审计委员会与外部审计独立性

本文首先从完全信息动态博弈的视角出发,推导得出,强化外部审计独立性是审计委员会的基本职能之一.然而,接下来的实证检验结果却与前述的理论预期相悖,即实证检验结果表明,我国上市公司审计委员会制度在实际运行中,并不具有强化外部审计独立性的功能.接下来的分析表明,由于缺乏"独立人"的资格,导致我国审计委员会很难打破原有的均衡,从而很难强化外部审计独立性.     

我国内部审计的独立性问题

内部审计的独立性是审计理论和实务必须认识和解决的问题。受托经济责任需要内部审计拥有独立性．但当前的管理体制、机构和人员设置状况，法律环境、人员素质和工作质量等制约了内部审计的独立性。在国家对内部审计管理体制进行改革的形势下，笔者提出了强化内部审计独立性的措施建议。     

The association between audit committees,compensation incentives,and corporate audit fees

This study uses audit fee data from the 2001–2003 reporting periods to examine the relationship between measures of audit committee effectiveness and compensation incentives with corporate audit fees. Our results suggest that audit committee size, committee member expertise, and committee member independence are positively associated to audit fee levels, consistent with the notion that audit committees serve as a complement to external auditors in monitoring management. In contrast, CEO long-term pay and insider ownership are inversely related to audit fee levels, substituting for external audit effort in motivating management. Notwithstanding results on the full sample of firm-years, we uncover significant differences in the determinants of audit fees between the years examined. An important implication of these results is that explaining the intra-firm variation in audit fees over time is clearly necessary in order to understand the antecedents and consequences of audit fees.

The effects of audit firm rotation on perceived auditor independence and audit quality

Our study explores loan officers’ perceptions of auditors’ independence and audit quality under three experimental audit firm rotation scenarios. We use a case experiment with a between-subjects design to determine whether rotation of the audit firm impacts financial statement users’ perceptions of auditor’s independence and quality. Findings based on 212 useable responses indicate that loan officers do perceive an increase in independence when the company follows an audit firm rotation policy. However, the length of auditor tenure within rotation fails to significantly change loan officers’ perceptions of independence. Findings also indicate that neither the presence of a rotation policy nor the length of the auditor tenure within rotation significantly influences the loan officers’ perceptions of audit quality.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

Perceived auditor independence and audit firm fees

Regulations requiring the disclosure of fees paid to an auditor for audit and non-audit services (NAS) respond to concerns that such payments are potentially detrimental to auditors' actual or perceived independence. Although empirical studies have failed to produce unequivocal evidence of detrimental effects on auditor independence, the actions of regulators, audit firms and companies are consistent with the belief that economic bonding generated by fees can impair perceived levels of auditor independence.

Using a sample of UK companies over a six year period to March 2006, we study perceived impairment of auditor independence by examining the relationship between levels of total relative fees (combined audit and NAS fees payable by a company to its auditor as a proportion of the audit firm's UK income) and market value. This paper's methodological innovation is its use of a valuation framework in this setting. A further contribution lies in dropping the assumption of linearity found in most prior empirical studies. We provide evidence that shareholders perceive a threat to auditor independence only at high total relative fee levels. At lower levels, total relative fees are positively related to company value. These results suggest that disclosure of NAS and audit fees are of relevance to investors, as is information about auditor income. Our results support the view that regulation by reference to the threshold at which total relative fees are perceived negatively is more consistent with investor preferences than prohibition of the supply of NAS by auditors to their audit clients.     

The determinants of audit committees: evidence from the charity sector

Drawing on the theoretical perspectives of agency theory, institutional theory and resource dependency theory, this study finds that board attributes (consisting of the number of trustees and board structure), charity size, the nature of charitable activities, and external influences (namely proportion of restricted funds, presence of government funding and auditor quality) are all significantly positively associated with the annual report disclosure of audit committee existence. No relationship was found with either organizational legal form or donor dependence.     

Boundary spanning and gatekeeping roles of UK audit committees

Post-financial crisis, audit committee (AC) reforms are proposed to improve the quality of financial reporting.^?? The editorial process for this paper was undertaken by Pauline Weetman, former ABR editor. This paper's empirical contribution is to investigate the extent to which ACs and audit committee chairs (ACCs) engage with chief financial officers (CFOs) and audit partners (APs) across a range of 32 financial reporting issues. It is the first large-scale survey of interactions to move beyond the micro-CFO/AP dyad and to distinguish the individual ACC from the AC group. While 37% of the 5445 reported discussions involve all three key individuals together with the full AC, 35% involve neither the AC nor the ACC and the ACC acts without the full AC in a significant minority of cases. The parties reported to be involved are similar across the three respondent groups but vary with financial reporting issue, company size and audit firm size. The paper's theoretical contribution is to interpret the evidence using the concepts of boundary spanning and gatekeeping roles. The research reveals incomplete levels of AC and ACC engagement with financial reporting issues. Findings have implications for policy-makers regarding the role, influence and effectiveness of the AC in financial reporting matters. Directions for future research are identified.     

On the demand for independent and active audit committees

We extend the literature on director independence and the role of the board by focusing on the importance of audit committees in the contracting process. We find that the demand for independent and active audit committees is positively related to the demand for accounting certification. In particular, we find that the likelihood of a firm having a completely independent and active audit committee is negatively related to firm growth opportunities and managerial ownership and positively related to firm size and leverage. Our results suggest that audit committees are an important organizational construct related to the demand for accounting certification.     

浅谈审计委托模式的改进

目前,审计委托权由公司经营者行使是造成注册会计师无法保持应有的独立性,从而导致独立审计失败的重要原因之一。而我国国有控股公司内部治理结构上的缺陷又是造成审计委托权实际上由被审计人的经理层行使从而导致审计失败的根本原因。本文提出:要真正做到由完全独立于公司经营者的机构行使审计委托权,维护注册会计师的独立性,有必要从公司外部引进独立的第四方作为审计委托人,也可从制度上防范和减少审计失败,提高注册会计师的社会公信力。     

Voluntary formation of audit committees by large municipal governments

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires that publicly-traded U.S. corporations have an audit committee in their internal control structure. In contrast to publicly-traded commercial firms, municipal governments are not required to form audit committees. Given that regulators believe it is a crucial aspect of internal control, we examine the extent to which city governments feature audit committees in the internal control structure. Based on a survey of financial managers from cities with populations greater than 100,000, we find that approximately 58% of the municipalities have such committees. Results indicate that larger and more financially viable cities are more likely to have audit committees. However, the form of municipal government and the quality of the local government’s financial reporting and audit processes are not significant determinants of the presence of an audit committee.     

Audit quality indicators: Perspectives from Non-Big Four audit firms and small company audit committees

Through a combined study, we explore the professional perspectives of two distinct PCAOB constituent groups related to the PCAOB's proposed regulatory approach for audit quality indicators. First, we examine the comment letters of Non-Big Four audit firms and find that this specific constituent group views most of the PCAOB's proposed audit quality indicators as infeasible and redundant. Further, Non-Big Four audit firms contend that the indicators require greater clarification from the regulator as well as substantial accompanying qualitative context to avoid misinterpretation that may lead to unintended consequences. Second, we survey a collection of audit committee members from small, publicly-traded companies regarding the current evaluation and perceived effectiveness of eleven specific PCAOB audit quality indicators, each of which is well-established in the extant audit quality literature. We find indicators related to auditor personnel with specialized skill and knowledge, experience of audit personnel, and the timely reporting of internal control issues are perceived to possess the highest level of effectiveness in the evaluation of audit quality.     

制度环境对威胁审计独立性因素的影响

审计独立性不仅是审计学术界与职业界关注的核心问题,也是各国资本市场发展中必须面对的重要问题.本文将审计制度放入整体的社会制度框架中,探讨审计独立性受到威胁的根源所在,以及制度环境如何约束和影响威胁审计独立性的因素.     

关于审计独立性的几个基本理论问题

审计独立性乃会计职业之基石.它既是一个基本理论问题,又关涉重大的监管决策.本文以独立性概念在美国的界定与演变为对象,讨论三个相关的理论问题,包括独立性概念的定义;概念变迁的"人格化"涵义;规范方式的选择:"原则型"或"规则型".美国的借鉴意义是(1)独立性概念至关重要,其定义需要"与时俱进";(2)会计职业在同监管者的互动中不断调整其"独立性"立场;(3)"原则型"与"规则型"的选择要考虑会计职业的总体道德水准.     

Optimal versus suboptimal choices of accounting expertise on audit committees and earnings quality

By employing a Heckman two-stage selection model, we identify whether employing a financial expert with or without accounting expertise on the audit committee is optimal and how earnings quality varies across these optimal and suboptimal choices. Using four earnings quality measures (informativeness, timely loss recognition, earnings persistence, and accruals quality), we find no differences in earnings quality between firms optimally choosing an expert with or without accounting expertise, consistent with Demsetz and Lehn (J Polit Econ 93:1155–1177, 1985) and others who argue that when firms optimize their choice (i.e., accounting expertise), there should be no difference across the characteristic (i.e., earnings quality) being examined. We do find, however, earnings quality is significantly higher for firms that optimally choose an accounting expert relative to firms that choose (with/without accounting expertise) suboptimally. Finally, firms suboptimally choosing an accounting expert exhibit no improvement, or even lower earnings quality, than firms that optimally choose no accounting expert. Our results provide important evidence of the impact accounting expertise has on earnings quality when considering the firm’s choice.     

Reputation concerns and herd behavior of audit committees - A corporate governance problem

This paper offers an explanation for audit committee failures within a corporate governance context. The management of a firm sets up financial statements that are possibly biased. These statements are audited/reviewed by an external auditor and by an audit committee. Both agents report the result of their work, the auditor acting first. Both use an imperfect technology that results in a privately observed signal regarding the quality of financial statements. The audit committee as well as the auditor are anxious to build up reputation in the labor market. Given this predominant goal they report on the signal in order to maximize the market’s assessment of their ability. At the end of the game the true character of the financial statements is revealed to the public with some positive probability. The market uses this information along with the agents’ reports to update beliefs about the agents’ abilities. We show that a herding equilibrium exists in which the audit committee “herds” and follows the auditor’s judgement no matter what its own insights suggest. This result holds even if the audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, performance based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases.     

The audit expectation gap: existence,causes, and the impact of changes

Recent regulatory initiatives targeting the statutory audit regime support the notion that the audit expectation gap is still a driver of change. This study seeks to analyse causes of the gap as well as the impact of proposed changes to the current statutory audit regime using an approach that differs from those used in prior literature. This approach allows us to attribute the audit expectation gap under the current regime to a failure of the public, the standard-setter, or the auditor. Based on a questionnaire survey conducted in 2011 in Germany, we find the public to have exaggerated expectations of auditors' responsibilities under current standards. Other causes of the gap relate to the public's difficulty in assessing the performance of auditors, but also to deficiencies in auditors' performance. In addition, we find that auditors are not fully aware of their responsibilities. Increasing the information content of the audit opinion is expected to narrow the gap. By contrast, recent proposed changes, such as mandatory rotation and a ban on non-audit services, may reduce the gap only to a lesser extent. Overall, it can be shown that the audit expectation gap is by its nature a persistent phenomenon comprising complex social aspects and interactions with changing accounting requirements, such as increased uncertainties in accounting estimates.     

我国证券审计市场的集中度与注册会计师独立性

近年来,我国证券审计市场经过脱钩改制、合并重组等重人变革,在职业准则制定方面也不断完善.住这种形势下,我国的证券审计市场格局和注册会计师独立性又随之出现了哪些新的变化?本文拟对此做一研究.     

Non-audit services provided to audit clients,independence of mind and independence in appearance: latest evidence from large UK listed companies

This paper investigates whether the provision of non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients impairs auditor independence of mind and independence in appearance. The main contributions of this paper are in terms of its timeliness with respect to regulatory changes, the simultaneous examination of both forms of auditor independence and the methodological innovation whereby it uses a variable derived from the level of abnormal audit fees as a moderating variable in order to capture the direct impact of the NAS fee level on auditor independence as well as how its influence is moderated by the level of unexpected audit fees. Our results indicate that auditor independence of mind is compromised by the size of NAS fees, particularly for clients who pay below the level of expected audit fee. The stock market perceives that auditor independence is compromised by NAS fees but, at the same time, additional tests indicate that there are benefits that accrue from NAS and, in particular, the relation between return and non-discretionary net income is increasing in NAS fees. The balance of evidence suggests that the European Union is correct in undertaking some reform of the auditing market.     

The role of audit evidence in a strategic audit

This study examines how audit risk (the probability of false acceptance) and its components change when the auditor obtains audit evidence in an acceptance sampling model. Inherent risk and audit risk increase with audit evidence if the auditee has a sufficiently strong incentive for committing fraud. Detection risk always increases when audit evidence is introduced. If the auditor has a sufficiently strong incentive for avoiding false rejection, audit risk also increases with audit evidence. The analysis indicates that requiring auditors to obtain information is not effective in preventing material misstatements in at least some instances.