Selling Time and Selling Price: The Influence of Seller Motivation

We consider the role that seller motivation plays in determining selling time, list price and sale price. A new survey of home sellers suggests that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivation to sell. Our findings are that a seller who, at the time of listing, has a planned date to move sells more quickly than one who does not. Also, the shorter the planned time until a move at the time of listing, the shorter the actual duration of marketing time. We find that seller motivation affects sale price, but not the list-price markup. Our results suggest that theoretical models of the housing search process should be recast to allow for heterogeneous sellers.     

Optimal Selling Mechanism,Auction Discounts and Time on Market

This article examines the optimal selling mechanism problem in real estate market using mean‐variance analysis and downside risk analysis. When sellers can choose between accepting the first offer above a reservation price or auctions (waiting an optimal and fixed time), sellers having higher risk aversion choose auctions and wait a fixed time while sellers having lower risk aversion choose an optimal reservation price and wait a random time. Positive auction discounts are compensated by reduced risks, and there exists a connection between liquidity risk and conditional auction discount. More (Fewer) sellers will choose to sell their houses through auctions in a hot (cold) market or when holding cost increases (decreases). When sellers choose auctions, sellers having higher risk aversion who have lower holding cost wait longer and obtain higher sale price. Loss‐averse sellers unanimously choose the mechanism of setting an optimal reservation price.     

A Spatiotemporal Solution for the Simultaneous Sale Price and Time‐on‐the‐Market Problem

There exists an important methodological challenge when dealing with sale price and time‐on‐the‐market variables because both variables are simultaneously determined and related to the motivation of the sellers and buyers. Exploiting the fact that transactions occur over space and time, we propose a two‐stage approach based on instrumental variables (IV) built from information collected from previous transactions. The unidirectional temporal property and the fact that other transactions are exogenous from the perspective of a single buyer or seller are exploited to evaluate the effect of the sale price on time‐on‐the‐market, and the effect of time‐on‐the‐market on the sale price. Based on 29,471 transactions occurring in the suburban neighborhood of Montréal (1992‐2000), the results suggest that, everything else being equal, houses staying longer on the market provide negative information to the market, which results in a lower final sale price, while the final sale price is negatively related to time‐on‐the‐market, indicating that houses of better quality (better amenities) stay less time on the market.     

The Effects of Charm Listing Prices on House Transaction Prices

As is the case for many different goods and services, it is common practice in many real estate markets for sellers to offer properties for sale at listing prices just below some round number price ( e.g. , $99,900 instead of $100,000). The academic marketing literature refers to this practice as "charm" pricing and suggests that this strategy is an attempt by sellers to take advantage of buyers' cognitive processes in which charm prices affect buyers' perceptions about the seller or the item being offered for sale. Although numerous papers in the housing economics literature have addressed the impact of the magnitude of listing price on observed house transaction prices, no prior published study has considered the impact of the design of listing prices in housing markets. This paper presents an empirical investigation of the effects of charm pricing on house transaction prices using sample data. The results provide some evidence that houses listed at certain charm prices sell for significantly greater transaction prices than those listed at round number prices.     

List Prices,Sale Prices and Marketing Time: An Application to U.S. Housing Markets

Many goods are marketed after first stating a list price, with the expectation that the eventual sales price will differ. In this article, we first present a simple model of search behavior that includes the seller setting a list price. Holding constant the mean of the buyers’ distribution of potential offers for a good, we assume that the greater the list price, the slower the arrival rate of offers but the greater is the maximal offer. This trade‐off determines the optimal list price, which is set simultaneously with the seller's reservation price. Comparative statics are derived through a set of numerical sensitivity tests, where we show that the greater the variance of the distribution of buyers’ potential offers, the greater is the ratio of the list price to expected sales price. Thus, sellers of atypical goods will tend to set a relatively high list price compared with standard goods. We test this hypothesis using data from the Columbus, Ohio, housing market and find substantial support. We also find empirical support for another hypothesis of the model: atypical dwellings take longer to sell.     

Why Do Sellers Hold Out in the Housing Market? An Option‐Based Explanation

In the residential housing market, home owners are reluctant to sell in a declining market. We build a model which focuses on the embedded call option associated with home ownership that allows owners to delay the (irreversible) sale. When prices are low, the (opportunity) cost of a sale, i.e., a higher implied gain from a future sale, likely exceeds its immediate trade benefit and an owner is better off waiting for market conditions to improve. The model also highlights the importance of supply conditions: a more constrained supply is associated with a longer delay. Using state‐level residential housing data, we find evidence consistent with the model. Transaction volume is increasing (decreasing) in the rental growth rate (volatility) in the cross section; their effects are amplified in areas with low supply elasticities, and in times with low market prices. Overall, this paper provides a rational explanation for delayed trading decisions in the housing market.     

Do birds of a feather flock together? Platform’s quality screening and end-users’ choices theory and empirical study of online trading platforms

We propose a model which incorporates both quality and quantity in end-users’ interactions and analyze how platforms can use quality screening to alleviate information asymmetry and motivate end-users’ participations. We address the question from theoretical and empirical perspectives. In the theory, we build a model in which two platforms compete but only one of them screens sellers’ products. We show that the quality screening influences consumers’ expectations of product quality and their choices of sellers and platforms. The resulting screening effect, together with the network and competition effects, further drives sellers to enter different platforms. The equilibrium result indicates that sellers’ incentives to join the platform that screens products follow a non-monotonic relationship with respect to the observable quality of products. We estimate the model in Alibaba’s Platforms - Tmall and Taobao. The results are consistent with the theory. Counterfactual analysis suggests quality screening benefits consumers and Alibaba.     

The burgeoning role of iBuyers in the housing market

We examine the iBuyers’ business model and their impact on housing markets. We find that iBuyers tend to enter neighborhoods that have more easily priced and homogeneous homes, as price discovery is simpler and more consistent with their pricing algorithm in those areas. iBuyers purchase homes at lower prices than individual owner-occupiers, and this acquisition discount reflects the benefits iBuyers offer to motivated sellers rather than distressed home purchases or unobserved lower-quality housing characteristics. Last, a greater presence of iBuyers results in a higher volume of local housing transactions and encourages more home sellers to sell without listing.     

Warranty,Seller Reputation,and Buyer Experience: Evidence From EBAY Used Car Auctions

Using data from the eBay car auction market, we test several predictions regarding warranties, seller reputation and buyer experience in the determination of the final price. We find that the presence of a warranty generates a price premium, but that its magnitude decreases when the seller has a more established reputation. Compared to private sellers, professional dealers, who are ‘repeated‐game players’ in the market, benefit less from a warranty and its substitutability for seller reputation is relatively small. In addition, a buyer with greater experience tends to pay less for a warranty or for a professional dealership.     

Housing Market Conditions, Listing Choice and MLS Market Share

In some housing markets, a seller may hire a broker to multiple list or exclusively list a property for sale or may bypass the brokerage industry and list the property privately as a "sale by owner." This article introduces a new model that illustrates the factors which will impact on the broker's and seller's preferred type of listing. An implication of the model is that if the choice is available, sellers and real estate brokers will employ a multiple listing service more often during slower market periods where the volume of sales is low and properties are more difficult to sell. An empirical analysis of Vancouver data yields results consistent with these arguments.     

How much are sellers willing to pay for the features offered by their e-commerce platform?

The success of an e-commerce platform is significantly dependent on the number of sellers and their quality. Thus, it is important to understand the factors that influence a seller's platform choice. This paper investigates features of an e-commerce platform on which sellers place high value when choosing a platform to sell their products, using a conjoint analysis. The data was collected by online survey from 1,796 sellers who are using Naver Smart Store (https://sell.smartstore.naver.com), which is one of the largest e-commerce platform in South Korea. After analyzing the willingness to pay for each combination of functions by separating six functions of Naver Smart Store, it was estimated that the MWTP ranged 3.05 to 4.48 for the main process related functions and 2.61–5.3 for the sub process related functions. MWTP can be considered as a benefits for the sellers since Naver does not require monetary commissions from sellers. This paper also shows that the higher technical understanding of the functions provides the more value to platform to sellers.     

Ethnicity in housing markets: Buyers,sellers and agents

This paper examines how ethnicity related to cultural differences arising from ethnic background affects housing market transactions in the Atlanta metro area. Using both the US Census and Wikipedia approaches to infer ethnicity from individuals' names, we find that the interplay of buyer, seller, and agent ethnicity composition affects interaction in the housing market. Sellers working with listing agents in the same ethnic group set higher listing prices and enjoy higher selling prices and quicker sales. Agents working with same ethnicity buyers yield higher prices and liquidity. Even though sellers only communicate with buyers through their agents, houses sold by sellers to buyers of same ethnicity have higher prices and sell faster. And while the ethnic mix of agents and their clients matter, the ethnic mix of agents in the transaction does not.     

CEO Overconfidence,REIT Investment Activity and Performance

This is the first article to study the effects of overconfidence on trading activity and performance in real estate. The article looks at Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), as their investments and divestments can be identified with precision. We look at the effect of CEO overconfidence on investment activity and separately investigate property acquisitions and dispositions. We find that REITs with overconfident CEOs tend to invest more; these REITs acquire more assets and are less likely to sell assets than their counterparts if they have enough discretionary cash. Valuable private information is not the main driver for CEOs to be net buyers of company shares: the shares of their companies perform relatively weakly. In addition, we find that overconfident managers have lower property investment performance measured by net operating income and gain on sale of real estate.     

Restricted access: Real estate agent response to client race,ethnicity, gender,and side of market

We design and implement a correspondence experiment to test for differences in real estate agent response across client race, ethnicity, gender, and side of market. Real estate agents are more likely to respond to White clients than Black or Hispanic clients—Whites have a 32.18% higher response rate than Hispanics and an 8.48% higher response rate than Black clients. We also find that real estate agents are more responsive to sellers (23.81% premium over buyers) and female clients (13.57% premium over males).     

Who Is “Misleading” Whom in Real Estate Transactions?

The observation that real estate agents sell their clients' homes cheaper and faster than their own homes has been well identified in the literature and interpreted as evidence of an agency problem originated from information asymmetry. This article studies whether this well‐known result holds true for all types of agents and clients, and whether information asymmetry is the full story. By using the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) data from Indiana, we find that, after controlling for observables, mainly homes owned by institutional clients are sold cheaper and faster than agent‐owned homes, and the differences are mainly driven by less and moderately experienced agents. Besides information asymmetry, we also find evidence of motivation heterogeneity—institutions themselves are very motivated to sell, and therefore are willing to sell cheaper in order to sell faster.     

Competing through information provision

This paper studies the symmetric equilibria of a two-buyer, two-seller model of directed search in which sellers commit to information provision. More informed buyers have better differentiated private valuations and extract higher rents from trade. When sellers cannot commit to sale mechanisms, information provision is higher under competition than under monopoly. In contrast, when sellers commit to both information provision and sale mechanisms, I identify simple conditions under which sellers post auctions and provide full information in every equilibrium, ensuring that all equilibrium outcomes are constrained efficient. Sellers capture the efficiency gains from increased information and compete only over non-distortionary rents offered to buyers.     

Seller curation in platforms

This article explores why market platforms do not expel low-quality sellers when screening costs are minimal. I model a platform market with consumer search. The presence of low-quality sellers reduces search intensity, softening competition between sellers and increasing the equilibrium market price. The platform admits some low-quality sellers if competition between sellers is intense. Recommending a high-quality seller and this form of search obfuscation are complementary strategies. The low-quality sellers enable the recommended seller to attract many consumers at a high price and the effect of the recommendation is strengthened as low-quality sellers become more adept at imitating high-quality sellers.     

Hot and Cold Markets

This article considers why housing market conditions, including the ratio of buyers to sellers, expected time-to-sale and transaction prices are sensitive to fundamentals. These high sensitivities result from feedback: market participants optimally respond to shocks in a manner that amplifies a shock's initial impact, which in turn elicits further reinforcing responses. For example, a positive demand shock brings more buyers into a market. This improves the bargaining position of sellers, who then sell more quickly, decreasing the stock of sellers in the market. This further increases the relative number of buyers to sellers, amplifying the initial shock.     

Do firms sell forward for strategic reasons? An application to the wholesale market for natural gas

Cournot models of oligopolistic interaction in forward and spot markets have shown that firms may sell forward for risk-hedging reasons only, or for both risk-hedging and strategic considerations. Using data from the Dutch wholesale market for natural gas where we observe the number of players, spot and forward sales, churn rates and prices, this paper presents evidence that strategic reasons play an important role at explaining the observed firms’ hedging activity. Our test for strategic behavior is based on the theoretical relationship between the number of sellers and the incentives to sell forward: if risk-hedging is the only motive behind firms’ decision to sell forward, then hedging activity ought to decrease in the number of firms; otherwise, if strategic reasons are relevant, then firms incentives to sell forward should increase in the number of competitors.     

Equity and Nonequity Determinants of FHA Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures in the 1980s

We examine foreclosures on FHA single-family mortgages insured during the 1975–87 period. The importance of the market value of borrower equity and national house price dispersion support much earlier work emphasizing the key role of negative equity in triggering default. The lower is "mean" market-value equity, and the greater is dispersion, the greater is the fraction of borrowers likely to have negative equity. The unemployment rate and the book value of borrower equity are also shown to be significant determinants of default. Unemployment is one of those events that can force borrowers to move. The moving decision increases the likelihood of default because moving costs no longer deter default, and the costs of selling the house reduce the effective equity in the house. The book value of equity is relevant to this decision because it is what the sellers receive if they move without defaulting. Not only are both of these variables significant determinants of default, but the smaller is book equity, the greater is employment impact (with large book equity, unemployment should not matter because selling the house is preferred to default).