Natural resources, democracy and corruption

We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.     

Corruption and the Political Economy of Resource-Based Development: A Comparison of Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

We model how the “supply and demand” for bribes affects resource use by an economy, and the reinvestment of resource rents in other assets. This requires adjusting the World Bank’s measure adjusted net savings for any rent dissipation due to corruption. The impacts of corruption on long-run changes and periodic growth in the adjusted net savings rate are estimated across African and Asian economies from 1970 to 2003. Corruption rather than resource dependency per se affects negatively the ability of African countries to reinvest resource rents in the short term, but for Asian countries, corruption is less important than point resources. Corruption influences long-run growth in adjusted net savings rates in all countries, and is also the “pathway” through which this growth is affected by patterns of resource use, trade and abundance.     

Oil rents, corruption, and state stability: Evidence from panel data regressions

We examine the effects of oil rents on corruption and state stability exploiting the exogenous within-country variation of a new measure of oil rents for a panel of 30 oil-exporting countries during the period 1992–2005. We find that an increase in oil rents significantly increases corruption, significantly deteriorates political rights while at the same time leading to a significant improvement in civil liberties. We argue that these findings can be explained by the political elite having an incentive to extend civil liberties but reduce political rights in the presence of oil windfalls to evade redistribution and conflict. We support our argument documenting that there is a significant effect of oil rents on corruption in countries with a high share of state participation in oil production while no such link exists in countries where state participation in oil production is low.     

Demographic change and economic growth: The role of natural resources in the MENA region

This paper analyses the conditional effect of demographic change on economic development in the MENA region. We employ fixed-effects panel analysis on data from 19 countries in the region and demonstrate a negative impact of natural rents on the relationship between the working-age population and economic growth. Once the critical level of approximately 16% of resource rents (as share in total GDP) is reached, a one-unit increase in working-age population appears to harm economic growth. Further tests show that this finding is mainly driven by the negative effects of resource rents on female labor force participation. However, other drivers are a large public sector, low private sector development and inefficient labor market policies and issues such as the “Dutch disease”. The main finding remains after robustness checks in the form of controlling for competing hypotheses. Policy makers are advised to encourage economic diversification, female employment and private sector development.     

Why do many resource-rich countries have negative genuine saving?: Anticipation of better times or rapacious rent seeking

We investigate the Hartwick rule for saving of a nation necessary to sustain a constant level of private consumption for a small open economy with an exhaustible stock of natural resources. The amount by which a country saves and invests less than the marginal resource rents equals the expected capital gains on reserves of natural resources plus the expected increase in interest income on net foreign assets plus the expected fall in the cost of resource extraction due to expected improvements in extraction technology. Effectively, depletion is then postponed until better times. This suggests that it is not necessarily sub-optimal for resource-rich countries to have negative genuine saving. However, in countries with different groups with imperfectly defined property rights on natural resources, political distortions induce faster resource depletion than suggested by the Hotelling rule. Fractionalised societies with imperfect property rights build up more foreign assets than their marginal resource rents, but in the long run accumulate less foreign assets than homogenous societies. Hence, such societies end up with lower sustainable consumption and are worse off, especially if seepage is strong, the number of rival groups is large and the country does not enjoy much monopoly power on the resource market. Genuine saving is zero in such societies. However, World Bank genuine saving figures based on market rather than accounting prices will be negative, albeit less so in more fractionalised societies with less secure property rights.     

The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

Predicting FDI inflows: Exploring a nonlinear relationship between peace years,oil wealth,and the rule of law

Despite previous studies investigating the impacts of various factors such as peace years, natural resources, and the rule of law on foreign direct investment (FDI), empirical findings remain inconclusive. Therefore, this study investigates the interplay between these factors in shaping host country conditions that facilitate FDI inflows. Using generalized additive models, we examine the simultaneous effects of peace years, oil wealth, and the rule of law on FDI inflows in a sample of non-OECD countries from 1970 to 2009. Our results reveal that established peace is a critical factor in attracting FDI inflows for both oil-exporting and non-oil-exporting countries. However, the effects of the rule of law vary depending on oil wealth. Oil-exporting countries receive more FDI inflows when they have a weak rather than a strong rule of law, while non-oil-exporting countries tend to receive more foreign investments when they have a moderately strong rule of law. We argue that countries with oil wealth combined with a moderately weak rule of law provide an environment that is conducive to multinational corporations (MNCs) in extractive industries seeking monopoly rents. Conversely, countries without oil wealth should create stable yet efficient environments that protect property rights and promote labor market flexibility to appeal to non-resource-seeking MNCs.     

Transmission channels of the resource curse in Africa: A time perspective

Most sub-Saharan African countries share the following characteristics: a strong dependence on natural resources, weak institutions, and relatively low growth levels preventing them to catch up with the rest of the developing world. This paper aims to unfold the natural resource curse by introducing a time perspective: long-term versus short-term effects. Following the two-step Engle and Granger procedure, an error-correction model is performed after a cointegration estimation. In addition, the paper clusters the countries to differentiate the natural resource curse mechanisms by level of institutional quality. Results are three-fold. On the long run, the negative impact of the dependence is confirmed for all categories. Countries with weak institutions are more vulnerable to the curse because the resource dependence not only negatively impacts long-term growth but also adversely impacts the recovery process. Finally, in a strong institutional environment, results point towards a potential positive impact of natural resources during recovery process.     

Investigating the twin-deficit phenomenon among oil-exporting countries: Does oil really matter?

This study empirically investigates the existence of twin deficits—the impact of fiscal policy on the current account—among selected major oil-exporting countries. Given the huge effects of the oil proceeds on these economies, the study separates the effects of oil on the fiscal balance from its effect on the current account balance. The investigation took a further step by grouping these countries—based on their fiscal policy actions over the period of years under review—into pro-cyclical and counter-cyclical fiscal countries. In line with the existing literature, the impact of fiscal balance on the current account balance takes into consideration the contemporaneous effects brought about by exchange rate fluctuations, the growth in GDP, rate of openness and the growth in money supply. The models are estimated based on a panel of 31 oil-exporting countries over the period 1984–2013, using the two-stage least squares estimation techniques. The results from all countries estimations reveal the existence of twin-deficit in the total economy. In the non-oil economy, on the other hand, the evidence of twin-deficit disappears. This evidence is also reported in the counter-cyclical fiscal countries. Results from pro-cyclical fiscal countries indicated the total opposite, revealing the existence of twin-deficit in the non-oil economy, while this evidence does not occur in the total economy. The indisputable conclusion is that oil dominance continues to blur the existence of twin deficits among the oil-exporting countries.     

Initial endowments and economic reform in 27 post-socialist countries

This study explores how initial endowments at the start of transition have shaped reform outcomes and reform trajectories in 27 former communist countries in Europe and Central Asia. Countries of the former Russian Empire that had a large resources sector at the start of transition underperformed other countries in terms of the speed and the depth of economic reforms. The effect is particularly strong for privatization, enterprise restructuring and competition policy. Within country, Ottoman or Russian provinces that had a large natural resources sector in 1989 have a lower share of entrepreneurs and of small and medium sized enterprises today and also experience endemic corruption. Our results indicate that the propensity, or ability, of special interest groups to capture the reform process that would erode their rents were facilitated by the quality of institutions whose foundations go back centuries; and that the effects on the local economy are real.     

General Equilibrium Tragedy of the Commons

Many poor economies depend on open access resources for their livelihoods. Households in resource-based economies allocate their time and other factors between resource extraction and other activities. As a result, factors may shift from one sector to another as marginal returns change. This has two important implications. First, it implies potentially strong linkages between resource and non-resource sectors. Second, it means that unmanaged resources cause inefficient allocations of inputs across all sectors, and the effects of resource management spill into other sectors. We construct a local general equilibrium model that accounts for inputs that over-allocate to an open access resource and create a general equilibrium tragedy of the commons. This model describes resource rent dissipation more adequately in economies with mobile factors than a model with slowly dissipating rents. Perfectly mobile factors dissipate rent in every period, but endogenous wages cause labor and capital allocations to change with the resource stock. We use the model to illustrate medium-run impacts of a limit on capital in an artisanal fishery in Honduras. Simulation results reveal that fishery management has economy-wide impacts on prices and wages. Managers in developing countries thus should consider these linkages when implementing policies to conserve fish stocks.     

Oil and political survival

Political economy theories on the “natural resource curse” predict that natural resource wealth is a determining factor for the length of time political leaderships remain in office. Whether resource wealth leads to longer or shorter durations in political office depends on the political incentives created by the natural resources, which in turn depend on the types of institutions and natural resource. Exploiting a sample of more than 600 political leadership durations in up to 152 countries, we find that both institutions and resource types matter for the effect that natural resource wealth has on political survival: (i) wealth derived from natural resources affects political survival in intermediate and autocratic, but not in democratic, polities; and (ii) while oil and non-lootable diamonds are associated with positive effects on the duration in political office, minerals are associated with negative duration effects.     

Oil Exports, Non-Oil GDP, and Investment in the GCC Countries

This paper studies the long-run and short-run relationships between oil exports, non-oil GDP, and investment in five major oil-exporting countries. Its goal is to verify the effect of natural resources exports on economic performance. It considers the effect of cross-sectional correlations and uses the corresponding panel unit-root tests to study the long-run characteristics of the data series. The results show that resources' exports have no long-run relationship with the macroeconomic variables. A VAR analysis is used to estimate the short-run dynamics and shows that the effect of oil exports on those variables depends on local policies.     

Drivers of the real effective exchange rates in high and upper‐middle income countries

This paper revisits the nexus between real effective exchange rate (REER) and total factor productivity (TFP) by controlling for trade openness, financial development and natural resources rents. We use a sample of 60 high‐income and upper‐middle income countries over the period 1995–2015 and employ the GMM estimation framework. Our results advance the empirical knowledge on the drivers of REER by providing robust evidence that the impact of TFP is not uniform across different country clusters. We find that in high‐income countries, increasing productivity causes the REER to depreciate hence becoming more trade competitive while the opposite is true for upper‐middle income countries. Furthermore, financial development and natural resources rents have no meaningful impact in the case of upper‐middle income countries but retain a significant effect in high‐income countries. Trade openness plays a key role in explaining the variation in REER in both country clusters.     

Taxation of a Polluting Non-renewable Resource in the Heterogeneous World

This paper extends the literature on the taxation of polluting exhaustible resources by taking international heterogeneities and national tax-setting into account. We propose a two-country Romer model of endogenous growth in which the South is endowed with the stock of an essential polluting non-renewable resource and world economic growth is driven by a northern research sector. We consider the stock of pollution as affecting global welfare. First, we characterize the optimal environmental taxation policies. Second, we examine the impacts of national taxes. Their time profile determines the extraction path, the dynamics of pollution accumulation and that of world output. Their respective levels entail inter-country interactions by altering the efficiency of the world resource allocation, the tax revenues and the resource rents. We study isolatedly the distortional and distributional effects of local taxes. Then, we completely assess the overall impact of a unilateral tax increase. Finally, we find that, even if heterogeneous countries coordinate their taxation policies to correct the global environmental problem, their divergent strategic interests cause another global, non-environmental distortion in the allocation of the resource.     

Frontiers and sustainable economic development

Exploiting new resource “frontiers,” such as agricultural land and mineral reserves, is a fundamental feature of economic development in poor economies. Yet frontier-based development is symptomatic of a pattern of economy-wide resource exploitation in developing economies that: (a) generates little additional economic rents, and (b) what rents are generated are not being reinvested in other sectors. Such development is inherently unsustainable. The following paper explains this phenomenon, and provides evidence that long-run expansion of agricultural land and oil and natural gas proved reserves across poor economies is associated with lower levels of real income per capita. The paper proposes a frontier expansion hypothesis to explain why the structural economic dependence of these economies on frontier land expansion and resource exploitation is not conducive to sustained long-run growth. The key to sustainable economic development in poor economies will be improving the economic integration between frontier and other sectors of the economy, targeting policies to improved resource management in frontier areas and overcoming problems of corruption and rent-seeking in resource sectors.      

OIL CURSE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES: WHICH INSTITUTIONS ARE MOST VULNERABLE TO THE CURSE AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES?

This article extends recent analyses linking the alleged oil curse to a broader set of institutions (13 in number) than democracy, the institution that has received the most attention in the literature. It does so using panel data for over 100 countries between 1975 and 2005, wherever possible, and compares the effects obtained with several different measures of both the importance of oil and experience in the industry and of the interactions between them. Most importantly, instead of simply examining the effect of oil and experience in the industry on the contemporary levels of these various institutions, this study focuses on the effects on changes in the various institutional indicators from one decade to another. While not surprisingly our results reveal considerable sensitivity in the effects of oil resources, oil experience, and interactions across different specifications, they also suggest a number of important findings. The most robust of these are the significant negative effects of oil rents on bureaucratic quality and on socioeconomic conditions. We also find that the number of years since peak oil discovery has a positive effect on government stability, but a negative one on bureaucratic quality. When interactions are allowed for, still more negative effects on institutions are identified, at least partially re‐enforcing several of the institutional links in the oil curse hypothesis. (JEL O13, P16)     

Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies

Resource-rich countries have tended to be autocratic and also have tended to use their resource wealth badly. The neoconservative agenda of promoting democratization in resource-rich countries thus offers the hopeful prospect of a better use of their economic opportunities. This paper examines whether the effect of democracy on economic performance is distinctive in resource-rich societies. We show that a priori the sign of the effect is ambiguous: Resource rents could either enhance or undermine the economic consequences of democracy. We therefore investigate the issue empirically. We first build a new dataset on country-specific resource rents, annually for the period 1970-2001. Using a global panel dataset, we find that in developing countries the combination of high natural resource rents and open democratic systems has been growth-reducing. Checks and balances offset this adverse effect. Thus, resource-rich economies need a distinctive form of democracy with particularly strong checks and balances. Unfortunately, this is rare: Checks and balances are public goods and so are liable to be undersupplied in new democracies. Over time they are eroded by resource rents.     

China's Economic Influence in Latin America

After decades of low‐level commercial interaction, China and Latin America significantly ramped up their economic relationship in the 2000s. China has jumped to first place as an export destination for many countries, and it is a major source of imports for all countries in the Latin America/Caribbean region. While not a major source of foreign direct investment overall, China has built a strong investment presence in certain countries, particularly in the natural resource and infrastructure sectors. China's influence in Latin America has presented a great opportunity for many countries, but it has also brought new risks. Three main challenges face the region: how to mitigate the impacts of increased commodity concentration as a result of China's strong demand for natural resources; how to avoid other natural resource curse effects; and how to manage the tapering of this growth. Latin American countries' relationships with China vary widely, so there is no single, coordinated regional response.