Company takeovers and the auditor choice decision

There is a growing literature on how companies select their auditors. This literature emphasizes both theoretical development and empirical testing. Anderson, Stokes, and Zimmer (1993) recently identified corporate takeovers as events that generate auditor selection decisions; the acquiring company (the acquirer) has to choose whether to retain the new subsidiary’s (the acquiree) incumbent auditor or switch to its own auditor. To date, this is the only reported study that examines auditor changes following corporate acquisitions. Anderson et al. (1993) speculated that if the business activities of the acquirer and the acquiree are different, then the acquiree’s incumbent auditor is more likely to be retained. They used takeover type (horizontal, vertical, conglomerate) as a proxy for differences in activities. Their empirical results, however, were contrary to these expectations.The purpose of this paper is to test the robustness of Anderson et al.’s findings in a different national setting (Britain instead of Australia). Further, it modifies Anderson et al.’s test procedures by introducing new variables that are also hypothesized to affect auditor choice in acquired companies. The results show that proxies for differences in activities between acquirers and acquirees, namely takeover type and industry, are associated with the retention of the acquiree’s incumbent auditor. The takeover type finding therefore differs from the findings of Anderson et al. (1993).Other factors associated with the decision to retain auditors include audit opinions, contested takeover bids, changes in top management, restructuring and integration of businesses, and relative audit fees. Some of these factors have also been identified in other, non-takeover contexts. Finally, audit switches to Big Eight firms are found to be more likely than switches away from the Big Eight.     

An investigation of recent changes in going concern reporting decisions among Big N and non-Big N auditors

Corporate accounting failures and regulatory proceedings that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 increased the scrutiny of auditors. We investigate whether these events resulted in a change in auditor behavior with respect to going concern reporting. Generally speaking, we find that non-Big N auditors became more conservative while Big N auditors became more accurate. Specifically, non-Big N auditors issued more going concern opinions to both failing and non-failing clients post-2001, reducing their Type II misclassifications at the expense of increased Type I misclassifications. However, Big N auditors decreased their Type I misclassifications with no corresponding increase in Type II misclassifications. Thus, our findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny resulted in performance improvements in the area of going concern reporting primarily for larger auditors. For smaller auditors, improved going concern accuracy for subsequently bankrupt clients came at the cost of more going concern opinions being issued to subsequently non-failing clients.     

Audit Reporting of Big 4 Versus Non-Big 4 Auditors: The Case of Ex-Andersen Clients

This paper examines audit reporting of Big 4 auditors versus non-Big 4 auditors for ex-Andersen clients and other clients. It suggests that ex-Andersen clients are more risky than other clients and are able to exert more influence than other clients on non-Big 4 auditors because they are larger in size than other non-Big 4 auditees. In addition, Big 4 auditors are more risk-averse and able to withstand clients' pressure than non-Big 4 auditors. The results show that Big 4 auditors are more likely than non-Big 4 auditors to issue going-concern opinions to ex-Andersen clients or restrict the level of discretionary accruals of those clients compared with other clients. Further, ex-Andersen clients of Big 4 auditors would have had a lower likelihood of receiving going-concern opinions or higher levels of discretionary accruals had reporting practices for other clients been applied. Ex-Andersen clients of non-Big 4 auditors would have had a higher likelihood of going-concern opinions or lower levels of discretionary accruals. Hence, the suggestion to reduce the Big 4 concentration in the audit market by allowing non-Big 4 firms a larger market share should be viewed prudently. Overall, these results are consistent with the suggestion that litigation risk and client pressure are important factors in audit reporting.     

The Effect of Litigation Risk Increase on Big N Auditor Exits and Audit Quality in the Korean Savings Banking Industry

This study investigates whether an increase in litigation risk results in Big N auditors leaving the industry and examines the impact of this increase on audit quality. Using a sample of Korean savings banks from 2009 to 2015, the study finds that the proportion of Big N auditors sharply decreases after a savings bank crisis, suggesting that Big N auditors are likely to reject riskier clients, while audit quality is unchanged. The results provide new evidence that an increase in litigation risk does not necessarily increase audit quality. The findings have academic and practical implications, as they suggest that policies for improving audit quality should consider auditors’ strategies in response to litigation risk.     

Independent and joint effects of audit partner tenure and non-audit fees on audit quality

We examine the individual and joint effects of auditors’ non-audit services (NAS)/abnormal NAS fees and length of audit partner tenure on audit quality. Our results raise questions about the ‘one size fits all’ approach imposed by the current audit partner rotation requirement in Australia as a result of (1) a learning differentiation that we observe between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors and (2) higher discretionary accruals associated with non-Big 4 auditors. We find abnormal NAS fees to have a positive association with both absolute and positive (income-increasing) values of discretionary accruals for firms with short audit partner tenure. NAS/abnormal NAS fees are also negatively associated with the issuance of going concern opinions to financially distressed firms when partner tenure is short. In terms of policy implications, regulators are able to gauge the efficacy of the CLERP 9 reforms which currently impose a five year mandatory audit partner rotation requirement.     

Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

Auditor changes following big eight mergers with non-big eight audit firms

This paper examines the reaction of clients of “non-Big Eight” audit firms to mergers of their auditors with “Big Eight” firms. We postulate that a non-Big Eight audit firm's clients will retain a Big Eight acquirer following a merger if they benefit from the Big Eight firm's specialized services and/or reputation. Clients that do not have these economic incentives to retain the Big Eight firm are more likely to change to another non-Big Eight audit firm following the merger. Empirical tests of the characteristics of clients that remain with a Big Eight acquirer or change to another smaller auditor following an audit merger generally support our hypotheses.     

Does audit quality matter more for firms with high investment opportunities?

This paper examines the association of firms with high investment opportunities with high quality audits (proxied by Big 5 auditors) and whether that association results in a lower likelihood of earnings management. Firms with high investment opportunities may demand high quality audits for curbing earnings management. This is because they have more flexibility in the provision of discretionary accruals that arises from the attendant operating uncertainty which creates particular monitoring problems. Big 5 auditors will provide high quality audits that will constrain earnings management for firms with high investment opportunities because the risk of losing (and hence the likelihood of maintaining) auditor independence is higher. Results show the following. First, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to hire Big 5 auditors than firms with low investment opportunities. Second, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to have more discretionary accruals but this relationship is weaker when they have Big 5 auditors. These results are robust to various sensitivity tests.     

Do External Auditors Perform a Corporate Governance Role in Emerging Markets? Evidence from East Asia

In emerging markets, the agency conflicts between controlling owners and the minority shareholders are difficult to mitigate through conventional corporate control mechanisms such as boards of directors and takeovers. We examine whether external independent auditors are employed as monitors or as bonding mechanisms, or both, to alleviate the agency problems. Using a broad sample from eight East Asian economies, we document that firms with agency problems embedded in the ownership structures are more likely to employ Big 5 auditors. This relation is evident among firms that raise equity capital frequently. Consistently, firms hiring Big 5 auditors receive smaller share price discounts associated with the agency conflicts. Also, we find that Big 5 auditors take into consideration their clients' agency problems when making audit fee and audit report decisions. Taken together, these results suggest that Big 5 auditors do have a corporate governance role in emerging markets.     

Audit fee determinants and auditor premiums: evidence from the micro-firm sub-market

Despite the growing literature on the market for audit services, to date no study has examined the determinants of audit fees for the smallest auditees in the market. This study therefore provides some new theory and evidence on the determinants of the audit fees of micro-firms operating in the UK manufacturing sector. A key finding of the study is that in the highly competitive market under consideration, independent small auditees willingly paid a premium to be audited by a mid-tier or a (then) Big Six auditor, with the latter commanding the higher premium. It is concluded that these findings are consistent with Big Six (and, to a lesser extent, mid-tier) auditors commanding a brand premium stemming from the (perceived) higher quality audit conducted by large auditors, for which small firms are willing to pay a premium in order to benefit from associated ‘reputational’ and ‘signalling’ effects. The common finding that the explanatory power of audit fee models declines as a function of firm size is also examined. The empirical analysis confirms this effect, but evidence is offered that, rather than resulting from model misspecification, it is likely that audit prices of the smallest auditees are relatively insensitive to variations in corporate size, which may result from lower incremental economies of scale and minimum pricing.     

The value of Big 4 audits in Australia

Research suggests that equity markets value Big N audits over non‐Big N audits. Explanations include the information quality hypothesis, whereby Big N auditors increase information quality, and the insurance hypothesis, whereby investors value the deeper pockets of Big N auditors. Using client firms’ex ante cost of capital as the dependent variable, we investigate whether capital market participants differentially value Big 4 versus non‐Big 4 audits in Australia and whether the value of Big 4 audits in Australia changed as a result of the audit failures of 2001–2002. We find that Big 4 audits reduce the ex ante cost of equity capital until 2001, but not after 2001. We cannot dismiss the insurance hypothesis for the persistence of the loss beyond 2003 because of the establishment of liability caps, but the demise of the Big 4 audit value for 2001–2003 is consistent with the information quality hypothesis and does not support the insurance hypothesis.     

审计意见中的信息指标权效重构

代理人通过操纵信息来实现机会主义的行为已受到持久关注,本研究则考察在审计意见出具的过程中,审计双方不改变信息,但加重对自身更有利的指标的影响力的行为。以中国上市公司为样本的检验结果表明,会计业绩和市场回报都对审计意见具有解释力,当市场回报在同行业内相对于会计业绩的排序位置越差,其对审计意见的影响力也越大,同时,并没有证据表明,客户加强了表现较好的业绩指标的影响力。结果表明,表现较差的指标对审计意见的影响力得到增强,这可能源于审计方对执业风险的重视。进一步的测试表明,重构的效果随着公司业务复杂度的提升而下降,说明复杂的经营环境削弱了审计方的重构能力。综合结论为审计方的权效重构行为提供了经验证据。     

Do supply shocks in the audit partner labor market affect auditor choice? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

We examine whether supply shocks in the audit partner labor market induce clients to switch audit partners. We argue that audit partners in their early careers (i.e., junior partners) charge low audit fees to attract clients, which induces client firms to switch from senior partners to junior partners when there are more junior partners available. Utilizing the Big4 localization policy, we find that Big4 clients are more likely to replace senior auditors with junior auditors to cut costs after the policy. Furthermore, the results are mainly driven by clients who are charged high fees. Our empirical evidence enriches the understanding of auditor choice determinants and informs the ongoing debates surrounding new regulations for Big4 firms in China.     

International evidence on economic policy uncertainty and asymmetric adjustment of audit pricing: Big 4 versus non‐big 4 auditors

By investigating the association between economic policy uncertainty and audit fees using data from eight countries, this study examines whether and how Big 4 auditors reinforce their advantages over non‐Big 4 auditors through audit pricing. We find that both Big 4 and non‐Big 4 auditors reduce their audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases. However, while non‐Big 4 auditors adjust audit pricing asymmetrically as economic policy uncertainty changes, i.e., the magnitude of decline in audit fees when economic policy uncertainty increases exceeds the magnitude of rise when economic policy uncertainty decreases, Big 4 auditors regulate their audit pricing in a symmetric manner. Further analyses reveal that: (1) the asymmetric pricing of non‐Big 4 auditors mainly exists in countries where Big 4 auditors have dominant market share, (2) Big 4 auditors provide higher‐quality audits when economic policy uncertainty increases and (3) many firms in better financial condition turn to Big 4 auditors during uncertain years. Our findings suggest that the symmetric audit pricing helps Big 4 auditors maintain a favorable position in the audit market.     

The impact of audit firms’ characteristics on audit fees following information security breaches

Given the importance of auditors’ assessing business risks and evaluating internal controls, we investigate whether an audit firm’s industry expertise, tenure, and size can help its auditors better understand external and internal threats faced by the client with less effort. Using reported information security breach incidents from 2004 to 2013, we find that, consistent with prior studies, audit fees are higher after the occurrence of an information security breach. However, such an association is negatively moderated when the audit firm has industry-specific expertise, longer experience with the client, and is one of the Big 4 firms. Our results suggest that because of their better knowledge about a specific industry, increased familiarity with the client’s operations, and more resources to understand a client’s vulnerabilities and/or information security policies and procedures, these auditors are more capable of assessing the potentially changing information security risks implied by the occurrence of information security breach incidents. Our results are robust to a variety of sensitivity checks.     

Do goodwill impairments affect audit opinions? Evidence from China

There has been a steady growth of goodwill impairments in the Chinese stock market since the adoption of the impairment approach in accounting. The influence of goodwill impairments on a firm’s financial position and profitability give reason to doubt its current and future performance. We examine whether auditors, as a crucial external monitor, identify the information risks of goodwill impairments and express their concerns about financial reporting quality in their audit opinions. Using a sample of firms listed on China’s A-share market from 2007 to 2017, we test the association between goodwill impairments and the type of audit opinion received in the same financial period. Our findings are as follows. First, the probability of receiving a modified opinion increases with the amount of goodwill impairments. Second, the positive association between goodwill impairments and modified audit opinions is driven primarily by earnings management risks. Third, this positive association is more salient when auditors are industry experts and there is no auditor–client mismatch. Fourth, auditors are more sensitive to the amount of goodwill impairments than to their mere existence. Overall, we document that auditors perceive goodwill impairments as a signal of information risks and communicate their concerns to investors to avoid litigation.     

The Removal of a Specialist Oversight Body for Local Public Audit: Insights from the Health Service in England

The abolition of the Audit Commission in England and Wales removes the ‘protector of the public purse’. The oversight body and its audit practice are largely replaced by the private sector regime and audit firms. We analyse the audit market for health service foundation trusts, an area of local public audit that operates without oversight from the Commission. We find evidence of premiums paid to some Big4 firms and that the presence of specialist public service auditors results in fee discounts. The firms limit their liability and assurance of audit quality is reduced under new audit regimes and governance structures.     

Client importance and audit partner independence

We use data from Taiwan where audit partners are required to sign audit reports to examine whether audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients. Uniquely, we include both listed and unlisted clients in audit partners’ client portfolios and separately study these clients for Big N and non-Big N auditors. We employ multiple proxies for auditor independence, including various abnormal accruals measures, the propensity of audit partners to issue modified audit opinions, and the probability that clients meet or just beat earnings targets. We fail to find evidence that Big N audit partners compromise their independence for economically important clients; however, we find such evidence for non-Big N auditors. Our results are robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. While our inferences are limited to the Taiwanese capital market, our study may be of interest to market participants and regulators in other well developed capital markets.     

New development: Breaking out or hanging on? Internal audit in government

Public audit is in transition. On the one hand, professional organizations claim it is time ‘to break out’ and develop new roles for auditors that ‘add more value’. On the other hand, critics are concerned about public sector accountability deficits necessitating more control and urging auditors to hold on to their traditional role. This article discusses tensions and relevance between these positions and their implications for auditing in government. The article will help policy-makers in their strategic decision-making on the role and focus of internal audit in government.