Diversification discount and investor sentiment

While previous research has linked the diversification discount to suboptimal managerial decisions, recent empirical work and methods have shown these relationships are not as strong. A rational learning framework indicates the diversification discount is related to economic activity. Building on this framework, we test and find support for the hypothesis that investor sentiment explains the diversification discount. Investor sentiment favors riskier firms when sentiment is high, thereby increasing returns and relative valuations. As a result, diversified firms imputed value based on these multiples leads to a larger diversification discount and reverses when sentiment falls.     

Corporate diversification and innovation: Managerial myopia or inefficient internal capital markets?

Which is more innovative: the decentralized, diversified firm, or the centralized, more narrowly focused firm? The economics and finance literatures argue that diversified firms have innovation advantages as their operating units have access to an internal capital market. In contrast, the strategy and entrepreneurship literatures argue that managers of these firms suffer from “managerial myopia,” discouraging them from investing in projects with long-term, uncertain payoffs. We take a fresh look at the relationship between innovation and diversification using a comprehensive sample of diversified and nondiversified firms and a novel approach that teases out the mechanisms influencing the relationship between diversification and innovation. Consistent with conceptual and empirical work in strategy, we find a robust negative correlation between diversification and R&D intensity, suggesting that diversification reduces innovation by discouraging investment. However, our analysis suggests that internal capital market inefficiencies, rather than managerial myopia, is responsible for this observed negative relationship.     

House prices and rents in Spain: Does the discount factor matter?

We estimate alternative price-to-rent ratios in the Spanish housing market by considering different stochastic discount factors in present value models similar to those used in the financial literature but where the higher rigidity that characterises this market is taken into account. We identify three robust across-model regularities: (i) the increase in the price-to-rent ratio since the late 1990s helped at first to restore equilibrium, (ii) further increases in house prices raised the ratio between 24% and 32% above equilibrium by 2004, although (iii) at that time the ratio was only around 2% above its short-term adjustment path towards a (new) long-run equilibrium.     

Diversification,capital structure,and performance: A simultaneous equation approach

This paper examines the relationships between diversification, capital structure, and performance jointly on the financial sector. Our dataset covers 412 French financial institutions over the period ranging from 2002 to 2012. Furthermore, we use a three‐stage least squares to check reverse causality. Our three‐stage least squares results show positive significant simultaneous interdependencies between performance and leverage. Performance reduction and debt levels increase are associated with activity diversification. Performance and leverage reduction is due to geographic diversification. Our estimation confirms reverse association between the interaction of diversification, leverage, and performance. Moreover, the findings are robust after taking into account alternative measures of diversification.     

Organization of innovation and capital markets

This paper develops a theory of the firm scope where not only research but also ordinary production employees can generate inventions. Separating research from production (“specialization”) solves the two-tier agency problem of inducing simultaneously research effort and managerial truthful-reporting but is costly when capital markets are imperfect. Improvements in capital markets, therefore, promote specialization, allowing a greater number of specialized firms to be established and also enabling them to undertake innovative projects with larger potential outcomes. Moreover, this capital market improvement effect is stronger for innovative activities that are less capital-intensive and that have weaker synergies with existing production activities. The model can help us understand the explosion of small company innovation in the U.S. since late 1970s and the contribution of venture capital to this change.     

Contingent factors of the coinsurance function of internal capital markets: Evidence from the US nonlife insurance industry

By analyzing intragroup reinsurance activities in the US nonlife insurance sector from 1999 to 2016, we provide evidence that the coinsurance function of internal capital markets is contingent on internal capital providers’ financial resources and the relative sizes of capital receivers within the group. We demonstrate that insurance groups commonly use intragroup reinsurance (a substitute for capital) to support insurers that sustain underwriting losses. Larger insurers are more likely to obtain internal reinsurance if their affiliated insurers hold more financial resources. Our findings show that the financial capabilities of group members providing support affect the feasibility of the coinsurance function through the activities of internal capital markets. Group members with greater influence are more likely to benefit from the coinsurance function.     

State-owned enterprises' political capital,city administrative rank and economic resources acquisition: Empirical evidence from Chinese capital markets

This paper examines the impact of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises' (SOE) corporate political capital and the administrative rank of the city where the firm is located on their ability to acquire economic resources. The study found that the stronger the political capital owned by SOEs and the higher the administrative rank of the cities in which SOEs were located, the easier it was for them to obtain more loans and subsidies. We also found that as the city administrative rank increased, the positive effect of SOEs' political capital on economic resources acquisition also increased. When SOEs were divided into commercial competitive versus specific functional enterprises, the administrative rank of the city in which the enterprise was located played a significant positive role in obtaining economic resources for commercial competitive enterprises, while the role of their political capital played a limited role. For specific functional enterprises, their own political capital played the more significant positive role. This paper expands the research scope of corporate political connections with a new perspective.     

Fixed capital and internal rate of return

For a neo-Austrian process of production, more generally multisectoral fixed capital models, it is shown that the maximum rate of growth and the minimum rate of interest are both equal to the internal rate of return. This von Neumann type equality is here obtained in absence of truncation, i.e., free disposal of fixed capital. If several internal rates of return coexist, the economically significant one is the maximal one. This result provides theoretical grounds for the internal rate of return criterion in infinite horizon.     

Learning,information processing and order submission in limit order markets

By introducing a genetic algorithm learning with a classifier system into a limit order market, this paper provides a unified framework of microstructure and agent-based models of limit order markets that allows traders to determine their order submission endogenously according to market conditions. It examines how traders process and learn from market information and how the learning affects limit order markets. It is found that, measured by the average usage of different group of market information, trading rules under the learning become stationary in the long run. Also informed traders pay more attention to the last transaction sign while uninformed traders pay more attention to technical rules. Learning of uninformed traders improves market information efficiency, but not necessarily when informed traders learn. Opposite to the learning of informed traders, learning makes uninformed traders submit less aggressive limit orders and more market orders. Furthermore private values can have significant impact in the short run, but not in the long run. One implication is that the probability of informed trading (PIN) is positively related to the volatility and the bid-ask spread.     

Reproducing low‐wage labour: capital accumulation,labour markets and young workers

Drawing on evidence from Greater Manchester, this article examines how structural changes in capital accumulation have created particular labour market outcomes, which have led to young people becoming a source of cheap labour for the growing low‐wage service economy. Greater Manchester has been selected as a case study because of the sectoral composition of its labour market and because levels of low pay for young workers are above the national low‐pay average of 40 per cent. The research reveals that it is necessary to move beyond sociological explanations that concentrate on the ‘essential youthfulness’ of young people and instead draw on analytical categories from political economy in order to understand the structural causes of young people's material circumstances.     

Relational capital,environmental knowledge integration,and environmental performance of small and medium enterprises in emerging markets

Although several prior studies have examined associations between firm social capital and environmental sustainability, the links between relational resources (i.e., relational capital and ties strength), environmental knowledge integration, and environmental performance have yet to be well established at the micro-level. This study, therefore, aims to determine (1) how environmental knowledge integration serves as a mediating mechanism for the relationship between relational capital and environmental performance and (2) how this impact differs at different levels of ties strength. A quantitative approach has been adopted to examine the main hypotheses using a structural equation model (SEM) technique. Two groups of actors were surveyed, including chief executive officers (CEOs) and financial officers of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operating in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. In total, 216 survey responses were gathered, suggesting a response rate of 73.22%. Our findings suggest that environmental knowledge integration is a vital mediating mechanism for the relationship between relational capital and SMEs' environmental performance. Also, we find that ties strength moderates the indirect effect of relational capital on SMEs' environmental performance via environmental knowledge integration. Our empirical evidence provides recommendations for SMEs' managers and policymakers to promote environmental sustainability in the emerging market context.     

Accounting and capital markets: a survey of the European evidence

The relationship between accounting information and capital markets has been the subject of numerous studies, especially in the US. The purpose of this article is to examine the corresponding evidence in Europe. This review classifies the European literature into three groups: studies of the market reaction to newly released accounting information; studies of the long-term association between stock returns and accounting numbers; studies devoted to the use of accounting data by investors and to the impact of market pressure on accounting choices. The paper reviews and summarizes the main results related to each of these topics. It also addresses some methodological issues and provides suggestions for future research.     

Monetary policy,housing rents,and inflation dynamics

In this paper we study the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing rents. Our main finding is that, in contrast to house prices, housing rents increase in response to contractionary monetary policy shocks. We also find that, after a contractionary monetary policy shock, rental vacancies and the homeownership rate decline. This combination of results suggests that monetary policy may affect housing tenure decisions (own versus rent). In addition, we show that, with the exception of the shelter component, all other main components of the consumer price index (CPI) either decline in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock or are not responsive. These findings motivated us to study the statistical properties of alternative measures of inflation that exclude the shelter component. We find that measures of inflation that exclude shelter have most of the statistical properties of the widely used measures of inflation, such as the CPI and the price index for personal consumption expenditures, but have higher standard deviations and react more to monetary policy shocks. Finally, we show that the response of housing rents accounts for a large proportion of the “price puzzle” found in the literature.     

Dismissals and match-specific rents

Labor contracts that result in dismissals are quite common in the real world. The question that arises is why employers do not just offer reduced wages instead of asking workers with low realized productivity to leave. This paper argues that such behavior can be explained by workers' understandable unwillingness to agree to contracts that an employer will not have an incentive to honor in the future. Specifically, we construct a matching model in which the employer and the worker are both uncertain about the value the other places on the match. Because the worker's match-specific productivity is the employer's private information, a commitment to pay a wage equal to the worker's value of marginal product is not enforceable. In the absence of a wage guarantee, the employer will offer retained workers wages below their value of marginal product, which causes quits to be inefficiently high. The employer can reduce quits by contractually promising a guaranteed wage to retained workers. Although this will lead to some involuntary dismissals, the loss from dismissals will be less than the gain from lower quits if the wage guarantee is not too high.     

Asymmetric information and capital mobility in antebellum America

The New York legislature granted charters to 28 new banks in 1829. Over $5 million in capital was subscribed by 1745 individuals or entities. The average distance between investor and bank is less than 40 miles, and the average number of investors is 75 per bank, with ownership and control closely aligned. A gravity model fixed effects regression is estimated. Insiders, such as public officials and bank officers account for over one quarter of the invested capital. After accounting for information asymmetry, a strong home bias exists which suggests a high degree of capital immobility. The failure of Northern capital to invest in Southern manufacturing is readily explained by the picture of a thin and localized market dominated by political elite and specialized traders.     

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.     

The no-arbitrage condition and financial markets with heterogeneous information

This paper examines the role of the no-arbitrage condition in financial markets with heterogeneous expectations. We consider a single-period, state-contingent claims model, withM risky securities andS states. There exist two types of heterogeneously informed investors, where the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to either the security payoff matrix, the state probability vector, or state partitions. When the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to either the security payoff matrix or state partitions, the no-arbitrage condition imposes a constraint on the dispersion of information between informed and uninformed investors. Further, the no-arbitrage condition is useful in ascertaining the patterns of heterogeneity among investors that are consistent with equilibrium. However, when the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to state probabilities, the role of the no-arbitrage condition is severely restricted. Finally, the no-arbitrage condition may have important implications for the (necessary and sufficient) conditions for the existence of an equilibrium price vector in financial markets with heterogeneous expectations.     

多元化经营、财务杠杆与过度投资

基于我国上市公司实行多元化经营战略的背景,从公司过度投资的视角对财务杠杆的治理效应进行了理论分析,并以2004-2009年的非金融上市公司为样本,检验了多元化经营对财务杠杆抑制企业过度投资治理效应的影响.结果发现,财务杠杆对我国上市公司的过度投资行为有明显的抑制作用,但是多元化经营会削弱这种抑制作用.进一步研究还发现,财务杠杆由于抑制过度投资,对公司绩效起到了正面的影响.而多元化经营同样会弱化财务杠杆对公司绩效的正面作用.研究结论不仅对于理解我国多元化经营的上市公司财务杠杆治理效应与投资效率之间的关系具有重要意义,同时也为我国上市公司多元化经营会降低公司经营业绩提供了新的证据.     

Arbitrage and price revelation with asymmetric information and incomplete markets

This paper deals with the issue of arbitrage with differential information and incomplete financial markets, with a focus on information that no-arbitrage asset prices can reveal. Time and uncertainty are represented by two periods and a finite set S of states of nature, one of which will prevail at the second period. Agents may operate limited financial transfers across periods and states via finitely many nominal assets. Each agent i has a private information about which state will prevail at the second period; this information is represented by a subset S_i of S. Agents receive no wrong information in the sense that the “true state” belongs to the “pooled information” set ∩_iS_i, hence assumed to be non-empty.Our analysis is two-fold. We first extend the classical symmetric information analysis to the asymmetric setting, via a concept of no-arbitrage price. Second, we study how such no-arbitrage prices convey information to agents in a decentralized way. The main difference between the symmetric and the asymmetric settings stems from the fact that a classical no-arbitrage asset price (common to every agent) always exists in the first case, but no longer in the asymmetric one, thus allowing arbitrage opportunities. This is the main reason why agents may need to refine their information up to an information structure which precludes arbitrage.