The effect of US stress tests on monetary policy spillovers to emerging markets

This paper explores the transmission of US monetary policy through US banks to emerging market economies (EMEs) and the role that stress tests play in this transmission. Data on US banks’ monthly commercial and industrial loan originations shows that: (a) US bank lending to EMEs was sensitive to domestic monetary policy changes during the zero‐lower bound period. (b) Effects of monetary easing were heterogeneous across banks and depended on banks’ stress test results, a proxy for their capital strength. Only banks that comfortably passed the stress tests issued more loans to EME borrowers. (c) Effects of monetary tightening were more similar across banks. (d) Banks shifted their lending to safer borrowers within EMEs in response to monetary easing, leaving the risk of their overall loan books unchanged. These results support the hypothesis that bank capital affects the transmission of easier monetary policy, including across borders. We conjecture that bank lending to EMEs during the zero‐lower bound period would have been even higher had the United States not introduced stress tests for their banks.     

The interaction between bank solvency and funding costs: A crucial effect in stress tests

This paper presents new evidence on the empirical relationship between bank solvency and funding costs. Building on a newly constructed data set drawing on the supervisory data of 54 large banks from six advanced countries over 2004–2013, we use a simultaneous equation approach with panel data to estimate the contemporaneous interaction between solvency and funding costs. Our results and test statistics show that these two are (a) determined simultaneously and (b) more pronounced than suggested by the existing empirical literature. A 100‐bps increase in regulatory capital ratios is associated with a decrease of bank funding costs of about 113 bps. A 100‐bps increase in funding costs reduces regulatory capital buffers by 48 bps. Applying our estimation results to the 2014 EU‐wide stress test reveals that neglecting the solvency‐funding cost nexus leads to the systematical and significant underestimation of the impact of shocks on bank capital ratios.     

Determinants of the Eurosystem's Central Banks Provisions

Central bank provisions may be used as a measure of the perceived risk of the balance sheet composition by a central bank. We identify three possible sources that may change the size of the provisions. These are: The length of the balance sheet, the central bank revenues, and measures of fiscal stress. Using data of the 11 founding members of the Eurosystem for the years 1999–2015, we are able to test each of the three determinants. We find that provisions are increased with the size of the balance sheet especially in the recent financial crisis. Moreover, provisions are increased at the cost of lower central bank revenues. While this holds for the pre‐crisis period this relationship seems to be less pronounced in the crisis period probably because of the more active collateral policy. Finally, central banks do not tend to lower provisions because of fiscal tensions. This is even more true in the crisis period.     

中国银行业系统性风险研究*——宏观审慎视角下的三个压力测试

本文在传统网络模型中加入去杠杆—降价抛售机制,研究以下两类宏观经济冲击对银行体系系统性风险的影响。从房地产贷款违约压力测试看,房地产贷款违约引起的传染风险是系统性风险的重要来源;传染损失比重和去杠杆次数结果则表明,2007年我国银行面临的传染风险最高,之后呈现快速下降的趋势;参数敏感性结果表明,网络模型中去杠杆、降价抛售以及破产对传染风险的相对重要性依次递减。从地方政府融资平台贷款违约压力测试看,大型商业银行受平台贷款违约的影响小于股份制和城市商业银行。此外,平台贷款违约概率存在阈值,在阈值之上银行损失和倒闭急剧攀升。基于银行倒闭压力测试,量化出本文的网络模型相对于传统网络模型的优越性。本文还发现中国金融体系的系统重要性与系统脆弱性指标的“错配”对于维持金融体系稳定非常关键。     

Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain

We test whether the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism is conditioned by the financial system in which firms operate. Our results indicate that the legal and institutional environment determines the use of bank debt to finance growth opportunities. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the country's banking system contributes to solving agency and asymmetric information problems and avoiding information monopoly costs. The evolutionary process of the financial systems in each country means that market imperfections such as information asymmetry or agency costs can have a diverse influence on firms’ bank debt decisions.     

Modelling the causes and manifestation of bank stress: an example from the financial crisis

In this study, I model the predictors and manifestation of bank stress during the financial crisis using a Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause model. Unlike most early warning models that predict failure probabilities, this article describes a framework for predicting a broader notion of bank stress that need not rely on regulatory decisions. As such, this method can be easily applied to large institutions, and avoids the complications associated with modelling a regulatory decision such as failure or a CAMELS downgrade. Using bank reliance on Term Auction Facility funds and the out-of-sample incidence of failures and acquisitions, I demonstrate that the measure of bank stress generated here accords with other notions of bank-level distress. Finally, this method catalogues predictors of distress during the financial crisis. Thus, this article can help assess the validity of several recent regulatory proposals. I find that those banks entering the crisis with more Tier 1 capital, more liquid balance sheets, and relatively stable liabilities subsequently came under less stress. These findings support the Basel III recommended increases in banks’ capital adequacy, liquidity and stable funding.     

Central bank independence,inflation and political instability in developing countries

We test whether political instability affects central bank independence in developing countries. Both a legal measure and the turnover tate of central bank governors are used as proxies for central bank independence and the frequency of government transfers is used to proxy political instability. Only the number of coups affects the turnover rate of central bank governors. We also find that both the turnover rate of central bank governors and political instability affect the rate of inflation.     

银行负债、制度环境与控股股东代理成本

债权人对控股股东的制衡力量在学术界一直鲜有人关注。文章就企业的银行负债对控股股东代理成本的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验,在此基础上进一步检验了产权性质对二者关系的调节作用,以及内部治理机制和法律环境与银行负债的交互作用。利用中国A股房地产上市公司2003-2011年的面板数据,研究表明:企业的银行负债显著降低了控股股东代理成本;产权性质对二者关系具有调节作用,公司内部治理机制、法律环境与银行负债存在交互作用。文章所得出的研究结论既丰富了委托代理、资本结构等相关理论,又对银行与国有企业产权改革以及企业融资决策具有较强启示意义。     

Integrating bank profit and risk-avoidance decisions for selected European countries: A micro–macro analysis

A two-equation integrated model is developed to capture bank profit and risk-avoidance decisions. Output is limited to customer loans. The profit function is based on output and selected inputs. Risk-avoidance (using the capitalization ratio) depends on micro and micro 1 macro interactive variables. The SUR method is used to test the hypothesis that the two functions are interdependent. Also, a single reduced-form equation is derived from the SUR model to analyze the volatility of the capitalization ratio. Five European countries and their banks for the period 1991–2001 are used to run the regressions and to test the hypothesis. The individual statistical results were generally consistent with similar results found in the literature. The Breusch–Pagan test of independence was rejected. A key finding from the volatility analysis suggests that bank profit rates are inversely related to the volatility of the banks' capitalization ratios as measured by their variances.     

FDIC Coverage on bank failures: Cointegration analysis using annual data, 1942–91

The present study empirically investigates whether in the U.S. federal government-provided deposit insurance, which was intended to prevent runs on banks and to protect depositors of modest means, has acted to induce increased bank failures. This issue has been investigated earlier, but only with regression analysis, and it remains unresolved since results vary sharply from one study to the next. By contrast, the present study uses cointegration techniques to investigate this problem. The cointegration analysis finds strong evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the bank failure rate and the extent of central government-provided deposit insurance, as well as other variables. Maximum eigenvalue and trace test results, along with normalized cointegrating vectors and likelihood ratio test results, are provided for examination.     

The law of proportionate effect and OECD bank sectors

The paper investigates the growth dynamics of the bank sectors in the OECD area over the period 1985–1994 and examines whether the structural financial reforms of the late 1980s have affected their growth path. Based on a test of Gibrat's law of proportionate effect, it is found that the 1985–89 period was characterized by size convergence, implying that smaller bank sectors were expanding more rapidly. However, in the 1990–1994 period the pattern reversed to proportionate growth. The analysis of the determinants of bank market growth reveals that macroeconomic growth, operational bank efficiency, credit quality, and capitalization are the main drivers of bank industry growth.     

Social aspirations in European banks: peer-influenced risk behaviour

We test a sample of 3,586 banks from 33 European countries to determine whether performances above or below a social aspiration level (median performance of peer banks) influence banks’ aggregate risk levels. Our results are consistent with the behavioural theory of the firm and prospect theory in that we find that bank performance below a bank’s social aspiration level is followed by increased aggregate risk, i.e. risk-taking behaviour in the subsequent year. Although under-performing banks tend to be risk-takers, large banks and banks with high aggregate risk levels tend to limit the increase in their aggregate risk levels.     

Testing for nonlinearities in German bank stock returns

In this paper nonlinear structures in German bank stock returns are investigated in a stochastic modelling framework. In the first step we show the existence of a nonlinear return structure by means of the McLeod-Li and the BDS test. In the second step we focus our analysis on the kinds of nonlinearity actually present in bank stock data. On the basis of the Hsieh test it is possible to discriminate with high power additive from multiplicative dependencies to provide guidance for the choice of an adequate class of stochastic models. It is shown that the multiplicative dependencies predominating the bank stock returns can be captured by low order GARCH models.     

中国通胀惯性特征与货币政策启示

通胀惯性与货币政策效果紧密相关。本文应用具有统计无偏性的"Grid Bootstrap"估计法和未知断点结构突变检验法,研究了1980—2007年中国通货膨胀的惯性特征。本文发现,在低通胀环境下通货膨胀仍然呈现相当高的惯性特征,这暗示着我国货币政策的滞后效应依然非常明显,通货膨胀对政策变化的反应速度缓慢。计量结果说明,中央银行至少应该在出现通胀压力前一年采取措施,来应对高通胀惯性环境下的政策滞后效应。因此,新时期货币当局不仅需要保持对通胀抬头趋势的适度警觉,而且应该关注高通胀惯性对政策效果的影响。     

房地产价格、泰勒规则与宏观经济调控——基于2000-2010年我国宏观经济数据的检验

央行是否应该针对房地产价格制定货币政策进行调控,一直是学者们关注的焦点,但研究结果仍存在分歧。基于2000-2010年我国季度经济数据,对比检验了融入房地产价格的泰勒规则与标准泰勒规则对我国制定货币政策调控宏观经济的适用性。实证结果表明,依据标准泰勒规则所制定的利率政策,可以降低央行损失函数值,提高利率政策有效性。这一结果意味着,在房地产价格波动不影响物价稳定和经济增长的情况下,央行不应针对房地产价格进行调控。也就是说,央行需考虑房地产价格波动与通货膨胀和产出之间的相关关系,判断其对政策目标的潜在影响,制定利率政策对宏观经济进行调控。     

Estimating bilateral exposures in the German interbank market: Is there a danger of contagion?

Credit risk associated with interbank lending may lead to domino effects, where the failure of one bank results in the failure of other banks not directly affected by the initial shock. Recent work in economic theory shows that this risk of contagion depends on the precise pattern of interbank linkages. We use balance sheet information to estimate a matrix of bilateral credit relationships for the German banking system and test whether the breakdown of a single bank can lead to contagion. We find that in the absence of a safety net, there is considerable scope for contagion that could affect a large proportion of the banking system. The financial safety net (in this case institutional guarantees for saving banks and cooperative banks) considerably reduces—but does not eliminate—the danger of contagion. Even so, the failure of a single bank could lead to the breakdown of up to 15% of the banking system in terms of assets.     

The Theory of the Second Best and the Competitive Equilibrium Model

We study the international transmission of bank liquidity shocks from multinational, Islamic, bank-holding companies to their subsidiaries. Based on a total sample of 120 Islamic and conventional bank subsidiaries, we test whether foreign bank lending for Islamic and conventional banks is determined by different factors. We estimate a model that includes subsidiary and parent bank characteristics as well as host and home country variables. Our empirical findings show that lending is negatively affected by the fragility of conventional parent banks' subsidiaries. Nevertheless, we show that parent Islamic banks do not significantly affect lending by subsidiaries. Finally, we examine the market discipline regarding the transmission of liquidity shocks. We also find that reduction in foreign Islamic bank lending is stronger for those that are dependent on the interbank market. We establish that the depositors react to a deterioration of bank performance and punish their institutions by withdrawing their money. We show that market discipline has a more important role for Islamic banks, whereas liquidity needs determine the change in conventional banks.     

Public subsidies and new ventures’ use of bank loans

Access to financial resources is crucial for young firms to strive. To foster innovation and growth in these firms, governments address financing constraints by initiating public support programs. For such financial support to be effective, it is, however, important that firms are able to augment publicly provided resources with additional means. This study examines the relationship between new ventures’ subsidy receipt and long-term bank loans. Studying new ventures founded between 2005 and 2009 in Germany, we test whether the subsidy itself facilitates use to bank financing. Applying econometric techniques that account for the endogenous nature of a subsidy receipt, we find that subsidized young firms are more likely to use bank loans and to have obtained a larger share of their financing mix from banks. We further show that this effect is stronger in highly information-opaque sectors. These results suggest that the effect may be attributed to an information value carried by the grant that is relevant to banks’ loan assessment procedures, especially when new venture value is difficult to judge.     

Bank Behaviour and the Channel of Monetary Policy in Japan, 1965–1999

Using monthly data, this paper investigates whether there are differential effects of monetary policy across bank size and business size in Japan, to test the presence of the "bank lending channel" of monetary policy. It also considers that channel for the aggregate of banks. Prior to the end of 1984, support is found for the bank lending channel and also partly for the money channel. The study of the period from 1985 onwards suggests that no channel of monetary policy has been substantially effective in Japan.     

Inflation, government transfers, and optimal central bank independence

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage non-cooperative game between the government and the central bank. The solution to this policy game determines the optimal combination of central bank conservatism and independence. The results show that the optimal institutional design always requires some degree of central bank independence and that there is substitutability between central bank independence and conservatism. The results also show that partial central bank independence can be optimal and that there are circumstances under which it is optimal for the government to appoint a liberal central banker.