浅谈行政监察与企业之间的关系

<正>对于行政监察与企业之间究竟有什么关系这一问题,可从以下几个方面谈谈我们的粗浅意见。 一、从行政监察的职能和企业性质来看两者的关系 行政监察是指由国家权力机关或政府设置的专门机构对国家行政机关及其工作人员的行政行为进行的专门的综合的监督检查。它的职能主要是由廉政监察和效能监察两个部分所构成。廉政监察是监察机关依法监督、惩戒、纠举监察对象利用职权非法去攫取各种利益的腐败行为的一种行政监督活动。     

政府审计监督与腐败治理

政府审计监督是腐败监督体系中的重要组成部分,主要通过对权力的制约和监督实现腐败治理.当前,改革、发展、法治、反腐是主题,政府审计如何在法治框架下实现腐败治理具有重要的现实意义.本文认为,基于政府审计与腐败之间的关系,政府审计应该从权力审计、审计信息共享机制、审计监督的协作机制、审计预警机制、国际借鉴等方面实现腐败治理.     

审计全覆盖、协同监督与全面从严治党 ——基于结构方程模型的实证检验

审计作为党和国家监督体系的重要组成部分,对协调推进"四个全面"战略布局发挥重要保障作用。文章基于国家审计在管党治党责任落实和腐败治理方面的"免疫系统"功能作用的发挥,构建以审计全覆盖和审计主体协同监督为逻辑起点的国家审计推进全面从严治党的理论模型,利用浙江等5个省份546位审计相关工作者的问卷调查数据,通过结构方程模型检验国家审计推进全面从严治党的作用机理。研究发现,审计全覆盖和审计主体协同监督均对推进全面从严治党具有正向影响,且审计主体协同监督的总效应最大,审计业务内容在审计主体协同监督与全面从严治党中起部分中介作用。研究结果为国家审计助推全面从严治党向纵深发展提供了初步经验证据。     

中国企业财政补贴政策之国家审计监督研究

通过构建国家审计、补贴发放权力机关与申请补贴企业三部门之间的理论框架,探讨国家审计如何监督政府部门利用财政资金补贴个体企业的过程。国家审计发挥效力的两个机制为:第一,国家审计机关既要监督权力机关对补贴的发放是否符合中央政策部署,同时也要审查企业申报财政补贴的材料是否真实有效,确保财政资金能够发放到最应该得到补贴的那部分企业手中;第二,国家审计可以直接监督企业如何使用财政补贴资金,也可与权力机关共同对企业进行监督,确保企业在实际经营中按照国家顶层设计使用补贴资金;第三,根据2015—2016年中国经验证据,简要说明国家审计在不同政策目标下如何监督政府对企业财政补贴的发放,为国家审计机关在执行审计时提供参考依据。     

国家审计与国家治理关系的深度透视

国家治理的追求是实现国家良治,促进国家良治是国家审计机关的重要任务和目标。国家治理需要审计监督机制,国家审计的产生源于国家治理,国家审计的业务类型取决于国家治理的需要,国家审计在国家治理中的基本职能是监督,国家审计在国家治理中的根本作用是建设,具体表现为监督权力运行、保证廉洁行政、提高政府效能、维护市场经济秩序、维护人民群众利益,最终推动社会可持续和谐发展。     

强化审计腐败防治作用的若干思考

审计在减少权力滥用、促进政府持续高效治理方面具有巨大的作用,被《联合国反腐败公约》确定为国家腐败治理体系的＂四大支柱＂之一。审计在腐败防治中具有及时提供腐败线索、事前预防、人才专业知识等的优势,但由于独立性不足、问责不到位、人员素质不高、审计公开不完善等原因制约了审计的腐败防治功能。因此,可以通过改革管理体制提高审计独立性、建立问责和公开制度等来强化审计的腐败防治功能。     

公共权力监督视角下国家审计质量影响因素分析及应用

党的十六大报告明确指出,"加强对权力的制衡和监督最重要的是要发挥司法机关和行政监察、审计等职能部门的作用"。这赋予了国家审计新的职责。文章提出了国家审计公共权力监督论,认为审计是对经济权力乃至整个行政权力运作的制约和监督,并以此建立了新的国家审计质量影响因素的分析框架,并以此分析我国审计署及地方审计机关审计质量差异的原因,以探索完善我国国家审计质量的对策。     

监察体制改革视域下“监督模型”创新构建

国家监察制度改革的重要目标,是建立完善覆盖权力运行全领域和全对象的国家监察体系。深入推进国家监察制度改革,关键是要解决监督模式创新中的理论和实践面对的突出问题,确保监督制度改革工作的顺利推进。当前,各级监察机关主动应对大数据互联网时代新的信息化技术带来的挑战,结合自身工作实际利用大数据和云计算技术,对"互联网+纪检监察"模式进行积极探索,取得了一些成果。但是,对于监察体制改革中信息化手段运用的理论构建问题还处于薄弱环节,亟需从社会科学和技术发展两个维度的结合层面做出思考和解读。在此背景下,探索监察体制改革视域下"监督模型"的创新路径就具有更加突出的理论价值和现实意义。     

廉政政府建设审计研究

廉政政府建设关系国家发展、关系人民根本利益、关系社会公平与和谐稳定。坚决严惩腐败和有效预防腐败,大力加强廉政建设,是中国共产党和中国政府的一贯主张。各级审计机关作为廉政政府建设的重要参与者,在政府廉政建设中发挥着不可替代的作用。与先进国家政府审计制度及执行情况进行比较和借鉴,将有助于发挥各级审计机关在政府廉政建设中的积极作用。     

关于国家审计跟踪问责制度的思考

完善国家审计跟踪问责制度是构建不敢腐社会的应有举措.从国家审计视角出发,分析了国家审计的基本功能和国家审计跟踪现状,试图针对审计跟踪问责制度欠缺的问题,构建预防腐败的有效路径.国家审计和政府跟踪问责制度关系密切,国家审计是政府实施问责程序之前不可或缺的关键步骤,可以为政府实施问责程序出具必须的线索和证据,同时,跟踪问责制度是国家审计功能的纵向延伸,有利于增强国家审计对腐败行为的打击程度,又能加强国家审计的震慑力.主张:加强和完善跟踪制度和问责制度建立,这将有利于国家审计发挥腐败治理的作用.     

Optimal supervision with moral hazard

This paper adopts the principal–supervisor–agent hierarchy model pioneered by Tirole [Tirole, J., 1986. Hierarchies and bureaucracies: on the role of collusion in organizations. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 2, 181–214] to analyze the optimal architecture of supervision. We consider a principal who encounters a double moral hazard problem. In particular, we examine the endogenously determined supervisory effort and the possibility of untruthful revelation of supervisor's message. The degree of accuracy for this endogenously chosen information architecture hinges upon the supervisory technology, the supervisor's reservation utility and the agent's production technology. Besides, though the principal's welfare would be lowered when the possibility of untruthful revelation is taken into account, we find that his desired supervisory effort level may be enhanced instead.     

Mechanism design with collusive supervision

We analyze an adverse selection environment with third party supervision. The supervisor is partly informed of the agent's type. The supervisor and the agent collude while interacting with the principal. Contracting with the agent directly and ignoring the presence of the supervisor constitutes the no-supervision benchmark. We show that delegating to the supervisor reduces the principal's payoff compared to the no-supervision benchmark under a standard condition on the distribution of the agent's types. In contrast, if the principal contracts with both the agent and the supervisor, there exists a mechanism that improves the principal's payoff over the no-supervision payoff.     

Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs

Preshipment inspection (PSI) programmes are implemented in many developing countries to assist governments in the collection of revenue at their borders. These programs consist of the delegation of the inspection of imports to a private firm. To study these PSI programmes, we develop a hierarchical agency model in which the government authority can rely on two supervisors, namely the private inspection firm and the customs administration, to control importers' declarations. The government's optimal contract is fully characterized. We devote some attention to the inspection policy and its comparative statics properties. In particular, we identify the situations in which PSI programmes are revenue enhancing. We also discuss the reconciliation policy, i.e. what to do in case of conflicting inspection reports by the inspection firm and the customs administration. In the optimal mechanism, mutual supervision between the inspection firm and the customs administration is used to provide adequate incentives to all parties.     

中国保险监管问题浅析

保险业作为金融业三大组成部分之一,在社会与经济发展中的作用愈来愈重要。目前,我国保险监管还存在一些亟需解决的问题。解决的对策是：加快保险监管法制建设,加强金融监管机构的协调,从机构监管向功能监管转变,充分发挥行业组织的辅助作用,培育保险市场的自律机制。     

Incentives,supervision, and sharecropper productivity

Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, ‘supervised’ tenants are significantly more productive than ‘unsupervised’ ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision.     

论政策性农业保险的监督管理

我国应尽快建立独立的政策性农业保险监督管理体系,由国务院保险监督管理机构、国务院财政部门、国务院农业行政主管部门和各级人民政府负责有关政策性农业保险活动的监督管理工作.我国政策性农业保险的监管对象包括政府、政策性农业保险经营组织和投保农户.政策性农业保险的监管内容包括对政策性农业保险监管对象的监管以及对政策性农业保险监管机构的监管.     

Learning under supervision: an experimental study

In many market environments, for example in investment banking, salesforce management and others, workers and supervisors work closely as a team. Workers are paid a fixed salary and supervisors determine any raises, which are typically dependent on how well the organization does. In such scenarios, a supervisor who constantly offers suggestions can create a problem—typically a worker cannot ignore his supervisor’s advice, yet if such advice is wrong and is followed, it will only decrease firm profits. We conduct a laboratory experiment to address a question critical for such settings—does the relationship between advisor and worker interfere with the learning abilities of the worker? The answer is a resounding no. In fact, subjects who have a supervisor advising them and whose advice is costly to ignore actually learn better than those with an advisor whose advice can be ignored. An even more striking result is that advisees as well as advisors in both these conditions learn better than subjects with no advisors. Our result can be attributed to the presence of advice and has direct relevance to learning in many environments.     

Bank regulation and supervision and its welfare implications

This study provides a general equilibrium model to explore the welfare implications of bank regulation and supervision (RS). The model supports the basic expectations regarding the positive effects of RS on the growth rate, output, credit, investment, wages and profits; and its negative effects on the interest rate. In addition, RS is observed to lead to a convergence effect. Furthermore, it is observed that the decision of banks to monitor and charge differentiated interest rates to firms depends on the distribution of firm-specific moral hazard rates; bank monitoring increases profits as the distribution of producer type improves.     

Disturbing effects of contracts based on effort supervision

This paper points out some of the paradoxical and counterfactual results that contracts based on effort supervision may lead into. Specifically it is argued that those contracts may lead to the dismissal of the most able workers and to promoting the least able. An alternative framework is also suggested to eliminate those effects.     

A金融监管与利率市场化改革

分析了我国进行利率市场化改革的现状、必要性和风险,探讨了我国目前金融监管的缺陷,指出了完善金融监管防范利率市场化过程中可能发生风险的措施.