The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment

In this paper, the strategy method's impact on behavior in sequential bargaining games is investigated. Besides the decision procedure (hot versus cold), we varied the second mover punishment costs (high versus low). Significant impacts of both treatment variables were observed. For example, second movers punished significantly more often in the hot version of the low cost game. Furthermore, first mover behavior was significantly different in the hot and cold versions of both games. In the hot games, first mover behavior suggests an expectation of decreased rewards and/or punishments from second movers. We observed, however, no decrease in reward and an increase in punishment. The hot cold variable only informs first movers that the decision procedure used by second movers has changed. Therefore, first mover behavior must be shaped by their perceived assessment concerning how second movers make decisions. We argue that first mover behavior can be explained by the interaction of two well-known psychological effects: the consensus and positive self-image effects.     

A Common Pool Resource Game with Sequential Decisions and Experimental Evidence

We describe a common pool resource game in which players choose how much of the stock to extract in a sequential manner. There are two choices and one represents taking a larger proportion of the stock than the other. After a player makes a choice, the remaining stock grows at a constant rate. We consider a game with a finite number of alternating moves. It is shown that changes in the larger proportion of the stock that the players are allowed to take and the growth rate affect equilibrium, but have little effect on behavior in the laboratory. In addition to observing more cooperation than predicted, we observe that parameters that are strategically irrelevant affect behavior. The results of this research might help policy makers in developing adequate policies to prevent overexploitation of some natural renewable resources.     

The Carrot vs. the Stick in Work Team Motivation

This paper reports on the use of carrot (positive) and stick (negative) incentives as methods of increasing effort among members of work teams. We study teams of four members in a laboratory environment in which giving effort towards the team goal is simulated by eliciting voluntary contributions towards the provision of a public good. We test the efficiency-improving properties of four distinct environments: monetary prizes given to high contributors versus monetary fines assessed to low contributors, where high/low contributor is defined first in terms of absolute contributions and then in terms of contributions relative to abilities—which we call handicapping. Our results show that both carrot and stick can increase efficiency (i.e., contributions) levels by 10–28%. We find that handicapped incentives promise the highest efficiency levels, and when handicapping is not used penalties may be more effective than prizes. The implications for work teams and suggestions for practical implementation are discussed.     

Reciprocity and Cooperation in Repeated Coordination Games: The Principled-Player Approach

Two long-lived players play a repeated coordination game. I show the restrictions on players' beliefs which imply that cooperation is optimal play. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D83.     

Cognition and Extended (NSNX) Rational Choice: Some Early Results

The paper sketches a neoDarwinian model of cooperation, which is then used to analyze archived data from two prominent series of public goods experiments. Each of three tests supports a conjecture drawn from the model, but also reveals a cognitive complication. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Capacity Choices and Price Competition in Experimental Markets

We report on experimental duopoly markets with heterogeneous goods. In these markets, sellers first choose capacities and then prices. While capacities remain fixed for either five or ten periods, prices have to be chosen in every period. The experiments starts with two sets of exogenously predetermined capacities. Independently of the distribution of capacities is, a unique pure-strategy in prices is subgame perfect. In equilibrium, capacities should correspond to the Cournot prediction. Given capacities, price-setting behavior is in general consistent with the theory. Average capacities converge above the Cournot level. Capacities converge at the industry level but are somewhat dispersed. Sellers rarely manage to cooperate.     

Inside Shadow Banking in China: Credit Driven Growth vs. Financial Stability

Shadow banking has been growing rapidly in China since the 2008 global financial crisis. Shadow banking has also played an increasing role in supplying credit. I investigate the development of the shadow banking sector, and assess its impacts on financial stability and economic growth in China. I argue that, due to the loose regulations and institutional characteristics of the shadow banks, these banks tend to adopt business practices that elevate institutional risks. At the systemic level, shadow banks have contributed to credit expansion and credit-driven growth. However, such growth entails significant financial risks and renders the macro-economy financially fragile. I conclude with a discussion of imminent fullblown financial crisis, calling for policy actions.     

模仿引进、自主创新的技术战略模型选择

企业竞争优势的根源是企业竞争能力,企业技术水平、人力资本、物质资本是影响企业竞争能力的决定性因素.企业技术水平提高的途径主要有两种:模仿引进和自主创新.但技术创新并不只是实力强大、技术先进企业的"专利",技术模仿引进战略和技术自主创新战略在各个企业发展过程中不是绝对的,受外部一系列约束条件的影响.     

Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study

We present experimental results on a repeated coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria in which a payoff from choosing an action is positive only if a critical mass of players choose that action. We design a baseline version of the game in which payoffs remain constant for values above the critical mass, and an increasing returns version in which payoffs keep increasing for values above the critical mass. We test the predictive power of security and payoff-dominance under different information treatments. Our results show that convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium is the modal limit outcome when players have full information about others' previous round choices, while this outcome never occurs in the remaining treatments. The paths of play in some groups reveal a tacit dynamic coordination by which groups converge to the efficient equilibrium in a step-like manner. Moreover, the frequency and speed of convergence to the payoff-dominant equilibrium are higher, ceteris paribus, when increasing returns are present. Finally, successful coordination seems to crucially depend on players' willingness to signal to others the choice of the action supporting the efficient equilibrium.     

Financialization and Vested Interests: Self-Regulation vs. Financial Stability as a Public Good

I propose an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Thorstein Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial instruments in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen (1919), I argue that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization, often leading to a perverse accumulation process and resulting in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent selfregulation, proves unable to deal with society-level issues like financial stability. This latter issue must be handled at a systemic level, as a public good. Therefore, specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy.     

On the Dynamics of Basic Growth Models: Ratio Stability vs. Convergence and Divergence in State Space

Abstract. We show for a class of basic growth models that convergence in ratios does not imply the pathwise convergence to the corresponding balanced growth path in the state space. We derive conditions on parameters and on the elasticity of the savings function for convergence or divergence and apply our results to the Solow model, an augmented Solow model as well as to an optimal growth model. An implication for the convergence debate is that two economies that differ only in the initial capital stock and converge in per capita terms might diverge to infinity in absolute terms.     

Inefficiency in Earnings Forecasts: Experimental Evidence of Reactions to Positive vs. Negative Information

Prior archival studies of analysts' forecasts have found evidence for systematic underreaction, systematic overreaction, and systematic optimism bias. Easterwood and Nutt (1999) attempt to reconcile the conflicting evidence by testing the robustness of Abarbanell and Bernard's (1992) underreaction results to the nature of the information. Consistent with systematic optimism, forecasts are found to underreact to negative earnings information but overreact to positive information. However, Easterwood and Nutt are unable to distinguish between misreaction caused by incentives unique to analysts with misreaction caused by human decision bias that may be typical of investors. We address this issue by analyzing forecast reactions to positive versus negative information in the controlled experimental setting of Gillette, Stevens, Watts, and Williams (1999). The forecast data reveal systematic underreaction to both positive and negative information, and the underreaction is generally greater for positive information than negative information. This suggests that prior empirical evidence of forecast overreaction to positive information is unlikely to be attributable to human decision bias.     

Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records

We show that the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions between adjustment costs for workers and hours constraints set by firms. We develop a model in which firms post job offers characterized by an hours requirement and workers pay search costs to find jobs. We present evidence supporting three predictions of this model by analyzing bunching at kinks using Danish tax records. First, larger kinks generate larger taxable income elasticities. Second, kinks that apply to a larger group of workers generate larger elasticities. Third, the distribution of job offers is tailored to match workers' aggregate tax preferences in equilibrium. Our results suggest that macro elasticities may be substantially larger than the estimates obtained using standard microeconometric methods.     

企业间合作的战略性选择及其相关稳定性维护

企业间的合作及合作关系的管理是当今学术界研究的中心问题。分析传统企业与合作企业差异化、合作企业的类型特点,才能更好地把握企业间合作的选择动机、战略优势,促进企业间合作关系管理的稳定性。     

建筑业招投标中“平均价中标”的实验研究

本文通过实验室实验研究私人独立价值（IPV）假定和共同价值（CV）假定下平均价中标的拍卖。无投标限价时,IPV拍卖的报价迅速收敛至前期平均价,而CV拍卖的报价并未有明显的收敛趋势。有投标限价时,CV拍卖的报价均收敛于投标限价,报价的波动几乎与投标限价的起伏重合,而IPV拍卖的报价却没有随投标限价的起伏而有大幅的波动,仍收敛至前期的平均价格。IPV拍卖的平均报价或中标价格和中标企业的成本没有很大的联系,平均价中标几乎不能配置资源至成本最低的企业。无投标限价CV拍卖虽然避免了“赢家诅咒”问题,但报价普遍偏高;而设立较低的投标限价虽可能降低价格,但和最低价中标拍卖一样,不可避免遭遇“赢家诅咒”问题,同时投标限价很容易成为竞拍者协调报价的共同信息。     

企业开放式创新合作策略:文献综述

在回顾开放式创新及创新合作相关研究成果的基础上,对开放式创新的概念界定、研究领域和开放式创新合作的相关理论进行了梳理,然后对开放式创新合作伙伴的选择与合作方面的研究文献进行分析、分类和综述,最后对开放式创新合作伙伴关系治理机制的研究进行了综述,并对未来相关研究进行了展望。     

Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers

Focusing on responder behavior, we report panel data findings from both low and high stakes ultimatum bargaining games. Whereas Slonim and Roth (1998) find that offers are rejected fairly equally across rounds in both low and high stakes games, we find that learning does take place, but only when there is sufficient money on the table. The disparate results can be reconciled when one considers the added power that our experimental design provides-detecting subtle temporal differences in responder behavior requires a data generation process that induces a significant number of proportionally low offers.     

The Onset and Persistence of Secular Stagnation in the U.S. Economy: 1910-1990

Human relations involve a balance of substitution and complementarity. In economics, substitution is stressed and complementarity ignored. An economics of substitution will lead to competitive fragmentation. An economics of complementarity supports a case for cooperation and organizational health. If complementarity outweighs substitution, what are the implications? A shift to common needs enters new realms of social design. If wellbeing is social — if our benefits are aligned — the lack of conflict invites community. Here, competitive values cause strife and harm. In this paper, I depict the culture of complementarity in economics. I offer a key to achieving community, replacing substitution with complementarity in our basic assumptions. To move beyond a myopic culture resulting from competition, we need an economics of complementarity.     

中美科技合作论文成果的国际比较分析

本文运用科学引文索引对中美合著科技论文进行了国际比较,从历史的角度(1978-2007年)和现实的角度(2007年)分析了中羡科技合作取得的论文成果,表明了中关科技合作对中国改革开放及科技发展的贡献,揭示了中美科技合作在中国国际科技合作中的重要地位和在美国对外国际科技合作中的地位,试图为我国制定全面的国际科技合作战略提供依据.     

Public Investment and Income Taxation: Redistribution vs. Productive Performance

This paper deals with government investment in a static two-type self-selection model of optimum income taxation. It is shown that the second-best investment rule is consistent with efficient production, provided that public investment has no influence on relative factor prices. Otherwise, however, redistributive income taxation implies that optimal investment expenditures exceed (or fall below) the efficient level as long as they raise (or decrease) the wage rate of the unskilled individuals relative to the wage rate of the skilled individuals.