Is Family Control Relevant for Corporate Cash Holding Policy?

This empirical research examines the effect of family control on firms’ cash holding policy. Using a sample of Western European firms, we confirm the precautionary motive for holding cash as family‐controlled firms’ desire to perpetuate the family legacy for future generations motivates them to accumulate more cash than their non‐family counterparts. We also show that, given family‐controlled firms’ long‐term perspective, they focus on cash flow volatility rather than cash flow level. Finally, the relation between financing constraints and cash holdings is not homogeneous: financially constrained family‐controlled firms hold higher levels of cash than financially constrained non‐family firms. Overall, these results suggest that family firms’ cash holding policy is the result not of a specific financial outcome but rather on the strategic objectives of the firm.     

A theory of operational cash holding,endogenous financial constraints,and credit rationing

This paper develops a theory of operational cash holding. Liquidity shocks due to delayed payments must be financed using cash or short-term debt. Debt holders provide an irrevocable credit line given a firm's expected insolvency risk, and equity holders select optimum cash holding. The model demonstrates the trade-off between cash holding and investing in fixed assets. Introducing uncertain cash flows leads to precautionary cash holding if debt holders impose financial constraints. Precautionary cash holding, in turn, reduces insolvency risk enhancing access to short-term finance. The theory shows that credit rationing can occur in the absence of market frictions. Using U.S. data from 1998 to 2012, empirical findings suggest that the decline in credit lines has contributed to the increase in cash holding in line with theoretical predictions.     

Cash holdings in family firms: CEO identity and implications for firm value

We investigate the cash holdings policy of family firms and examine potential value implications. Family firms hold more cash than other firms, with an average difference of 2.3% of total assets. This result is driven by firms managed by heir CEOs. While the cash holdings policy of first‐generation family firms is more sensitive to firm risk, consistent with founders’ increased risk aversion, that of later‐generation firms is more sensitive to information asymmetry and agency conflicts. Heir CEOs’ cash policies destroy value, as the marginal value of an additional Euro suffers from a 38.3‐cent discount, on average, relative to non‐family firms.     

The Dynamic Speed of Cash-Holding Adjustment in a Transition Economy: A New Approach and Evidence

Using a new approach, we estimate the speed of cash-holding adjustment for a typical transitional economy by using Chinese listed firms’ samples over 1999–2011. First, we use model-averaging techniques to identify reliably important cash-holding determinants. Second, we conduct Monte Carlo simulation using the real finance data to evaluate appropriateness of the empirical estimator from a variety of dynamic estimation methods and suggest an optimized system of generalized method of moments (OPT-GMM) as an appropriate econometric approach for speed estimation. Finally, we get the speed of 46 percent, which is significantly lower than the contemporary speed in the United Kingdom and the United States.     

Shariah compliance and corporate cash holdings

This study investigates the influence of Shariah compliance status on cash holding levels and the speed of adjustment of non-financial listed firms in six Gulf Cooperation countries from 2005 to 2016. The results show that Shariah compliance status has a significant effect on firms’ cash holding decisions. Shariah-compliant firms have significantly higher cash holding levels than non-Shariah-compliant firms. Further, Shariah-compliant firms adjust more quickly towards their target cash holdings than their conventional counterparts. In our view, Shariah-compliant firms are subject to multiple restrictions that limit their external financing channels. Therefore, holding larger cash reserves is important as it helps gain from the transaction cost motive of holding cash. The findings of this study have important implications for regulators, investors and managers. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to compare the effect of Shariah compliance on firms’ cash holdings and the speed of adjustment towards the trade-off theory’s optimal cash holding target.     

An axiomatic approach to the valuation of cash flows

We model a stream of cash flows as an optional stochastic process, and value the cash flows by using a continuous and strictly positive linear functional. By applying a representation theorem from the general theory of stochastic processes we are able to study this valuation principle, as well as properties of the stochastic discount factor it implies. This approach to valuation is useful in the non-presence of a financial market, as is often the case when valuing cash flows arising from insurance contracts and in the application of real options.     

Vertical interlock and the value of cash holdings

We test whether vertical interlock endangers cash resources that manifests in a lower value of cash in listed companies affiliated with business groups. Using a sample of 9,032 observations from 2007 to 2016 in the Chinese market, we find that investors tend to value cash holdings in companies with vertical interlock substantially less than in those without. The marginal effect of vertical interlock on the value of cash remains significantly negative after controlling for existing governance mechanisms, accounting conservatism and internal control quality, shedding light on agency problems between majority shareholders and minority shareholders within business groups of emerging markets.     

Exploring the Causes of Accounting Restatements by Family Firms

Prior research shows that family firms have better earnings quality than non‐family firms in common‐law countries and highly developed markets. In contrast, we do not find a significant difference in the financial reporting quality between family and non‐family firms in the context of a civil‐law system and less developed market. We show that the financial reporting quality of family firms is conditioned on: (1) the divergence between the controlling shareholders’ voting rights and their cash flow rights, and (2) the firm's reputation for integrity, while these two conditions do not explain the restatement likelihood for non‐family firms. Moreover, when accounting irregularities are detected in the case of family firms, they are associated with more serious accounting restatements. Together, these results imply that the severity of the conflict between ultimate and minority shareholders, and a lack of integrity, explain the propensity for making financial restatements among family firms in a regime characterized as having weak investor protection and concentrated ownership structures.     

Local social environment and the speed of leverage adjustment

This study examines the impact of social capital on firms’ leverage adjustment speed. Using a comprehensive dataset of 83,374 firm-year observations for 744 US counties for 1990–2016, we find that both underleveraged and overleveraged firms located in US counties with higher levels of social capital incur slower leverage adjustment towards their optimal target capital structure. This finding is robust to alternative measures of leverage and social capital, different model specifications, controlling for county- and firm-level characteristics, and endogeneity. We further identify two mechanisms through which social capital affects leverage adjustments: monitoring (channel for underleveraged firms) and disciplinary (channel for overleveraged firms) mechanisms.     

Does Family Control Shape Corporate Capital Structure? An Empirical Analysis of Eurozone Firms

This study investigates the relationship between family control and corporate capital structure considering the dynamic nature of the debt policy and the ownership structure of family firms. Our results show that the sensitivity of debt to fluctuations in cash flow is less pronounced in family firms and highlight that family control increases the speed of adjustment toward target debt. Four dimensions of the family business model explain these results: deviations of voting from cash flow rights, the presence of a second blockholder in the company, involvement of family members in management, and the generation in charge of the business. The weaker negative impact of cash flow on debt is driven by family firms with no control‐enhancing mechanisms, companies with active family participation in management and family businesses that are still controlled by the first generation. By contrast, the more severe agency conflicts between owners and creditors in family firms with a second blockholder lead to more pronounced pecking order behaviour. Furthermore, the higher flexibility in corporate decision‐making of family firms managed by the family and under the influence of the first generation explains why family companies are able to rebalance their capital structure faster.     

The role of credit ratings on capital structure and its speed of adjustment: an international study

Using an international dataset, we examine the role of issuers’ credit ratings in explaining corporate leverage and the speed with which firms adjust toward their optimal level of leverage. We find that, in countries with a more market-oriented financial system, the impact of credit ratings on firms’ capital structure is more significant and that firms with a poorer credit rating adjust more rapidly. Furthermore, our results show some striking differences in the speed of adjusting capital structure between firms rated as speculative and investment grade, with the former adjusting much more rapidly. As hypothesized, those differences are statistically significant only for firms based in a more market-oriented economy.     

Share pledging,payout policy,and the value of cash holdings

Share pledging for insiders’ personal bank loans is associated with the agency problems of insider risk aversion and stock price crash risk. We examine the relation between insider share pledging and the value of cash holdings using the pledging data of listed firms in Taiwan. We find that the value of cash holdings is lower for pledging firms, especially for those that are relatively more risk averse. Pledging firms that repurchase shares have a higher marginal value of cash than those with other payout methods, likely due to the role of repurchases in reducing the stock price crash risk. Our results show how insiders’ personal financing incentives arising from share pledging would affect the value of cash holdings from the perspective of agency problems and payout policy.     

An evaluation of alternative approaches to the application of cash reserve requirements in Nigeria

This article evaluated ‘o-size-fits-all’ approach to cash reserve requirement implementation in Nigeria using the Vector Autoregressive methodology and scenario analysis. The central thrust was to ascertain if a one-size-fits-all approach would produce a better outcome or perhaps utilizing a differentiated approach would provide a better outcome. To that effect, our results eloquently provides various scenarios for consideration.     

Corporate codes of ethics and cash holdings: International evidence

In the presence of agency costs, managers retain cash for their own benefit at the expense of shareholder wealth. Extending prior literature on the role of corporate governance in mitigating the effects of agency conflicts on corporate cash holdings, we study a governance mechanism that has largely been overlooked, namely, corporate codes of ethics. We find a negative association between code of ethics quality and cash holdings, which suggests that managers hold less cash when the firm has a strong code of ethics in place. The effect is greater when agency costs are elevated due to weaker country-level investor protections. We also find that payouts and the marginal value of cash holdings to investors are increasing in code quality. Overall, our results are consistent with codes of ethics helping to limit opportunistic behaviour from managers when determining the firm's level of cash holdings.     

我国家族企业中的“人际关系网”——现状及制度诱因

本文以新制度经济学为基础,实证考察了我国家族企业中人际关系网的存在性及其制度诱因。本文认为,当企业经营具有关系型交易特征时,家族成员及泛家族成员与创始人之间的相互信任关系会显著降低交易成本,提升企业关系型资产的价值。以创始人具有的政商关系以及企业与客户和供应商之间的商业网络关系作为关系型交易的衡量指标,本文对我国274家民营企业在IPO年度的3639位高管成员的分析支持上述结论,即家族企业的关系型交易特征与家族成员和泛家族成员在高管团队中的比例显著正相关。进一步的检验表明,家族成员和泛家族成员的持股比例显著高于其他高管,但年度薪酬对公司当期业绩的敏感性却显著低于其他高管。这表明,人际关系网导致高管激励模式更趋长期化。     

Stability of international stock market relationships across month of the year and different holding intervals

Potential benefits from international diversification depend upon the stability in stock market relationships. Using monthly data of 11 international stock markets, this paper examines the stability in stock market relationships across month of the year and across different holding intervals. Empirical results show that the correlation structure is more stable than the covariance structure. While empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that the correlation structure is very stable across different holding intervals, the empirical support for the stability in correlation structure across month of the year is much weaker.     

The speed of adjustment in working capital requirement

This paper analyzes the determinants of working capital requirement (WCR) and examines the speed with which firms adjust toward their target WCR. The findings indicate that firms adjust relatively quickly, which supports the hypothesis that current balance sheet items are easier to manipulate and could be changed quite easily, even in the short run. Moreover, we find that the speed of adjustment is not equal across all firms and varies according to their external finance constraints and their bargaining power. Firms with better access to external capital markets and greater bargaining power adjust faster due to their lower costs of adjustment.     

Does the value of cash holdings deteriorate or improve with material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting?

We find that cash holdings are more valuable for firms disclosing material weaknesses in the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) 404 internal control assessments. We estimate that the value spread for firms with weak controls vs. effective controls is about $0.25 for an extra dollar of cash. Our results are not driven by account-level weaknesses but by more severe, company-level weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICFR). Further, the economic consequences of cash resources significantly decrease with the remediation of previously reported material weaknesses. These results suggest that the favorable (precautionary) impact induced by weak ICFR appears to more than offset the adverse (agency) effect entailed by ineffective ICFR. Overall, our results survive alternative variable specifications, sample splits, matched sample analyses, and a variety of controls.     

Paving the way for children: Family firm succession and corporate philanthropy in China

We investigate whether internal succession in family firms motivates founders to engage in corporate philanthropy. We argue that founders who intend to pass control of the firm to their children are likely to prepare for the internal succession by building up family assets such as reputation and political connections through corporate philanthropy. Supporting our argument, we find that both the likelihood and the amount of philanthropic donations increase when listed family firms in China are in the internal succession process. The effect of successions on philanthropic donations is stronger for family firms that have political connections or are located in areas with stronger government influence in the local economy. The effect concentrates on family firms when heirs are young and inexperienced. When heirs are established, family firms actually make fewer philanthropic donations. Our results remain robust after addressing endogeneity issues.