations for African‐Americans as a Transfer Problem: A Cautionary Tale

We examine how different methods of reparations payments to African‐Americans affect both the black and nonblack populations of the United States using the framework of the transfer‐problem from international trade theory as a theoretical foundation. We find that reparations payments that provide incentives for blacks to use the payment toward purchases of goods and services produced by nonblacks might expand the income gap. Also a reparations payment in the absence of productive capacity owned by blacks is found to have no final positive impact on black income. These results indicate that a reparations payment strategy must be carefully and cautiously conceived in order to achieve the desired effects.     

企业集群边界均衡影响因素分析——基于空间区位架构

文章以企业集群为研究对象,从空间区位的角度研究集群边界均衡问题。通过salop圆形选址模型的集群区位架构,应用C-D形效用函数的扩展微观方程组,经过推演得到的渐进解析解显示,区位市场容量和谈判成本对集群边界有最直接的制约作用。如果谈判成本不存在,集群边界可以无限大;如果谈判成本存在,在市场价格稳定不变、投入成本系数固定的情况下,谈判成本系数与集群边界负相关,区位市场容量与集群边界正相关。在分别满足这两种情况的数值条件下,集群边界达到均衡。而区位企业密度结构对集群边界扩张速度具有调节作用,帮助集群以最优效率发展。从均衡结论入手,文章指出如果一种类型的产品是盈利的,那么应该重点关注于找出最合理的集群空间密度结构,调控边界增速,同时尽可能降低谈判成本,作为治理集群边界的核心渠道。文章对认识集群边界扩张的演化发展有一定的理论创新性,从空间区位架构的视角来研究集群扩张边界问题,扩展了现有的文献研究。     

京津冀大气治理生态补偿支付原则研究

生态补偿是跨界大气污染治理的重要政策工具。迄今为止,京津冀大气治理生态补偿机制仍未出台,严重制约着京津冀生态环保协同发展做深做实,创新思维方式、构建非传统领域生态补偿理论体系是当务之急。厘清了传统生态补偿认识误区,创新性地提出了生态补偿支付原则统一框架,将"污染者付费原则"(PPP)和"受益者付费原则"(BPP)统一在"改变者付费原则"(CPP)分析框架中,为京津冀大气治理生态补偿机制设计提供了思想前提和理论基础;通过构建京津冀大气治理CGE模型具体测算了特定大气质量控制目标下河北应获得的生态补偿额。这对于加快补齐京津冀生态文明建设制度短板、有效弥补河北大气治理资金需要、强化京津冀生态环境联建联防联治具有重要意义,对于全国和其他重点区域大气治理具有普遍启示意义。     

生产性服务业集聚对区域技术转移的作用机制

以协同创新为中介变量、环境规制为调节变量,构建生产性服务业集聚与技术转移二者关系的理论模型。以我国2002-2015年省域数据为样本,采用多元回归分析法对生产性服务业集聚影响区域技术转移的作用机制进行研究。结果显示：生产性服务业集聚对区域技术转移有正向影响;协同创新对生产性服务业集聚与区域技术转移的关系发挥中介作用;环境规制对协同创新与区域技术转移间的关系具有正向调节作用;环境规制对生产性服务业集聚与区域技术转移间关系的调节作用通过多主体协同创新的中介效应实现。结论可为揭示生产性服务业集聚对区域技术转移的作用机制提供理论依据,为推动生产性服务业集聚、多主体协同创新和区域技术转移提供实践参考。     

Payment for ecosystem services： emerging lessons

Market based initiatives for management of degrading ecosystems and their services have received the added attention as one of the innovative responses in the reent years. Those initiatives such as direct and indirect payment for ecosystem services like premium for rain forest honey, payment by the people at the lower reach to those at the upper reach for the watershed services etc. have drawn the attention of the decision makers as they have proved to be far more cost effective.This paper wynthesizes the key messages from some of the paper are carbon, watershed services and biodiversity, We find that while credible valuation of ecosystem services for all services remain a critical concern behind setting up the payment mechanism, absent of necessary institutional framework may seriously undermine this innovative response for management of ecosystems. In the paper, necessary institutional mechanisms enabling the market for those services have been sketched out, Key messages from those cases have been synthesized.     

Management and the representative firm revisited: the modern significance of Marshall's evolutionary economics

In an essay written in honour of Peter Swann, it is second nature to discuss some aspects of the economics of innovation, as that is the very challenging area of economic life where he has added so much to our understanding. I will attempt to do this by posing the problem of how innovation fits into the theory of value. Innovation research continues apace, but its broader systemic implications for how we understand the dynamics of capitalism are in danger of being overlooked. But two important economists, Schumpeter and Marshall, have seen the problem differently and built innovation into their theoretical schemes from the start. Marshall's theory of evolutionary change provides a natural focus for our discussion, and this is reflected in his treatment of management, in his use of the representative firm and in the variation-cum-selection dynamics of his open competitive process. We treat each of these topics and show how his evolutionary dynamics can be expressed in the Fisher/Price dynamics of evolutionary change. More generally, the key to economic development is the uneven nature of innovation and it is the uneven nature that gives economic transformation its evolutionary character. This, I suggest, is the proper legacy of Marshalls economics.     

Monitoring and Motivation in Principal-Agent Relationships: Some Issues in the Case of Local Authority Services

This paper examines a number of issues concerning the effects of monitoring on principals and agents involved in the provision of local authority services subject to competition. It examines, and then extends, existing theoretical work indicating the potential for sub-optimal outcomes which result from the principal introducing monitoring schemes which focus upon the measurable aspects of the agent's performance. The paper then departs from the received principal-agent paradigm in order to consider whether monitoring and competitive regimes more generally have negative effects on the welfare and performance of principals and agents in both theory and practice.     

The impact of medical complications on optimal hospital payment

This paper studies the optimal payment policy offered by a regulator to a partially altruistic hospital when the latter privately observes the severity of illness of patients and chooses a hidden quality that influences the probability of medical complications occurring. We analyze how the level of altruism of the hospital affects the conditions under which the payment, for a given diagnosis-related group, should be refined according to the severity of illness and the occurrence of complications.     

Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games

We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions.     

The Impact of Exchange Rate Risk on Intercountry Trade and Production

Analysing various arrangements of intercountry trade, this paper investigates the impact of exchange rate risk on production and expected trade. It addresses the question how a mean-preserving spread of the exchange rate distribution effects strategic aspects of different trading arrangements. It is shown that in an uncertain environment the efficiency loss induced by double marginalization can in general not be overcome by negotiation.     

第三方支付的宏观经济风险及宏观审慎监管

国内第三方支付市场发展迅猛,作为一种新型的支付清算体系,它的诞生也为现代金融体系增加了新的宏观经济风险。本文针对第三方支付独特的风险机理,探讨将其纳入宏观审慎监管框架的理论依据,同时在借鉴欧美经验的基础上,提出我国的监管对策。     

Clean technology — Innovation and environmental regulation

The development and diffusion of clean technologies has an important role to play in preventing pollution. Government must address the issue of how firms can be given the necessary incentive to develop environmentally sound production techniques and products. This paper focus on how subsidies can — under certain restrictive conditions — stimulate innovation. Subsidization is usually assumed to involve unit subsidies for pollution reduction. Unit subsidies have little to do with the subsidy schemes in actual use. Our focus is on subsidy schemes specifically designed to promote the development of clean technologies through the use of grants/financial aid. Based on data from the development projects initiated through The Danish Clean Technology Programme we analyze how environmental innovations take place when the polluters, their suppliers and consultants are actively engaged in the development processes. The main merit of subsidy schemes like the Danish one is its direct focus on the innovation processes and the active incorporation of the network of firms surrounding the polluters. Our findings lead us to conclude that when it comes to subsidization, the role of government should be redefined. Government can act as a matchmaker by providing firms with informative incentives and necessary contacts for finding more efficient technological solutions to specific environmental problems.     

我国规范的省对县(市)均衡性转移支付制度研究

县(市)级政府是提供基本公共服务的主体,如果缺乏规范、科学和公正的省对县(市)均衡性转移支付制度,以均等化为目标的均衡性转移支付将难以实现其政策意图。本文以"因素法"为基础,从标准财政收入测算、标准财政支出测算和均衡性转移支付绩效评价三个层面构建我国规范的省对县(市)均衡性转移支付制度体系。在此基础上,以云南省为例对均衡性转移支付资金分配进行实证测度,并提出该制度体系在实践运行中的经验与研究展望。