Does financial reporting above or below operating income matter to firms and investors? The case of investment income in China

We explore a unique regulatory change in China in 2007 that moves investment income in an income statement from below the line of operating income to above the line. We find that, post-regulatory change, firms report high investment income when core earnings (operating income excluding investment income) are low and vice versa. Investment income and core earnings exhibit a significantly negative correlation every year post regulation, in contrast to a significantly positive correlation beforehand. We also find that investors do not fully see through the change. Before the regulation, both core earnings and investment income are positively correlated with contemporaneous stock returns and uncorrelated with future stock returns, suggesting appropriate pricing of the information. However, afterward, the results on core earnings are similar to those in the pre-regulation period, but investment income is negatively correlated with future stock returns, implying that the stock market overreacts to the information in investment income in the contemporaneous year.     

The effect of banks’ financial reporting on syndicated-loan structures

We explore how an accounting measure of information asymmetry between lead and participating lenders influences syndication structures by examining whether lead lenders’ commercial and industrial (C&I) loan-loss provision validity affects the fraction of loans they retain. We first conduct multiple tests showing that C&I provision validity reflects banks’ underlying screening and monitoring effectiveness. We then find lead lenders’ loan share decreases with C&I provision validity, but not with non-C&I provision validity. Consistent with an information effect, we further find this association is attenuated by (i) alternative information sources about the borrowers and (ii) previous lead/participant relationships and participant/borrower relationships.     

Do management reports on internal control over financial reporting improve financial reporting?

Sections 404a and 404b of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act require management and external auditors, respectively, to report on the adequacy of a company’s internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). Larger public firms were first required to file a management report and have an external audit of ICFR in 2004. Smaller public firms were first required to file a management report on ICFR in 2007 but are exempt from the attestation requirement. We investigate the distinct effect of management reports on financial reporting quality. We find that management reports on ICFR improve reporting quality and demonstrate that there are financial reporting benefits from the management report requirement on its own without attestation.     

The cost of firms’ debt financing and the global financial crisis

We provide an assessment of the determinants of the risk premium paid by non-financial corporations on long-term bonds. By looking at 5500 issues over the period 2005–2012, we find that in recent years the sovereign debt market turbulence has been a major driver of corporate risk. Compared with the three-year period 2005–2007 before the global financial crisis, in the years 2010–2012 Italian, Spanish and Portuguese firms paid on average between 70 and 120 basis points of additional premium due to the negative spillovers from the sovereign debt crisis, while German firms received a discount of 40 basis points.     

Auditor–client management relationships and roles in negotiating financial reporting

We carry out an interview based field study of chief financial officer (CFO)–audit partner dyads to examine the assumption that the roles played by each side and the nature of the relationships are similar across negotiations. These dyads freely discussed with us their relationship, a specific issue negotiated and it’s resolution process. Employing the lens of social positioning negotiation research, we find these negotiations are ‘fluid’, with continual redefinition not only of the substantive issues under negotiation, but also of the negotiation roles and relationships (i.e. ‘shadow’ negotiations). The CFO’s actions and expectations in these ‘shadow’ negotiations appear to define the auditor’s role and the relationship’s parameters, but both can evolve over time. The audit partners express a desire to be in the “ideal” relationship where they assume the role of the ‘expert advisor’ (as opposed to a ‘police officer’) but they seemingly have no explicit strategy to move the relationship toward a ‘proactive’ (rather than ‘reactive’) state. Furthermore, the audit partner is always the ‘relationship manager’ whose job it is to see that client management remains “happy”. These roles and relationships negotiated in the ‘shadows’ also affect how the negotiation process unfolds, including the set of alternative accounting treatments considered during negotiations. Finally, audit firms appear to manage the assignment of partners to engagements based on CFO preferences and remove those partners who are in “poor” relationships, irrespective of why the relationship is considered by the CFO to be “poor”. Implications for the broader research program on auditor–client management negotiations are discussed.     

Do differences in financial reporting attributes impair the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy?

This study explores the effect of cross-sectional and time-series differences in financial reporting attributes on the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy. We identify proxies for discretion over financial reporting, the importance of intangible assets, the comprehensiveness of the accounting model and recognition of losses. Each of our proxies for financial reporting attributes is associated with financial ratios that are less informative in predicting bankruptcy. Furthermore, our time-series tests reveal a decline in the predictive ability of financial ratios for bankruptcy and document that this decline is associated with our measures of financial reporting attributes.     

Do conventional financial disclosures matter in alternative financing? Evidence from equity crowdfunding

As a novel form of external financing, equity crowdfunding enables small and early stage firms to raise capital from the public through an online platform. There has been criticism of the benefits and costs of mandating financial statements to promote this alternative form of financing. Using a setting where disclosure of financial statements is optional, this study provides evidence that financial statements influence investors’ decisions and facilitate borderless capital formation. The provision of financial statements appears to enhance how investors view other aspects of disclosure, suggesting a positive reporting externality. These market-wide benefits provide important insights on the role of financial disclosures for market participants, policymakers, and academics.     

Threat of entry and the use of discretion in banks’ financial reporting

This paper studies managers’ use of accounting discretion to deter entry. Using state-level changes in branching regulation under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, I find geographically-constrained community banks increased their loan loss provisions to appear less profitable when faced with the threat of entry by competitors. Additional tests rule out alternative explanations that firm economics or regulators drove the increase. I complement my analyses with survey-based evidence. Findings from the survey confirm that banks prefer to locate in markets where incumbents have high profitability and low credit losses, and that banks use competitors’ financial statements to analyze competition.     

Management’s personal ideology and financial reporting quality

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We investigate the relation between managers’ personal ideologies and financial reporting quality. We use Federal Elections Commission data to...     

Managerial labor mobility and banks’ financial reporting quality

This paper explores the relationship between managers’ labor mobility and the financial reporting quality of banks. Using the state-level adoption of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (IDD) as an exogenous shock discouraging labor mobility, we show that adoption of the IDD is associated with a decline in financial reporting quality, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions. The effect is larger for banks with managers who have limited outside job opportunities and smaller for banks with tight regulatory oversight. Our results support the view from the career concern hypothesis that bank managers facing restrictions on mobility have greater incentives to engage in discretionary accounting.     

Audit committees’ social capital and financial reporting quality

We draw on social capital theory to examine the relationship between audit committee (AC) members’ social capital and financial reporting quality. Using US data for the period 2001–2010, our results suggest that non-AC directors’ social capital does not appear to be relevant to financial reporting quality. As far as AC members are concerned, our findings show a negative relationship between their social capital and financial reporting quality, suggesting a ‘dark side’ to social capital. Specifically, we find that sitting in multiple ACs (centrality) has a negative impact on reporting quality only for those AC members designated as financial experts. When other proxies for social capital are considered (connectedness, brokerage position and strong ties), our results show that the quality of financial reporting significantly decreases with the social capital of non-financial experts sitting in the AC. We contribute to prior research by: (i) relying on social capital theory, which is widely neglected in accounting research, (ii) using multiple metrics to capture the complex dimensions of social capital, and (iii) discriminating between the effects of financial and non-financial experts’ social capital on reporting quality. Our results suggest policy-makers might wish to limit financial experts’ multiple directorships as well as assess the actual contribution of non-financial experts to AC effectiveness.     

Does financial reporting misconduct pay off even when discovered?

Review of Accounting Studies - Experts and popular belief contend that it pays to engage in financial misconduct. We hand-collect data on three subsamples of severe misconduct cases, between 2003...     

What explains the value premium? The case of adjustment costs,operating leverage and financial leverage

This paper empirically examines and compares the different theoretical predictions on how adjustment costs, operating and financial leverage influence the value premium. Consistent with Ozdagli (2012), financial leverage plays a dominant role, supported by adjustment costs (which represent the degree of investment irreversibility). Specifically, the observed value premium is driven by the financial leverage differences between value and growth firms, partially neutralized by investment irreversibility. The relation between the value premium and investment irreversibility is contrary to the intuition in Zhang (2005) and Cooper (2006). Operating leverage does not significantly influence the value premium.     

Has Australian financial reporting become more conservative over time?

This study examines whether Australian financial reporting became more conservative over the period of 1993–2009. Unlike the United States and European evidence in Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Grambovas et al. (2006) , the Australian evidence is not consistent with the notion that conservatism has increased over time. The degree of conservatism fluctuates without any obvious trend over the 17‐year period, especially for the constant sample of firms appearing throughout the period. We also examine the impact of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption on accounting conservatism in Australia. Our evidence suggests the adoption of IFRS has led to a decrease in conditional conservatism (i.e. asymmetric timeliness).     

Ordering collective performance manipulation practices: How do leaders manipulate financial reporting figures in conglomerates?

This article explores some of the resources, tactics and skills used by managers involved in the manipulation of performance reporting by looking at management accounting practices in a conglomerate. Prior research on reporting manipulation in large corporations has focused on why executives manipulate figures. The present paper documents how BU leaders compensate for the uncertainties impacting the performance of their activities. Empirical evidence comes from a field study of a diversified French conglomerate. Performance reporting practices within and between a parent company and two subsidiaries are analyzed. The article shows that the conglomerate constitutes a strategic action field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011) where skillful group leaders use the resources granted by their power position to frame other actors’ interests and identities to initiate stable cooperation around manipulation practices. This study clarifies the collective and collaborative dimensions of practices granting greater control over reporting figures.     

Financial reporting language in financial statements: Does pessimism restrict the potential for managerial opportunism?

This study shows that the proportion of total pessimistic language is higher for companies with lower earnings manipulation and higher leverage. In contrast, high growth companies display less pessimism. Companies with higher levels of pessimism tend to display higher conservatism even if they experience bad news or low cash flows. Companies that use pessimistic language tend to display stronger corporate governance. The use of pessimistic language is positively associated with forecast accuracy and analyst coverage. Annual reports tend to be more pessimistic in order to guide analysts downward and reach target earnings. Companies that meet or just beat analysts' forecasts tend to use less pessimistic language. On the other hand, they are likely to use pessimistic language in order to reduce the magnitude of a negative market reaction to underperformance. This study also shows that the change of the reporting tone to pessimistic as well as the use of unexpected pessimistic language reduces the cost of equity.