地方官员更替与经济增长

改革开放以来,中国的省长、省委书记更替成为一种常态,现有文献忽视了其对辖区经济增长的影响,本文对此进行了探讨。在理论上,我们讨论了多种地方官员更替影响短期经济增长的机制,强调省长、省委书记更替会对辖区经济增长带来短期的负面影响。在实证上,我们采用1979—2006年间我国29个省区的官员更替样本进行检验。结果发现,省长省委书记更替对辖区经济增长有显著的负面影响;这种影响的程度因地方官员更替频率、更替的地方官员的年龄等因素的不同而不同;地方官员更替主要影响辖区的短期经济增长波动,并非长期经济增长趋势。本文的发现是稳健的,能够增进对如何现实省区经济平稳增长的理解。     

The All-Russian National Front – for Russia: a new actor in the political and economic landscape

The All-Russian National Front (ARNF), created by Vladimir Putin in 2011, has rapidly increased its power and influence in policy-making. The Front has been used to monitor regional policies and to check both the effectiveness and loyalty of regional governors in carrying out central government policies. This article examines the main activities of the Front and its membership since its creation, and considers the implications for future economic development in Russia.     

地方国有上市公司持股商业银行动机和效应研究*

本文研究地方政府或地方国资委控股国有上市公司（地方国有上市公司）持股商业银行的动机和效应。研究发现，相比于其他国有上市公司，地方国有上市公司更偏好持股商业银行，且多为同地区的商业银行；当公司注册地为省会城市、金融业市场化水平较低、地方官员任职年龄较小时，上述关系更加显著；当政府发布相关促进银行业发展政策后，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的概率显著上升。除此之外，本文对经济后果进行分析发现，持股商业银行提升了地方金融业水平以及地方官员晋升概率。本文的研究结论表明，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的经济行为更多地反映了政府动机和地方官员晋升激励动机。     

地方国有上市公司持股商业银行动机和效应研究

本文研究地方政府或地方国资委控股国有上市公司(地方国有上市公司)持股商业银行的动机和效应。研究发现,相比于其他国有上市公司,地方国有上市公司更偏好持股商业银行,且多为同地区的商业银行;当公司注册地为省会城市、金融业市场化水平较低、地方官员任职年龄较小时,上述关系更加显著;当政府发布相关促进银行业发展政策后,地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的概率显著上升。除此之外,本文对经济后果进行分析发现,持股商业银行提升了地方金融业水平以及地方官员晋升概率。本文的研究结论表明,地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的经济行为更多地反映了政府动机和地方官员晋升激励动机。     

Autocratic governors in public procurement

The personal role of sub-national rulers is crucial for regional development in countries with weak institutions. This paper studies the impact of regional governors’ tenure in office and their local ties on procurement performance in Russia. To identify the causal effect, we construct instruments for governor’s tenure by exploiting the regional vote share of ruling party in past parliament elections. We find the evidence that governors who do not have pre-governing local ties in the region (outsiders) demonstrate predatory behaviour, compared to governors with local ties (insiders). Namely, governors-outsiders restrict the competition at awarding stage significantly more than governors-insiders. Moreover, for governors-outsiders this restriction becomes stronger with tenure in office, while governors-insiders do not demonstrate such negative tenure effect. We argue that this restriction of competition by governors-outsiders cannot be explained by the intention of better contracts execution: the delays in execution and the probability of contract termination either increase or keep stable with tenure for governors-outsiders and these outcomes decrease with tenure for governors-insiders.     

Lame ducks and divided government: How voters control the unaccountable

Electoral institutions interact through the incentives they provide to policy makers and voters. In this paper divided government is interpreted as the reaction of voters to a systematic control problem. Voters realize that term-limited executives (“lame ducks”) cannot credibly commit to a moderate electoral platform due to missing reelection incentives. By dividing government control voters force a lame duck to compromise on policies with an opposing legislature. Based on data from the US states, I present evidence showing that the probability of divided government is about 8 to 10 percent higher when governors are lame ducks.     

The colonial origins of fiscal capacity: Evidence from patronage governors

We combine historical personnel data from the British colonial administration with modern public finance data to study the impact of colonial governors on fiscal capacity. Exploiting rule-based variation in the allocation of governors connected to their superior at the time of appointment, we find that modern-day countries exposed to more patronage governors exhibit lower fiscal capacity today. These negative effects are persistent over time and driven by indirect taxes that patronage governors disproportionately controlled in the colonial period. The results thus provide evidence for a public finance channel through which the effects of patronage appointments extend beyond decolonization.     

旅游减贫具有空间溢出效应吗?

针对现有文献缺乏旅游减贫多维效果及空间效应研究,本文基于多维贫困视角,运用2008—2017年中国30个省份的面板数据,构建了包含经济、教育、医疗、生活与环境五个维度的贫困减缓评价指标体系,并在地理距离矩阵和经济距离矩阵共同构成的综合嵌套矩阵的基础上,分别运用空间自相关检验、空间杜宾模型探究了各维度贫困减缓的空间分布特征及旅游发展对各维度贫困减缓的空间效应。主要结论有:(1)十年间,中国乡村旅游业发展水平呈现显著空间正向相关性,纳入空间效应的空间杜宾模型较好地揭示出区域间乡村旅游发展存在显著的空间溢出效应。(2)十年间,各维度的减贫效果亦呈现显著空间正向相关性,表明各维度减贫效果存在着空间集聚特征。(3)十年间,旅游发展对经济、生活、环境等维度的贫困均具有显著减缓作用,更重要的发现是旅游发展在这三个减贫维度上具有正向空间溢出效应。旅游发展对教育、医疗两个维度上贫困减缓的直接和间接效应均未通过显著性检验。(4)从空间异质性视角分析,旅游发展对经济减贫维度的空间溢出效应呈现出东部区域→中部区域→西部区域逐步递减规律;旅游发展对生活减贫维度和环境减贫维度的空间溢出效应均呈现出由东部区域→中部区域→西部区域逐渐增大特征。最后,论文就旅游减贫提出了相关政策建议。     

PARTY CUES,POLITICAL TRENDS,AND FISCAL INTERACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Recent theoretical and empirical research has suggested that similarities in party affiliations across space will alter voters' comparisons, thus influencing fiscal policy mimicking. We employ a two‐regime spatial panel data model applied to U.S. state governors from 1970 to 2012, and find rather weak empirical evidence of influence of political party affiliations in fiscal yardstick competition. Our observed cross‐state interdependence in fiscal policies suggests voters may not weigh party affiliation heavily in their measure of comparative quality, treating each incumbent individually and independently. Incumbents strategically choose policy accordingly. This provides indirect support for the median voter theorem, in which incumbents' objective function is to maximize votes, independent of political affiliation. (JEL D72, H2, H7)     

Central bank independence,inflation and political instability in developing countries

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.     

我国FDI区域分布的区位条件及其地理溢出程度的经验研究

依据企业选址理论,运用空间计量模型对我国29个省FDI的区域分布的区位条件进行了经验研究。一方面证明了各地区的经济总量、劳动成本、市场化水平、累积的FDI和开放程度等区位条件是决定FDI区域分布的主要因素,而基础设施和沿海地区哑变量的作用却不显著。另一方面证实了中国FDI区域分布的空间依存性的存在,并对我国FDI省际区域地理溢出的程度进行了估计;最后根据研究结论,提出了有关各地区,特别是广大中西部地区吸引更多FDI的政策建议。     

转型期城市形态演化的空间政策影响机制——以扬州市为例

在当前我国经济社会转型期,由于内外环境的变化,地方政府的空间政策强烈影响着城市的发展,需要得到广泛的关注.文章通过对扬州1990年代以来推行的一系列空间政策和同时期城市形态演化以及可能的变化趋势进行比照,试图剖析空间政策对城市形态演化的影响机制,重点对行政区划和规划之间的矛盾冲突如何阻碍城市空间发展目标的实现进行了阐述.     

Politics and entrepreneurship in the US

There is a strong belief that Republicans are more pro‐business than Democrats. In this paper, we investigate the causal impact of partisan allegiance of governors (Republican or Democratic) on entrepreneurial activity by exploiting random variation in close gubernatorial elections in 50 states over the last three decades in a regression discontinuity design. We find that Republican governors are no different than Democratic governors in their effects on entrepreneurship. Our findings are robust to several sensitivity checks.     

市场化中地方政府职能转变与区域模式

地方政府职能转变与地区经济发展模式选择之间存在着密切的互动影响效应,地方政府职能转变是在一定的市场机制下进行的并受到市场化条件约束。改进地方政府公共治理能力、提高地方政府公共产品供给能力与完善公共政策体系已成为地方政府职能转变的主要途径和特点。地方政府职能转变中的地区社会经济利益导向必然产生多样化的地区经济发展模式,地方政府之间的政绩竞争会导致地区经济发展模式选择中的模仿学习效应与互动竞争效应。     

The Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Corruption: A Non‐linear Hypothesis

This study advances the literature on the effect of decentralization on corruption by proposing a theoretical motivation for the hypothesis that the corruption‐minimizing decentralization arrangement prescribes intermediate decentralization degrees: a ‘middle’ decision‐making power of local governors may mitigate the tradeoff between the rent‐seeking incentive for local politicians and the effectiveness of their voters’ monitoring. The estimation of a non‐linear empirical model strongly confirms that a decentralization degree between 15% and 21% minimizes corruption even through different estimation procedures, introduction of control variables and the use of internal and external IV and of alternative decentralization and corruption measurements.     

地方官员与经济增长——来自中国省长、省委书记交流的证据

通常认为地方官员在我国经济发展中扮演着积极角色,近来国家也有意通过干部交流促进省区平衡发展,但国内还没有定量识别地方官员影响经济增长的文献。本文基于1978—2005年间省长(书记)交流样本构造了省长(书记)与省区相匹配的面板数据,系统地实证分析省长(书记)交流对流入省区经济增长的影响(即省长交流效应),结果发现,整体而言,省长交流能够使流入地的经济增长速度提高1个百分点左右;这种省长交流效应是通过在流入地采取大力发展二产、重视一产、忽视三产的产业发展取向实现的。本文的发现是稳健的,有助于增进对加强干部交流破解省区发展不平衡的理解。     

Economic Competition,Policy Interdependence,and Labour Rights

Extant scholarship treats national policies concerning labour rights as a function of economic factors and yet neglects influences of policies among economically competing states. Relying on the policy interdependence theory, this study argues that labour rights policy in a state is dependent on its economic competitors’ labour policy decisions. It specifically maintains that the intensifying competition for foreign direct investment and exports as well as against imports channels negative externalities of deteriorating labour protection in competing states which drives expansive downward policy mimicking and leads to a global decline in labour rights – a race to the bottom. Utilising spatial econometric technique to analyse a new data on labour rights for the period 1994–2009, it finds that labour rights practices are interdependent among economic competitors and experience global deteriorations; whereas labour rights laws remain largely independent due to high policy and reputational costs of lowering them and show more fluctuations.     

战略性新兴产业政策依赖性探析 ——来自地方政府补贴视角的实证检验

战略性新兴产业发展受到各级政府普遍扶持,扶持过程处处存在政府的影响,是研究政府行为的良好载体。为此,本文以战略性新兴产业为研究对象,以海克曼（Heckman）两步选择模型为基础分析地方政府补贴选择以及补贴实施机制,并考察其区域效应、省际效应及具体地区经济特征的影响。本文研究表明,地方政府行为具有多样性,其具有显著的扶持弱者行为取向,这是政策依赖的重要因素,这一影响机制受地区经济发展因素的影响,存在显著的区域差异。研究还表明,地方政府补贴行为具有较强的所有制类型偏好,中央国有企业受到补贴的概率、补贴数量及补贴程度显著低于其他所有制,其中蕴含着地方政府与中央国有企业之间的诸多问题。     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

技术溢出视角下技术进步对能源消费的回弹效应研究——基于空间面板数据模型

针对现有文献测算回弹效应普遍忽略技术溢出效应的缺憾,文章构建了三要素经济增长的空间误差模型,在此基础上给出了回弹效应的估算方法,并利用1995-2010年省际面板数据对我国技术溢出视角下技术进步对能源消费的回弹效应进行了实证分析。结果表明,技术进步所导致的能源回弹效应显著存在,中、西部的平均回弹效应明显高于东部,全国的平均回弹效应呈现上升趋势。因此,政府在制定能源政策时需要注意降低单位GDP能耗可能出现的回弹效应,把提高能源效率与自主创新、产业结构调整、政府宏观调控等手段结合起来以实现既定的节能目标。