Financial Ratio Covenants in UK Bank Loan Contracts and Accounting Policy Choice

The attitudes of lending bankers to the use of restrictive ratio covenants in loan contracts are of importance to both corporate management and accounting policy makers. Such attitudes also underly research linking costly contracting with accounting policy choices. This paper reports a survey of 33 UK lending bankers. It analyses their views on (a) the extent of ratio covenants in UK bank loan contracts and factors with which their presence is most likely to be associated; (b) costs that may be imposed on borrowers violating such covenants or expecting to do so; and (c) the ability of borrowers to avoid such costs by appropriate choice of accounting methods. Respondents indicated that ratio covenants are widely used, particularly for loans in excess of £1 million and with companies that are relatively highly geared. ‘High cost’ penalties such as loan acceleration are most likely to be adopted where no prior warning has been given of a covenant breach. Where prior warning has been given, or where a breach is due to an acquisition, waivers and contract renegotiation are more likely responses. Breaches caused by new SSAPs cause few real costs to borrowers, while just under 60% of respondents indicate they may take no action in response to a voluntary accounting method change.     

会计稳健性与银行借款契约——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

会计稳健性在银行借款契约中居于重要地位。借款人采用高水平的稳健性可以帮助银行降低风险,相应地,银行会提供一定的优惠作为回报。使用手工收集的2000-2007年中国A股上市公司的单笔银行贷款为研究数据,我们对上述问题进行了实证检验。结果发现,企业的会计稳健性越强,企业获得的每笔贷款金额越大,贷款期限越长,贷款的利率越低。另外,我们发现在法制环境越好,优惠政策越多,政府干预越少的地区,上述关系更为显著。     

Financial Covenants in Australian Bank-Loan Contracts: Incidence, Measurement Rules and Monitoring

This paper reports the results of an interview survey of 48 Australian bank lending officers on the use of financial covenants in bank-loan contracts. A wide variety of financial covenants appear to be used. As expected, the accounting measurement rules were generally conservative in nature but they appeared to be less restrictive in other areas. The results were compared with similar studies of Australian public-debt contracts and US and UK bank-loan contracts and considerable cross-market diversity was noted. Evidence on the frequency and method of monitoring these covenants is also documented.     

International Variation in Accounting Measurement Rules and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

We theorize that accounting systems affect analysts' forecast accuracy through changes in earnings variability. We argue that the matching and historical cost principles reduce earnings variability, and hence, reduce analysts' earnings forecast errors. We also argue that restricting the choice of accounting methods can result in larger forecast errors. We argue that more informative disclosure environments should reduce forecast errors. We test whether variation in these factors across countries explain variation in analysts' earnings forecast bias and accuracy. Our results indicate that these characteristics of financial accounting systems are complements, and that they affect financial analysts' earnings forecast errors.     

略论国际借款合同的准据法

正确确定合同准据法是有效解决国际贷款合同法律冲突的关键，准据法的确定一般应遵循当事人意思自治原则和有管辖权的法院确认原则，就国际融资实践而言，国际借款合同的准据法的适应范围是很广的，但在涉及当事人身份能力，合同形式以及有关诉讼程序等问题上却不适用合同准据法，而受其他有效法律的调整。     

Bank Competition and Loan Quality

We analyze the impact of bank competition on the equilibrium quality of loans in a formal model where banks do not observe the type of loan applicants, i.e. face an adverse selection problem, nor borrowers’ effort, i.e. also face a moral hazard problem. The main finding is that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and the average quality of loans. Policy implications are derived from this result and from an extension to the basic model where banks may sequentially acquire information about potential borrowers.     

The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts

This paper studies the effects of banking mergers on individual business borrowers. Using information on individual loan contracts between banks and companies, I analyze the effect of banking consolidation on banks' credit policies. I find that in-market mergers benefit borrowers if these mergers involve the acquisition of banks with small market shares. Interest rates charged by the consolidated banks decrease, but as the local market share of the acquired bank increases, the efficiency effect is offset by market power. Mergers have different distributional effects across borrowers. When banks become larger, they reduce the supply of loans to small borrowers.     

委托贷款违约风险传染与企业银行借款

违约是信用风险传染的一种表现形式,现有研究忽视了委托贷款的违约风险。本文利用上市公司委托贷款数据研究发现,委托贷款借入方违约导致贷出方银行借款可得性下降。当贷出方两权分离程度和融资约束较高时,其抵御风险能力较弱,更容易受到风险传染;货币政策从紧时期以及经济政策不确定性较高时期,风险传染更容易发生。进一步研究发现,借入方违约通过提高贷出方的经营风险,降低了贷出方银行借款可得性。本文为企业间风险传染提供了实证证据,对于企业委托贷款决策、银行授信决策和监管部门防控金融创新工具的风险具有一定的启示作用。     

Loan Market Competition and Bank Risk-Taking

Recent literature (Boyd and De Nicoló, J Finance 60:1329–1343, 2005) has argued that competition in the loan market lowers bank risk by reducing the risk-taking incentives of borrowers. Using a model where competition arises from falling switching costs for entrepreneurs, we show that the impact of loan market competition on banks is reversed if banks can adjust their loan portfolios. The reason is that when borrowers become safer, banks want to offset the effect on their balance sheet and switch to higher-risk lending. They even overcompensate the effect of safer borrowers because loan market competition erodes their franchise values and thus increases their risk-taking incentives.     

借用他人名义签订借款合同的后果——一起借款合同纠纷及其启示

基本案情2003年6月9日,被告李强借用王权之名与原告中国农业银行A县支行订立《个人生产经营借款合同》,约定被告向原告借款40万元。还款期限为2004年6月3日,借款年利率为6.9%。被告李强以其所有挂靠于某市融通运输有限公司的卧铺客车(价值68万元)作为该笔借款的抵押物。融通运输有限公司与原告双方于2003年6月3日在《动产抵押清单》上盖章,并约     

Enforceable Accounting Rules and Income Measurement by Early 20th Century Railroads

We investigate the extent to which income measurement by major early 20th‐century U.S. railroads shows evidence of lower income smoothness and increased conservatism following new fixed asset accounting rules issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1907 and 1908 and concurrent rate regulation regime shifts. Accounting rules promulgated by the ICC after the Hepburn Act of 1906 are the first accounting rules in U.S. history in which regulators could enforce such rules under federal law to increase compliance. Our samplewide results are more consistent with increased conservatism than with income smoothing. Additional tests indicate these effects are more pronounced for firms subject to more intense rate regulation by the ICC, which suggests that the tie‐in between accounting regulation and product/service market regulation influences how managers respond to new accounting rules.     

公司治理与银行借款融资

本文以中国深沪两市A股上市公司为样本,检验了公司治理在银行信贷决策中的作用。通过检验公司治理水平对企业银行借款融资能力和融资成本的影响,我们发现,企业银行借款融资能力方面,无论长期借款还是短期借款,公司治理因素对企业银行借款融资能力均没有影响,银行更看重企业的经营状况。企业银行借款融资成本方面,我们发现公司治理机制中只有监事会特征和股权集中度对企业银行借款融资成本有显著影响。具体地,监事会规模越大,融资成本越低;股权集中度越高,融资成本越高。本文结果说明公司治理因素在我国银行放贷决策中的作用有限。