Skewed background risks and higher-order risk preferences: prudent versus temperate behavior

In recent economic experiments, lotteries with left-skewed background risks elicit more prudent choices than lotteries with right-skewed background risks. In this letter, we use an expected utility framework to show that a skewed zero-mean background risk may induce not only prudent but also temperate behaviour. We suggest that the experimental findings could also be due to temperance, rather than merely to prudence.     

Higher-order risk preferences in social settings

We study prudence and temperance (next to risk aversion) in social settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that these higher-order risk preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only affect their own payoff. Yet, many risky and financially relevant decisions are made in the social settings of households or organizations. We elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematically vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. Our results reveal that the majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings. We also observe that individuals are influenced significantly by the preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate and choices are payoff-relevant for both of them.     

ON THE CONCAVITY AND QUASICONCAVITY PROPERTIES OF UTILITY FUNCTIONS

Concavity and quasiconcavity have always been important properties in financial economics particularly in decision problems when an objective function has to be maximized over a convex set. Both properties have mainly been used as purely technical assumptions. In this paper, we link concavity and quasiconcavity of a utility function to the basic concepts of risk aversion, prudence, risk vulnerability and temperance. We show that concavity means the agent is more risk vulnerable than prudent. In particular, we can see when a function is both concave and quasiconcave and when it is only quasiconcave.     

Underestimation of probabilities modifications: characterization and economic implications

The aim of this paper is to propose a behavioral characterization of individuals who underestimate probabilities modifications and to characterize this behavior in the standard preferences representation models under risk (expected utility, dual theory, rank dependent utility theory and MaxMin expected utility). Our main results are the following. Underreaction to probabilities modifications is in general independent from standard risk aversion and prudence. In models involving probabilities transformation functions, it is characterized by the slope of the probability transformation function. In the MaxMin expected utility model under risk, it is related to the weights of the maximal and minimal consequences in the preferences representation function. Considering a simple prevention decision, consisting in the reduction in the probability of a monetary loss, we show that individuals who underreact to probabilities modifications, invest less in prevention than individuals who objectively evaluate these modifications. Underreaction to probabilities modification is thus a possible explanation for low investment in prevention.     

Optimal Commodity Taxation in the Presence of Tourists

Abstract

This paper explores empirically whether Japanese consumers became more prudent in the second half of the 1990s, a decade in which Japan registered historically low economic growth. Employing the methodology developed by Dynan (1993), this study uses micro-level data from the Family Savings Survey and the Family Income and Expenditure Survey to estimate the coefficient of prudence for Japanese households in the second half of the 1990s. The estimates reveal that the coefficient of prudence is positive and statistically significant in the 1998–1999 period. The obtained value for the coefficient of prudence is four, which is much higher than that estimated for US households (not significantly different from zero) or UK households (around 2). The estimated coefficient for young households is higher still, which is consistent with simulation studies conducted by Gourinchas & Parker (2002) showing that precaution is the most important saving motive for younger households.     

Aggressive oil extraction and precautionary saving: Coping with volatility

The effects of stochastic oil demand on optimal oil extraction paths and tax, spending and government debt policies are analyzed when the oil demand schedule is linear and preferences quadratic. Without prudence, optimal oil extraction is governed by the Hotelling rule and optimal budgetary policies by the tax and consumption smoothing principle. Volatile oil demand brings forward oil extraction and induces a bigger government surplus. With prudence, the government depletes oil reserves even more aggressively and engages in additional precautionary saving financed by postponing spending and bringing taxes forward, especially if it has substantial monopoly power on the oil market, gives high priority to the public spending target, is very prudent, and future oil demand has high variance. Uncertain economic prospects induce even higher precautionary saving and, if non-oil revenue shocks and oil revenue shocks are positively correlated, even more aggressive oil extraction. In contrast, prudent governments deliberately underestimate oil reserves which induce less aggressive oil depletion and less government saving, but less so if uncertainty about reserves and oil demand are positively correlated.     

Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion

Variation in the degree of downside risk aversion across decision makers has implications for efficient risk sharing. However, except for small differences in risk preferences, there is no index, analogous to the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, that depends only on local properties of the utility function and indicates the degree of aversion to downside risk. A measure that does depend only on local properties of the utility function u, the index of prudence p=−u^?/u^″, is related to downside risk aversion, which is indicated by a positive value for u^?. Although we show that the degree of prudence is not an accurate indicator of the degree of downside risk aversion, we nonetheless demonstrate that a uniform increase in prudence accompanied by a uniform increase (decrease) in risk aversion is sufficient to indicate greater downside risk aversion, provided prudence is greater (less) than three times the degree of risk aversion.     

The impact of prudence on optimal prevention

Summary. What are the determinants of the optimal level of effort to reduce the probability of a loss to occur? Whereas most of the literature on this question focused on risk aversion, we show that the concept of prudence (i.e., a positive third derivative of the utility function) is essential to answer this question. We explain in this paper that prudence and prevention tend to be opponents rather than allies contrary to the intuition attached to everyday language.Received: 7 November 2003, Revised: 3 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D61, D81. Correspondence to: Christian Gollier     

Consumption and precautionary saving: An empirical analysis under both financial and environmental risks

This paper studies the empirical relationship between consumption and saving under two different sources of uncertainty: financial risk and environmental risk. The analysis is carried out using time series data for six advanced economies in the period 1965–2007.The results support the theoretical conclusions that both financial risk alone and the interaction between financial and environmental risks influence consumption. Moreover, we suggest a solution to some shortcomings which affect the empirical analysis performed with one-argument utility functions. Finally, we provide new estimates of indexes of relative risk aversion and relative prudence, as well as relative preference of environmental quality.     

Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks

This paper studies both the owner–manager relationship and the union–firm relationship in a model of unionised duopoly to analyse whether a firm's owner delegates the task of wage bargaining to a manager along with the task of output determination. We also analyse the profit and welfare effects of multiple‐task delegation. It has been shown in the literature that, when there is only one delegation task – output determination – delegation of output decisions to managers leads to lower profits for owners than non‐delegation as pure profit‐maximisation. However, when there are two delegation tasks as in our model – output determination and wage bargaining – we show that owners are better off delegating both tasks than delegating only the output decision or not delegating at all. This result provides a rationale and managerial insight for strategically delegating multiple tasks to managers. Moreover, we show that union utility, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher when owners do not delegate the task of wage bargaining than when they do. This result suggests that governments implement union contracts that require owners, rather than managers, to negotiate wages with unions in order to benefit unions and consumers and to improve social welfare as well.     

Optimal choice of prevention and cure under uncertainty on disease effect and cure effectiveness

This paper studies optimal prevention and cure when an agent copes with two different sources of uncertainty: uncertainty on disease effect and uncertainty on cure effectiveness. We first analyze how optimal choices are affected by uncertainty when prevention and cure do not interact. Under both types of uncertainty, we obtain that the optimal level of prevention rises. Furthermore, we characterize for each source of uncertainty the conditions for the optimal level of cure to increase. We show that these conditions are related to different measures of prudence in health and cross-prudence in wealth. Lastly, we generalize our results to the case where prevention and cure interact and characterize for each source of uncertainty the conditions for the optimal level of prevention and cure to jointly increase. These conditions are similar to those obtained in the case without uncertainty but, in this context, Edgeworth–Pareto complementarity is also required.     

Suit the action to the word,the word to the action: Eliciting motives for trust and reciprocity by attitudinal and behavioural measures

Two important primitives of social capital are the disposition to trust and to reciprocate manifested in social life. In this paper, attitudinal and behavioural evidence is used to investigate the nature of the motivations underlying behaviour in Trust and Dictator games. In doing so, we have three aims. First, to find out whether, and to what extent, answers to a questionnaire about attitudes towards trust and civicness predict subjects’ behaviour. Second, to disentangle strategic from other-regarding motivations by comparing behaviour in Trust and Dictator Games. Third, to investigate to what extent a correspondence could be found between subjects’ attitudinal ‘type’ and their behaviour in the two interactive experimental settings. The paper builds on previous work in the area and in particular finds that using surveys to distinguish between the behavioural responses of different attitudinal types–“Trusting” or “Prudent” on the one hand and “Trustworthy” or “Untrustworthy” on the other, allows us to dig deeper into the underlying motivations of the experimental subjects. The self-declared trusting tend to manifest trust by investing more in the risky interaction than the prudent, and the self-declared trustworthy are inclined to return more than the untrustworthy. Moreover, the self-reported trustworthy and untrustworthy tend to manifest positive or negative reciprocity, respectively. The evidence suggests that the former are moved by the intention to reward and the latter by the desire to punish a stingy Sender by returning an even smaller amount than received. This seems to confirm the “multiple self” view (Elster, 1986), whereby in the personality of each individual many components–possibly distant in terms of the motivating sentiments–are gathered together.     

Political Leaders' Socioeconomic Background and Public Budget Deficits: Evidence from OECD Countries

This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between political leaders' socioeconomic backgrounds and public budget deficits utilizing panel data on 21 OECD countries from 1980 to 2008. Building on sociological, as well as economic research, we argue that the socioeconomic status of political decision‐makers, i.e., presidents or prime ministers, is an important determinant of fiscal budget decisions. Our theory‐consistent findings show that the tenures of lower‐class leaders – i.e., leaders of low socioeconomic status – are associated with a deficit‐to‐GDP ratio which is 1.6 percentage points higher than that during tenures of upper‐class leaders.     

Comparison of Some Static Hedging Models of Agricultural Commodities Price Uncertainty

In static framework, many hedging strategies can be settled following the various hedge ratios that have been developed in the literature. However, it is difficult to choose among them the best the appropriate strategy according the to preference or economic behavior of the decision-maker such as prudence and temperance. This is so even with the hedging effectiveness measure. After introducing a hedging ratio that take into account the prudence and temperance of the decision maker, we propose a ranking based approach to measure the effectiveness using L-moment to classify hedge portfolios, hence hedge ratios, with regard to their performance. Moreover, we deal with the hedging issue in presence of quantity and rollover risks and derive an optimal strategy that depends upon the basis and insurance contract. Such hedging issue includes the relevant risks encountered in practice and we relate how insurance contract, specially designed for production risk could affect the futures hedge. The application on some agricultural futures prices data at hands shows that taking into account quantity and rollover risks leads to better hedging strategy based on the L-performance effectiveness measure.

     

习惯形成、收入阶层异质性与我国城镇居民消费行为研究

习惯形成是居民消费变化的一个基本特征，收入阶层异质性是居民禀赋差异的主要体现，本文旨在结合两者探究我国城镇居民的消费行为，以探寻扩大居民消费的方法。基于阶层消费函数理论，运用收入阶层面板SUR的结果显示，居民消费具有显著的习惯形成特征，消费行为呈现异质性，表现为低收入居民的消费习惯较弱、消费倾向较高，中等收入居民的习惯较强、消费较谨慎，高收入居民的习惯较强、地位性消费较活跃。当前“金字塔”形的收入分布、不断扩大但谨慎的中等收入居民、地位性消费的外流抑制了城镇居民消费的扩大，居民消费的相对不足主要是结构性问题。应依据各阶层消费的特点，从供给侧出发构建长效机制，促进低收入居民的收入平稳增长，多方面减弱中等收入居民的谨慎性，并提升国内消费品的质量和档次。     

Economic status of households and labour supply to market and non-market activities mdash; some results from a poor rural economy

Assuming a given underlying utility structure for all households, we have demonstrated that the differential labour supply behaviour among household categories results owing to the different sets of constraints they face depending on their economic status and asset ownership. Using the criteria implied by the theoretical model four household gorups are defined. The labour supply functions estimated for these four groups support the theoretical result of significantly different supply behaviour. The empirical exercise, as expected, indicates that the labour supply decision of the subsistence group is guided by their need to achieve the minimum level of consumption while the middle-income households, who do not have enough non-labour income to meet their minimum subsistence need, tend to work longer hours in market activities than the workers from high-income households. However, market labour supply by high-income households is found to be relatively more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. The behaviour of the household groups differ so significantly that if an aggregate model is estimated ignoring inter-household differences, the predicted hours will grossly over-estimate labour supply to market activities.     

Precautionary saving under liquidity constraints: Evidence from rural Pakistan

This paper investigates precautionary saving under liquidity constraints in Pakistan using household panel data. In particular, while it estimates Kimball's [Kimball, M.S. Precautionary saving in the small and in the large. Econometrica 1990; 58; 53–73.] prudence parameter based on a framework that is similar to Dynan [Dynan, K.E. How prudent are consumers? Journal of Political Economy 1993; 101; 1104–1113.], this study deviates from the framework by explicitly considering liquidity constraints, as in Zeldes [Zeldes, S.P. Consumption and liquidity constraints: an empirical investigation. Journal of Political Economy 1989; 97; 305–346.]. By doing so, this paper attempts to differentiate the standard precautionary saving caused by uncertainty from that caused by liquidity constraints. Furthermore, endogenous liquidity constraints are used in order to resolve issues of selection biases. We find substantial evidence of the presence of precautionary saving in Pakistan. More specifically, the estimated prudence is significantly higher for liquidity-constrained households as compared with unconstrained ones. The finding suggests that the precautionary saving motives appear stronger when households see that their access to credit markets is limited.     

Learning in Cournot Oligopoly – an Experiment

This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful behaviour if they have the necessary information, and if they imitate, markets are more competitive. Other subjects follow a best reply process. On the aggregate level we find that more information about demand and cost conditions yields less competitive behaviour, while more information about the quantities and profits of other firms yields more competitive behaviour.     

Fee-for-service payments and consultation length in general practice: a work–leisure trade-off model for French GPs

This article presents an adaptation of the labour supply model applied to the independent medical sector. First, we model simultaneous General Practitioner (GP) decisions on both the leisure time and the consultation length for two payment schemes: fixed fees and unregulated fees. The objective of this econometric study is to validate the theoretical prediction that doctors under unregulated fees may make choices about the length of patient consultations independent of their personal leisure decision. Indeed, according to our empirical results, the bidirectional link between leisure choice and consultation length – verified with fixed fees – does not hold any longer under unregulated fees. Our findings can be seen as a necessary but not a sufficient condition to legitimize unregulated fees in general practice.