Corporate taxes and defined benefit pension plans

The Tepper–Black arguments for tax-arbitrage opportunities from overfunding pension plans are critically examined and modifications proposed. Tax status, a function of current marginal tax rates and expected future taxable income, is predicted to determine funding policy. Tests of this modified tax benefits view suggest that 1) tax status declines are associated with pension contribution reductions, 2) reductions in contributions are related to previous excess contributions as well as non-pension tax shield increases causing the decline in tax status, and 3) cross-sectionally, tax status is related to fund levels, choice of actuarial variables, and the use of defined benefit plans.     

Corporate capital structure and pension-funding strategy

This article provides an integrated analysis of pension funding and corporate financing strategies in the presence of default risk. The article shows that when the marginal personal income tax rate is constant, the financing decision with respect to pension funding is influenced entirely by tax considerations. When the marginal personal income tax is progressive, the optimal financing of pension funding depends on the cyclical nature of the firm (as characterized by the sign of beta), the riskiness of pension assets, and ERISA regulations concerning the pension-benefit guaranty rate, the marginal pension insurance premium and the firm's legal responsibility for its unfunded pension obligations. It is shown that a necessary condition for partial pension funding is that the marginal insurance premium imposed by PBGC must be less than actuarially fair, and a necessary condition for pension funding to be financed by both debt and equity is that beta must be positive.     

Corporate pension funding policy

What policy should a corporation adopt concerning the funding of a defined-benefit pension plan and the investment of the assets held in trust for the plan? Until recently, pension plans did not have to be insured, and some risk could be borne by intended beneficiaries. Federal legislation has now mandated such coverage. This paper analyzes corporate policy under three conditions which correspond, roughly, to the earlier situation (‘uninsure’ loans), the current situation (‘partially insured’ loans), and the situation required by law to be implemented in the future (‘completely insured’ plans). We show that if insurance premiums are set correctly, corporate policy in this area may not matter; otherwise the optimal policy may simply be that which maximizes the difference between the value of the insurance and its cost.     

Government pension policy and the cost of labor and capital

This article examines how the pension insurance provided by the PBGC and the tax treatment of pension plans affect the cost of labor and capital. Two important aspects of the insurance program are (1) the premium schedule and (2) an employer's liability for unfunded pension benefits (the deductible). These two aspects interact to increase the cost of capital relative to labor, especially for firms with underfunded plans.     

The effect of regulation on optimal corporate pension risk

We study firms' pension prefunding and portfolio allocation choices in a model in which firms trade off the need to compensate workers for the financial risk in their pension benefit against the cost advantage that may be gained by exploiting underpriced pension insurance. In the absence of pension insurance, the firm minimizes costs by rendering promised benefits free of risk to workers, who are assumed to be unable to hedge firm-specific risk. Various forms of government intervention, such as benefit guarantees, can alter this outcome dramatically by providing the firm with an incentive to shift risk to other parties. In this case, we find that the firm's decisions depend on, among other influences, the degree of insurance mispricing, the amount of guaranteed benefits, the stringency of minimum funding requirements, and the costs of financial distress.     

The Integration of Insurance and Taxes in Corporate Pension Strategy

This paper examines the implications of the joint effects of insurance and taxes for the optimal corporate pension strategy. It is shown that neither the “mini-max” nor the “maxi-min” strategy advocated by previous authors is necessarily best in corporate pension management. In the presence of capital market imperfections, the analysis via a single-period contingent-claims model indicates that optimal corporate pension strategy in both asset-allocation and funding decisions can be a noncorner interior solution.     

The elusive relation between pension discount rates and deficits

The relation between defined-benefit (DB) pension discount rates and funding status is more complex than it might first appear. Existing evidence suffers from estimation biases that make precise inference unreliable. We document the biases and quantify their impact on inference in relation to corporate window-dressing of DB funding status. Our empirical evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that pension sponsors use discretion in the choice of pension discount rate not only to reduce reported deficits but also to reduce reported surpluses.     

The political origin of pension funding

The paper seeks to explain the huge cross country variation in private pension funding, shaped by historical choice made when universal pension systems were created after the Great Depression. According to Perotti and von Thadden [Perotti, E., von Thadden, E.-L., 2006. The political economy of corporate control and labor rents. J. Polit. Econ., 145–175], large inflationary shocks due to war damage devastated middle class savings in some countries in the first half of the XX century. This shaped political preferences over the role of capital markets and social insurance, and contributed to the Great Reversals documented by Rajan and Zingales [Rajan, R.G., Zingales, L., 2003. The great reversals: The politics of financial development in the 20th century. J. Finan. Econ. 69 (1), 5–50]. Wealth distribution shocks are indeed strongly related to private pension funding, as a large shock reduces the stock of private retirement assets by 58% of GDP. While the sample size is limited, the results are robust to other explanations, such as legal origin, original financial development, past and current demographics, religion, electoral voting rules, redistributive politics, national experiences with financial market performance, or other major financial shocks that were not specifically redistributive. Corroborating evidence indicates that such redistributive shocks help explain the cross country variation in social expenditures, state ownership of industry, financial development and employment protection measures as predicted by the political shift hypothesis.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

Design of employee pension benefits model and China's pension gender gap

The pension gender gap is a universal concern, and policymakers worldwide strive to address the factors leading to gender inequality. This study examines the pension gender gap problem and its causes and effects in China, conducting micro-empirical simulations on China's employee pension benefits model. We propose solutions to this gender inequality and suggest an intra-family pension benefits transfer for women in a family framework. For family units headed by a single woman, we recommend enhanced tax-deductible contributions by prior employers to strengthen the equality of pensions between genders throughout retirement. This additional support and enhancement of female pensions can effectively narrow the pension gap between male and female beneficiaries while maintaining the system's long-term sustainability. More importantly, these proposed enhancements minimize acute poverty while improving the living standards of female pensioners.     

The tax treatment of UK defined contribution pension schemes

The paper aims to clarify the tax status of pension schemes in the UK and, by using economic and other arguments, to establish a theoretical benchmark that could be considered the ‘appropriate’ tax regime for pension saving. We consider existing tax regimes for saving (such as the ‘ISA’ regime) and theoretical regimes (such as a pure expenditure tax and a comprehensive income tax) and we compare the costs different tax regimes impose on defined contribution pension schemes. We conclude that an expenditure tax is an appropriate benchmark tax regime for pension saving, and that other tax regimes impose additional financial as well as administrative costs.     

Ageing and the tax implied in public pension schemes: simulations for selected OECD countries

A key figure suited to measuring intergenerational imbalances in unfunded public pension schemes is given by the ‘implicit tax rate’ imposed on each generation's lifetime income. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits fall short of actuarial returns to contributions paid to these systems while actively working. Under current pension policies, implicit tax rates will increase sharply for younger generations in most industrialised countries. In this paper, this is illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their development over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to differences in ageing processes and in the institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we can demonstrate how effective different approaches to pension reform are in smoothing the intergenerational profile of implicit tax rates.     

Arguments in Favour of Tax Neutral Cost Allocation

When considering corporate taxes in a cost allocation context a trade‐off is generated for shareholders. On the one hand, accelerated depreciation increases the value of a project due to the depreciation tax shield. On the other hand, accelerated depreciation most likely does not induce robust goal congruency between managers and shareholders when utilizing residual income as an incentive system and, as a consequence, over‐ or underinvestment could result. In this context, the literature suggests the application of particular allocation rules. When extending the relative marginal benefits cost allocation rule (Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) to include corporate taxes we find it to be tax neutral and to maintain its properties of generating robust incentives. As a consequence the over‐/underinvestment problem is solved, but the depreciation tax shield is often not maximized. However, we illustrate that in competitive markets shareholders ought to prefer a tax neutral allocation scheme over an accelerated depreciation schedule. Thus, we show that shareholders as well as regulators have—for different reasons—a preference for tax neutral cost allocation.     

Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension policy

We examine whether the compensation incentives of top management affect the extent of risk shifting versus risk management behavior in pension plans. We find that risk shifting through pension underfunding (and, to a lesser extent, through pension asset allocation to risky securities) is stronger with compensation structures that create high wealth-risk sensitivity (vega) and weaker with high wealth-price sensitivity (delta). These findings are stronger for chief financial officers (CFOs) than for chief executive officers (CEOs), suggesting that pension policy falls within the CFO’s domain. Risk shifting through pension underfunding is also lower when the CFO’s personal stake in the pension plan is larger. Overall, these findings show that top managers’ compensation structure is an important driver of corporate pension policy. They also highlight firms within which the moral hazard concerns fueled by Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation insurance are most relevant.     

The new joint pension scheme established by collective agreement between the Norwegian employers' confederation and the Norwegian federation of trade unions

Abstract

Norway has a statutory old age pension scheme covering the whole population over 70 years of age. Since 1959, pensions are granted without a means test. As from 1 April 1962, the annual pension amounts are 3348 crowns for a single person and 5028 crowns for a married couple. For special groups, such as seamen, fishermen and forestry workers, additional pension schemes have been established by law. Many private companies, especially the larger firms, have established staff pension schemes on a voluntary basis, either in the form of actuarial pension funds, or through collective pension insurance. Many of these schemes cover only staff employees, not workers. In other cases both groups are covered, but with relatively higher benefits for staff than for workers.     

Developments in pension reform: the case of Dutch stand-alone collective pension schemes

Corporate defined-benefit plans suffer from a number of serious weaknesses, including credit risk of the sponsor, ambiguous ownership of the surplus and back-loading of benefits. Also defined-contribution plans feature drawbacks. Individuals are not well equipped to make the complex financial decisions involved, transaction costs are substantial and various risks are not managed properly over the life cycle. Stand-alone collective pension schemes offer an attractive third way between corporate defined-benefit schemes and individual defined-contribution schemes. The members of the fund are the risk bearers and the funds manage risk aimed at providing an adequate income level during retirement at low costs. Dutch pension funds are evolving into such stand-alone pension schemes. Some directions for future reforms are sketched.     

Accounting measures of unfunded pension liabilities and the expected present value of future pension cash flows

The associations between three alternative measures of the unfunded pension obligation discussed in the accounting literature and a measure that reflects the present value of expected cash flows (economic liability) are examined in this study using simulated data. The sensitivity of the correlations to funding methods, growth rates of the plan population, interest rates, plan initiation dates, and extent of sweetening are also studied. It is shown that all the accounting measures of the pension obligation are highly correlated with the total economic liability when funding is excluded, but the correlations decrease significantly when the net (unfunded) liability is examined. Furthermore, it is shown analytically that one cannot predict ex ante which measure of the unfunded liability will be most highly correlated with the economic liability. The implication for accounting standard-setting bodies is that both the pension plan assets and pension obligations should be disclosed to facilitate users in making predictions about changes in the economic liability. A recent official pronouncement, SFAS 87, provides for such disclosure in most circumstances.     

Determinants of pension funding and asset allocation decisions

Prior research suggests that the funding and asset allocation decisions for defined benefit pension plans may be based on tax, risk, and profitability factors. Much of the previous empirical work, however, suffers from statistical problems that may produce misleading or contradictory results. We employ a confirmatory factor analytic model to address the statistical problems plaguing pension research. Various competing hypotheses are tested simultaneously. Findings indicate that firms use pensions to offset business risk.An earlier version of this article was presented at the Financial Management Association Meetings held in Toronto, October 1993. Much of the work on this article was done while the authors were at the University of Texas-Arlington.     

基于目标替代率的税延型商业养老保险扣除限额优化研究

我国养老保障体系三支柱发展严重失衡,为了缓解基本养老保险的压力,提升养老保险替代率,商业养老保险的发展迫在眉睫,税收递延型商业养老保险也开始试点。在2018年个税改革后,目前税收递延型商业养老保险推行办法下,中低收入群体无法享受实际税收优惠,高收入群体可享受的税收优惠有限且过低。本文以替代率为基准,根据精算平衡原理构建模型,对扣除限额进行优化研究,试图测算出与新个税办法匹配且有利于多层次收入水平的消费个体享受实际税优的扣除限额。同时,本文还对不同扣除限额下开始购买保险年龄、个税起征点、个人收益率及初始收入水平这四个参数变化对实际税优额的影响做了分析,得出所测算出的扣除限额的确较现行扣除限额更为合理,并提出了相关对策建议。