中国本土会计师事务所的市场地位与经济回报

区域规模化和行业专长化是会计师事务所通常采取的两种发展战略。本文分析和比较了具有区域市场领先地位以及具有行业市场领先地位的中国本土会计师事务所伴随的经济回报(以审计定价度量)。基于全样本的证据显示:本土会计师事务所仅仅通过在各省际市场取得领先地位并不足以获取明显的经济回报;具备行业市场领先地位则伴随着显著更高的经济回报;同时具备行业市场领先地位和区域市场领先地位则伴随着更大的经济回报。进一步的分析显示,不同本土会计师事务所可能需要考虑在发展战略及其实现途径上的差异化。本文的发现对本土会计师事务所制定符合自身特征的发展战略具有启示意义。     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

The determinants of audit fees—evidence from the voluntary sector

Given the growing demand for accountability in the public sector, there is a need to begin to investigate audit pricing issues in this sector. This study makes three contributions. First, it develops and estimates, for the first time, a model of audit fee determinants for the charity sector. As in previous private sector company studies, size, organisational complexity and audit firm location are the major determinants. A positive association between audit fees and fees for non-audit services is also observed. Charity sector factors of empirical significance include the nature of the charity (i.e., grant-making or fund-raising), its area of activity and the importance of trading income. Separate models for grant-making and fund-raising charities reflect the relative complexity of the audit of fund-raising charities. Second, the lower auditor concentration in the charity sector market, compared to the private sector market, permits a more powerful test of whether large firms and/or auditor expertise are rewarded with a fee premium. In the more complex audit environment of fund-raising charities, the results show that Big Six audit firms receive higher audit fees (18.5%, on average) than non-Big Six firms. Also, non-Big Six audit firms with charity expertise are rewarded with a fee premium over other non-Big Six firms. Finally, the study demonstrates that the charity audit fee rate is significantly lower than that of private sector companies; in fact it is approximately half. A change in the reporting of charity audit fees is proposed to reflect any element of ‘charitable giving’ by the audit firm.     

Audit market structure,fees and choice in a period of structural change: Evidence from the UK – 1998–2003

This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and auditor fee levels in the UK market in the crucial period of structural change following the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) merger and encompassing Andersen’s demise (1998–2003). Given the current interest in auditor choice, analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level and by industry sector. There is evidence of significant upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 but only for smaller auditees. Audit fee income for top tier auditors (Big 5/4) did not change significantly while the number of auditees fell significantly, consistent with a move towards larger, less risky, clients. A decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the period identifies the impact of four distinct consumer-based reasons for change: leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; and (only for the audit fees measure) audit fee changes. Andersen’s demise markedly reduced the level of inequality among the top tier firms but PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’. On switching to the new auditor, former Andersen clients experienced an initial audit fee rise broadly in line with inflation, with no evidence of fee premia or discounting. They also reported significantly lower NAS fees, consistent with audit firms and auditees responding to public concerns about perceptions of auditor independence. There is no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit fee by NAS. The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing; the key concerns remain the lack of audit firm choice and issues concerning the governance and accountability of audit firms.     

Size effects and audit pricing: Evidence from Germany

Previous research into audit pricing has focused on the US and Australasian markets. This study aims to elaborate on the role played by various size effects on audit pricing using data from the German market.As previous research has shown, audit firms that provide additional non-audit services are able to charge higher fees for auditing. By contrast, our results show that only Big 4 auditors can earn an audit fee premium by providing non-audit services.Our findings also show that the Big 4 premium shown by previous German research is strongly affected by the premium for overall market leadership. Furthermore, we find that the influence of risk variables such as leverage or past losses is significant only for small auditees, while for large auditees size is the determining factor.Finally, this study proposes that using the logarithm of the number of employees is a better proxy for company size than is the more commonly used logarithm of total assets because it is more constant over time and does not bear the risk of interdependencies with other financial statement-based variables. Therefore, its further use in audit pricing research is strongly recommended.     

Is the audit services market competitive following Arthur Andersen's collapse?

This study investigates whether audit markets remain competitive in the wake of Arthur Andersen's demise and merger with Ernst & Young to create the Big Four. We conduct the study estimating audit fee models using Australian audit market data from both 2000 and 2003 to determine whether there is any evidence of cartel pricing either before, or subsequent to, the merger. In both years, we find evidence of a Big N price premium when estimating an audit fee model across all clients, and when we estimate the model separately across large and small client market segments. This evidence is consistent with product differentiation by Big N auditors and competitive markets.     

The Effect of Client Industry Agglomerations on Auditor Industry Specialization

Prior research on auditor industry specialization documents fee premiums for local audit offices that are industry specialists. This research assumes that the effects of specialization are uniform across markets. We examine industry specialization based on the economic theory of industry agglomeration (geographic areas with high industry concentration). Agglomeration economies can facilitate access to knowledge for auditors serving a specific industry in those locations. We find that industry specialists in agglomerations earn a fee premium in excess of specialists in other markets. We find that nonspecialist offices in agglomerations also earn fee premiums in that industry when compared to nonspecialists in other markets even when controlling for these groups’ absolute share of the national market. We also address whether or not this expertise can be shared among offices in an agglomeration specialist's firm. We find that audit offices that have easy connections to a within-firm office in an agglomerated market can earn a fee premium relative to more distant offices, suggesting a benefit from knowledge transfer. This fee premium accrues to offices that would not be considered a specialist using traditional market share measures in a given industry. These findings indicate that the benefit of industry specialization depends on more than local market share.     

The Market for External Audit Services in the Public Sector: An Empirical Analysis of NHS Trusts

This study investigates the market for audit services in the UK National Health Service (NHS). The market has a number of interesting features, including the presence of the Audit Commission as a regulator, appointer and provider of audit services. Following a theoretical overview of audit pricing in the NHS, evidence is provided on the behaviour of private sector auditors in an environment where audit risk characteristics differ from the private sector. The research also investigates, for the first time in the public sector, the relationship between audit fees and non–audit (consultancy) fees. Comparisons are also drawn between audit fees in the public and private sectors in an analysis of audit fees by industry. Despite some key similarities, the study shows that a number of differences exist between private and public sector audit fee models. In particular, we find no evidence of Big 6 (or mid–tier) auditor premiums, but we do find a significant negative relationship between audit and consultancy fees providing support for the 'knowledge spill–over' hypothesis. In addition, the fees charged to trusts appear significantly lower than their private sector counterparts, despite trust auditors having additional duties to perform. Possible explanations for this finding are offered in the paper.     

Competition in the Audit Market: Policy Implications

The audit market's unique combination of features—its role in capital market transparency, mandated demand, and concentrated supply—means it receives considerable attention from policy makers. We explore the effects of two market scenarios that have been the focus of policy discussions: mandatory audit firm rotation and further supply concentration due to the exit of a “Big 4” audit firm. To do so, we first estimate publicly traded firms' demand for auditing services, allowing the services provided by each of the Big 4 to be differentiated products. We then use those estimates to calculate how each scenario would affect client firms' consumer surplus. We estimate that, for U.S. publicly trade firms, mandatory audit firm rotation would induce consumer surplus losses of approximately $2.7 billion if rotation were required after 10 years and $4.7–5.0 billion if after only four years. We find similarly that exit by one of the Big 4 would reduce client firms' surplus by $1.4–1.8 billion. These estimates reflect only the value of firms' lost options to hire the exiting audit firm; they do not include likely fee increases resulting from less competition among audit firms. The latter could result in audit fee increases between $0.75–1.3 billion per year for mandatory rotation and $0.47–0.58 billion per year for the disappearance of a Big 4 audit firm. Such losses are substantial; by comparison, total audit fees for public firms were $11 billion in 2010.     

Does Auditor Industry Specialization Improve Audit Quality?

This study examines whether auditor industry specialization, measured using the auditor's within‐industry market share, improves audit quality and results in a fee premium. After matching clients of specialist and nonspecialist auditors on a number of dimensions, as well as only on industry and size, there is no evidence of differences in commonly used audit‐quality proxies between these two groups of auditors. Moreover, there is no consistent evidence of a specialist fee premium. The matched sample results are confirmed by including client fixed effects in the main models, examining a sample of clients that switched auditors, and using an alternative proxy that aims to capture the auditor's industry knowledge. The combined evidence in this study suggests that the auditor's within‐industry market share is not a reliable indicator of audit quality. Nevertheless, these findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for auditors, but that the methodology used in extant archival studies to examine this issue does not fully parse out the effects of auditor industry specialization from client characteristics.     

Workforce environment and audit fees: International evidence

Using a dataset from 30 countries over the period from 2002 to 2017, we examine the effects of auditing clients’ workforce environment on audit fees as well as the role that national labor market flexibility plays in this relationship. We find evidence that audit fees are significantly lower for firms with a good workforce environment, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as less risky; as a result, auditors expend less effort and/or charge a lower risk premium. Furthermore, we find this effect to be stronger for firms in countries with a more flexible labor market. Our mediation test results indicate that the relationship between the audit client workforce environment and audit fees is mediated by media coverage of workforce controversies. Our study contributes to the international audit fee literature by identifying employee welfare as a distinct audit pricing factor, above and beyond the effects of overall corporate social responsibility practices.     

Transaction costs and competition among audit firms in local markets

We develop a measure to capture an audit firm's competitive position in a local audit market based on the transaction costs of changing audit firms included in DeAngelo's (1981) multi-period audit pricing model. Our competition measure reflects the size difference between the largest audit firm in a market specified by client industry at the city level and the other audit firms operating in that market. We find that audit fees of a client decrease as this size difference increases. This result suggests that smaller audit firms charge lower audit fees because of their competitive disadvantage to the local largest firm.     

To switch or not to switch? The effect of audit firms’ economies of scale on audit firm switches after audit price deregulation in China

We exploit the unique setting of China’s 2014 audit price deregulation policy to examine whether audit firms use their economies of scale (EOS) to compete for clients. We find a significant increase in client firms switching from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation policy was implemented. The additional analyses show that EOS audit firms are more likely to offer audit fee discounts than non-EOS audit firms while retaining audit quality. We also find that the auditors’ EOS effect is more pronounced for highly homogeneous industries and firms paying high abnormal audit fees, firms in financial distress, and firms receiving less capital market attention than for less homogeneous industries and firms paying low abnormal audit fees, financially stable firms, and firms receiving more capital market attention. Finally, we find that the presence of state-owned enterprises and political connections both separately and jointly moderate the effect of audit firm–client realignments from a non-EOS auditor to an EOS auditor after the audit price deregulation. Overall, our study provides important insights for policymakers and regulators reviewing and developing new policies on audit services.     

City Markets as a Unit of Analysis in Audit Research and the Re-Examination of Big 6 Market Shares

Big 6 market shares based on aggregate national data have been used in prior research to infer market leadership and industry expertise, and to differentiate Big 6 accounting firms from one another. In this study it is demonstrated that further differences exist with respect to city-specific audit markets, both between firms and within the same firm across different city markets. The specific finding is that the national market leader is not the city-specific market leader the vast majority of time. Usefulness of the city-level unit of analysis is further demonstrated by re-examining the 1989 mergers creating Ernst & Young and Deloitte Touche. The primary effect of the Ernst & Young merger was to increase market shares in cities in which the pre-merger firms already had significant market shares, resulting in an increase in the number of cities in which the merged firm achieved top ranking. In contrast, the primary effect of the Deloitte Touche merger was an expansionof the number of city-level markets in which the merged firm had significant (though not leading) market shares. The findings of this study suggest that, in order to move beyond our current understanding, important audit research questions such as the reason for particular auditor–client alignments, the competitive nature of markets, audit pricing of reputations, and auditor reporting and independence issues should be investigated in city-level markets where audit contracting occurs and where Big 6 market shares (and presumably reputations) vary widely from city to city.     

中国上市公司初始审计的定价折扣考察——来自审计师变更的经验证据

初始审计的定价折扣具有重要的与审计独立性相关的公共政策含义。本文基于DeAngelo(1981)和Dye(1991)关于初始审计定价折扣的竞争性理论预期,利用2002——2004年我国审计市场的数据对初始审计的定价行为与特征进行了较为细致的实证考察。经验结果支持中国证监会关于审计费用的强制性公开披露政策,准租金和低价折扣引起的潜在的审计独立性问题会随着审计费用的公开披露而得到消除或减轻。本文还具有重要的监管含义:对审计师变更的监管应着重关注那些大型上市公司在小型会计师事务所之间进行变更的行为。     

The effect of large audit firm mergers on audit pricing in the UK

This paper examines the effects on UK audit market concentration and pricing of mergers between the large audit firms and the demise of Andersen. Based on data over the period 1985–2002, it appears that mergers contributed to a rise in concentration ratios to levels that suggest concern about the potential for monopoly pricing. The high concentration ratios have not improved the level of price competition in the UK audit market. Our pooled models suggest that concentration ratios are associated with higher audit fees. The evidence suggests that the effects of mergers between big firms on brand name fee premium and on price competition vary depending on the particular circumstances. The brand name premium is strongest for the largest quartile of companies prior to the mergers. After the Big Six mergers, the premium increases for average‐sized companies but falls for the smallest and largest companies. Following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the premium increases for below median‐sized clients but decreases for above‐median sized clients. For the Deloitte‐Andersen transaction, the premium falls for the smallest and largest companies but increases for those in the second quartile. Our results provide evidence that auditees are likely to pay higher fees if their auditor merges with a larger counterpart. We attribute merger‐related fee hikes to product differentiation, rather than anti‐competitive pricing.     

Audit Firm Ranking,Audit Quality and Audit Fees: Examining Conflicting Price Discrimination Views

In this study, we examine whether highly ranked audit firms in Iran, as determined by the Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO), earn a fee premium, firstly, by providing superior quality audit services or, secondly, due to reputation created by the ranking system implemented by the SEO. We employ price discrimination theory, and we test quality discrimination versus brand reputation explanations in the context of a unique institutional setting (where international audit firms are not allowed to operate). The data are derived from firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) for the period 2006 to 2015. Our results show that the quality of audit services (using all of our measures) provided by the highest ranked audit firms is not superior to that of the non-highest ranked firms. In addition, the audit fee models suggest that the highest ranked firms charge significantly more audit fees compared to lower ranked firms. We employ several sensitivity tests and the results do not change materially. Such findings go against the “quality-based price discrimination” view but support the reputation-based view, and make a significant contribution towards understanding the economic consequences of state-determined ranking of audit firms rather than allowing the market to determine quality differentiation.     

Market competitiveness and Big 5 pricing: Evidence from China's binary market

Big 5 auditors enjoy a worldwide audit fee premium that is believed to be attributable primarily to their reputation for providing high-quality services to clients. This study finds that the fee premium is also attributable to a lack of competition in the market. Taking advantage of the binary structure of the audit market in China, we compare the pricing practices of the Big 5 in the competitive statutory market and the less competitive supplementary market. Although the Big 5 have a reputation for high-quality audits in both markets, the degree of competition in the two markets is very different. Using audit fee data from the period 2000 to 2003, we find that the Big 5 earn a significant fee premium in the less competitive supplementary market, but not in the competitive statutory market. Although our results do not completely rule out reputation as an explanation, they are consistent with the notion that the audit fee premium that is earned by the Big 5 is more likely to be attributable to their dominant market position than to their reputation in the emerging Chinese markets, in which the usual audit-quality benefits for investors and managers are either absent or minimal.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

Seeing is believing? Executives' facial trustworthiness,auditor tenure,and audit fees

Psychology and neuroscience studies document that facial trustworthiness perceptions may affect observers' decision-making process. Our study examines whether auditors' perceptions of client executives' facial trustworthiness are associated with their audit fee decisions. We employ a machine-learning-based face-detection algorithm to measure executives' facial trustworthiness. We find that auditors charge 5.6% less audit fee to firms with trustworthy-looking CFOs than to those with untrustworthy-looking CFOs in initial audit engagements. Auditor tenure weakens the negative association between CFOs' facial trustworthiness and audit fee. Further evidence shows that CFO's facial trustworthiness is associated with neither financial reporting quality nor litigation risk.