Audit market structure,fees and choice in a period of structural change: Evidence from the UK – 1998–2003

This paper presents evidence on audit market concentration and auditor fee levels in the UK market in the crucial period of structural change following the PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) merger and encompassing Andersen’s demise (1998–2003). Given the current interest in auditor choice, analysis is also undertaken at the individual audit firm level and by industry sector. There is evidence of significant upward pressure on audit fees since 2001 but only for smaller auditees. Audit fee income for top tier auditors (Big 5/4) did not change significantly while the number of auditees fell significantly, consistent with a move towards larger, less risky, clients. A decomposition analysis of the aggregate Big 5/4 concentration ratio changes over the period identifies the impact of four distinct consumer-based reasons for change: leavers; net joiners; non-par auditor switches; and (only for the audit fees measure) audit fee changes. Andersen’s demise markedly reduced the level of inequality among the top tier firms but PwC retained its position as a ‘dominant firm’. On switching to the new auditor, former Andersen clients experienced an initial audit fee rise broadly in line with inflation, with no evidence of fee premia or discounting. They also reported significantly lower NAS fees, consistent with audit firms and auditees responding to public concerns about perceptions of auditor independence. There is no general evidence of knowledge spillover effects or cross-subsidisation of the audit fee by NAS. The combined findings provide no evidence to indicate that recent structural changes have resulted in anticompetitive pricing; the key concerns remain the lack of audit firm choice and issues concerning the governance and accountability of audit firms.     

Auditor mergers,audit quality and audit fees: Evidence from the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger in the UK

Focusing on the merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand in 1998, we document increased audit quality (measured by earnings quality of the clients) for the merged firm and other big-X auditors (The big-X auditors are Ernst & Young, Deloitte, KPMG and Arthur Anderson.) during the post-merger period because: (1) controlling for economic conditions, clients of big-X auditors have lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals and (2) the value relevance of earnings has significantly increased. Furthermore, we find evidence that in the post-merger period, there is a significant increase in audit fees for PricewaterhouseCoopers and other big-X client firms, which suggests that the effect of collectively enhanced market power of big-X auditors (which tends to increase audit fees) dominates the effect of cost savings from the merger (which tends to lower audit fees). The results have implications for regulators and policy makers.     

The effect of large audit firm mergers on audit pricing in the UK

This paper examines the effects on UK audit market concentration and pricing of mergers between the large audit firms and the demise of Andersen. Based on data over the period 1985–2002, it appears that mergers contributed to a rise in concentration ratios to levels that suggest concern about the potential for monopoly pricing. The high concentration ratios have not improved the level of price competition in the UK audit market. Our pooled models suggest that concentration ratios are associated with higher audit fees. The evidence suggests that the effects of mergers between big firms on brand name fee premium and on price competition vary depending on the particular circumstances. The brand name premium is strongest for the largest quartile of companies prior to the mergers. After the Big Six mergers, the premium increases for average‐sized companies but falls for the smallest and largest companies. Following the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger, the premium increases for below median‐sized clients but decreases for above‐median sized clients. For the Deloitte‐Andersen transaction, the premium falls for the smallest and largest companies but increases for those in the second quartile. Our results provide evidence that auditees are likely to pay higher fees if their auditor merges with a larger counterpart. We attribute merger‐related fee hikes to product differentiation, rather than anti‐competitive pricing.     

The effect of the PricewaterhouseCoopers merger on auditor concentration in Australia: A note

Concerns have been raised about the impact of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) merger on the structure of and competition in the audit and assurance services market in Australia. The market share of publicly listed companies for audit firms for each industry category pre– and post–merger is examined in this paper to ascertain levels of auditor concentration. Using the approach outlined by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission a decrease in the level of competition is identified. However, when using another generally accepted concentration measure, the Herfindahl Index, the merger is found to not necessarily decrease competition. In fact, for a number of industry sectors a more equitable spread of clients between the main audit firms was achieved.     

Audit Firm Tenure,Non‐Audit Services,and Internal Assessments of Audit Quality

We use data from internal assessments of audit quality in a Big 4 firm to investigate the impact of audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided non‐audit services (NAS) on audit quality. We find that first‐year audits receive lower assessments of audit quality and that quality improves shortly thereafter and then declines as tenure becomes very long. Partitioning our sample between SEC registrants and private clients, we find that the decline in audit quality in the long tenure range is attributable to audits of private clients. For audits of SEC registrants, the probability of a high quality audit reaches its maximum with very long tenure. We also find that audit fees are discounted for first‐year audits but auditor effort is higher than in subsequent years. We find no association, on average, between total NAS fees and audit quality in the full sample but observe that total NAS fees are positively associated with quality for SEC registrants and negatively associated with quality for privately held clients. Our findings are important for regulatory policies related to audit firm tenure and auditor‐provided NAS.     

Audit fees around dismissals and resignations: Additional evidence

This paper offers new findings about how audit fees vary around auditor dismissals and resignations. For dismissals, we find evidence of lower than normal fees before and after an auditor change, consistent with the view that both incumbent and successor auditors adjust fees downward to retain the client. Our evidence also shows that incumbent and successor auditors charge unusually high fees before and after a resignation. We interpret the higher than normal incumbent fees as an indication that resignation companies reflect unusual levels of audit effort or risk, which the incumbent auditor captures as additional fees. Eventually, however, the additional fees are insufficient, inducing the incumbent to resign. A fee premium by the successor auditor after resignation also supports this view.     

Non‐audit Services and Auditor Independence Depending on Client Performance

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on auditor independence in Korea is based on audit client performance. Further, we suggest that an audit client with low performance has an incentive to purchase non‐audit services (NAS) from an incumbent auditor to facilitate earnings management and steer accounting practices in a preferred direction. We find evidence that as non‐audit fees in Korea increase, auditor independence is reduced only for low‐performing audit clients. Thus, unconditional prohibition of NAS seems unnecessary. Regulators and policymakers should examine the motivation for purchasing NAS, particularly among audit clients with poor performance.     

审计师收取客户债务风险溢价了吗?

已有研究发现,公司债务风险越高,审计师收取的审计费用越高;然而,审计费用提高的原因可能是审计投入的增加,也可能是审计师收取客户公司的债务风险溢价。由于缺少审计投入的数据,已有研究无法回答审计师是否收取客户公司债务风险溢价的问题。本文以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,运用我国独到的审计工时数据,就此展开相关问题研究。研究发现,在控制了审计投入之后,客户债务风险与审计费用显著正相关,表明审计师收取了客户公司的债务风险溢价。进一步研究表明,审计师对财务状况较差和治理较差的公司以及非国有企业收取更高的债务风险溢价,规模较小的会计师事务所收取的债务风险溢价高于规模较大的会计师事务所。     

Note on Self‐Selection of Auditors in the Municipal Sector*

The objective of this article is to revisit the literature on Big‐N audit fee premiums in the municipal setting using a methodology that controls for self‐selection bias. Because auditor choices can be predicted based on certain client characteristics, using standard one‐stage ordinary least squares regressions to draw inferences about the presence or absence of such a premium in the extant public‐sector audit fee studies may not be appropriate. Results indicate that, after controlling for a self‐selection bias, Big‐6 (non‐Big‐6) municipal clients on average pay a fee premium, compared to the case if they were to retain a non‐Big‐6 (Big‐6) auditor. Results continue to hold when we conduct further analyses on a subset of municipalities with access to both Big‐6 and non‐Big‐6 auditors in a local market defined by a 60‐km radius, rather than over a province‐wide audit market. The existence of non‐Big‐6 audit fee premiums has not been documented previously in the private‐ or public‐sector audit fee literature. We surmise that it may be caused by the dominance (79.4 percent) of non‐Big‐6 auditors in the Ontario municipal market, compared to most private‐sector audit markets where their market share generally does not exceed 20 percent. The strong market position of non‐Big‐6 firms in turn may have allowed these auditors to command a fee premium for the subset of municipalities that self‐selects to be audited by them. An implication from our study is that Ontario municipalities often choose to be audited by more costly auditors, even though they could have paid lower audit fees by switching to an alternative auditor type. These results do not support those reported by Chaney et al. (2004) , who find that U.K. private firms are audited by the least costly auditor type. The conflicting findings may be attributable to the fact that the Ontario municipal audit market is subject to regulation by not just the audit profession but also the Ontario government and that, unlike business corporations, municipalities receive funding from provincial governments to fulfil much of their financial requirements. Thus, municipal clients may be relatively more willing to accept higher audit fees provided their chosen auditor (or auditor type) matches their needs.     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Understanding the determinants of the magnitude of entity-level risk and account-level risk key audit matters: The case of the United Kingdom

This study was conducted to analyse the influence of auditor and client characteristics on the magnitude and type of key audit matters (KAM) disclosed in the audit reports of the FTSE 100 companies in the UK during the period 2013–2016. A recently introduced standard requires auditors to reveal the main risks faced by the client and to describe how these are addressed in the audit. Our results show that Deloitte, EY and KPMG tend to report fewer entity-level-risk KAM (ELRKAM) than PwC, while KPMG and BDO report fewer account-level-risk KAM (ALRKAM) than PwC. In general, auditors of companies that pay higher audit services fees present more ELRKAM and fewer ALRKAM. Our findings also show that client characteristics are relevant to the number and type of KAM included in the audit report. Our results show that auditor and client characteristics are determinants of the number of KAM disclosed and, moreover, determine the type of KAM disclosed in the audit reports.     

Public Equity and Audit Pricing in the United States

To what degree are audit fees for U.S. firms with publicly traded equity higher than fees for otherwise similar firms with private equity? The answer is potentially important for evaluating regulatory regime design efficiency and for understanding audit demand and production economics. For U.S. firms with publicly traded debt, we hold constant the regulatory regime, including mandated issuer reporting and auditor responsibilities. We vary equity ownership and thus public securities market contextual factors, including any related public firm audit fees from increased audit effort to reduce audit litigation risk and/or pure litigation risk premium (litigation channel effects). In cross‐section, we find that audit fees for public equity firms are 20–22% higher than fees for otherwise similar private equity firms. Time‐series comparisons for firms that change ownership status yield larger percentage fee increases (decreases) for those going public (private). Results are consistent with litigation channel effects giving rise to substantial incremental audit fees for U.S. firms with public equity ownership.     

Auditor liability and excess cash holdings: Evidence from audit fees of foreign incorporated firms

Auditors of foreign cross-listed firms face liability arising from the nature of the institutional monitoring framework of legal claims that can potentially be brought against the auditor in both the home country and the US. This paper is the first to document the relationship between auditor liability and auditor pricing of excess cash holdings for foreign firms cross-listed in the US. Our findings indicate that auditors demand a fee premium for foreign incorporated clients with greater excess cash holdings, consistent with auditors recognizing the potential for legal exposure to agency conflict arising from foreign listed US traded clients. Furthermore, we examine aspects of foreign capital market protections, such as disclosure requirements, the strength of legal enforcement, and the strength of shareholder rights to better understand auditor perception of the liability they incur due to the agency costs associated with excess cash holdings. We find that there is a significant positive association between audit fees and excess cash holdings for firms where the country of incorporation permits greater liability of auditors in criminal and civil litigation. In addition, auditors assign higher audit fees to firms holding greater excess cash incorporated in countries with greater required accounting disclosure, stronger legal enforcement and stronger shareholder rights.     

Large audit firm premium and audit specialisation in the public sector

The outsourcing of public‐sector audits to the private sector is an important issue. This study examines the fee premium in the public sector by comparing audit fees between the government auditor and the Big5. The study (i) statistically adjusts for self‐selection bias, (ii) allows the slope coefficients in the audit fee model to vary between the Big5 and the government audit and (iii) estimates the counterfactual audit fee premium. The Big5 premium is around 23 percent. However, the variation in premium depends on whether the Big5 auditor is an industry or city specialist.     

Audit quality effects of the PCAOB's 2006 tax service restrictions

In 2004 and 2005, use of aggressive tax services provided by a company's auditor had become so broadly concerning that it was the focus of a PCAOB roundtable and discussed in a Congressional subcommittee investigation report (PCAOB, 2004 and US Senate, 2005). Although auditor provision of these and other nonaudit services to issuer audit clients was restricted in 2006, research on the effectiveness of these restrictions finds that they did not impact audit quality (Notbohm, Paterson and Valencia, 2015 and Lennox, 2016). We reexamine this issue with a focus on the audit quality effects for the engagements most impacted by the restrictions-Big 4 audit clients with pre-restriction tax service fees of at least $100,000 that fell by at least 75% following the restrictions. Using a difference-in-difference framework and two proxies for audit quality, we find evidence of the effectiveness of the PCAOB's 2006 restrictions among those clients. Additionally, we find these results are sensitive to the level of pre-restriction tax service fees, with the restatement (going concern) effect of the restrictions strengthening (weakening) in the pre-restriction tax service fee level. We also find that the effects of these restrictions are concentrated among clients of Big 4 auditors rather than clients of the 2nd tier or 3rd tier auditors. Results of additional analyses indicate that audit quality, as measured by the probability of restatement, was lower in the pre-restriction period for purchasers than for non-purchasers. Our results are robust to a barrage of sensitivity tests. Our findings contribute to the continued regulator discussion about the proper level and types of allowable tax nonaudit services.     

Public Disclosure of Audit Fees and Bargaining Power between the Client and Auditor: Evidence from China

Before the public disclosure of audit fees was mandated, it was unlikely for an audit client to have accurate information about how much other companies were charged by their auditors. Public fee disclosure decreases the cost of auditees' access to audit fee information for the auditor's portfolio of clients and is thus likely to increase the relative bargaining power of auditees over auditors when they negotiate audit fees. Using both proprietary and public audit fee data before and after public fee disclosure was mandated in China, we provide evidence consistent with the preceding conjecture. We find that public fee disclosure reinforces the magnitude of audit fee decreases for overcharged clients and weakens auditors' ability to raise audit fees for undercharged clients. These findings suggest the existence of unintended consequences of public fee disclosure regulation, the original rationale of which was a concern about audit pricing practices that could undermine auditor independence.     

Extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees

This study investigates whether sudden and severe reductions in total CEO compensation affect auditor perceptions of risk. We argue that extreme CEO pay cuts can incentivize the CEO to manipulate the financial reports or make risky operational decisions in a desperate attempt to improve firm performance. This incentive, in turn, is likely to impact auditor assessments of audit risk and auditor business risk, leading to higher audit fees. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence of a positive and highly significant association between extreme CEO pay cuts and audit fees. The results suggest that audit fees are 4.6% higher when there is an extreme CEO pay cut, which corresponds to an audit fee that is $111,458 higher for the average firm-year observation in our sample.     

Costs Associated With Going-Concern-Modified Audit Opinions: An Analysis of the Australian Audit Market

This article examines the potential costs to Australian auditors and their clients from the issuance of first-time going-concern-modified audit opinions. We examine the population of Australian companies receiving a first-time going-concern-modified audit opinion during the period 1994–97 and a matched sample of financially distressed firms receiving a clean audit opinion. Results indicate that auditor switching is positively associated with receipt of a going-concern-modified opinion. However, we find no empirical evidence that there is a self-fulfilling prophecy of increased probability of company failure following the issuance of a going-concern-modified opinion for the Australian companies in our study. Our analyses of lost audit fees indicate that auditors issuing first-time going-concern-modified audit opinions lost proportionately more fees by losing clients (through switching or company failure) than firms not issuing a going-concern-modified opinion to financially stressed clients.     

Pro forma disclosures,audit fees,and auditor resignations

The disclosure of non-GAAP (pro forma) earnings numbers by managers in the post-SOX era continues to attract attention from regulators, media, and researchers. However, there is limited empirical evidence on how auditors view clients that emphasize pro forma earnings over GAAP earnings. We study the extent to which audit fees and auditor resignations are associated with opportunistic non-GAAP disclosures. We find that during the pre-SOX period, optimistic pro forma differences, measured using either IBES actual earnings or hand-collected pro forma earnings, are associated with higher audit fees and a higher likelihood of auditor resignations. Additional results indicate that auditors seem to be more concerned with non-GAAP earnings disclosures in the post-SOX period.