中国金融高管腐败问题研究及对策浅析

一、我国金融高管腐败的表现特征 本文的"金融高管"指金融业界的高级管理人员,即在金融机构内掌握有资金配置权的人,他们可以利用手中的权力进行不正当的交易,谋取私利,致使机构自身、投资人乃至全体公众与国家利益受损.如原中国银行开平云行行长余波正,原建设银行行长王雪冰,原建设银行董事长张恩照,原证监会官员高勇、王小石、段素珍等.     

财产申报制度对防治腐败有效性的博弈分析

被誉为“阳光法案”的财产申报制度兼有预防和惩治腐败的双重功能,通过对官员腐败行为的博弈模型进行分析,结果表明财产申报制度在一定条件下能防治腐败.基于博弈过程中潜在腐败官员和反腐部门双方的策略选择和期望收益,可以从推进财产申报法制化进程、健全基本框架、完善配套措施等方面来提高其对腐败防治的有效性.     

特约评论员文章:腐败“家族化”为何难挡?

正中央党校政法部教授林喆将腐败"家族化"界定为领导干部与亲友等"身边人"都参与官员职务犯罪活动,分工协作,形成"一荣俱荣、一损俱损"的腐败利益共同体。他称,腐败"家族化"成为官员腐败的一个新特点。中纪委官员也说过:他们现在查办的腐败案件,通常是家破人亡。林教授说腐败"家族化"是新特点值得商榷。妻儿老小、亲友情妇、同僚同党与执掌权杖的官员结伙贪腐式的腐败"家族化"在中国历史上并不罕见,即便是     

金融资源配置效率影响因素研究——基于晋升激励的视角

本文从任期制度、财政压力、地区制度效率等多个维度对中国式金融资源配置效率下降的深层原因进行探究。研究发现,地方官员晋升激励制度能够很好地解释金融资源配置。以“GDP政绩考核”为标准的晋升激励政策会对金融资源配置效率产生负效应,造成金融资源配置效率下降。地方官员晋升激励导致的金融资源配置效率下降随任期增加而减少,同时财政压力减少、制度效率水平提高均会削弱地方官员晋升激励对金融资源配置效率下降的影响。     

和谐社会语境下政府官员腐败行为心理透视与矫治

政府官员腐败是一种社会历史现象,不管是在国内,还是在国外,都存在一定程度的腐败。官员腐败现象的产生是一定社会历史条件下内外因素交互作用的结果,它是腐败官员对不良客观现实的反映,是腐败心理的外化。为此,探究腐败官员实施腐败行为背后的腐败心理,并觅寻与之相对的化解对策是我们有效预防腐败的重要途径。笔者认为,官员腐败是在包括矛盾心理、侥幸心理、补偿心理和贪婪心理等腐败心理内因和不良的社会环境外因共同怂恿下的必然恶果。     

打造中国职业银行家问题研究

一直以来，我国商业银行的行长们多是懂银行的政治家，而不是懂政治的银行家，必须让商业银行各级经营管理者从国家干部阶层中分离出来，取消行政级别，使之成为具有独立利益和独立地位的、不同于政府官员的职业银行家。培育一个职业银行家阶层是深化金融改革、建立现代商业银行制度、赢得竞争优势、确保金融安全的需要。     

国外政府官员申报财产简介

一些斟家为防止政府官员腐败，制定了申报个人财产法规、制度，并作为政府官员从政的第一要务。     

社会转型时期金融行业腐败的特征及治理对策

社会转型时期金融行业腐败行为的动机表现出腐败利益共享趋势,腐败行为的主体呈现出结群性趋势,腐败行为的方式趋向于歪曲、利用和扩大制度化倾向,腐败行为的手段凸现出隐形化、智能化倾向,腐败行为的危害性更大,社会腐蚀性更强。治理金融行业腐败要深化金融体制改革,从多方面遏制腐败的发生,完善金融法律体系和金融行业内控体系。     

基于委托代理理论的官员腐败分析

政府官员作为公共权力的行使者,与公民之间存在着公权委托代理关系。当公权代理人为寻求个人利益最大化而做出未经委托人同意的举动时,即导致了公权的委托代理失灵,腐败由此而生。只有设计出合理的公权委托代理模式,才能从根本上规范行政权力的运行,缩小寻租空间,遏制官员个人腐败行为的发生。     

基于委托代理理论的官员腐败分析

政府官员作为公共权力的行使者,与公民之间存在着公权委托代理关系。当公权代理人为寻求个人利益最大化而做出未经委托人同意的举动时,即导致了公权的委托代理失灵,腐败由此而生。只有设计出合理的公权委托代理模式,才能从根本上规范行政权力的运行,缩小寻租空间,遏制官员个人腐败行为的发生。     

Auditors' Response to Political Connections and Cronyism in Malaysia

This paper extends the literature on the role of political economy in financial reporting and auditing by testing two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that there will be a greater increase in audit effort and audit fees for Malaysian firms with political connections, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, than for non‐politically connected firms because these firms have a higher risk of financial misstatements. The second hypothesis predicts that the audit fees of politically connected firms will decline when capital controls are introduced by the government as a ploy to financially assist politically connected firms to rebound from the crisis, and thus reduces the risk of financial misstatements. The results show that there is a greater increase in audit fees for firms with political connections than for non‐politically connected firms as a result of the Asian financial crisis. However, there is a decline in audit fees for politically connected firms after the capital controls are implemented.     

Financial liberalization,bureaucratic corruption and economic development

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalization which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalization is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may coexist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.     

Liquid asset sheltering,or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings

I posit that political corruption affects firms through an entrenchment between entrepreneurs and politicians instead of coercive extortion. Based on this postulate, I refute the claim that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash due to liquid assets sheltering from political extraction. Instead, I propose that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash because of the high cost of capital. In fact, I find that firms in more corrupt countries hold cash beyond their optimum for the given cost of carry due to severe financial constraints. This excess cash results in value destruction. I call this phenomenon the financial effect of corruption. Thus, I challenge the conventional wisdom and argue that the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings are primarily indirect through financial mechanisms.     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

U.S. POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND LOAN PRICING

Using U.S. Department of Justice data on state-level political corruption, we find that banks charge higher loan spreads (all-in-drawn spreads) to firms in states with higher corruption and that these effects are more pronounced for firms facing financial constraints but less pronounced for firms experiencing greater external monitoring. These results are robust to additional controls, alternative corruption measures, a measure of the lack of oversight of lobbyist activities, and the use of instrumental variables. Overall, our findings are consistent with the harmful corruption environment hypothesis, which states that banks charge higher loan spreads to firms in states with greater political corruption environments as these firms are susceptible to making suboptimal financial decisions to fend off rent-seeking behavior.     

What is the impact of corruption on audit fees?

This study examines the impact of country-level corruption on audit fees. Using a sample of 102,934 companies from 48 countries over the period 1998–2014, the authors find that audit fees are positively associated with higher levels of corruption. They also discovered that corruption adds a significant margin to the premium paid to Big 4 (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and KPMG) auditors. The study opens up a new line of research and adds significantly to the academic literature on the Big 4 audit premium.

IMPACT

The study has several important implications for academics and policy-makers. These include discussion of the factors driving corruption and the role of auditing. Knowledge of the factors driving corruption should guide policy-makers to adoption of polices that could reduce corruption. The finding that audit fees are positively associated with corruption, as well as with audit quality, points to the potential for auditing as a tool for corruption control beyond its traditional role as an assurance service.     

The role of auditing in the fight against corruption

The purpose of this paper is to analyze how various types of auditing may contribute to fight corruption. While previous literature has primarily addressed auditing's ability to prevent corruption, this paper systematically explores auditing's potential to detect corruption. It argues that financial auditing has excluded corruption from the definition of fraud and instead classified it as ‘non-compliance with laws and regulations’. The main arguments for this exclusion is that corruption leaves no material errors in financial statements and no evidence for the auditor to follow. The paper refutes this, arguing that commercial and political corruption creates misstatements in the financial statements of the corruption giver's organization as well as the corruption receiver's organization. Thus, if auditing is to gain a more prominent role in the fight against corruption, auditing standards must include corruption in the definition of fraud, private and public sector auditors need to cooperate and exchange information, auditing techniques to detect corruption should be employed, and the auditing profession must embrace effective preventive measures such as anti-corruption certifications.     

The roles of financial asset market failure denial and the economic crisis: Reflections on accounting and financial theories and practices

Throughout the world every economic and socio-economic indicator has deteriorated. The so-called ‘real economy’ has been deeply contaminated by the most significant global financial crisis for seven decades. The ultimate extent and duration of this rampant degeneration and its longer-term political effects are unpredictable but what caused the crisis? This paper examines a range of suppositions made in theories which deny the possibility of financial asset market failure and identifies ways in which they contributed to the circumstances and actions which created the current crisis.     

Corruption as an organizational process: Understanding the logic of the denormalization of corruption

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.     

Corrupción como proceso organizacional: comprendiendo la lógica de la desnormalización de la corrupción

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.