减税能否提高企业生产效率?——基于西部大开发准自然实验的研究

降低实体经济企业成本,提高其经济效率,是我国供给侧改革的核心内容,而减税政策是重中之重.文章以西部大开发作为准自然实验,基于1998-2007年工业企业微观数据,使用双重差分法研究了减税对实体经济的影响.研究发现,减税政策能够刺激实体经济发展,名义税率每下降1%,企业生产效率平均提高0.38%-0.75%.减税对企业生产效率的影响既有直接效应也存在间接效应.直接效应表现为减税有利于存续企业生产效率的提升,间接效应则表现为减税可以刺激更多的创业活动,而新进入企业比存续企业具有更高的生产效率.异质性检验表明,小企业比大企业对于减税政策更加敏感,而且减税对生产效率的影响随着时间推移先增加后减小,存在长期收敛效应.文章为我国减税政策如何影响企业生产效率提供了经验证据,对于今后税收政策的制定具有重要的理论与实践意义.     

创业政策对大学生创业动力的影响实证研究

我国中央及各地方政府出台了一系列政策以激励大学生创业,但大学毕业生的自主创业比例及成功率均很低.本文从创业政策角度实证探讨了其对大学生创业动力的影响,对完善大学生创业政策具有一定的参考意义.以大学生为研究对象,在564份有效问卷的基础上,通过因子分析提取商务支持、金融支持、创业教育、配套措施、创业文化五个创业政策因子,以及内在、外在创业动力两个创业动力因子.实证结果表明,五个创业政策因子均与大学生内在、外在创业动力有显著正相关性,其中金融支持和配套措施对外在创业动力的影响最为显著,配套措施对内在创业动力的影响最为显著.     

国外中小企业税收政策及其对我国的启示

在对中小企业的税收支持方面,各国的具体做法虽然各有千秋,但总体而言,还是存在比较大的相似性。我们应借鉴国外的相关做法,结合我国的具体国情,从税收制度和税收管理两方面入手,进一步改革和完善扶持中小企业的税收政策。     

Entry,growth, and survival: The new learning on firm selection and industry evolution

This paper tries to shed some light on the seeming paradox posed by the findings in the industrial organization literature that (1) the bulk of firms in an industry are not only very small, but also sufficiently small so that they are operating at a sub-optimal scale of output, and (2) entrepreneurs are apparently not deterred from starting new firms even in industries where scale economies play an important role. A dynamic view of the process of firm selection and industry evolution is that new firms typically start at a very smal scale of output. Because this level of output may be sub-optimal, the firm must grow in order to survive. The empirical evidence supports such a dynamic view of the evolutionary nature of industries. Viewed through a dynamic lens, the often-observed asymmetric size distribution of firms becomes more understandable. The persistence of an asymmetric firm-size distribution skewed towards small enterprises presumably reflects a continuing process of entry into industries and not necessarily the survival of such small and suboptimal enterprises over a long period of time.     

Freedom,barriers to entry,entrepreneurship, and economic progress

While entrepreneurs benefit from unrestricted free entry into markets, they have a time-inconsistent incentive to lobby for government entry restrictions once they become successful. Bad political institutions yield to these demands, and growing barriers are placed on domestic and international competition. Good institutions do not, and this effort is instead channeled toward further wealth creation. We find that productive entrepreneurship depends on both the freedom to succeed and discipline of failure that free markets provide. Trade barriers result in fewer combinations of goods and inputs attempted, and less productive entrepreneurial resource use. We also provide evidence on the value of business failure.

Taxation and corruption: theory and firm-level evidence from Uganda

This article develops a simple framework to analyse the negotiation over bribe and tax payments during the tax collection process. We show that the larger the bribe a firm offers to a tax collector, the larger the tax rebate it gets. More particularly, we show that the negotiation over bribe and tax payments hinges on four other factors: firms’ official liabilities, detection, firms’ negotiation power and red tape costs imposed on firms. Some of the predictions from the theoretical model are tested using firm-level data from Uganda. We find that bribe and tax payments are inversely related, thereby supporting the hypothesis of a negotiation taking place between firms and tax collectors. In particular, a 1% point increase in average bribe payments per employee is associated with a 7% point reduction in average amount of tax payments per employee. Results are robust to various instruments dealing with the endogenous relationship between bribes and taxes.