The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options

We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC. Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC.     

A remark on static hedging of options written on the last exit time

In this paper, several different static hedges of the option written on the last exit time are given. One of them was originally presented in Akahori et al. (Methodol Comput Appl Probab 11(4): 661–668, 2009). Another one is derived from an expression in Madan et al. (Asia Pac Financ Mark 15(2): 97–115, 2008d). It is remarked in this paper that these static hedges are also obtained by applying a method in Carr and Chou (Hedging complex barrier options, 2001).     

Expensing stock options: a fair-value approach

Now that companies such as General Electric and Citigroup have accepted the premise that employee stock options are an expense, the debate is shifting from whether to report options on income statements to how to report them. The authors present a new accounting mechanism that maintains the rationale underlying stock option expensing while addressing critics' concerns about measurement error and the lack of reconciliation to actual experience. A procedure they call fair-value expensing adjusts and eventually reconciles cost estimates made at grant date with subsequent changes in the value of the options, and it does so in a way that eliminates forecasting and measurement errors over time. The method captures the chief characteristic of stock option compensation--that employees receive part of their compensation in the form of a contingent claim on the value they are helping to produce. The mechanism involves creating entries on both the asset and equity sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side, companies create a prepaid-compensation account equal to the estimated cost of the options granted; on the owners'-equity side, they create a paid-in capital stock-option account for the same amount. The prepaid-compensation account is then expensed through the income statement, and the stock option account is adjusted on the balance sheet to reflect changes in the estimated fair value of the granted options. The amortization of prepaid compensation is added to the change in the option grant's value to provide the total reported expense of the options grant for the year. At the end of the vesting period, the company uses the fair value of the vested option to make a final adjustment on the income statement to reconcile any difference between that fair value and the total of the amounts already reported.     

孤注一掷救券商

美国大搞资本市场，而我们不搞或是小搞，那就是我们的机遇；美国犯错误而我们不犯错误或少犯错误也是我们的机遇。希望我们能够不再重复美国的错误     

Disclosure versus recognition: the case of expensing stock options

The SFAS 123R comment process generated over 6,500 comment letters, most of which were against the standard’s enactment. This outpouring of emotion indicates that many believe that disclosure versus recognition matters. Our paper provides evidence for the debate whether managers’ discretion, motivation, and accuracy of stock option estimates differ under the recognition and disclosure reporting regimes. We compare firms that are mandatorily forced to recognize stock options expense with those voluntarily choosing to do so. First we find that mandatory firms (versus voluntary) with more intensive stock option granting tend to understate option estimates, especially in the post SFAS123R period. Our results suggest that a higher recognition cost motivates firms for doing so. Second, we find that mandatory firms with lower future operating risk have better accuracy in the post SFAS123R period, as compared to themselves in the pre SFAS123R period and voluntary firms in the post SFAS123 period. Our results support the notion that the informativeness of option estimates explains the level of accuracy. The findings of this paper add to the debate on the benefits of recognizing stock option expenses.     

Taxation and executive compensation: Evidence from stock options

Understanding the effects of taxes on executive compensation provides insight into the process determining this compensation and is a key input to top income tax rate policy. A 2010 tax reform in Canada, which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms, provides a natural experiment with which to address this issue. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that this tax increase resulted in an immediate reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options with limited, if any, substitution towards other components of compensation.     

Non-marketability and the value of employee stock options

We adapt the Benninga et al. (2005) framework to value employee stock options (ESOs). The model quantifies non-diversification effects, is computationally simple, and provides an endogenous explanation of ESO early-exercise. Using a proprietary dataset of ESO exercise events we measure the non-marketability ESO discount. We find that the ESO value on the grant date is approximately 45% of a similar plain vanilla Black–Scholes value. The model is aligned with empirical findings of ESOs, gives an exercise boundary of ESOs and can serve as an approximation to the fair value estimation of share-based employee and executive compensation. Using the model we give a numerical measure of non-diversification in an imperfect market.     

Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options

We develop a multiperiod framework to evaluate the incentive effects of executive stock options (ESOs). For a given increase in the grant-date firm stock price (and a concurrent increase in return volatility), the increment of total value at the vesting date acts as a proxy for the incentive effects of ESOs. If the option is attached to the existing contract without adjusting cash compensation, we suggest that a firm should not always fix the strike price to the grant-date stock price; instead, the strike price should vary with the length of the vesting period. We also show that, compared with at-the-money options, restricted stock generates greater incentives to increase stock prices in some scenarios, especially when equity-based awards are vested early. If the vesting period is long, the firm could grant options instead of restricted stock to maximize incentives.     

Price discovery in the U.S. stock and stock options markets: A portfolio approach

Option prices vary with not only the underlying asset price, but also volatilities and higher moments. In this paper, we use a portfolio of options to seclude the value change of the portfolio from the impact of volatility and higher moments. We apply this portfolio approach to the price discovery analysis in the U.S. stock and stock options markets. We find that the price discovery on the directional movement of the stock price mainly occurs in the stock market, more so now than before as an increasing proportion of options market makers adopt automated quoting algorithms. Nevertheless, the options market becomes more informative during periods of significant options trading activities. The informativeness of the options quotes increases further when the options trading activity generates net sell or buy pressure on the underlying stock price, even more so when the pressure is consistent with deviations between the stock and the options market quotes. JEL Classification C52, G10, G13, G14     

Employee stock options in compensation agreements: A financing explanation

We develop a model for the use of stock options in compensation agreements based on a financing explanation. Our model is consistent with the extensive use of options for non-executive employees. Simulation results from our model show an optimal use of options of about 9.3% of total compensation for a non-executive employee with a compensation of US$50,000. Finding an optimal level of options as part of compensation in this context requires a balancing of two opposing factors—the benefit of a lower capital issuance cost versus a higher compensation cost as a result of the discount that an employee places on options because of an undiversified position.     

Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options

We examine voluntary disclosures around the exercise of CEO stock options. Previous research shows that managerial incentives depend on the intended disposition of the exercised options' underlying shares. When CEOs intend to sell the underlying shares of exercised options, they have an incentive to increase stock prices in the pre-exercise period. In contrast, when CEOs intend to hold the underlying shares, they have a tax incentive to decrease stock prices in the pre-exercise period. Consistent with these private incentives, we find a significant increase in the frequency and magnitude of good (bad) news announcements in the pre-exercise period when CEOs implement exercise-and-sell (exercise-and-hold) strategies. We provide some evidence that CEOs' propensities for opportunistic disclosures are positively related to the value of their exercised stock options. Lastly, we find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) generally reduces, but does not eliminate, this type of managerial opportunism.     

A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences

We investigate the determinants of executive stock options (ESOs) and their impact on risky investment and subsequent firm performance in a dynamic setting. We find that, first, the dynamic response of ESOs to growth opportunity and risk is positive and lasts for two to three years. Second, the dynamic response of risky investments to option compensation is positive but converges to zero after three years. More importantly, the positive effect of ESOs on risky investments is observed when CEOs' personal risk-aversion is taken into account. Third, accounting performance responds positively to the risky, option-induced investment, but the dynamic effect lasts only for one year. Meanwhile, when managers undertake more risky investments than what ESOs imply, accounting performance responds negatively to the over-investment.     

Executive stock options: volatility,managerial decisions and agency costs

This paper proposes a new rationale for understanding managerial contracts which set-out to induce stock price volatility in the form of granting of executive stock options. First, we suggest that previous research focuses too much on short term volatility effects and offering neither a theoretical or empirical perspective on incentives which might influence long-term behaviour. To address this, we offer a theoretical structure of why managerial incentives might be important in determining the evolution of volatility over the life of an option contract and provide empirical support for our views. Second, we examine the impact of option moneyness on managerial behaviour over time and provide an analysis, with supporting empirical work, of the unintended incentives thereby created. Our approach suggests that volatility-inducing contracts do not work in the intended manner and supports a growing body of work which indicates that option-based remuneration does not incentivise managers to enhance corporate performance. Our evidence is within a UK context, based on a near-population sample size.     

Analytical approximations for the critical stock prices of American options: a performance comparison

Many efficient and accurate analytical methods for pricing American options now exist. However, while they can produce accurate option prices, they often do not give accurate critical stock prices. In this paper, we propose two new analytical approximations for American options based on the quadratic approximation. We compare our methods with existing analytical methods including the quadratic approximations in Barone-Adesi and Whaley (J Finance 42:301–320, 1987) and Barone-Adesi and Elliott (Stoch Anal Appl 9(2):115–131, 1991), the lower bound approximation in Broadie and Detemple (Rev Financial Stud 9:1211–1250, 1996), the tangent approximation in Bunch and Johnson (J Finance 55(5):2333–2356, 2000), the Laplace inversion method in Zhu (Int J Theor Appl Finance 9(7):1141–1177, 2006b), and the interpolation method in Li (Working paper, 2008). Both of our methods give much more accurate critical stock prices than all the existing methods above.     

Making imaginary worlds real: The case of expensing employee stock options

West [West, B. (2003). Professionalism and accounting rules. London: Routledge] and Chambers [Chambers, R. J. (1966). Accounting evaluation and economic behavior. Houston: Scholars Book Company] have provocatively argued that financial reporting has reached a state of near-total incoherence. In this paper, we argue that a source of this incoherence is the transformation of the US accounting academy into a sub-discipline of financial economics, a transformation in which accounting became a servant of the imaginary world of neoclassical economics. After noting the unusually prominent role of rules within the accounting profession, we describe the displacement of accounting’s centuries-old root metaphor of accountability by the metaphor of information usefulness, and situate that displacement within neoliberalism, a broader political movement that arose after World War II. Finally, we use SFAS 123R, the recently issued stock option standard, as a case study of the incoherence that West and Chambers assert. Through various issues – such as reflexivity, theory paradox, and unexplained questions of responsibility – we demonstrate the logical inconsistencies involved in SFAS 123F. The incoherence of stock option reporting rules raises serious questions about the information metaphor as a foundation for either individual rules or the standard setting process. The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) attempts to make the imaginary world of neoclassical economics real have resulted in rules which are not defensible.     

O/S: The relative trading activity in options and stock

Relatively little is known about the trading volume in derivatives relative to the volume in underlying stocks. We study the time-series properties and the determinants of the options/stock trading volume ratio (O/S) using a comprehensive cross-section and time-series of data on equities and their listed options. O/S is related to many intuitive determinants such as delta and trading costs, and it also varies with institutional holdings, analyst following, and analyst forecast dispersion. O/S is higher around earnings announcements, suggesting increased trading in the options market. Further, post-announcement absolute returns are positively related to pre-announcement O/S, which suggests that at least part of the pre-announcement options trading is informed.     

A note on the impact of options on stock return volatility

This paper measures the impact of option introductions on the return variance of underlying stocks. Past research generally finds a significant reduction in stock return variance following the listing of options through 1986. Using a more extensive sample, I compare changes in the return variance of optioned stocks to changes in the return variance of a control group. Since the average change in the control group is statistically indistinguishable from the average change in the optioned stocks, I conclude that option introductions do not significantly affect stock return variance.     

Sovereign rating actions and the implied volatility of stock index options

This paper examines the interaction between the equity index option market and sovereign credit ratings. S&P and Moody's signals exhibit strong impact on option-implied volatility while Fitch's influence is less significant. Moody's downgrades reduce the market uncertainty over the rated countries' equity markets. Strong causal relationships are found between movements in the option-implied volatility and all credit signals released by S&P and Fitch, but only actual rating changes by Moody's, implying differences in rating agencies' policies. The presence of additional ratings tends to reduce market uncertainty. The findings highlight the importance of rating information in the price discovery process and offer policy implications.