House prices and rents in Spain: Does the discount factor matter?

We estimate alternative price-to-rent ratios in the Spanish housing market by considering different stochastic discount factors in present value models similar to those used in the financial literature but where the higher rigidity that characterises this market is taken into account. We identify three robust across-model regularities: (i) the increase in the price-to-rent ratio since the late 1990s helped at first to restore equilibrium, (ii) further increases in house prices raised the ratio between 24% and 32% above equilibrium by 2004, although (iii) at that time the ratio was only around 2% above its short-term adjustment path towards a (new) long-run equilibrium.     

Fixed capital and internal rate of return

For a neo-Austrian process of production, more generally multisectoral fixed capital models, it is shown that the maximum rate of growth and the minimum rate of interest are both equal to the internal rate of return. This von Neumann type equality is here obtained in absence of truncation, i.e., free disposal of fixed capital. If several internal rates of return coexist, the economically significant one is the maximal one. This result provides theoretical grounds for the internal rate of return criterion in infinite horizon.     

Accounting and capital markets: a survey of the European evidence

The relationship between accounting information and capital markets has been the subject of numerous studies, especially in the US. The purpose of this article is to examine the corresponding evidence in Europe. This review classifies the European literature into three groups: studies of the market reaction to newly released accounting information; studies of the long-term association between stock returns and accounting numbers; studies devoted to the use of accounting data by investors and to the impact of market pressure on accounting choices. The paper reviews and summarizes the main results related to each of these topics. It also addresses some methodological issues and provides suggestions for future research.     

Dismissals and match-specific rents

Labor contracts that result in dismissals are quite common in the real world. The question that arises is why employers do not just offer reduced wages instead of asking workers with low realized productivity to leave. This paper argues that such behavior can be explained by workers' understandable unwillingness to agree to contracts that an employer will not have an incentive to honor in the future. Specifically, we construct a matching model in which the employer and the worker are both uncertain about the value the other places on the match. Because the worker's match-specific productivity is the employer's private information, a commitment to pay a wage equal to the worker's value of marginal product is not enforceable. In the absence of a wage guarantee, the employer will offer retained workers wages below their value of marginal product, which causes quits to be inefficiently high. The employer can reduce quits by contractually promising a guaranteed wage to retained workers. Although this will lead to some involuntary dismissals, the loss from dismissals will be less than the gain from lower quits if the wage guarantee is not too high.     

The no-arbitrage condition and financial markets with heterogeneous information

This paper examines the role of the no-arbitrage condition in financial markets with heterogeneous expectations. We consider a single-period, state-contingent claims model, withM risky securities andS states. There exist two types of heterogeneously informed investors, where the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to either the security payoff matrix, the state probability vector, or state partitions. When the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to either the security payoff matrix or state partitions, the no-arbitrage condition imposes a constraint on the dispersion of information between informed and uninformed investors. Further, the no-arbitrage condition is useful in ascertaining the patterns of heterogeneity among investors that are consistent with equilibrium. However, when the information heterogeneity is defined with respect to state probabilities, the role of the no-arbitrage condition is severely restricted. Finally, the no-arbitrage condition may have important implications for the (necessary and sufficient) conditions for the existence of an equilibrium price vector in financial markets with heterogeneous expectations.     

Information markets, product markets and vertical merger

In many markets, firms have the option of advertising at price comparison sites to broaden their market reach. Such sites are often controlled by profit-maximizing “information gatekeepers” charging advertising fees. This paper considers vertical merger between such a monopoly information gatekeeper and a firm in the product market. We find that: (i) If the integrated firm can act as a price leader before independent firms make advertising and pricing decisions, then the merger is profitable. (ii) If the integrated firm cannot move first, then the merger is unprofitable, or divestiture is optimal in the case where the firm has already created the gatekeeper. As a result, the merged entity has an incentive to invest in technologies to support a price leader.     

Pre-assigned rents and bureaucratic friction

In this paper we study the endogenous determination of bureaucratic friction in a bureaucratic contest with () and without (n = 1) rent contestability. When n= 1 bureaucratic impediments induce the individual to undertake rent-securing activities at the same level as in the two-player rent-seeking contest. However, under rent contestability the bureaucracy no longer serves as a means of extracting resources from the public. The paper concludes with the study of the effect of ‘net costs’ on bureaucratic friction. It turns out that under cotestability the only reason for creating bureaucratic friction is the ‘negative costs’ it incurs while when n = 1 the effect of the bureaucrat's net costs of generating bureaucratic friction on the optimal degree of such friction is ambiguous. Received: October 30, 2000 / Accepted: December 28, 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The authors are grateful to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments     

Optimal pricing of a conspicuous product during a recession that freezes capital markets

This paper considers the problem of how to price a conspicuous product when the economy is in a recession that disrupts capital markets. A conspicuous product in this context is a luxury good for which demand is increasing in brand image. Brand image here means the ability of a consumer to impress observers by conspicuously displaying consumption of the good. Brand image is built up when the good is priced high enough to make it exclusive, and eroded if the good is discounted.Recession is modeled as having two effects: it reduces demand and it freezes capital markets so borrowing is not possible. In pricing the conspicuous product the firm faces the following trade-off. Reducing price helps maintain sales volume and cash flow in the face of reduced demand, but it also damages brand image and thus long-term demand.The paper analyzes the firm's pricing policy facing scenarios of mild, intermediate and severe recessions, while taking the threat of bankruptcy into account. For an intermediate recession the optimal solution is history-dependent. The results have implications for policy interventions in capital markets and for timing of mergers and acquisitions.     

Industrial policy,social capital,human capital,and firm-level competitive advantage

Despite the popularity of governmental action devised to foster firm performance, the link between industrial policy and firm-specific human capital and social capital has received scant attention in the strategic management literature. In this paper, we build a dynamic optimization model which bridges concepts from industrial policy, social capital, human capital, and firm-level competitive advantage. We derive theoretical and policy implications from our competitiveness model, concluding that it increases in the opportunity cost of social capital reduce the production of human capital, so the optimal opportunity cost of social capital under feasible industrial policy should be set equal to zero. A government’s optimal industrial policy to help accumulate and churn human capital should reduce the opportunity cost of social capital to zero and reduce the probability of human capital leaving the community to zero. Thus, the model not only expands the potential determinants of competitive advantage in the context of governmental intervention, but also broadens the human capital theory and social capital theory in the creation of firm-specific human capital.

     

多元化经营、资产流动性与创新投入

本文选取我国2011—2017年在创业板上市的企业为样本,对多元化经营、资产流动性以及创新投入三者的关系进行探究,并重点分析了多元化经营对资产流动性与创新投入关系的调节作用,研究表明:资产流动性越强,企业的创新投入越高;多元化经营程度越高,企业创新投入越高;多元化经营具有强化资产流动性与企业创新投入关系的作用。     

The effects of internal locus of control on entrepreneurship: the mediating mechanisms of social capital and human capital

This paper proposes the research framework that locus of control enhances entrepreneurship through the mediating mechanisms of increased social capital in interpersonal networks and improved human capital in personal development. We adopted structural equation modeling to examine the research hypothesis. The research participants comprised managers from 14 enterprises in China; a total of 1002 valid questionnaires were collected. The results revealed that social and human capital mediate the effect that internal locus of control exerts on entrepreneurship. This study provides the following research contributions: first, the findings address the gaps in previous studies regarding the effect that a single dimension (i.e. personality traits) produces on entrepreneurship. Second, by employing the social exchange and human capital theories, we integrated interpersonal and individual perspectives into the research framework to explore factors affecting entrepreneurship, identifying that social and human capital are key-mediating mechanisms through which locus of control influences entrepreneurship.     

Hedonic theory, bid rents, and willingness-to-pay: Some extensions of Ellickson's results

An alternative to Ellickson's multinomial logit model of household bids for dwelling units is derived by making use of observable information on the price paid by the winning bidder. The alternative specification makes it possible to estimate willingness-to-pay for housing attributes, which cannot be obtained from Ellickson's model. Some methodological issues arising from Ellickson's method of grouping households are also examined.     

浅论我国内外资企业所得税制度

内外资企业所得税制度改革一直是我国税制改革中有争议的重要话题。随着我国市场经济的不断完善,两税并存的局面暴露出了越来越多的弊端。文章通过分析我国现行企业所得税制度产生的历史原因、现状与弊端,提出了相关的对策和建议,力求为我国所得税制度改革提供建议和帮助。     

Asymmetric information as a barrier to knowledge spillovers in expert markets

This paper investigates barriers to effective knowledge spillovers for markets in which the product can be characterized as a credence good, i.e. its complexity impedes the evaluation of quality by customers both ex-ante and ex-post. We focus on the German market for energy efficiency consultants, as an emerging and subsidized sector in which the service offered has strong credence good properties. Based upon in-depth interviews with stakeholders, we analyze the determinants and barriers to knowledge spillovers. We find that the incentive to foster spillovers to increase suppliers’ knowledge is limited by the difficult commercialization of additional capabilities. The implementation of a public certification scheme has failed to increase the sectoral knowledge spillovers. By contrast, the participation in formal knowledge networks has been more effective in prompting companies to foster knowledge spillovers, which has also led to a higher degree of specialization. We conclude that access to certification schemes should be further restricted to increase market transparency and private networks should be supported to achieve the aim of increasing knowledge spillovers.     

Incomplete markets, ambiguity, and irreversible investment

The problem of irreversible investment with idiosyncratic risk is studied by interpreting market incompleteness as a source of ambiguity over the appropriate no-arbitrage discount factor. The maxmin utility over multiple priors framework is used to model and solve the irreversible investment problem. Multiple priors are modeled using the notion of κ‐ignorance. This set-up is used to analyze finitely lived options. For infinitely lived options the notion of constant κ‐ignorance is introduced. For these sets of density generators the corresponding optimal stopping problem is solved for general (in-)finite horizon optimal stopping problems driven by geometric Brownian motion. It is argued that an increase in the set of priors delays investment, whereas an increase in the degree of market completeness can have a non-monotonic effect on investment.     

A note on globalization and urban residential rents

We present evidence on the impact of international economic openness upon residential real estate, consistent with the well-known Balassa–Samuelson effect, which suggests that increasing openness raises relative prices of non-tradable goods and services. Using a data set for 46 cities in different countries, we find that urban rents are positively affected by the openness of the economy and by city size.     

Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents

In this article, a Tullock contest success function is used to model an innovation contest with endogenous innovation height. We can prove stability for this endogenous prize contest. The winner of the contest gains a monopoly rent, which has two dimensions. In the first dimension the winning firm influences the innovation height. The second dimension is the life span of the temporary monopoly. This life span is determined by the contest designer, who can be asocial planner or the consumers. We find interior solutions in both cases, whereas consumers prefer a monopoly life span below the social optimum. Furthermore, the optimal number of firms in the contest is two.