Exit, sunk costs and the selection of firms

Summary. This paper aims to identify the cost characteristics of exiting firms whenever firms are playing an infinite horizon supergame with time-invariant cost and demand functions. With more than two firms, the problem of which firms exit is quite similar to a coalition formation one. Solving this coalition formation problem, we obtain that the exiting firms are those with higher average cost functions whenever reentry is costless while, whenever reentry is unprofitable, the exiting firms are those with lower marginal (and possibly average) cost functions. Since reentry costs are typically sunk, our analysis points out that the presence of sunk costs affects not only the size (as it is well known) but also the composition of the industry. Received: April 5, 1995; revised version: January 28, 1998     

Loan processing costs,information asymmetries and the speed of technology adoption

This paper presents a simple model in which credit-constrained firms might delay the adoption of new and more productive technologies because of the external financing costs involved. Applying for a loan can be a very costly process by itself. Where there is a high degree of credit rationing, these costs might even deter entrepreneurs from applying for a loan altogether. We argue that the efficiency of the banking system, by affecting such costs, can influence the profitability of new technologies and entrepreneur's investment decisions, which, in turn, influence new technology implementation, capital accumulation and growth.     

The costs of distribution in the UK life insurance market

The cost of direct and independent distribution in the UK life insurance sector over the period 1990–1997 is examined. This is a novel contribution to the literature that until now has focused almost solely on distribution in the non-life sector. Unlike the non-life sector the distribution of life insurance is complicated by the existence of investor protection policies. Which in the UK are believed to have increased the use of independent agents. Using a pooled data set of 44 companies between 1990 and 1997, this study finds little evidence for such a view. Cost benefits are found for firms focusing in one mode of distribution. From a modelling of the distribution decision this finding maybe attributed to firms choosing distribution systems which match the transactional problems associated with their product mix and/or mode of corporate governance.     

Existence of financial market equilibria with transaction costs

The purpose of this paper is to give an existence proof of equilibria in a two-period exchange economy with incomplete markets and transaction costs. When tradings on financial markets incur real transaction costs —interpreted as costs of enforcement of financial contracts or real taxation of financial revenues —the set of individual portfolios is bounded by the limited resources of the economy. Existence of equilibria then follows from Kakutani 's fixed point theorem.     

Export market participation with sunk costs and firm heterogeneity

In this article we investigate the importance of sunk costs, firm characteristics and spillovers from nearby exporters on a firm's decision to participate in exporting. The empirical analysis involves the estimation of a nonstructural, discrete choice, dynamic model with firm heterogeneity. By using panel data for Estonian companies from 1994 to 1999 we find that: (i) both sunk costs and observable firm characteristics are important determinants of export market participation; (ii) previous history matters, in that, if a firm has been exporting the previous period or the period before, it significantly increases the likelihood of the firm exporting in the current period; (iii) larger firms with high capital intensity and foreign ownership are more likely to be exporters; (iv) operating in an export-oriented industry increases a firm's likelihood of exporting.     

A structural model of the fixed time costs of market work

We link ATUS 2003–04 to March CPS data and examine market work's effects on non-market activity. In a structural model fixed time costs of work generate a utility-equivalent of 8% of income to be overcome before working becomes optimizing.     

Conservative traders,natural selection and market efficiency

This paper examines the impact of conservative traders on market efficiency in an evolutionary model of a commodity futures market. This paper shows that the long-run market outcome is informationally efficient, as long as in every period there is a positive probability that entering traders are more conservative than their predecessors. Conservative traders are those who correctly predict the spot price with a positive probability, and more importantly, who in their mistakes err on the side of caution, and rarely overpredict the spot price as buyers, and underpredict the spot price as sellers. This result does not require entry of traders with better information than their predecessors.     

Information sharing and lending market competition with switching costs and poaching

We analyze information sharing with repeated banking competition. In the presence of switching costs we find that information sharing renders poaching more profitable in future rounds of competition, since the poaching activities can be targeted towards (more) creditworthy borrowers. We find that information sharing reduces relationship benefits, and, therefore relaxes competition for initial market shares. Information sharing introduces a welfare tradeoff by promoting equilibrium profits at the expense of talented entrepreneurs whenever market power persists in credit market, whereas it is a matter of indifference without market power. Thus information sharing may induce exclusion of creditworthy borrowers from credit markets.     

Fixed and Sunk Costs Revisited

The authors attempt to clarify the concepts of, and the link between, fixed costs and sunk costs. They argue that the root for possible confusion between fixed costs and sunk costs is the inconsistency in defining the term fixed costs. They define fixed costs uniformly as the costs that are independent of the level of output and suggest that instructors refer to the part of fixed costs that are irrevocably committed as sunk costs. Under these definitions, the statement “there are no long-run fixed costs” is incorrect. Instructors should teach students that in the long run there are no sunk costs, although there may easily be fixed costs.     

Separation costs, job heterogeneity and labor market volatility in the matching model

This paper extends the standard matching model by introducing a gap in separation costs between entrant and incumbent workers. We show that when this gap is omitted from the model, these costs do not improve the labor market volatility without introducing unrealistic unemployment responses to unemployment benefits.     

A strategic market game with seigniorage costs of Fiat money

Summary. A model that includes the cost of producing money is presented and the nature of the inefficient equilibria in the model are examined. It is suggested that if one acknowledges that transactions are a form of production, which requires the consumption of resources, then the concept of Pareto optimality is inappropriate for assessing efficiency. Instead it becomes necessary to provide an appropriate comparative analysis of alternative transactions mechanisms in the appropriate context. Received: September 5, 2000; revised version: May 3, 2001     

沉淀成本与政府管制政策

新古典一般均衡理论的假设前提是完全的产品和要素市场,这是一个没有沉淀成本的经济模型。一旦我们放松新古典经济学资源流动性的假设前提,引入沉淀成本概念,就会发现,沉淀成本不仅导致要素市场失灵,造成进入壁垒,而且还为政府管制奠定了理论指导。为了提高市场绩效,政府管制必须将沉淀成本管制（进入壁垒）、产权管制（外部性）和信息不完全管制（交易成本）有机结合起来。     

The overlooked costs of the permanent war economy: A market process approach

How does the permanent war economy interact, and subsume, the private, non-military economy? Can the two remain at a distance while sharing resource pools? This paper argues that they cannot. Once the U.S. embarked upon the path of permanent war, starting with World War II, the result was a permanent war economy. The permanent war economy continuously draws resources into the military sector at the expense of the private economy, even in times of peace. We explore the overlooked costs of this process. The permanent war economy does not just transfer resources from the private economy, but also distorts and undermines the market process which is ultimately responsible for improvements in standards of living.     

Over-the-counter loans,adverse selection,and stigma in the interbank market

We study a model of interbank credit where physical and informational frictions limit the opportunities for intertemporal trade among banks and outside investors. Banks obtain loans in an over-the-counter market (involving search, bilateral matching, and negotiations over the terms of the loan) and hold assets of heterogeneous quality that in turn determine their ability to repay those loans. When asset quality is not observable by outside investors, information about the actions taken by a bank in the loan market may influence prices in the asset market. In particular, under some conditions, borrowing from the central bank can be regarded as a negative signal about the quality of the borrower?s assets and banks may be willing to borrow in the market at rates higher than the one offered by the central bank.     

Testing for adjustment costs and regime shifts in BRENT crude futures market

This paper, using a threshold vector error-correction (TVECM) model, examines whether BRENT crude spot and futures oil prices are cointegrated. By employing this methodology we are able to evaluate the degree and dynamics of transaction costs resulting from various market imperfections. TVECM model is applied on daily spot and futures oil prices covering the period 1990-2009. The hypothesis we test is to what extent BRENT crude is indeed an integrated oil market in terms of threshold effects and adjustment costs. Our findings support that market follows a gradual integration path. We find that BRENT crude spot and futures are cointegrated, though two regimes are clearly identified. This implies that a threshold exists and it is indeed significant. Adjustment costs in the error correction are present, and they are valid at the typical regime that is the dominant, and as a result should not be ignored.     

Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection

Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents), then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson). Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments.     

Firm routines,customer switching and market selection under duopoly

This paper explores the dynamics of market selection for an industry in which firms employ relatively simple pricing, production and investment routines and in which consumers switch between rival firms in response to price differentials but do not all do so instantaneously. The key issue is whether market processes result in the elimination of less efficient firms by their more efficient rivals. That is to say, do such processes unfailingly increase the efficiency with which available economic resources are used? In the context of duopoly, we show that the survival of the more efficient firm is not guaranteed and that, more generally, the outcome depends upon the speeds with which firms adjust prices and capacities and with which customers switch between rival firms.     

Caste discrimination and transaction costs in the labor market: Evidence from rural North India

This paper is an empirical attempt to quantify caste-based discrimination in the labor market using household data taken from rural North India. In the regression analysis, transaction costs associated with entry into the labor market and reservation wages are estimated simultaneously along with market wages. The estimation results provide evidence of the existence of transaction costs in the labor market and discrimination against backward classes with regard to access to regular employment. In line with previous studies, the results suggest that the achievements of India's reservation policy so far have at best been limited. In addition, a comparison between the estimates from the model employed in this paper and conventional (reduced-form) approaches shows that discrimination in labor market entry is likely to be underestimated in the conventional reduced-form approaches.     

Misallocation and financial market frictions: Some direct evidence from the dispersion in borrowing costs

Financial frictions distort the allocation of resources among productive units—all else equal, firms whose financing choices are affected by such frictions face higher borrowing costs than firms with ready access to capital markets. As a result, input choices may differ systematically across firms in ways that are unrelated to their productive efficiency. We propose an accounting framework that allows us to assess empirically the magnitude of the loss in aggregate resources due to such misallocation. To a second-order approximation, the framework requires only information on the dispersion in borrowing costs across firms, which we measure—for a subset of U.S. manufacturing firms—directly from the interest rate spreads on their outstanding publicly-traded debt. Given the observed dispersion in borrowing costs, our approximation method implies a relatively modest loss in efficiency due to resource misallocation—on the order of 1 to 2 percent of measured total factor productivity (TFP). In our framework, the correlation between firm size and borrowing costs has no bearing on TFP losses under the assumption that financial distortions and firm-level efficiency are jointly log-normally distributed. To take into account the effect of covariation between firm size and borrowing costs, we consider a more general framework, which dispenses with the assumption of log-normality and which implies somewhat higher estimates of the resource losses—about 3.5 percent of measured TFP. Counterfactual experiments indicate that dispersion in borrowing costs must be an order of magnitude higher than that observed in the U.S. financial data, in order for misallocation—arising from financial distortions—to account for a significant fraction of measured TFP differentials across countries.     

Scale economies with regard to price adjustment costs and the speed of price adjustment in Australian manufacturing

This paper aims to examine the impact of firm size, industry concentration and the length of production on industry speed of price adjustment. To motivate the paper, an industry pricing model in error correction form is derived from firm pricing behaviour. As a new development, firms are assumed to have price adjustment costs that are a function of their size. The empirical model is estimated using two‐digit Australian manufacturing industry data for the period 1994:3 to 2006:1. The results suggest that the industry speed of price adjustment is positively related to firm size and negatively related to industry concentration and the production lag. Implied values for industry speeds of price adjustment are generally small when compared to other country industry studies. However, the industry average median lag of 7.1 quarters indicates a slightly faster speed of price adjustment than the estimate for the Australian consumer price index by Dwyer and Leong (2001 Dwyer, J. and Leong, K. 2001. Changes in the determination of inflation in Australia 1–44. Reserve Bank of Australia Research Discussion Paper 2001‐02 [Google Scholar]).