Investment Bank Reputation and the Price and Quality of Underwriting Services

The relation between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond underwriting services is studied here. After controlling for endogeneity in issuer–underwriter matching, I find that reputable banks obtain lower yields and charge higher fees, but issuers' net proceeds are higher. These relations are pronounced in the junk‐bond category, in which reputable banks' underwriting criteria are most stringent. These findings suggest that banks' underwriting decisions reflect reputation concerns, and are thus informative of issue quality. They also suggest that economic rents are earned on reputation, and thereby provide continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation.     

Conflict of Interest in Commercial Bank Equity Underwriting

This paper examines the pricing characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. Assuming IPO underpricing is directly related to ex ante uncertainty, if the market rationally perceives these commercial banks to have a conflict of interest, these securities should have more underpricing than non-commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings (all else being equal). On the other hand, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality, less underpricing should be observed. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999. We find that the underpricing of commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings in which the firm had a previous banking relationship with the underwriter is significantly less than those underwritten by investment banks.     

The Competitive Impact of Commercial Bank Underwriting on the Market for Municipal Revenue Bonds

This paper examines the impact of commercial bank entry in the market for municipal revenue bonds. We show that issues underwritten by commercial banks have lower underwriter spreads but not lower yields relative to issues underwritten by nonbank investment firms. In particular, this is more significant for non-investment-grade bonds underwritten by commercial banks. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that bank entry has resulted in increased competition in the municipal revenue bond market and that the lower yields observed for bank-underwritten commercial bonds may be due to banks having private information. Overall, our results suggest that policy changes leading to the relaxation of restrictive provisions concerning bank underwriting of municipal revenue bonds have had beneficial effects.     

商业银行声誉风险管理组织体系的构建思考

商业银行声誉风险管理目标确定之后,需要由风险管理组织体系予以实施,即完善的声誉风险管理组织体系是有效实施声誉风险管理的基本保障。由于声誉风险管理既具有其它种类风险管理的共同特征,又有其个性化管理要求。构建商业银行声誉风险管理组织体系,除了要认真落实国家银行业监督管理委员会关于声誉风险管理组织体系的基本要求外,更要根据声誉风险管理的内在规律性要求构建体现商业银行声誉风险管理特定要求的组织体系。     

商业银行高管声誉激励机制的完善

商业银行高管与股东之间存在着委托-代理关系。激励机制能够减少高管的投机行为,而声誉激励则是高管激励的重要组成部分。本文基于不确定的市场预期业绩,根据委托代理理论,构建了银行高管的声誉激励模型。利用不确定规划理论对模型进行了简化求解,并依据模型结果,对影响声誉激励的因素以及如何强化高管的声誉激励进行了分析。在此基础上,提出了完善商业银行高管市场和激励机制的对策。     

声誉模型视角的商业银行关系营销策略研究

根据菲利普·科特勒关于关系营销的建议,商业银行对客户实施关系营销有效的深度是不同的。商业银行与客户的关系是一种既竞争又合作的关系,声誉模型可以为商业银行有效实施关系营销策略提供支持。研究发现：商业银行应该选择“合作策略”彰显良好声誉,选择具有良好声誉的客户合作,并着力发展优质的忠诚客户。     

信息不对称、银行声誉差异与金融规制

国有商业银行长期以国家声誉代替银行声誉,以此来维持自己的日常运营,这会增加政府负担,容易导致全面金融危机的爆发。本文在声誉理论框架下,运用信息经济学研究银行声誉与规制制度之间的关系,并且针对我国当前银行声誉制度存在的问题提出相应的政策建议。     

Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation

We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity-marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.     

券商承销业务评价体系研究

对承销商的承销业务进行考评，是成熟市场国家监管市场主体的一项主要内容。中国证监会于2000年7月发布《信誉主承销商考评试行办法》，标志着对承销商的考评进入实施阶段。在《办法》中，证监会授权证券业协会负责组织考评的日常工作。此后，证券业协会制订了详尽的考评指标体系和计分、积分办法，针对主承销商的承销业务考评体系初步构建成形。今年3月核准制正式运行以后，现行的考评体系表现出很多的不适应性。     

国家信誉退出的双重约束及松释

国家信誉从国有商业银行退出,存在着低资本金充足率及高不良资产率约束,同时存在金融安全网缺失约束。随着国有银行股份制改造中资本金注入主体的多元化,资本金问题已不再成其为问题;随着中国经济体制改革的深入所带来的国民经济结构的调整,原来国有商业银行存在的体制性脆弱性逐步得到消解,不良资产问题越来越与银行机构自身经营高度相关。存款保险制度的显性化以及审慎监管制度的确立可以加快国家信誉从银行机构退出的速度。     

The Satellite Insurance Market and Underwriting Cycles

This research analyses whether underwriting cycles are present in an important but often overlooked line of insurance, satellite insurance. Unlike previous underwriting cycle studies, this study uses rates-on-line and capacity devoted to satellite insurance as well as loss ratios to determine the applicability of cycles. The sample period encompasses virtually the entire history of the satellite insurance industry, 1968–2010. The results indicate that cycles are present in the minimum and average rates-on-line and in capacity, but not the loss ratio. Regression analysis is carried out on the rate-on-line and capacity variables, and the regression results support the rational expectations/institutional intervention hypothesis and the capacity constraint (capital shock) hypothesis.     

The Effect of Reputation and Competition on the Advice of Real Estate Agents

We study a two-period bargaining game where buyers and sellers employ real estate agents to help them determine the sales price of a house. We find that agents are less likely to provide aggressive bargaining advice to their client when they receive percentage commissions and when they work for the buyer. In addition, we find that agents are less likely to suggest aggressive bargaining strategies when there is little market competition, the gains to trade are large, in markets where housing values appreciate slowly, and when dual agency is permitted. More importantly, we show that an agent is more likely to bargain aggressively and capture a portion of the gains to trade for a client when the house’s sales price is closely related to the agent’s reputation and future business (referrals).

Do Bank Relationships Affect the Firm's Underwriter Choice in the Corporate‐Bond Underwriting Market?

This paper studies the effect of bank relationships on underwriter choice in the U.S. corporate‐bond underwriting market following the 1989 commercial‐bank entry. I find that bank relationships have positive and significant effects on a firm's underwriter choice, over and above their effects on fees. This result is sharply stronger for junk‐bond issuers and first‐time issuers. I also find that there is a significant fee discount when there are relationships between firms and commercial banks. Finally, I find that serving as arranger of past loan transactions has the strongest effect on underwriter choice, whereas serving merely as participant has no effect.     

声誉机制、信任机制与小额信贷

小额信贷之所以在不需要抵押担保的情况下也能为借款者放款,究其原因,除了贷款者所实施的信贷规范起到了降低风险的作用以外,建立在"声誉效应"基础上的信任机制作用的发挥起到了关键性的作用,如果借贷双方以及借款联保小组成员间缺乏基本的信任,那么合作行为是不会出现的.本文对建立在声誉效应基础上的信任机制所发挥的作用进行动态博弈分析,在此基础上根据实地调研的数据进行实证剖析,提出了通过借贷双方长期博弈建立信任关系、不断投入资源以维护信任机制、发挥农业保险与专业组织的作用降低农户经营风险等政策建议.     

The Effect of Bank Debt Downgrades on Stock Prices of Other Banks

We find that debt downgrades of money center banks elicit negative stock price responses in nondowngraded money center banks. Stock prices of larger regional banks also react to these downgrades. Although downgrades of regional banks evoke negative stock price responses for regional banks in the same geographic region, the importance of geographic region as a factor determining the extent of intra‐industry reactions has diminished since 1989. Our results indicate that the merger and expansion activities triggered by interstate banking have blurred differences between regional and money center banks as interstate banking activity has moved towards nationwide banking