Wealth effects of convertible-bond and warrant-bond offerings: a meta-analysis

The literature on wealth effects associated with the announcements of convertible-bond and warrant-bond offerings is reviewed. The findings of 35 event studies, which include 84 sub-samples and 6310 announcements, are analysed using meta-analysis. We find a mean cumulative abnormal return of?1.14% for convertibles compared with?0.02% for warrant bonds, the significant difference confirming a relative advantage for warrant bonds. Abnormal returns for hybrid securities issued in the USA are significantly more negative than those issued in other countries. In addition, issuing hybrid securities to refund debt does not seem to be favoured by investors. Finally, several factors identified as important by theory or in prior research are not significant within our cross-study models, suggesting that more evidence is needed to confirm whether they are robust.     

国际信用评级体系改革进程及我国评级业发展展望

信用评级是解决金融市场信息不对称问题的重要途径之一,其在资本市场特别是债券市场运行中起着风险揭示、市场定价、防范信用风险等重要作用。长期以来,国际信用评级领域形成了以美国三大评级机构为主体的寡头垄断格局。本次国际金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机的爆发,凸显出现行国际信用评级体系存在的种种弊端。本文分析了现行国际信用评级体系所存在的缺陷,探讨了国际社会及我国政府为进一步完善国际信用评级体系所采取的措施、信用评级对我国商业银行的重要作用及应对建议。     

美国评级业监管发展动向及述评

在过去近百年的时间里,美国的资信评级业扩张明显,在资本市场的作用日益重要,评级业的监管也日益完善。本文回顾了美国评级业的监管历史,对2006年新发布的资信评级机构改革法案进行了介绍,并总结和评论了美国证监会2007年发布的“注册为全国认可统计评级组织的评级机构监管”规则提案征求意见稿的相关内容,以期为我国的评级业发展提供借鉴。     

欧盟信用评级机构最新监管草案研究及启示

2008年金融危机后,欧盟委员会正式启动欧盟信用评级机构监管立法工作,于2009年出台《欧盟信用评级机构监管法规》(Regulation No1060/2009),经过多次修订并引入新制度补充完善,欧盟信用评级监管框架趋于健全、规范。我国可以借鉴欧盟最新评级机构监管法规及监管实施思路,尽快完善信用评级监管法规体系,推行内外部评级双轨运行模式,同时从评级机构内部风险控制、信息披露等入手,统一规范执业标准,推动我国信用评级行业稳步健康发展。     

Rating or no rating? That is the question: an empirical examination of UK companies

The aim of this paper is to examine the main determinants of the rating likelihood of UK companies. We use a binary probit specification to model the main drivers of a firm's propensity to be rated. Using a sample of 245 non-financial UK companies over the period 1995–2006, representing up to 2872 firm years, the study establishes important differences in the financial profiles of rated and non-rated firms. The results of the rating likelihood models indicate that the decision to obtain a rating is driven by a company's financial risk, solvency, default risk, public debt issuance, R&D, and institutional ownership, thus identifying a wider range of determinants and extending the current literature. The study also finds that the rating decision can be modelled by means of a contemporaneous or predictive specification without any loss of efficiency or classification accuracy. This offers support to the argument that the rating process is fundamentally forward-looking.     

Do rating agencies’ decisions impact stock risks? Evidence from European markets

This article analyses the effect of rating agencies’ decisions on stock risks for European issuers concerning five kinds of events. Our approach is an extension of dummy variable regression event study methodology, using a GARCH(1,1) estimation to capture simultaneously the impact on both systematic and specific stock risks. This new methodology allows us to obtain both global results by categories of rating decisions and individual results, event by event. We document, globally, a positive impact of upgrading on systematic risk, a negative impact of rating confirmation on specific risk, and no significant impact in all other cases. Regarding event-by-event results, the proportion of rating actions exhibiting a significant effect on risk is almost always observed between 20% and 30%. The weak evidence of a global effect on systematic risk may be due to the lack of informational content of the rating decisions on the stocks’ risk, or the existence of rebalancing effects between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Furthermore, it should be noticed that the decline in volatility in case of a rating affirmed is an insight of the certification role played by the agencies.     

Insider employee stock option trading and stock prices

The question of which factors determine corporate bonds pricing is investigated by analysing the spreads of eurobonds issued by major G-10 companies during the 1991–2001 period. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, bond ratings appear as the most important determinant of yield spreads, with investors’ reliance on rating agencies judgments increasing over time. Second, the primary market efficiency and the expected secondary market liquidity are not relevant explanatory factors of spreads cross-sectional variability. Finally, rating agencies adopt a different, ‘through the cycle’, evaluation criteria of default risk with respect to the forward looking one adopted by bond investors.     

Cross‐Listed Bonds,Information Asymmetry,and Conservatism in Credit Ratings

We propose information asymmetry as an additional explanation for rating conservatism. Because information asymmetry is likely higher for cross‐listed bonds than for U.S. bonds, we expect and find that cross‐listed bonds are rated more conservatively than U.S. domestic bonds at issuance. Further, cross‐listed bonds receive less frequent upgrades and take longer to be upgraded after issuance. Because lower ratings might also reflect higher default risk based on agencies’ private information, we conduct additional tests to discriminate between the rating conservatism and private information explanations. The results are consistent with ratings conservatism and inconsistent with the private information explanation.     

Corporate Fraud and Corporate Bond Costs: Evidence from China

This study investigates the relationship between corporate fraud and four typical components of costs associated with corporate bonds. Based on data from a booming corporate bond market in China, we confirm that fraudulent issuers have higher corporate bond costs. Specifically, they are more likely to push upward price revisions, pay higher issue fees and coupon spreads, and encounter larger underpricing after issuance. Moreover, we demonstrate that severe corporate fraud is also significantly related to the costs of corporate bonds. Furthermore, we find that investors pay more attention to fraud in accounting information and disclosure. These results remain robust to a strand of endogeneity and through the robustness tests. In additional research, we find that bonds issued by fraudulent firms tend to receive lower ratings and show inferior performance after issuance. We also demonstrate that the effects of corporate fraud on bond costs erode as time passes, although the mitigation speed is slow. Finally, we find that hiring reputable financial intermediaries can partially mitigate the negative effects of corporate fraud.