DERIVATIVES AND THE FASB: VISIBILITY AND TRANSPARENCY?

In June 1998, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued its Statement No. 133 addressing the accounting for derivative instruments and for hedging activities.This Statement addresses old issues regarding the way companies report their activities in derivatives and how those instruments are used to hedge some types of risks. However, the impact of this standard could be very negative, and it could be not useful for investors and creditors for making good decisions. In fact, SFAS 133 presents serious problems and the Board doesn’t appear to have obtained its goals of increased financial statements transparency and comparability.The problems of implementing this standard are commented in this article. At the same time, an alternative is offered to improve the issue of comparability among different companies using derivatives to hedging purposes.     

FAS 133: What Is Accounting Truth?

FAS 133, the rule that governs accounting for derivatives, has been controversial since its inception. Besides being expensive to implement and maintain, the rules often cause accounting treatment to diverge markedly from economic reality, making financial statements less transparent and less useful. For example, by marking to market only one side of what are in fact two‐sided (hedged) positions, FAS 133 often introduces artificial volatility into earnings and, in so doing, discourages companies from hedging. How should companies tackle financial disclosure and balance the economic and accounting effects of hedging? This article recommends that companies make economically sensible hedging decisions and then present two sets of earnings numbers to the investment community: (1) the first prepared and audited in strict accordance with GAAP; and (2) a supplemental calculation showing what earnings would have been had the firm qualified for hedge accounting treatment. This kind of supplemental disclosure should be viewed by companies as an opportunity to explain to their investors, creditors, and counterparties how they conceptualize, measure, and manage risk.     

Hedging,selective hedging,or speculation? Evidence of the use of derivatives by Brazilian firms during the financial crisis

This paper analyse the use of foreign exchange derivatives by non-financial publicly traded Brazilian companies from 2007 to 2009. Using balance-sheet data on firms’ positions in derivatives and their foreign exchange exposure, the paper verifies the existence of three groups of derivative users: hedgers, selective hedgers – companies that significantly changed the volume of derivatives used during this period, but used them in line with their currency exposure – and active speculators – companies that adopted positions that would have been inadvisable had the aim been to hedge their currency exposure. Selective hedgers and speculators have one similarity: both tried to obtain gains through the continuous process of domestic currency appreciation. Confirming the optimal hedging literature, the paper shows that several firm characteristics are able to explain the use of derivatives and hedging by firms but market timing in the derivative markets is explained solely by firms’ foreign exposure, corporate governance and the macroeconomic environment.     

The impact of hedging on the market value of equity

We examine the annual stock performance of firms that disclose the use of derivatives to hedge over the period 1995 to 1999. We find that only 21.6% of publicly traded U.S. corporations in our sample hedged with derivative instruments over this period and their use is concentrated in the larger companies. Similar to other studies we find that when derivatives are used, interest rate and currency securities are used much more frequently than commodity products. Our sample of 1308 companies that hedge outperforms other securities by 4.3% per year on average over our sample period. This result is robust to several alternative methods of estimating abnormal returns. When we segment performance by the type of hedge used, however, we find that the over-performance is due entirely to larger firms that hedge currency. We find no abnormal returns for firms hedging either interest rates or commodities. The abnormal returns in firms hedging currency is robust to alternative models that seek to control for exchange rate fluctuations and global equity returns; however, we find no significant abnormal returns to currency hedgers when using an augmented model that controls for the role of intangible assets.     

The choice of hedging techniques and the characteristics of UK industrial firms

This study presents the empirical results for the relationship between the use of hedging techniques and the characteristics of UK multinational enterprises (MNEs). All the firms in the sample hedge foreign exchange (FX) exposure. The results indicate that UK firms focus on a very narrow set of hedging techniques. They make much greater use of derivatives than internal hedging techniques. The degree of utilisation of both internal and external techniques depends on the type of exposure that is hedged. Furthermore, the characteristics of the firms appear to explain the choice of hedging technique but the use of certain hedging techniques appears to be associated with increases in the variability of some accounting measures. This adverse impact of hedging has not been emphasised in the finance literature. The results imply that firms need to ensure that the appropriate techniques are used to hedge exposures.     

How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

An innovative analysis of taxes and corporate hedging

Theoretical research predicted that firms with convex tax schedules would hedge to minimize expected taxes. However, previous empirical research did not detect a relationship between derivative use and tax losses carry forward, which contribute to tax schedule convexity. This study aims to show that the tax incentive to hedge depends on tax losses carry forward and the ability of the firm to carry losses forward and back, which depends on the distribution of taxable income. A new measure of the tax incentive to hedge, which incorporates this, will be proposed. Hedging could be accomplished by methods other than by using derivatives. Measures of hedging activity which incorporates the effect of all methods of hedging, and which are consistent with previous theoretical research, will also be proposed. Using the new measures of the tax incentive to hedge and hedging activity, the firm’s tax incentive to hedge will be empirically established to significantly influence its hedging activity¹.     

Three Approaches to Risk Management—and How and Why Swedish Companies Use Them

Companies can manage risk by using derivatives or through operational hedging. But there is a third possibility: to leave their operating cash flows unhedged while ensuring that the firm has access to external finance in adverse states of the world. This article reports the findings of a recent survey of over 800 Swedish companies that aims to shed light on the relative importance of these three risk management methods, as well as how they interact in corporate risk management programs. The results show that risk management practices aimed at ensuring access to external finance are the main method used by the largest number of companies, followed by operational hedging methods and financial hedging with derivatives. Large companies hedge using both operational methods and derivatives, whereas small firms are less likely to use derivatives but nevertheless attach great importance to the other two ways of managing risk. Even among the largest companies, operational hedging tends to deemed more important than hedging with derivatives—a finding that, although perhaps a surprise to financial professionals, underscores the authors’ finding that operational and derivative‐based hedges function as complements rather than substitutes. Indeed, the authors report that the most financially sophisticated companies tend to use all three of these common forms of risk management.     

Exchange rate exposure and foreign exchange derivatives: do ineffective hedgers modify future derivatives use?

Recent studies examining the relationship between stock returns and exchange rate changes have provided evidence that the exchange rate exposure of non-financial companies is reduced by the use of foreign exchange derivatives. Building on such research, this study investigates whether past ineffective derivative hedging contributes to explaining future derivatives use. To the extent that companies monitor the effectiveness of their currency risk management practices, past ineffective hedgers can be expected to modify their future use of foreign exchange derivatives accordingly. In our study of 94 non-financial US multinationals, we provide evidence that the change in derivatives use from 1996–1998 to 1998–2000 can be explained in part by the ineffective hedging of currency risk in 1996–1998, controlling for variables associated with theories of optimal hedging. Additional analyses confirm that such primary results are robust to firm size, the level of foreign operations, and the use of derivatives to partially hedge currency risk. Our results imply that as exchange markets and risk management practices change, the use of derivatives to manage exchange rate risk also changes. Our contribution to this field of study is that we find evidence that past ineffective hedgers tend to increase their future use of FXDs.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations. Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts? In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.     

MEASURING HEDGE EFFECTIVENESS FOR FAS 133 COMPLIANCE

Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 133 requires business entities to document their anticipation of hedge effectiveness in order to qualify for hedge accounting treatment of gains and losses from financial derivatives. In the absence of specific guidelines, the accounting industry has espoused the "80–125" rule for determining hedge effectiveness. But the authors observe that meaningful assessment of anticipated hedge effectiveness must consider two distinct aspects of a firm's hedging strategy: (1) the strength of the hedging relationship, which is determined by the choice of the hedging instrument; and (2) the position taken in the hedging instrument relative to the holdings of the hedged item. They take both aspects of hedging into consideration in developing alternative measures of hedge effectiveness and distinguishing between the potential and attained effectiveness of a particular hedge. This approach enables the user to evaluate the relative merits of alternative hedging strategies to support risk management decisions, and also to document a selected hedging strategy's anticipated effectiveness for purposes of compliance with FAS 133. While the authors endorse a fairly broad interpretation of hedge effectiveness, their approach can also be used in the narrower context of an "80–125" rule.     

套期会计原则缺失问题研究——IASB套期会计征求意见稿评述

IASB 2010年12月发布的套期会计征求意见稿首次提出了套期会计目标,简化了套期会计适用条件,增加了套期工具和被套期项目种类,充分体现了财务报告编制者对增加套期会计适用性的要求。本文分析了套期会计原则缺失导致的套期会计方法与目标不一致问题,并通过对我国企业衍生金融工具交易实践的分析说明,套期会计方法可能会产生与套期会计目标背离的会计结果。提出应建立明晰的套期会计原则,实现套期会计方法与目标的统一,保证套期会计能够传达套期工具的实质,使报表使用者能够清楚地了解企业使用套期工具的真实目的和实际效果。     

The Determinants of Currency Risk Management in Latin American Nonfinancial Firms

This paper investigates the determinants of currency risk management in nonfinancial firms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, based on a panel data sample of firms that list as American depositary receipts from 2001 to 2004. Our evidence indicates that derivatives held for hedging purposes can yield cash flows of the same order of magnitude of capital expenditures, operational earnings, and financial expense, unlike what was previously found by Guay and Kothari (2003) for U.S. firms. We study not only the decision to use derivatives, but also the magnitude of derivatives holdings and the importance of operational hedging in firms' risk management strategies. We find that economies of scale, financial distress costs, informational asymmetry, and growth opportunities are important for risk management decisions, and that firms do not hedge because of potential tax benefits.     

Policy uncertainty,the use of derivatives: Evidence from U.S. bank holdingcompanies (BHCs)

We explore the link between bank holding companies’ hedging in derivatives and economic policy uncertainty using a newspaper-based index of policy uncertainty. Interestingly, we find that bank holding companies use derivatives less intensively in states where policy uncertainty is high (they hedge against homogenous (tradable) risk only); instead, they allocate their risk exposure via lending (thus increasing their credit risk). This finding is robust to different combinations of data samples, including the usage of only fourth quarter data, annual data, excluding bank mergers and acquisitions, and the results are robust to sample selection.     

Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives

We examine the use of currency derivatives in order to differentiate among existing theories of hedging behavior. Firms with greater growth opportunities and tighter financial constraints are more likely to use currency derivatives. This result suggests that firms might use derivatives to reduce cash flow variation that might otherwise preclude firms from investing in valuable growth opportunities. Firms with extensive foreign exchange-rate exposure and economies of scale in hedging activities are also more likely to use currency derivatives. Finally, the source of foreign exchange-rate exposure is an important factor in the choice among types of currency derivatives.     

Foreign Currency Derivatives versus Foreign Currency Debt and the Hedging Premium

This paper compares the effect on firm value of different foreign currency (FC) financial hedging strategies identified by type of exposure (short‐ or long‐term) and type of instrument (forwards, options, swaps and foreign currency debt). We find that hedging instruments depend on the type of exposure. Short‐term instruments such as FC forwards and/or options are used to hedge short‐term exposure generated from export activity while FC debt and FC swaps into foreign currency (but not into domestic currency) are used to hedge long‐term exposure arising from assets located in foreign locations. Our results relating to the value effects of foreign currency hedging indicate that foreign currency derivatives use increases firm value but there is no hedging premium associated with foreign currency debt hedging, except when combined with foreign currency derivatives. Taken individually, FC swaps generate more value than short‐term derivatives.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE USE OF FOREIGN‐EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES BY BANKS

We examine the effect of managerial compensation and ownership on the use of foreign‐exchange derivatives by U.S. bank holding companies. We focus on derivatives used for purposes other than trading to investigate derivative use in a hedging framework. We use instrumental variables probit and sample‐selection models to estimate the effects of endogenous and exogenous factors on the probability and extent of foreign‐exchange derivatives used. We find that the use of derivatives is inversely related to option awards but positively related to managerial ownership. Finally, our results suggest that ownership by large institutional shareholders provides incentive for managers to hedge.     

Financial derivatives and bank risk: evidence from eighteen developed markets

We examine the relationship between equity risk and the use of financial derivatives with a sample of 555 banks from eighteen developed markets from 2006 to 2015. Our main findings suggest that banks’ use of financial derivatives increased their risk. This increase in risk can be driven by banks’ use of derivatives for speculative purposes, by suboptimal hedging to obtain hedge accounting status, or from accounting mismatches that generate volatility in earnings. We also show that this relationship is nonlinear. Too-Big-To-Fail banks and those that employ a traditional retail banking business model are subject to lower idiosyncratic risk. We address endogeneity concerns using instrumental variables capturing the use of derivatives with portfolio ranking. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the impact of derivatives use on bank risk and the risk consequences of a bank’s business model choice.     

How fair-value accounting can influence firm hedging

The potential influence of accounting regulations on hedging strategies and the use of financial derivatives is a research topic that has attracted little attention in both the finance and the accounting literature. However, recent surveys suggest that company hedging can be substantially influenced by the accounting for financial instruments. In this study, we illustrate not only why but also how the accounting regulations may affect hedging behavior. We find that under mark-to-market accounting, most firms concerned with earnings smoothness adopt myopic hedging strategies relative to the benchmark, cash flow hedging. The specific influence of the accounting regulations depends on market and firm-specific characteristics, but, in general, the firms dramatically reduce the extent of hedging addressing price risk in future accounting periods. We illustrate that the change in hedging behavior significantly dampens the increase in earnings volatility stemming from fair value accounting of derivatives. However, the adjusted hedging strategies may substantially increase the firms’ cash flow volatility.